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I 


The  Military  Historical  Society  of  Mas- 
sachusetts proposes  to  publish  the  papers 
which  have  been  read  at  its  meetings  in  a 
series  of  volumes  under  the  following  titles  :  — 

1.  CAMPAIGNS  IN  VIRGINIA,  1861-1862. 

A  new  and  enlarged  edition  of  "  The  Peninsular 
Campaign  of  General  McClellan  in  1862,"  issued  by 
the  Society  in  1881.  {PublisJied.) 

2.  THE   VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  1862  under  Gen- 

eral Pope.  A  new  edition  of  the  volume  issued  in 
1886.    {Published. ) 

3.  ANTIETAM  to  GETTYSBURG. 

4.  THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864. 

The  Wilderness  to  Cold  Harbor 

5.  PETERSBURG. 

6.  THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864,  1865. 

Cedar  Creek  to  Appomattox. 

7.  CAMPAIGNS  IN  KENTUCKY  AND  TENNESSEE. 

April,  1862,  to  November,  1863. 

8.  THE  CAMPAIGN   IN  GEORGIA. 

May  to  December,  1864. 

9.  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  CAROLINAS,  1861-1863. 
10.  CRITICAL    SKETCHES    OF    SOME    OF  THE 

FEDERAL  AND  CONFEDERATE  COMMANDERS. 
{Published  June,  i8Q5.) 
Each  volume  will  be  sold  separately.     Price  per  vol- 
ume (8vo),  ^2.00. 

Published  for  the  Society  by 
HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  AND  COMPANY, 
Boston  and  New  York» 


PAPERS 

OF  THE 

MILITARY  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY 
MASSACHUSETTS 


VOLUME  II. 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  1862 
UNDER  GENERAL  POPE 


A  revised  and  enlarged  edition  of 
The  Virginia  Campaign  of  General  Pope  in  1862.  Papers  read  before  the 
Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts  in  1876, 1877,  and  1880.  Printed 
by  the  Society.    Volume  II.    Boston :  Ticknor  and  Company,  1886. 
The  numbers  of  pages  1-385  of  the  first  edition  remain  unchanged  in  this. 


THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  1862 
UNDER  GENERAL  POPE 


EDITED  BY 

THEODORE  F.  DWIGHT 


A  gift  from  The  Military  Historical  Society 
of  Massachusetts. 


PUBLISHED  FOR  THE  MILITARY  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY 
OF  MASSACHUSETTS  BY 
HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  AND  COMPANY 
BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK 


Copyright,  1895, 

By  the  military  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY  OF  MASSACHUSETTS. 


All  rights  reserved. 


By  transfer  from 


9  7  ^'t^  ^'^^  ^ 
K  ^ 

PREFACE. 

All  but  one  of  the  papers  printed  in  this  volume  were,  as 
has  been  stated  elsewhere,  first  publi^ed  by  the  Society  in 
the  year  1886,  and  have  for  some  time  been  out  of  print. 

In  this  edition  the  foot-note  references  to  authorities  have 
been  much  increased,  and  those  to  official  documents  and  cor- 
respondence have  been  changed  from  less  readily  accessible 
books  to  point  to  the  authorized  versions  given  in  the  War 
Records  published  by  the  Government. 

Since  1886,  but  one  paper  relative  to  the  Pope  Campaign 
has  been  presented  to  the  Society,  —  General  Andrews'  ac- 
count of  the  Battle  of  Cedar  Mountain,  —  and  that  has  been 
added  to  complete  the  volume. 

THEODORE  F.  D WIGHT. 


^  0  1932  tXCH 


238636 


<x  u 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


PAOB 

LIST  OF  BOOKS  CITED  xi 

1.  GENERAL  HALLECK'S  MILITARY  ADMINISTRATION  IN 

THE  SUjVBIER  OF  1862. 

By  GEifERAL  Samuel  M.  QuiifCY,  U.  S.  V  1 

2.  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GENERAL  POPE  IN  VIRGINIA.  —  FIRST 

PART :  TO  THE  19TH  OF  AUGUST,  1862. 

By  Colonel  Charles  P.  Hoeton,  U.  S.  V  31 

3.  THE  SAjME  SUBJECT.  — SECOND  PART:   TO  THE  28TH  OF 

AUGUST,  1862. 

By  John  C.  Ropes,  Esq.  .  55 

4  THE  SA:^IE  subject.  — THIRD  PART:  TO  THE  END  OF 
THE  CAMPAIGN. 

By  John  C.  Ropes,  Esq.  ........  71 

5.  THE  TWENTY-SEVENTH  DAY  OF  AUGUST,  1862. 

By  General  George  H.  Gordon,  U.  S.  V  99 

6.  THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANTILLY  AND  A  REVISIT  TO  THE 

FIELD. 

By  General  Charles  F.  Walcott,  U.  S.  V.       .      .      .  133 

7.  STRENGTH  OF  THE  FORCES  UNDER  POPE  AND  LEE. 

By  Colonel  Willloi  Allen,  C.  S.  A.    .      ,      .      .      .  195 

8.  THE  CASE  OF  FITZ-JOHN  PORTER. 

By  General  Stephen  M.  Weld,  U.  S.  V  221 

9.  THE  CONDUCT  OF  GENERAL  McCLELLAN  AT  ALEXAN- 

DRIA IN  AUGUST,  1862. 

By  Colonel  Franklin  Haven,  Jr  263 

10.  THE  SAME  SUBJECT. 

By  General  Stephen  M.  Weld,  U.  S.  V  287 

11.  REVIEW  OF  THE  REPORTS  OF  COLONEL  HAVEN  AND 

GENERAL  WELD. 

By  Colonel  Theodore  Lyman,  U.  S.  V.     .      .      .      .  303 


238636 


Vill 


TABLE   OF  CONTENTS, 


12.  THE  CONDUCT  OF  GENERALS  McCLELLAN  AND  HAL- 

LECK  IN  AUGUST,  1862 ;  AND  THE  CASE  OF  FITZ-JOHN 
PORTER. 

By  Colonel  Thomas  L.  Livermoke,  U.  S.  V.     .      .  .315 

13.  THE  HEARING  IN  THE  CASE  OF  FITZ-JOHN  PORTER. 

By  John  C.  Ropes,  Esq.        .......  349 

14.  THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN,  AUGUST  9,  1862. 


By  General  Geobgb  L.  Andrews,  U.  S.  V.       .      .      ,  387 


OFFICERS  OF  THE  MILITARY  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY  OF  MAS- 


LIST  OF  MEMBERS  OF  THE  SOCIETY,  MAY,  1895  .  .  .514 
LIST  OF  REPORTS  AND  PAPERS  READ  BEFORE  THE  SOCI- 


INDEX 


443 


SACHUSETTS,  1876-1895. 


513 


ETY,  1876-1895 


531 


LIST  OF  THE  MAPS 

ILLUSTRATING  THIS  VOLUME. 


THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RL"N,  August  29  and  30,  1862 :  — 

1.  "  Gexekal  Pope's  Map,"  slioTring'  tlie  positions  of  tlie  L^nion  and  Con- 
federate forces  at  the  close  of  tlie  action  of  Aug'ust  29.  Reproduced  from 
General  Pope's  Report. 

2.  The  "  Longstkeet  a>-d  Williams  j^L\p."  A  reproduction  of  a  "  Map  of 
Battle-Grounds  of  Au^st  28tli,  29tli,  and  30th,  1862,  in  the  vicinity  of 
Groveton,  Prince  William  Co.,  Va.  Made  by  the  authority  of  the  Hon.  G.  W. 
MeCrary,  Secretary  of  War.  Surveyed  in  June,  1878,  by  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen. 
G.  K.  Warren,  Major  of  Engineers,  U.S.  A.,  assisted  by  Capt.  J.  A.  Judson, 
C.  E.  (A.  A.  Gen.  "  King's  Division"),  and  H.  D.  Gurden,  C.  E.  (late  Capt. 
and  A.  A.  Gen.,  Confed.  Army),"  on  vrhich  the  position  of  Long-street's 
forces,  AugTist  29,  has  been  indicated,  in  accordance  with  his  statements  and 
the  statements  of  Charles  W.  Williams  made  to  the  Board  convened  to  in- 
vestig-ate  the  ease  of  Fitz  John  Porter,  1878-1879 ;  and  published  with  the 
Report  of  the  Proceeding's  of  that  Board, 

3.  BoAED  Map,  No.  1."  Showing  the  positions  of  the  Union  and  Confed- 
erate forces  at  noon,  August  29. 

4.  "  BoAJRD  Map,  No.  2."  Showing  the  "general  situation"  at  430,  p.  m., 
August  29. 

5.  "  BoAED  JtLAj',  No.  3."  Showing  the  "  supposed  situation "  under  which 
Pope's  order  to  Porter  of  4.30  p.  m.,  August  29,  was  issued. 

Maps  3,  4,  5,  are  reproductions  of  the  Warren  Map  described  above,  and 
from  copies  published  with  the  same  Report. 
THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANTILLY,  September  1,  1862:  — 

6.  The  Neighborhood  of  Chantilly. 

7.  The  Battlefield  of  Chajn'tillt. 

8.  THE  BATTLEFIELD  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN,  August  9,  1862,  with 
a  Sketch  Map  to  illustrate  the  operations  of  the  Union  and  Confederate 
armies  prior  to  August  9. 

9.  EASTERN  VHIGINIA. 


) 


BOOKS  CITED  OR  MENTIONED  IN  THIS  VOLUME, 
AND  THE  FOEMS  OF  REFERENCE. 


Army  axd  Navy  Journal.  See  United  States  Army  and  Navy  Journal. 

Arsty  of  Northern  Virginia.    See  Confederate  States. 

Bates  :  History  of  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  1861-5 ;  prepared  in  compliance 

with  acts  of  the  Legislature  by  Samuel  P.  Bates.    5  volumes,  Harrisburg, 

1869-1871. 

Bryant,  E.  E.  History  of  the  Third  Regiment  of  Wisconsin  veteran  volun- 
teer infantry,  1861-1865.  By  Edwin  E.  Bryant,  late  Adjutant.  Madison, 
Wisconsin :  Published  by  the  Veteran  Association  of  the  Regiment,  1891. 

Castlei-ian,  a.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Behind  the  Scenes.  A  diary  of 
unwritten  history  of  the  army,  by  General  George  B.  McClellan,  to  the  close 
of  the  Campaign  in  Virginia,  about  the  first  day  of  January,  1863,  by  Alfred 
Castleman,  Surgeon  of  the  Fifth  Regiment  of  Wisconsin  Volunteers.  Mil- 
waukee :  Strickland  &  Co.  1863. 

Conduct  of  the  War.    See  United  States. 

Confederate  States  of  Aiierica  :  Reports  of  the  Operations  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia,  from  June,  1862,  to  and  including  the  battle  at  Fred- 
ericksburg, Dec.  13,  1862.  2  vols.  Richmond  :  R.  M.  Smith,  Public  Printer. 
1864.  "A.  N.  V." 

Cooke,  J.  E.  Stonewall  J ackson :  A  Military  Biography.  By  John  Esten 
Cooke.    New  York:  D.  Appleton  and  Company,  1866.    "  Cooke's  Jackson." 

Gordon,  G.  H.  Brook  Farm  to  Cedar  Mountain,  in  the  War  of  the  Great 
Rebellion,  1861-62.  ...  by  George  H.  Gordon.  Boston:  James  R. 
Osgood  and  Company,  1883.  "  Gordon,  Brook  Farm." 

 History  of  the  Campaign  of  the  Army  of  Virginia  under  John  Pope 

.  .  from  Cedar  Mountain  to  Alexandria,  1862.  By  George  H.  Gordon. 
Boston:  Houghton,  Osgood  and  Company,  1880.  General  Gordon's  books 
are  now  published  by  Houghton,  Mifflin  &  Company.      "  Gordon,  A.  of  V." 

Gould,  J.  M.  History  of  the  First-Tenth-Twenty-ninth  Regiment.  In  ser- 
vice of  the  United  States  from  May  3,  1861,  to  June  21,  1866.  By  Maj. 
John  M.  Gould.  With  the  History  of  the  Tenth  Me.  Battalion.  By  Rev. 
Leonard  G.  Jordan.   Portland  :  Stephen  Berry,  1871. 

Greeley,  H.  The  American  Conflict :  A  History  of  the  Great  Rebellion  in 
the  United  States  of  America,  1860-1865.  ...  By  Horace  Greeley. 
2  vols.    Hartford:   Published  by  0.  D,  Case  &  Company.  1864-1867. 

"Greeley."- 


xii 


BOOKS  CITED  IN  THIS  VOLUME 


Harvard  Memorial  Biographies.  [Compiled  and  edited  by  Thomas  Went- 
worth  Hig-ginson.]     2  volumes.    Cambridge:  Sever  and  Francis,  1866. 

"  Harvard  Mem.  Biog." 

Jones,  J.  B.  A  Rebel  War  Clerk's  Diary  at  the  Confederate  States  Capital. 
By  J.  B.  Jones,  clerk  in  the  War  Department  of  the  Confederate  States 
Government.    2  vols.    Philadelphia,  1866.    J.  B.  Lippincott  &  Co. 

"  Jones,  Diary." 

McClbllan,  G.  B.  MeClellan's  Own  Story.  The  War  for  the  Union ;  the 
Soldiers  who  fought  it ;  the  Civilians  who  directed  it,  and  his  relations  to  it 
and  to  them.  By  George  B.  McClellan,  late  Major-General  commanding  the 
Armies.    New  York,  1887.  "  O.  S." 

■  Report  on  the  Organization  and  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac: 

To  which  is  added  an  account  of  the  Campaign  in  Western  Virginia,  with 
plans  of  battle-fields.    By  George  B.  McClellan,  Major-General  United  States 

[  Army.  New  York:  Sheldon  &  Company,  1864.  "  MeClellan's  Report." 
This  version  in  some  respects  differs  from  the  edition  printed  by  the  gov- 
ernment. 

 Letter  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  transmitting  report  on  the  Organization 


of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  of  its  Campaigns  in  Virginia  and  Mary- 
land, under  the  command  of  Ma j  .-Gen.  George  B.  McClellan,  from  July  26, 
1861,  to  November  7,  1862.  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  38th  Congress,  1st  session. 
Washington :  Govermnent  Printing  Office,  1864. 

[Reprinted  in]  The  War  of  the  Rebellion :  A  compilation  of  the  Official 
Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Armies.    Prepared  and  published 
under  the  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War.    Vols.  5,  12,  27. 
"  First  Period,"  July  27,  1861,  to  March  17,  1862.  "  5  W.  R.,  5-66." 

"  Second  Period,"  March  17  to  July  1,  1862.  "  12  W.  R.,  5-71." 

"  Third  Period,"  July  1  to  September  1,  1862.  "  12  W.  R.,  71-104." 

"  Fourth  Period,"  September  1  to  November  9,  1862.       "  27  W.  R.,  36-94." 

All  references  to  the  statements  in  this  version  of  the  report,  in  the  vol- 
umes of  this  series,  have  been  made  to  the  War  Records,  as  above. 
Orleans,  Louis  Philippe,  dug  d',  Comte  de  Paris.  History  of  the  Civil 
War  in  America.  By  the  Comte  de  Paris.  Translated,  with  the  approval  of 
the  author,  by  Louis  F.  Tasistro.  Edited  by  Henry  Copp^e,  LL.D.  4  vol- 
umes. Philadelphia :  Jos.  H.  Coates  &  Co.,  and  Porter  &  Coates,  1876-1888. 

"  Comte  de  Paris." 

The  Correspondence  of  the  Comte  de  Paris  with  General  Pope  is  referred 
to  in  this  list  under  Porter,  No.  32. 
Porter,  Fitz-John,  Major-General,  U.  S.  V.  The  following  is  a  list  of  the 
published  or  privately  printed  books,  pamphlets  and  other  pieces,  relative  to 
the  case  of  General  Porter,  in  the  Library  of  the  Military  Historical  Society 
of  Massachusetts.  Although  all  are  not  cited  in  this  volume,  it  has  been 
thought  proper  to  include  them,  as  an  essay  towards  a  bibliography  of  the 
subject. 

1.    Bayard,  T.  F.    Speech  of  Hon.  Thomas  Francis  Bayard,  of  Delaware,  in 
the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  Monday,  March  8, 1880,  on  bill  (S.  No.  1139) 


BOOKS  CITED  IX  THIS  VOLUME 


xiii 


for  tiie  reKef  of  Fitz-Jolin  Porter,  late  major-general  of  tLe  United  States 
volunteers  and  colonel  of  tlie  Army.  CongTessional  Record,  Forty-Sixtli 
Congress,  Second  Session,  !MareL.  11,  ISSO.  Xo.  64,  Vol.  10.  -ito.  pages 
1-8. 

2.  Biographical  Sketch  of  Gex.  Fitz-.Johi>  Poetee.  from  Encyclopedia 
of  Contemporary  Biography.  Xew  York,  Vol.  Pv".  Published  by  Atlantic 
Publishing  and  EngTaying  Company,  New  York,  1SS5.  8to,  6  pages,  -vrith 
portrait. 

3.  Bt.ate,  M.  Honorable  ^Montgomery  Blair,  Postmaster-General  during 
President  Lincoln's  administration,  to  ^flaj.-Gen.  Fitz  John  Porter.  Morris- 
town,  N.  J.:  '"Banner"  Steam  Book  and  Job  Printing  I^tablishment. 
lST-4.  Syo,  6  pages.  [Of  this  there  appear  to  hare  been  three  other  impres- 
sions. It  is  also  to  be  found  in  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  87,  Part  1 ;  No.  56  of  this 
list.] 

4.  Beewstee,  B.  H.  Opinion  of  the  Attorney-General.  [Benjamin  Harris 
Brewster,  June  23,  18S4].  on  the  act  entitled,  "  An  Act  for  the  relief  of  Fitz- 
John  Porter."  H.  E.  1015,  48 th  Congress,  1st  Session.  Imp,  8vo,  n.  p.,  n.  d., 
9  pages. 

5.  BuLEiTT.  J.  C.  Argument  of  John  G.  Bullitt,  counsel  for  the  j)etitioner, 
Fitz  John  Porter,  Before  the  Advisory  Board  of  Officers  at  "West  Point,  Jan- 
uaiy  6,  1879.  Philadelphia :  Allen.  Lane  &  Scott,  Printers,  n.  d=,  8yo,  99 
pages.  1  map. 

This  argument  will  be  found,  also,  in  the  Proceedings  and  Report  of  the 
Board  of  Army  Officers,  No.  55,  of  this  list,  toL  2,  pages  1369-1438 ;  and  in 
the  Congressional  reprint  of  the  same,  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  37,  Part  3,  pages 
1276-1346  ;  No.  56  of  this  list. 

6.  Choate,  J.  H.  Closing  argument  for  the  Petitioner,  Fitz-John  Porter,  by 
Joseph  H.  Choate,  of  counsel,  before  the  Advisory  Board  of  Officers  at  "West 
Point.  January  11th.  1879.  [Caption  of  page  1.]  8vo.  n.  p..  n.  d.,  241  pages. 
1  map. 

7.   Case  of  General  Fitz  John  Porter.     Mr.  Choate"  s  argument  for 

petitioner.    West  Point,  1879.    8vo,  241  pages,  3  maps. 

This  argument  will  be  found,  also,  in  No.  55  of  this  list.  vol.  2,  pages  167cl- 
1782  ;  and  in  No.  56,  Part  3,  pages  1573-1676. 

8.  Cobb.  A,  [Letter  of  Amasa  Cobb  to  General  Pope.  Nov.  14,  1874,  concern- 
ing the  rejoicing  over  Pope's  defeat  at  Franklin's  headc[uarters.]  4to.  n.  p., 
n.  d.   1  leaf,  1  page. 

9.  Cox,  J.  D.  Letter  from  Hon.  J.  D.  Cox  to  Gen'l  J.  A.  Garfield,  M.  C. 
Cincirmati,  14th  Feb'y,  1880.  Reviewing  RejDort  of  the  Schofield  Board. 
Fae-simile  reproduction  of  manuscript.  4to,  7  leaves.  7  pages,  1  map. 

10.   The  Second  Battle  of  Bull  Run.  as  connected  with  the  Fitz-John 

Porter  case.  A  pp.per  read  before  the  Society  of  Ex- Army  and  Navy  Officers 
of  Cincinnati,  February  28,  1882.  By  Jacob  D.  Cox,  Late  Maj.-Gen.  Com- 
manding 23d  Army  Corps.  Cincinnati:  Peter  G.  Thomson,  1882.  16mo, 
vi.  -\-  124  pages. 

11.  CuTCHEOix",  B.  M.    Fitz-John  Porter.    Speech  of  Hon.  Byron  M.  Cutcheon, 


xiv 


BOOKS  CITED  IN  THIS  VOLUME 


of  Michigan,  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  Tuesday,  February  16,  1886. 
Washington,  1886.    8vo,  59  pages. 

12.  Dawes,  R.  R.  Speech  of  Hon.  Rufus  R.  Dawes,  of  Ohio,  in  the  House 
of  Representatives,  Thursday,  February  15,  1883,  on  bill  (S.  1844)  for  the 
relief  of  Fitz-John  Porter.  Congressional  Record,  Forty-Seventh  Congress, 
Second  Session,  March  5,  1883.    4to,  pages  1-7. 

13.  Extracts  from  Reports  of  the  Operations  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  (Rebel  army).  Summer  Campaign  of  1862.  Opera- 
tions on  the  29th  of  August.    Second  Bull  Run.    8vo,  n.  p.,  n.  d.,  4  pages. 

14.  FiTZ-JoHN  Porter  Inquest.  Trenchant  review  by  a  soldier  and  a 
jurist,  Q.  E.  D.  [From  Cincinnati  Daily  Gazette,  April  18,  1879.]  8vo, 
n.  p.,  n.  d.,  7  pages. 

15.  [Force,  Manning  F.]  Synopsis  of  principal  points  made  in  Report  of 
Schofield  Board  in  Fitz-John  Porter's  ease,  with  answers  thereto  from  the 
Official  Records.    8vo,  n.  p.,  n.  d.,  10  pages. 

16.  Gardner,  A.  B.  Opening  Argument  for  the  United  States  in  rebuttal  in 
the  case  of  Fitz-John  Porter,  before  the  Advisory  Board  of  Officers  at 
Governor's  Island,  N.  Y.,  October  2,  1878,  by  Asa  Bird  Gardner,  "  Counsel 
for  the  Government."    8vo,  83  pages,  1  map. 

This  argument  will  be  found,  also,  in  No.  55,  vol.  1,  pages  464-547 ;  and 
in  No.  56,  Part  2,  pages  470-552. 

17.   Argument  of  Asa  Bird  Gardner,    Counsel  for  Government,  after 

conclusion  of  the  evidence  in  the  case  of  Fitz-John  Porter,  before  the  Board 
of  Army  Officers  at  West  Point,  January,  1879.  Washington :  Government 
Printing  Office,  1879.  ,  8vo,  233  pages. 

This  argument  will  be  found,  also,  in  No.  55,  vol.  2,  pages  1439-1672 ;  and 
in  No.  56,  Part  3,  pages  1347-1568. 

18.  Grant,  U.  S.  An  Undeserved  Stigma.  Extract  from  North  American 
Review,  No.  313,  vol.  135,  Dec,  1882,  pages  536-546. 

19.   General  Grant's  Unpublished  Correspondence  in  the  case  of  Gen. 

Fitz-John  Porter.    8vo,  n.  p.,  n.  d.,  20  pages. 

20.  Haynes,  M.  a.  Fitz-John  Porter.  Speech  of  Hon.  Martin  A.  Haynes,  of 
New  Hampshire,  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  Thursday,  February  11, 
1886.    Washington,  1886.    8vo,  15  pages. 

21.  Johnson,  R.  A  reply  to  the  review  of  Judge  Advocate  General  Holt,  of 
the  proceedings,  findings  and  sentence,  of  the  General  Court  Martial,  in  the 
case  of  Major-General  Fitz-John  Porter,  and  a  vindication  of  that  officer,  by 
Reverdy  Johnson.  Baltimore  :  Printed  by  John  Murphy  &  Co.,  1863.  8vo, 
88  pages. 

Printed  in  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  37,  Part  1,  No.  56  of  this  list. 

22.  LiPPiTT,  F.  J.  Pope's  Virginia  Campaign,  and  Porter's  part  in  it. 
Atlantic  Monthly.    Volume  42,  No.  251.    September,  1878,  pages  349-366. 

23.  Logan,  J.  A.  Speech  of  Hon.  John  A.  Logan,  of  Illinois,  in  the  Senate 
of  the  United  States,  March  2,  3,  4,  and  5,  1880.  Congressional  Record, 
Forty-Sixth  Congress,  Second  Session,  March  26,  1880.  No.  76,  vol.  10.  4to, 
46  pages,  1  map. 


BOOKS  CITED  IN  THIS  VOLUME 


XV 


24.  Lord,  T.  A.  A  summary  of  the  case  of  General  Fitz-Joka  Porter,  by 
Theodore  A.  Lord.  San  Francisco :  H.  S.  Crocker  &  Co.,  1883.  Svo,  114 
pages,  10  maps. 

25.  Loud,  TV.  B.  [Letters  of  "W.  Blair  Lord,  stenographer  to  Joseph  Holt, 
Jndge  Advocate  General,  May  30,  1871 ;  and,  W.  L.  Ormshey  to  W.  B.  Lord, 
May  22,  1870.  Concerning  admissions  of  disloyalty  to  Pope  made  by  Gen- 
eral Porter.]    4to,  n.  p.,  n.  d. ;  1  leaf,  1  page. 

26.  McClelI;Ax's  Dispatches  feom  Alexaxdeia  during  the  2d  battle  of 
Bull  Run.  From  Eeport  of  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War.  Part  2, 
(Supplement),  1865 ;  4to,  n.  p.,  n.  d. ;  3  leaves,  5  pages. 

27.  McDonald,  J.  E.  Speech  of  Hon.  Joseph  E.  McDonald,  of  Indiana,  in 
the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  March  0  and  10,  1880.  Washington,  1880. 
8to,  46  pages. 

28.  McDovTELL,  I.  [Letter  to  Colonel  Franklin  Haven,  jr.,  Boston,  Mass., 
from  General  McDovrell,  written  at  San  Francisco,  California,  May  7,  1879, 
relative  to  an  attack  on  him  (McDowell)  in  the  investigation  of  Fitz-John 
Porter  case,  the  subject  of  an  article  in  the  Nation  of  April  17,  1879.] 
Privately  printed,  folio,  4  leaves,  4  pages. 

29.   [Testimony  by  General  McDowell  before  the  Examining  Board 

convened  to  consider  Fitz-John  Porter's  case.]   4to,  n.  p.,  n.  d.,  2  pages. 

30.  Maltby,  A.  Argument  of  Anson  Maltby,  counsel  for  the  petitioner,  Fitz 
John  Porter,  before  the  Advisory  Board  of  officers,  at  West  Point,  J anuary 
Sd  and  4th,  1879.    Svo,  n.  p.,  n.  d.  ;  102  pages,  2  maps. 

This  argument  will  be  found,  also,  in  No.  55,  vol.  2,  pages  1241-1368 ;  and 
in  No.  56,  Part  3  ;  pages  1150-1276. 
SI.    Mangold,  F.,  Major,  Westphalian  Foot  Artillery.    The  Campaign  in 
Northern  Yirginia  in  August,  1862.    Fitz-John  Porter's  Case  from  a  German 
Standpoint.    Army  and  Navy  Journal,  Nov.  2, 1889 ;  pages  178-181. 

32.  Mills,  L.  E.  General  Pope's  Yirginia  Campaign  of  1862.  Read  before 
the  Cincinnati  Literary  Club,  February  5,  1870.  By  Lewis  Este  Mills. 
Cincinnati:  Robert  Clark  &  Co.,  1870.    Svo,  32  pages. 

33.  Novelty  ik  a  Judicial  Inquiry.-  [From  Cincinnati  Daily  Gazette.] 
Svo,  n.  p.,  n.  d.,  2  pages. 

84.  Gates,  W.  C.  Fitz-John  Porter.  Speech  of  Hon.  William  C.  Gates,  of 
Alabama,  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  Wednesday,  February  17,  1886. 
Washington,  1886 ;  Svo,  n.  p.,  n.  d.,  12  pages. 

35.  Opixions  ajstd  Memorials  in  the  ease  of  Gen.  Fitz  John  Porter,  Morris- 
town,  N.  J.,  "Banner"  Steam  Book  and  Job  Printing  Establishment,  1874. 
Svo,  90  pages  ;  1  map. 

There  appear  to  have  been  two  editions  of  this  pamphlet.    Printed  ^in 
Senate  Ex.  Doe.  37,  Part  1.    No.  56  of  this  Hst. 

36.  Patterson,  W.  C.  Fitz-John  Porter.  Reprint  from  Penn  Monthly  for 
April,  iSSO.  By  W.  C.  Patterson.  Plailadelphia  :  Press  of  Edward  Stem  & 
Co.    Svo,  49  pages. 

87.  Pope,  J.  Brief  statement  of  the  case  of  Fitz-John  Porter,  4to,  n.  p.,  n.  d., 
3  lea,ves,,  5  pages. 


xvi 


BOOKS  CITED  IN  THIS  VOLUME 


38.  Pope,  J.  Correspondence  between  General  Pope  and  the  Comte  de 
Paris,  concerning  the  second  hattle  of  Bull  Run.  Pope  to  the  Comte  de  Paris, 
May  29,  Dec.  21,  1876,  AprH  19,  1877.  The  Comte  de  Paris  to  Pope,  Oct.  8, 
1876,  March  23,  1877.    4to,  n.  p.,  n.  d.,  10  leaves,  10  pages. 

These  letters  were  first  printed  in  the  Army  and  Navy  Journal,  as  stated 
on  page  313,  supra. 

39.   [Letters:  John  Pope  to  General  Thomas,  January  19,  1870. 

W.  B.  Franklin  to  General  Roberts,  April  6,  1868.  George  H.  Thomas  to 
Secretary  of  War,  February  7,  1870,  concerning  charges  against  Pope,  in  a 
letter  of  General  W.  B.  Franklin  to  General  Grant.]  4to,  n.  p.,  n.  d.,  2 
leaves,  2  pages. 

40.   [Letters :   General  Pope  to  Ed.  Schriver,  December  30,  1869 ; 

Colonel  Ed.  Schriver  to  General  Pope,  Jan.  7,  1870,  embodied  in  a  letter  to 
General  Sherman,  October  23,  1878.  Concerning  Longstreet's  report  of  sec- 
ond battle  of  Bull  Run,  relative  to  Porter  Case.]    4to,  n.  p.,  n.  d.,  2  leaves, 

2  pages. 

41.   [Letters  concerning  General  Pope  as  a  witness  at  the  investigation 

of  Fitz-John  Porter,  1878  —  submitted  to  Judge  M.  F.  Force,  in  a  letter, 
by  General  Pope,  Nov.  2,  1878.  Also  a]  Summary  of  further  proceedings 
connected  with  the  foregoing  [by  General  Pope.]    4to,  n.  p.,  n.  d. ,  3  leaves, 

3  pages. 

42.  Porter,  F.  J.  Appeal  to  the  President  of  the  United  States  for  a  re- 
examination of  the  proceedings  of  the  General  Court  Martial  in  his  case,  by 
Maj.-Gen'l  Fitz  John  Porter,  with  accompanying  documents.  Morristown, 
N.  J.,  1869.    8vo,  66  pages. 

Printed  in  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  37,  Part  1.    No.  56  of  this  list. 

43.   Brief  Suggestions  in  the  case  of  General  Fitz  John  Porter.  Morris- 
town,  N.  J. :  "  Banner  "  Steam  Book  and  Job  Printing  Establishment,  1874. 
Svo,  44  pages,  1  map. 

Printed  in  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  37,  Part  1.    No.  56  of  this  list. 

44.   [Letter  of  Fitz-John  Porter  to  General  J.  D.  Cox,  August  29, 

1880.]    Svo,  n.  p.,  n.  d.    26  pages. 

45.   General  Fitz  John  Porter's  Narrative  of  the  services  of  the  Fifth 

Army  Corps,  in  1862,  in  Northern  Virginia.  Morristown,  N.  J.,  Banner  Steam 
Printing  Establishment,  1878.    Svo,  89  leaves,  89  pages. 

Another  edition,  same  place,  same  printers,  1878.    Svo,  89  pages. 

46.  ■ —  Gen.  Fitz  John  Porter's  statement  of  the  services  of  the  Fifth 

Army  Corps,  in  1862,  in  Northern  Virginia.  New  York:  Evening  Post 
Steam  Presses,  1878.    Svo,  122  pages,  1  map. 

This  is  virtually  the  same  as  the  narrative.  No.  38. 

  [The  Same].    Washington :   Government  Printing  Office,  1879. 

Svo,  85  pages. 

f  This  statement  is  to  be  found,  also,  in  Senate  Ex.  Doc,  37,  Part  1,  309- 
391.   No.  56  of  this  list. 

47.  Randolph,  T.  F.  Speech  of  Hon.  Theodore  F.  Randolph,  of  New 
Jersey,  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  Monday,  March  1,  1880,  on 


BOOKS  CITED  IX  THIS  VOLUME 


xni 


the  bill  for  tlie  Restoration  of  General  Fitz-Jolin  Porter  to  tlie  United 
States  Army.  Washing  ton.  D.  C. :  R.  0.  Pol  king-horn,  printer,  1880.  Svo, 
24  pag-es. 

48.  Ray,  G.  W.  Fitz-John  Porter.  Speech  of  Hon.  George  VT.  Ray.  of  Xew 
York,  in  the  Honse  of  Representatives,  Friday  and  Saturday,  January  25  and 
26,  1884    Washington,  1884.    Svo,  40  pages. 

49.  Republican  Press  on  the  Fitz-John  Porter  case.  Extracts  from  some  of 
many  Republican  papers  from  all  parts  of  the  country.  Washington :  R.  0, 
Polkinghorn,  Printer.    4to,  4pages. 

50.  Sewzll,  W.  J.  Speeches  of  Hon.  William  J.  Se"vrell.  of  Isew  Jersey, 
delivered  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  for  the  relief  of  Gen.  Fitz-John 
Porter,  December  2S.  1882,  and  January  3,  1883.  Washington,  1882.  8vo, 
48  pag-es. 

51.  Shkeqia2>.  W.  T.  [Letters  of  General  Sherman  to  General  Pope,  Decem- 
ber 13,  1869 ;  February  24,  1870.  Concerning  a  rehearing  of  Fitz-John  Por- 
ter ease.]    4to,  n.  p.,  n.  d.,  1  leaf,  1  page. 

52.  SiA-TEK,  J.  S.  An  address,  to  the  Soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
and  especially  to  the  surviving  members  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  containing  a 
brief  revievr  of  the  case  of  Gen.  Fitz  John  Porter.  By  one  who  served 
xmder  him.  John  S.  Slater,  13th  X.  Y.  V.,  1st  Brig..  1st  Div..  5th  Corps, 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  Washington.  D.  C,  Thomas  McGill  cfc  Co.,  printers, 
1880.     Svo,  30  pages. 

63.  Slocoi,  H.  W.  Fitz-John  Porter.  Speech  of  Hon.  H.  W.  Slocum.  of 
Xew  York,  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  Friday,  January  18,  18-84. 
Washington,  18S4,    Svo,  13  pages. 

54.  UxiTED  States,  Congress.  Fitz-John  Porter  Court-MarMal.  Letter 
from  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  answer  to  Resolution  of  the  House  of  3d 
instant,  [February  8,  1863,]  transmitting  copy  of  proceeding's  of  the  court- 
martial  in  the  trial  of  General  Fitz  John  Porter.  February  IS,  1863.  House 
of  Representatives  Ex.  Doc.  No.  71.  37th  Congress,  3d  Session.  Svo,  317 
pages. 

This  document  has  been  reprinted  in  17  W.  R..  also  in  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  37. 
Part  1,  No.  56  of  this  list. 

55.   Proceedings  and  Report  of  the  Board  of  Army  Of6.cers,  convened 

by  Special  Orders  No.  78,  Headquarters  of  the  Army.  Adjutant-General's 
office,  Washington,  April  12,  1878,  in  the  case  of  Fitz-John  Porter.  Major- 
General  John  M.  Sehofield,  Brigadier-General  Alfred  H.  Terry,  Colonel 
George  W.  Getty,  members.  Asa  Bird  Gardner,  Judge  Advocate,  United 
States  Army,  Recorder  and  Counsel  for  the  Government.  John  C.  Bullitt. 
Esq.,  Joseph  H.  Choate,  Esq.,  Anson  Maltby.  Esq.,  Counsel  for  petitioner. 
Parts  I.  and  H.  2  vols.  1  vol.  maps.  Washington  :  Government  Printing 
Office.  1879.    [Reprinted  by  Congress  in  the  following,  No.  56.] 

56.   Proceedings  and  Report  of  the  Board  of  Army  Officers,  convened 

by  Special  Orders  No.  78,  Headquarters  of  the  Army.  Adjutant-General's 
Office.  Washington,  April  12,  1878,  in  the  case  of  Fitz-John  Porter,  together 
with  the  proceedings  in  the  original  trial  and  papers  relating  thereto.  Senate 


xviii 


BOOKS  CITED  IN  THIS  VOLUME 


Executive  Document,  37,  46th  Congress,  1st  session.  In  three  parts.  Wash- 
ington :  Government  Printing  office,  1879.    3  vols,  text,  1  vol.  maps. 

"Senate  Ex.  Doe.  37." 

The  references  to  the  Proceedings  and  Report  in  this  volume  have  heen 
made  to  this  edition. 

57.   Report  of  Board  of  Officers,  convened  at  West  Point,  in  June, 

1878,  [for  investigation  of  Fitz-John  Porter's  case.]  Imp.  8vo,  n.  p.,  n.  d.,  27 
pages. 

58.   Report  of  the  Board  of  Officers  in  the  Case  of  Fitz-John  Porter, 

late  Major-General  of  Volunteers.  Washington,  D.  C. :  Army  and  Navy 
Gazette,  1879.  8vo,  18  pages.  This  Report  has  been  printed  distinctively, 
in  several  editions.  It  is  to  he  found  with  the  President's  proclamation  of 
May  4,  1882,  remitting  the  penalties  imposed  on  General  Porter  by  Court- 
Martial,  February,  1863,  in  16  W.  R.,  513-536 ;  also  in  No.  55  of  this  list, 
vol.  2,  pages  1801-1825 ;  and  in  No.  56,  Part  3,  pages  1695-1720. 

59.   Brief  in  the  matter  of  the  Report  of  the  "Advisory  Board,"  in 

the  casQ  of  Fitz-John  Porter.    4to,  n.  p.,  n.  d.,  11  leaves,  11  pages. 

60.   Fitz-John  Porter.    Message  from  the  President  of  the  United 

States,  transmitting  a  communication  from  Fitz-John  Porter,  with  copies  o£ 
accompanying  papers.  [February  2,  1885.]  48th  Congress,  2d  Session 
House  of  Representatives.    Ex.  Doc.  175.    8vo,  137  pages. 

61.  Wheeler,  J.  Fitz-John  Porter.  Speech  of  Hon.  Joseph  Wheeler,  of 
Alabama,  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  Thursday,  February  15,  1883. 
Washington,  1883.    8vo,  114  pages. 

62.  —  Fitz-John  Porter.    Speech  of  Hon.  Joseph  Wheeler,  of  Alabama, 

in  the  House  of  Representatives,  Tuesday,  February  16,  1886.  Washington, 
1886.    8vo,  82  j)ages,  8  maps. 

Quint,  A.  H.    The  Record  of  the  Second  Massachusetts  Infantry.  1861-65. 

By  Alonzo  H.  Quint,  its  Chaplain.    Boston :  John  P.  Walker.  1867. 
The  Rebellion  Recobd,  a  diary  of  American  events.    .    .    .    edited  by 

Frank  Moore.    12  vols..  New  York :  G.  P.  Putnam,  1861-1868. 

"  Rebellion  Record." 

Robertson,  J.  Michigan  in  the  War,  compiled  by  Jno.  Robertson,  Adjutant- 
General.  Revised  edition.  Lansing :  W.  S.  George  &  Co.,  State  Printers, 
1882. 

Ropes,  J.  C.  The  Army  under  Pope,  by  John  Codman  Ropes.  Campaigns  of 
the  Civil  War.  —  IV.  New  York :  Charles  Scribner's  Sons.  1st  edition,  1881 . 
Later  edition,  1892.  Ropes,  Army  under  Pope." 

Southern  Historical  Society  Papers.  Volume  1,  January  to  June,  1876. 
Volume  22,  January  to  December,  1894.     Richmond,  Va.  1876-1894. 

"Southern  Hist.  Soc.  Papers." 

SwiNTON,  W.  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac :  A  Critical  History  of 
Operations  in  Virginia,  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania,  from  the  commencement 
to  the  close  of  the  War,  1861-1865.  By  William  Swinton.  New  York, 
i866.  "Swinton." 

—  The  Twelve  Decisive  Battles  of  the  War :  A  History  of  the  Eastern 


BOOKS  CITED  IN  THIS  VOLUME 


xix 


and  Western  Campaigns,  in  Relation  to  the  Actions  that  decided  their  Issue. 
By  William  Swiaton.    New  York,  1867.  "S-wuiton,  Decisive  Battles."' 

Tatlok,  W.  H.  Four  Years  \vith  General  Lee :  being  a  summary  of  the  more 
important  events  touching  the  career  of  General  Robert  E.  Lee,  in  the  war 
between  the  States ;  together  with  an  authoritative  statement  of  the  strength 
of  the  army  which  he  commanded  in  the  field.  By  Walter  H.  Taylor,  of  his 
staff,  and  late  Adjutant-General  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  New 
York :  D.  Appleton  and  Company,  1877.  "  Taylor,  Four  Years." 

The  Ukited  States  Anair  akd  Navy  Journal,  a  gazette  of  the  regular 
and  volunteer  forces.  33  vols.  1863-1895.  New  York  :  [a  weekly  publica- 
tion.] "  Army  and  Navy  Journal."'' 

United  States  Congbess.  Conduct  of  the  War  :  Report  of  the  Joint  Com- 
mittee on  the  Conduct  of  the  War.  Appointed  under  Joint  Resolution  of 
December,  1861.  8  vols.  Washington :  Government  Printing  Office,  1863- 
1866. 

[First  sei-ies.]   Senate  Reports  [of  Committees] :  37th  Congress,  3d  Session. 
1862-1863,  Report  No.  71  (Battle  of  Fredericksburg),  in  vol.  1. 

Cited  as  "Sen.  Rep.  No.  71.    37  Cong.  3d  Sess." 
Report  No.  108.    Army  of  the  Potomac,  vol.  2,  part  1.  1  C.  W." 

Bull  Run,  Ball's  Bluff,  vol.  3,  part  2.  "  2  C.  W." 

Western  Department,  vol.  4,  part  3.  "  3  C.  W." 

[Second  series.]    [The  same.]    38th  Congress,  2d  Session.  1864-1865. 

Report  No.  142.    General  Report  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War,  May  22,  1865,  pp.  iii.-v. 
Journal  of  Proceedings  of  that  Committee,  pp.  vii.- 

SXXIX. 

Report  on  the  Army  of  the  Potomac : 
Under  General  Hooker,  pp.  xli.-lv. 
Under  General  Meade,  pp.  Iv.-Isxvii. 
Testimony  taken  by  the  committee  : 
Concerning  General  Hooker,  pp.  1-294. 
Concerning  General  Meade,  pp.  295-524. 
Followed  by  a  — 
Report  on  the  Battle  of  Petersburg,  July  30,  1864, 
pp.  1-249. 

All  comprised  in  part  1  {L  e.,  vol.  1).  "  1  C.  W.,  1865." 
Report  No.  142,  continued. 

Report  on  the  Red  River  Expedition,  pp.  iii.-xlis. 

Testimony  on  the  Red  River  Expedition,  pp.  1-401. 

Rejport  on  the  Fort  Fisher  Expedition,  pp.  i.-viii. 

Testimony  on  the  Fort  Fisher  Expedition,  pp.  1-260. 

Report  on  Heavy  Ordnance,  pp.  1-179. 

AU  comprised  in  part  2  {i.  e.  vol.  2.)     "  2  C.  W.  1865." 
Report  No.  142  [continued.    Each  report  has  a  distinctive  paging.] 

Report  on  the  Negotiations  of  General  Sherman  for 
the  Surrender  of  General  J.  E.  Johnston.    23  pp. 


XX 


BOOKS  CITED  IN  THIS  VOLUME 


Report  on  Lig-lit-draug-lit  Monitors,    iv.  -f  120  pp. 
Report  on  the  Massacre  of  Cheyenne  Indians,    vi.  + 
108  pp. 

Report  on  lee  Contracts.    100  pp. 
Report  of  General  Rosecrans'  Campaigns^    119  pp. 
Miscellaneous : 
Operations  against  Charleston. 
Operations  in  the  Gulf  Depai'tment. 
Trade  Regulations. 
Battle  of  Cedar  Mountain. 
Treatment  of  Prisoners.    86  pp. 

"  3  C.  W.,  1865,  Miscellaneous." 
Supplemental  Report:  39th  Congress,  1st  Session.    1865-66.    2  vols. 
Washington,  1886. 

Vol.  1.    Report  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman,  391  pp. 

Report  of  Major-General  G.  H.  Thomas.    472  pp. 

"  C.  W.,  1  Supplement/^ 

Vol.  2.  Reports  of  — - 

Major-General  John  Pope.    217  pp. 
.  "        "      J.  G.  Foster.    23  pp. 
"         "       A.  Pleasanton.    13  pp. 
"        "      E.A.Hitchcock.    12  pp. 
"         "       P.H.Sheridan.    77  pp. 
Brigadier-General  J.  B.  Ricketts.    7  pp. 
Comnaunication  and  Memorial  of  Norman  Wiard.  32  +  4  pp, 

"  aw.,  2  Supplement." 

War  Records.  The  War  of  the  Rebellion:  a  Compilation  of  the  Official 
Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Armies.  Prepared  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  Secretary  of  War,  by  Bvt.  Lieut.-Col.  Robert  N.  Scott,  Third 
U.  S.  Artillery,  and  published  pursuant  to  Act  of  Congress,  approved  June 
16,  1880.  Series  I.  Vols.  I.-XLVI.,  Part  I.  95  vols.  *  Washington :  Gov- 
ernment Printing  Office,  1880-1894.  "  W.  R." 

Volumes  1-49  were  prepared  and  published  under  the  direction  of  Lieut.- 
Col.  Scott ;  vols.  50-95,  under  the  direction  of  Major  George  B.  Davis, 
U.  S.  A.,  Mr.  Leslie  J.  Perry,  and  Mr.  Joseph  W.  Kirkley,  a  Board  of  Publi- 
cation. 

Until  the  publication  of  Vol.  XXIV.,  Part  I.,  the  volumes  bore  only  the 
particular  series  designations  in  Roman  numerals.  As  the  references  to  the 
earlier  volumes  have  been  made  in  this  book  by  their  serial  numbers,  a 
table  harmonizing  the  same  with  their  series  designations  is  here  given  for 
the  convenience  of  the  student. 

Series  Nos.  Serial  Nos.      Series  Nos.  Serial  Nos. 

L  .  1  V.  .  5 

IL  .  2  VI.    .    .   6 

in.  3  VII.  ..........  7 

IV,  .  4  VIIL  ..........  8 


BOOKS  CITED  IN  THIS  VOLUME 


xxi 


IX   9      ^vTTT  (  Part  1   24 

^  (Parti   10  'iPart  H   25 

{Partn   11     XVm   26 

(  Part  1   12       y-jy-  {  Part  1   27 

XI J  Part  II   13  1  Part  n   28 

(  Part  in   14  Part  1   29 


Part  1  15  (  Part  H  30 

Partn   ,    16       XXI  31 

XII-  1  Part  II.,  part  ii  17      ^^tt  \  Part  1  32 


t.i  Part  11^  part  ii  17      ^  J 

[Part  in  18  ( 


Part  n. 


Xm  19  ( Part  1  34 

XIV  20    ^^^-jpartlL  35 

XV  21  (  Part  1  36 


XVI. 


Part  1  22    XXIV.    Part  H  37 

Part  II  23  (Part  IIL    .....  38 


Whitman  aitd  True.  Maine  in  the  War  for  tlie  Union :  A  History  of  the 
part  borne  by  Maine  Troops  in  the  Suppression  of  the  American  Rebellion. 
By  William  E.  S.  Whitman  and  Charles  H.  True.  Lewiston :  Nelson  Ding- 
ley,  jr.,  &  Co.,  Publishers,  1865. 

Wilkes,  Geokge.  McCleHan :  from  Ball's  Bluff  to  Antietam.  New  York : 
S.  Tousey,  1863. 


I. 

THE  CHARACTER  OF  GENERAL  HALLECK'S  mLI- 
TARY  ADMINISTRATION  IN  THE  SUMMER  OF 
1862,  WITH  SPECIAL  REFERENCE  TO  THE  RE- 
MOVAL BY  HIS  ORDERS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE 
POTOMAC  FROM  THE  PENINSULA,  AND  TO 
THE  SHARE  WHICH  BELONGS  TO  HBI  IN  THE 
CAIMPAIGN  OF  GENERAL  POPE. 

By  Bvt.  Beig.-Gen.  SAMUEL  M.  QUINCY,  U.S.  V. 


COMmTTEE. 

Bvt.  Brig-.-Gen.  Samuel  M.  Quincy,  U.  S.  V. 
Colonel  TnoiiAs  L.  LrvEEMORE,  U.  S.  V. 


Read  before  the  Society  on  Monday  evening,  Jan.  S,  1S77. 


The  following  is  the  title  of  a  contribution  to  the  history  of  the  Civil  War 
by  General  Quincy  :  — 

HiSTOKY  OF  THE  Second  MASSACHUSETTS  Regiment  OF  Infantry  :  A  Pris- 
oner's Diary.  A  Paper  read  at  the  Officers'  Reunion  in  Boston,  May  11, 1877. 
By  Samuel  M.  Quincy,  Captain,  Second  Massachusetts  Infantry,  Brevet 
Brigadier-General  Volunteers.  Boston:  George  H.  Ellis,  Printer,  1882 
Privately  Printed  for  the  Association. 


POPE'S  YIPGIMA  CAMPAIGN. 


GENERAL  HALLECK'S  ADMINISTRATION. 


IHAT  up  to  tlie  present  time  it  has  been  too  early  to 


expect  from  any  of  our  historians  of  the  war  a  per- 
fectly nnhiased,  dispassionate,  and  reliable  judgment  upon 
the  Nvisdom  of  such  an  important  move  upon  the  military 
chessboard  as  the  withdrawal  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac from  the  Peninsula,  together  with  an  impartial  and 
just  distribution  of  the  respective  shares  of  responsibility 
attaching  to  commander  and  subordinates  for  the  disas- 
ters of  Gen.  Pope's  campaign,  we  tliink  will  be  admitted. 
All  that  the  chairman  of  your  committee  can  present  to 
the  society  this  evening  are  simply  the  conclusions  to 
which  such  study  as  he  has  been  able  to  devote  to  the 
subject  within  a  few  weeks  has  brought  his  own  mind. 
He  claims  no  credit  beyond  that  of  an  absence  of  partial- 
ity or  bias,  and  offers  his  opinion,  with  all  deference  to 
those  whom  more  intimate  acquaintance  with  the  facts 
has  brought  to  a  different  conclusion. 

In  whose  mind  first  originated  the  idea  of  withdrawing 
Gen.  Halle ck  from  the  scene  of  his  successful  operations 
in  the  West,  and  investing  him  with  supreme  command, 


3 


4 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


we  liave  been  unable  to  decide.  Greeley  credits  Pope 
witb  having  undoubtedly  suggested  to  tlie  President  tbe 
appointment  of  a  common  military  superior,"  ^  and  Pope, 
in  his  report,^  states  that  the  appointment  was  made  in  ac- 
cordance with  his  views  (after  receiving  Gen.  McClellan's 
answer  ^  to  his  letter)  of  the  necessity  of  a  military  supe- 
rior to  both,  to  ensure  cooperation  between  the  armies. 
By  whom  suggested  is,  however,  immaterial ;  the  necessity 
was  supposed  to  exist,  and  on  July  11th  the  order  was 
issued,^  although  command  was  not,  for  some  reason,  as- 
sumed thereunder  until  the  23d. ^  For  the  situation  in 
which  Gen.  Halleck  then  found  the  war  in  Virginia  he,  of 
course,  was  not  responsible.  Did  he  deal  with  that  situa- 
tion wisely,  in  viev/  of  the  resources  at  his  command,  and 
what  he  could  then  be  supposed  to  know  of  the  character 
of  his  lieutenants,  McClellan  and  Pope?  And  for  the 
disasters  which  ensued  until  both  armies  were  united  with- 
in the  fortifications  of  Washington,  what  share  of  respon- 
sibility ought  he  to  assume  ?  These  are  the  questions  for 
our  consideration,  and  which  may  hardly  be  considered  as 
definitely  settled  and  put  to  rest  for  many  years  to  come. 

On  the  26th  of  June,  1862,  by  an  order  of  the  Presi- 
dent, the  forces  under  Gens,  Banks,  Fremont,  and  Mc- 
Dowell were  consolidated  into  one  army,  to  be  styled  the 
Army  of  Virginia,  and  to  be  commanded  by  Major-Gen. 
John  Pope.^  It  was  doubtless  the  intention  that,  with  this 
command,  he  should  cover  Washington,  and  threaten,  if 
not  advance  upon  Richmond.  He  himself  declares  the 
latter  to  have  been  his  intention,  until  McClellan's  re- 
verses, commencing  on  the  day  of  Pope's  appointment, 

^2  Greeley,  173.  ^  14  ^^.U.,  306.  sib.,  371,  16  W.R.,  4. 

2 16  W.R.,  22.  *  Ib.j  314,  e  15  W.R.,  169. 


GEX.  HALLECK'S  ADMIXISTEATIOX. 


5 


put  a  foiTvard  moYeinent  out  of  tlie  question.  Gen.  Hal- 
leck  tlien,  on  assuming  coniinancl,  finds  t^vo-  armies  sepa- 
rated bv  Pdclimond  and  tlie  enemy, —  Pope  before  Wasli- 
ington,  and  McClellan  at  Harrison's  Bar,  —  eacli  on 
tlie  defensive.  If  McClellan  could  be  promptly  put  in  a 
condition  to  vigorously  resiune  tlie  offensive,  and  if  sucli 
vigorous  resumption  could  be  expected  of  Mm,  tlien,  un- 
doubtedly, the  plan  for  a  double  advance  on  Riclimond 
could  be  carried  out.  But  if  tlie  cliance  of  being  able  to 
bring  about  sucli  ^dgorous  resumption  appeared  as  small 
tlien  to  Gen.  Halleck  as  it  novr  seems  to  tlie  vaiter  to  liave 
been,  tlien  tlie  question  seems  to  be  simplified  into  tlie 
manner  of  bringing  tbe  tvro  armies  togetlier  —  vrliicli 
should  re  enforce  tlie  otlier?  It  \vas  tliougiit  tliat  tlie  at- 
tempt to  reenforce  McClellan  by  Pope  would  give  to  tlie 
ever-Tvatcliftd  enemy  tlie  opportunity  of  exclianging  Ricli- 
mond for  Wasliington,  as  Pope  must  be  for  that  puipiose 
witlidraTvn  from  before  tlie  capital.  If  Pope,  tlien,  could 
not  safely  be  vreakened,  v-liere  vrere  tlie  immediate  reen- 
f  or  cements  to  be  bad  vritli  vliicli  McClellan  promised  tliat 
lie  would  again  advance  ?  Even  Svinton,  vdiose  prejudice 
against  Gen.  Halleck  is  expressed  in  no  measured  terms,^ 
admits  that,  if  it  was  not  designed  to  reenforce  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  to  an  effective  that  vrould  enable  it  to  im- 
mediately recommence  active  operations,  then  undoubt- 
edly the  wisest  course  was  to  withdraw  it  from  the  Penin- 
sula,—  assuming  Gen.  Halleck's  ability,  had  he  so  chosen, 
to  have  not  only  enabled  but  induced  Gen.  McClellan  to 
promptly  resume  the  offensive,  and  this  without  endanger- 
ing Washington.- 

1  Swinton,  170.  2  lb.,  171. 


6 


POPE'S   VIEGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


Let  US  look  for  a  moment  at  Gen.  McClellan's  demands, 
and  then  allow  Halleck  to  speak  for  himself  in  his  reply 
to  the  former's  protest  against  the  order  of  withdrawal. 
Even  before  the  battle  of  Malvern  Hill  McClellan  had 
commenced  to  telegraph  the  President  for  fresh  troops. 
On  July  2d,  in  a  reply  to  a  demand  for  50,000  more 
troops,  the  President,  after  stating  the  numbers  and  posi- 
tion of  those  available,  concludes  :  *'  Thus  the  idea  of  send- 
ing you  50,000,  or  any  other  considerable  force,  promptly 
is  simply  absurd.  .  .  .  Save  the  army,  material  and  per- 
sonal, and  I  will  strengthen  it  for  the  offensive  again  as 
fast  as  I  can."  ^  But  on  the  next  day  Gen.  McClellan  again 
asks  for  100,000  to  capture  Eichmond  and  put  an  end  to 
the  rebellion.^  To  this  the  President  replies  on  July  4th : 
* '  To  re-enforce  you  so  as  to  enable  you  to  resume  the 
offensive  within  a  month,  or  even  six  weeks,  is  impossible. 
.  .  .  Save  the  army,  first,  where  you  are,  if  you  can  ;  and, 
secondly,  by  removal,  if  you  must.  ...  — P.S.  If  at 
any  time  you  feel  able  to  take  the  offensive  you  are  not 
restrained  from  doing  so."^  On  the  7th  of  July  Gen. 
McClellan,  abandoning  the  immediate  subject  of  re-en- 
forcements, volunteered  to  the  President,  by  letter,  his 
views  and  advice  ' '  upon  a  civil  and  military  policy  cover- 
ing; the  whole  s^round  of  our  national  trouble."  ^  The  Pres- 
ident,  however,  seemed  to  think  that  that  portion  of  what 
might  be  called  the  ground  of  our  national  trouble," 
then  held  by  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  Harrison's  Bar, 
was  sufficient  for  his  immediate  attention,  and,  conse- 
quently, visited  the  same  personally  on  July  8th.  The 
result  of  this  visit  seemed  to  give  McClellan  the  idea  that 

il4W,R.,  286.  2  lb.,  292,  ^  i2  W.R.,  72,  73.  *  lb.,  73. 


GEN.  HALLECK'S  AD3IINISTRATI0K 


7 


the  President  favored  a  withdrawal,  and  by  Gen.  Pope's 
testimony,  given  on  that  very  day,  July  8th,  to  the  Con- 
gressional Committee,  it  seems  that  he  (Pope)  had  already 
advised  the  President  in  that  direction.^  But,  whatever 
may  have  been  his  opinions,  the  President  did  not  take 
upon  himself  the  responsibility  of  the  move,  but  on  July 
11th  issued  the  order  calling  Gen.  Halleck  to  the  supreme 
command. 

On  the  25th  Gen.  Halleck  visited  the  camp  at  Harrison's 
Landing,  inspected  the  troops,  and,  it  is  said,  called  an 
informal  council  of  officers  high  in  command,  the  majority 
of  whom,  for  various  reasons,  favored  a  withdrawal  of 
the  army  from  the  Peninsula. 2 

In  the  interval  between  the  President's  visit  on  the  8th 
and  General  Halleck's  on  the  26th  McClellan  had  been 
calling  again  for  re-enforcements  with  which  to  resume  the 
offensive,  describing  the  spirit  and  condition  of  his  troops 
as  excellent,  deprecating  the  effect  of  a  retreat  on  their 
moral. ^  When,  therefore,  on  the  30th  he  received  Gen- 
eral Halleck's  order  to  send  away  his  sick,*  in  order  to 
be  in  readiness  for  a  move  in  any  direction,  he  must  have 
known  that  the  withdrawal  had  been  decided  on,  and  that 
the  utmost  promptness  and  energy  were  called  for  in  its 
execution.  But,  after  a  delay  of  two  days,  he  replies  that, 
while  in  ignorance  of  what  the  contemplated  move  is  to 
be,  he  cannot  decide  what  cases  to  send  off,  and,  in  fact, 
remonstrates  at  being  kept  in  the  dark.^  At  last,  on 
August  4th,  he  receives  it  in  black  and  white,  that  his 
army  is  to  be  withdrawn  to  Acquia  Creek,  but  that  the 
move  is,  for  the  present,  to  be  kept  a  secret,  even  from  his 

ilC.W.,  280.      2l6W.Il.,  5.      n2  W.R.,  74,  75.      ''lb.,  76.  ep^.^so. 


8 


POPE'S   VIBGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


own  officers.^  How  much  of  a  secret  the  intention  then 
was  in  Richmond  we  shall  soon  see. 

To  McClellan's  almost  indignant  remonstrance  and 
urgent  request  for  a  reconsideration  of  the  decision,  and 
withdrawal  of  the  order,  Gren.  Halleck's  reply  appears 
to  the  writer  so  conclusive  that  it  is  here  quoted  at 
length :  — 

Headquarters  op  the  Armt, 

Washington,  August  6,  1862. 

General  :  —  Your  telegram  of  yesterday  was  received  this 
morning,  and  I  immediately  telegraphed  you  a  brief  reply, 
promising  to  write  you  more  fully  by  mail. 

You,  General,  certainly  could  not  have  been  more  pained  at 
receiving  my  order  than  I  was  at  the  necessity  of  issuing  it.  I 
was  advised  by  high  officers,  in  whose  judgment  I  had  great 
confidence,  to  make  the  order  immediately  on  my  arrival  here, 
but  I  determined  not  to  do  so  until  I  could  learn  your  wishes 
from  a  personal  interview;  and  even  after  that  interview  I 
tried  every  means  in  my  power  to  avoid  withdrawing  your 
army,  and  delayed  my  decision  as  long  as  I  dared  to  delay  it. 

.  .  But  after  full  and  mature  consideration  of  all  the  pros 
and  cons,  I  was  reluctantly  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
order  must  be  issued.  There  was  to  my  mind  no  alternative. 
Allow  me  to  allude  to  a  few  of  the  facts  in  the  case. 

You  and  your  officers  at  one  interview  estimated  the  enemy's 
forces  in  and  around  Richmond  at  200,000  men.  Since  then 
you  and  others  report  that  they  have  received  and  are  receiving 
large  re-enforcements  from  the  South.  General  Pope's  army 
covering  Washington  is  only  about  40,000.  Your  effective 
force  is  only  about  90,000.  You  are  30  miles  from  Richmond, 
and  Gen.  Pope  80  or  90,  with  the  enemy  directly  between  you, 

1 12  W.R.,  80. 


GEN.    HALLECK'S  ADMINISTRATION. 


9 


ready  to  fall  with  his  superior  numbers  upon  one  or  the  other, 
as  he  may  elect.  Neither  can  re-enforce  the  other  in  case  of 
such  an  attack. 

If  Gen.  Pope's  army  be  diminished  to  re-enforce  you,  Wash- 
ington,  Maryland,  and  Pennsylvania  would  be  left  uncovered 
and  exposed.  If  your  force  be  reduced  to  strengthen  Pope, 
you  would  be  too  weak  to  even  hold  the  position  you  now 
occupy  should  the  enemy  turn  round  and  attack  you  in  full 
force.  In  other  words,  the  old  Army  of  the  Potomac  is  split 
into  two  parts,  with  the  entire  force  of  the  enemy  directly 
between  them.  They  cannot  be  united  by  land  without  expos- 
ing both  to  destruction,  and  yet  they  must  be  united.  To  send 
Pope's  forces  by  water  to  the  Peninsula  is,  under  present  cir- 
cumstances, a  military  impossibility.  The  only  alternative  is 
to  send  the  forces  on  the  Peninsula  to  some  point  by  water,  say 
Fredericksburg,  where  the  two  armies  can  be  united. 

Let  me  now  allude  to  some  of  the  objections  which  you  have 
urged.  You  say  that  the  withdrawal  from  the  present  position 
will  cause  the  certain  demoralization  of  the  army,  "  which  is 
now  in  excellent  discipline  and  condition." 

I  cannot  understand  why  a  simple  change  of  position  to 
a  new  and  by  no  means  distant  base  will  demoralize  an  army 
in  excellent  discipline,  unless  the  officers  themselves  assist  in 
that  demoralization,  which  I  am  satisfied  they  will  not. 

Your  change  of  front  from  your  extreme  right  at  Hanover 
Court-House  to  your  present  condition  was  over  30  miles,  but 
I  have  not  heard  that  it  demoralized  your  troops,  notwith- 
standing the  severe  losses  they  sustained  in  elfecting  it.  A 
new  base  on  the  Rappahannock  at  Fredericksburg  brings  you 
within  about  60  miles  of  Richmond,  and  secures  a  re-enforce- 
ment of  40,000  or  50,000  fresh  and  disciplined  troops.  .  .  . 
But  you  will  reply,  why  not  re-enforce  me  here,  so  that  I 


10 


POPE'S   YIEGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


can  strike  Richmond  from  my  present  position?  To  do  this 
you  said  at  our  interview  that  you  required  30,000  additional 
troops.  I  told  you  that  it  was  impossible  to  give  you  so  many. 
You  finally  thought  you  would  have  "  some  chance"  of  success 
with  20,000.  But  you  afterwards  telegraphed  me  that  you 
would  require  35,000,  as  the  enemy  was  being  largely  re-en- 
forced. If  yoTlr  estimate  of  the  enemy's  strength  was  correct, 
your  requisition  was  perfectly  reasonable,  but  it  was  utterly 
impossible  to  fill  it  until  new  troops  could  be  enlisted  and 
organized,  which  would  require  several  weeks. 

To  keep  your  army  in  its  present  position  until  it  could  be  so 
re-enforced  would  almost  destroy  it  in  that  climate.  The 
months  of  August  and  September  are  almost  fatal  to  whites 
who  live  on  that  part  of  James  River,  and  even  after  you 
received  the  re-enforcements  asked  for,  you  admitted  that 
you  must  reduce  Fort  Darling  and  the  river  batteries  before 
you  could  advance  on  Richmond.  It  is  by  no  means  certain 
that  the  reduction  of  these  fortifications  would  not  require 
considerable  time,  perhaps  as  much  as  those  at  Yorktown. 

This  delay  might  not  only  be  fatal  to  the  health  of  your 
army,  but  in  the  meantime  Gen.  Pope's  forces  would  be  ex- 
posed to  the  heavy  blows  of  the  enemy  without  the  slightest 
hope  of  assistance  from  you. 

In  regard  to  the  demoralizing  effect  of  a  withdrawal  from  the 
Peninsula  to  the  Rappahannock  I  must  remark  that  a  large 
number  of  your  highest  officers,  indeed  a  majority  of  those 
whose  opinions  have  been  reported  to  me,  are  decidedly  in 
favor  of  the  movement.  Even  several  of  those  who  originally 
advocated  the  line  of  the  Peninsula  now  advise  its  abandon- 
ment. I  have  not  inquired,  and  do  not  wish  to  know,  by 
whose  advice  or  for  what  reasons  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
was  separated  into  two  parts,  with  the  enemy  between  them.  I 


GEN.   HALLECK'S  ADMINISTRATION; 


11 


must  take  things  as  I  find  them.  I  find  the  forces  divided, 
and  I  wish  to  unite  them.  Only  one  feasible  plan  has  been 
presented  for  doing  this.  If  you  or  any  one  else  had  presented 
a  better  plan  I  should  certainly  have  adopted  it.  But  all  of 
your  plans  requii-e  re-enforcements,  which  it  is  impossible  to 
give  you.  It  is  very  easy  to  ask  for  re-enforcements,  but  it  is 
not  so  easy  to  give  them  when  you  have  no  disposable  troops 
at  3'our  command. 

I  have  written  very  plainly  as  I  understand  the  case,  and  I 
hope  you  will  give  me  credit  for  having  fully  considered  the 
matter,  although  I  may  have  arrived  at  very  different  conclu- 
sions from  your  own. 

Ver}^  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

H.  W.  Halleck, 
General-in-Chief.  ^ 

Major-Gen.  G.  B.  McClellan, 

Commanding ,  eic,  Berkeley,  Virginia. 

The  fiat  having  at  length  gone  forth,  protest  and  re- 
monstrance to  the  contrary  notwithstanding,  it  became 
evident  that  everything  depended  on  celerity  of  execu- 
tion. That  a  soldier  like  Gen.  Lee  would  fail  to  strain 
every  nerve  to  strike  one  army  or  the  other  the  heaviest 
possible  blow  before  their  union  could  be  effected,  could 
hardly  be  supposed  by  those  who  had  such  reason  to  be- 
lieve him  to  be  no  laggard  or  bungler.  And  as  to  the 
length  of  time  which  elapsed  before  the  decision  at 
Washington,  concealed  carefully  from  McClellan's  officers, 
became  known  at  Richmond,  and  the  energetic  action 
which  followed  such  knowledge,  we  need  but  call  attention 
to  the  following  extract  from  the  most  instructive  pages 
116  W.E.,  9-11. 


12 


POPE'S   VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


of  the  ''Diary  of  a  Rebel  War  Clerk,"  published  in  1866. 
It  will  be  remembered  that  McClellan's  first  receipt  of 
written  orders  for  withdrawal  was  August  4.  The  author 
of  the  diary  occupied  the  position  of  chief  clerk  to  the 
rebel  war  secretary  :  — 

''Auo^ust  3d.  There  is  a  rumor  that  McClellan  is 
'  stealing  away '  from  his  new  base  !  and  Burnside  has 
gone  up  the  Rappahannock  to  co-operate  with  Pope  in  his 
*  march  to  Richmond.' 

'*  August  4th.  Lee  is  makino-  herculean  efi'orts  for  an 
'  on  to  Washington,'  while  the  enemy  think  he  merely 
designs  a  defence  of  Richmond.  Troops  are  on  the  move, 
all  the  way  from  Florida  to  Gordonsville. 

''  August  5th.  ...  I  hope  Lee  will  make  the  most  of 
his  time,  and  annihilate  their  drilled  and  seasoned  troops. 
He  can  put  more  fighting  men  in  Virginia  than  the  enemy, 
during  the  next  two  months.  '  Now's  the  day,  and  now's 
the  hour ! ' 

"  August  6th.  Jackson  is  making  preparations  to  fight. 
I  know  the  symptoms.  He  has  made  Pope  believe  he's 
afraid  of  him. 

''August  9th.  Jackson  and  Ewell  are  waiting  and 
watching.    Pope  will  expose  himself  soon. 

"August  10th.  Jackson  struck  Pope  yesterday!  It 
was  a  terrible  blow,  for  the  numbers  engaged."  ^ 

Leaving  Gen.  McClellan  for  the  present  with  the  work 
thus  cut  out  for  him,  let  us  turn  our  attention  to  the  army 
to  be  re-enforced,  Gen.  Pope's  command  then  covering 

^  1  Jones'  Diary,  147-148. 


GEN.  EALLECK'S  AmimiSTRATION'. 


13 


Wasliington.  The  latter  had  already,  in  his  testimon}^  be- 
fore the  Congressional  Committee,  developed,  with  some- 
what surprising  confidence,  his  plans  for  the  defence  of 
Washington  against  the  advance  of  a  force  superior  to  liis 
own.  These  seemed  to  consist  in  a  prompt  getting  out  of 
the  way  in  front,  and  abandonment  of  all  intrenched  lines 
as  useless :  and  a  lying  off  on  the  enemy's  flanks  and  so 
bothering  him  by  unexpected  attacks  that  he  could  go  no 
farther,  but  must  turn  and  follow  his  assailant  to  the 
mountains.  What  would  there  transpire  the  committee 
did  not  inquire.  But  this  "lying  off"  strategy  need  not 
be  adopted,  if  he  could  be  re-enforced  by  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  before  Lee's  advance  in  force  could  be  made. 
And  this  he  thought  could  be  done.^  But,  unfortunately, 
by  his  sneers,  open  and  covert,  at  that  army,  its  command- 
ers and  its  fighting,  he  had  hardly  taken  the  means  which 
a  student  of  human  nature  Avould  recommend  to  bring  it 
to  his  assistance  at  an  enthusiastic  double-quick  when  the 
pinch  should  arrive. 

Let  his  well-known  bombastic  farrago,  issued  on  taking 
command,  speak  for  itself :  ^ 

Headquarters  Army  of  Virginia, 

Washington,  D.C.,  July  U,  1862. 

To  the  Officers  and  Soldiers  of  the  Army  of  Virginia : 

By  special  assigmneut  of  the  Presklent  of  the  United  States 
1  have  assumed  command  of  this  army.  ...  I  have  come 
to  you  from  the  West,  where  we  have  alwa^-s  seen  the  backs  of 
our  enemies  ;  from  au  army  whose  business  it  has  been  to  seek 
the  adversary  and  to  beat  him  when  he  was  found ;  whose 
policy  has  been  attack  and  not  defence. 

In  but  one  instance  has  the  enemy  been  able  to  place  our 
1 1  C.W.,  276,  277.  =  18  AV.R.,  473. 


14  POPE'S   YIBGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


Western  armies  in  defensive  attitude.  I  presume  that  I 
have  been  called  here  to  pursue  the  same  system  and  to  lead 
you  against  the  enemy.  It  is  my  purpose  to  do  so,  and  that 
speedily. 

I  am  sure  you  long  for  an  opportunity  to  win  the  distinction 
you  are  capable  of  achieving.  That  opportunity  I  shall  en- 
deavor to  give  you. 

Meantime  I  desire  you  to  dismiss  from  your  minds  certain 
phrases,  which  I  am  sorry  to  find  much  in  vogue  amongst  you. 

I  hear  constantly  of  ' '  taking  strong  positions  and  holding 
them,"  of  "lines  of  retreat,"  and  of  "bases  of  supplies." 
Let  us  discard  such  ideas. 

The  strongest  position  a  soldier  should  desire  to  occupy  is 
one  from  which  he  can  most  easily  advance  against  the  enemy. 
Let  us  study  the  probable  lines  of  retreat  of  our  opponents, 
and  leave  our  own  to  take  care  of  themselves.  Let  us  look 
before  us,  and  not  behind.  Success  and  glory  are  in  the 
advance,  disaster  and  shame  lurk  in  the  rear. 

Let  us  act  on  this  understanding,  and  it  is  safe  to  predict 
that  your  banners  shall  be  inscribed  with  many  a  glorious  deed 
and  that  your  names  will  be  dear  to  your  countrymen  forever. 

Jno.  Pope, 
Major- General,  Commanding. 

And  in  his  testimony,  given  a  few  days  before  to  the 
committee,  he  agrees  that  with  McClellan's  army  as  it 
left  Washington  he  (Pope)  could  have  marched  to  New 
Orleans,  and  that  the  secret  of  the  successes  of  the  West- 
ern troops,  who  had  nothing,  not  even  trousers,  and  who 
went  into  action  with  musket-locks  tied  on  with  string, 
was  harmony  and  an  aggressive  policy.^ 

1 1  C.W.,  282. 


GEX.  HALLECK'S  ADMIXISTRATIOX. 


15 


For  not  relishing  the  task  of  sending  liis  ovm  army  to 
reenforce  tliis  braggart,  to  save  liim  from  disgrace,  and 
assist  liim  to  success  and  fame,  Trho  can  blame  George  B. 
McClellan?  But  that  it  was  a  self-sacrifice,  wliich  true 
patriotism  demanded,  none  will  deny. 

The  first  reverse  to  Gen.  Pope's  army  which  seems  to 
have  opened  Gen.  Halleck's  eyes  to  the  fact  that  Lee  did 
not  propose  to  await  either  his  or  McClellan's  leisure  be- 
fore commencing  the  ^'  on  to  Washington ''  movement, 
which  otu^  friend  the  rebel  war  clerk  so  gleefully  chron- 
icles, was  the  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain.  As  there  has 
been  an  attempt  to  shift  the  responsibility  for  the  fighting 
of  this  battle  from  the  shoulders  where  it  properly  be- 
longs, and  an  utterly  absurd  charge  of  delay  in  going  into 
action  made  against  troops  on  whom  the  heaviest  brunt  of 
the  fiO'htino;  fell,  and  amono;  whom  the  vniter  had  the 
honor  of  serving,  he  cannot  refrain  from  a  short  digression 
fr^om  the  main  subject,  in  order  to  show  the  manner  in 
which  the  action  in  question  was  brought  about,  and  in 
the  consideration  of  wliich,  and  in  refutation  of  the  charge 
above-mentioned,  some  personal  experiences  must  be 
given. 

On  the  morning  of  the  9th  of  August  Gen.  Pope  knew 
that  Jackson  had  crossed  the  Eapidan,  and  was  moving  in 
force,  probably  upon  Culpeper. ,  The  cavalry  commands 
of  Bayard  and  Biiford  were  both  falling  back  from  differ- 
ent directions.  Crawford's  brigade  of  Banks's  corps  had 
been  thr^own  forward  the  day  before  in  the  direction  of 
Cedar  Mountain  to  support  and  assist  Bayard,  while 
Banks  and  Sigel  were  ordered  to  march  on  Culpeper. 


16 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


Banks  did  so,  but  Sigel  sent  back  most  unaccountably  to 
ask  by  what  road,  when,  according  to  Pope,  there  was  but 
one,  and  that  a  broad  pike.  This  delayed  him  so  that  he 
was  not  available  for  the*  9th,  as  Pope  had  expected  he 
would  be.  Ricketts's  division  of  McDowell's  corps  was 
not  pushed  up  to  Crawford  at  the  front,  but  was  posted 
three  miles  in  the  rear  at  the  intersection  of  the  road  from 
Madison  Court-House,  despatches  from  Buford  having 
given  rise  to  an  uncertainty  as  to  whether  the  enemy  was 
not  advancing  from  that  direction.  If  Crawford  was  to 
be  supported  where  he  was,  clearly  Banks  must  do  it,  and 
the  order  was  accordingly  issued.  And  with  a  common 
sense,  which  those  who  should  judge  from  his  bombastic 
proclamation  alone  might  not  suspect  him  of  possessing, 
in  view  of  Sigel's  delay  and  the  heavy  force  of  the  enemy 
reported  to  him  as  moving,  he  ordered  Gen.  Banks,  in  so 
many  words,  to  do  the  very  thing  the  bare  idea  of  which 
he  had  just  exhorted  the  whole  army  to  dismiss  from  their 
minds,  viz.,  to  take  a  strong  position  and  hold  it. 

My  own  experience  in  what  followed,  taken  mainly 
from  a  diary,  may  be  of  interest  to  some,  and  throw 
some  little  light  on  the  questions  under  discussion. 
The  previous  day's  march  had  not  been  a  severe  one, 
though  I  find  it  noted  as  having  "played  out"  some 
unfortunate  recruits  who  had  not  yet  got  their  sea- 
soning, and  the  regiment  bivouacked  at  nearly  mid- 
night under  a  full  moon.  One  of  the  most  sincerely 
mourned  of  the  next  day's  fallen  —  Lieut.  Stephen 
Perkins  —  came  to  my  fire  for  some  tea,  our  favorite 
drink    after  a  march,   and   during  our  exchange  of 


GEX.  HALLECK'S  ADJIIXISTEATIOX. 


17 


surmise  and  conjecture,  expressed  his  strong  conviction 
that  we  should  see  more  fighting  very  soon :  that,  as  he 
expressed  it.  there  Tras  a  battle  in  the  air."  though  we 
had  had  no  cause,  so  far,  to  suspect  the  proximity  of  the 
enemy. 

The  next  morning,  no  orders  having  arrived,  by  about 
9  o'clock  a  camp  was  marked  out  and  tents  just  begin- 
ning to  rise  when  enters  an  officer  of  Pope's  staff  at  a 
gallop  with  orders  which  soon  put  us  again  in  motion, 
under  a  blazing  sun.  but  without  knapsacks.  This  and 
the  pace  at  which  we  were  led  caused  me  to  suspect  that 
perhaps  Perkins  was  a  prophet,  and  in  effect  desultory 
artillery  firing  a  few  miles  in  advance  soon  greeted  our 
ears.  The  heat  was  tremendous,  and  my  first  sergeant 
fell  with  sunstroke  just  before  we  reached  the  front. 
"We  passed  through  Ricketts's  division,  lying  under  the 
trees  with  their  accoutrements  off.  and  supposed  that 
thev  would  not  be  lono;  after  us.  if  we  o-ot  into  a  fio-ht. 
We  were  nearly  exhausted  when  we  got  into  position  at 
last,  but  the  half  hour  of  rest  and  shade  which  followed 
made  men  of  us  again.  Our  position  was  a  strong  one, 
and  appreciated  by  the  men.  -If  they  come  at  us  here, 
we  shall  have  a  cross-fire  on  them."  was  remarked.  The 
right  and  left  companies  —  Capt.  Abbott's  and  mine  — 
were  then  thrown  well  to  the  front  as  skirmishers,  and 
there  we  lay  for  hours  behind  our  jDlatoons  in  reserve 
with  nothino^  to  do  but  to  watch  the  swavino-s  of  the  ar- 
tillery  fight,  and  time  the  explosion  of  the  hea^w  shells, 
until  the  sun  was  about  half  an  hour  high.  Then,  at 
last,  comes  an  order  to  Gen.  Gordon,  delivered  in  the 


18 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


writer's  hearing,  for  our  regiment  to  go  somewhere  im- 
mediately, followed,  as  it  seems,  by  another  for  a  general 
advance.  Instantly  on  receipt  of  the  first  order  the 
skirmishers  were  rallied  on  the  battalion  at  the  double, 
and  hardly,  panting  and  breathless,  had  we  taken  our 
places,  before  the  general  advance  took  place,  at  first  by 
the  right  of  companies  to  the  front  until  some  obstacles 
were  cleared,  then  in  line  and  at  the  double  across  the 
marsh,  through  the  brook,  and  into  the  timber,  whence 
proceeded  the  most  terrific  roar  of  musketry,  and  out  of 
which  wounded  were  staggering  to  the  rear  until  we 
came  to  the  edge  of  the  fatal  wheat-field,  where  we  found 
the  enemy  in  line. 

Banks  has  described  his  troops  on  that  day  as  pant- 
ing for  a  fight.^  So  much  is  certainly  true  that  our 
men  panted  for  breath  from  the  speed  with  which  they 
ran  into  it.  Against  the  enemy,  now  in  our  front,  we 
opened  fire  with  the  utmost  confidence  and  with  deadly 
effect,  as  the  increasing  gaps  in  his  ranks  testified,  until, 
at  last,  there  tore  through  our  lines  a  tremendous  and 
withering  flank  volley  from  the  right,  two  bullets  of 
which  stretched  me  for  twenty-four  hours  on  the  field, 
and  caused  me  thereafter  to  commence  a  most  painful 
"on  to  Richmond"  on  my  own  account.  A  most  ex- 
cellent and  exhaustive  description  of  this  battle  is  to 
be  found  in  a  paper  read  by  Gen.  Gordon  before  the 
2d  Mass.  Regiment  Association.  For  our  purposes  this 
evening  it  may  be  thus  summarized. 

A  most  gallant  and  spirited,  but,  to  quote  a  Confeder- 
ate opinion,  rash   and   meaningless,  assault  had  been 

1 3  C.W.,  1865,  "  Miscellaneous,"  46. 


GEN.  HALLECK'S  ADMINISTRATION. 


19 


made,  under  Banks's  orders,  by  our  left.  Its  temporary 
success  was  converted  by  Jackson's  reserves  into  a  bloody 
rejDulse,  and  tlien  it  was  that  we  of  the  right  were 
thrown  forward,  to  be  in  our  turn  flanked  and  over- 
whelmed. The  absurd  accusation  of  delay  in  going  into 
action,  and  a  failure  to  obey  repeated  orders,  made  by 
Banks  against  our  brigade,  may  possibly  have  been  at 
first  made  in  good  faith  owing  to  his  own  ignorance  of 
our  position.  But  its  falsity  having  been  demonstrated, 
he  has  not  had  the  manliness  to  make  a  public  with- 
drawal. What  orders  he  may  think  he  sent  to  Gen. 
Gordon  I  do  not  knoAV.  The  first  orders  received  were 
delivered  in  my  hearing,  and  executed  as  I  have  de- 
scribed. 

But  had  the  advance  been  simultaneous  along  the  line 
instead  of  by  piecemeal,  first  a  regiment  and  then  a  bri- 
gade, the  inevitable  result  Avould  have  been  the  same, 
except  that  we  might  have  inflicted  greater  loss  on  the 
enemy.  Jackson  outnumbered  us  far  too  heavily,  —  Ms 
positions  were  far  too  strong  to  allow  any  hope  of  more 
than  a  temporary  success  against  his  first  line.  Banks's 
force  actually  present  was  only  6,289,  and  Jackson's 
25,000,  of  all  arms. 

Could  we  have  held  our  own  until  nightfall  had 
Jackson  advanced  on  us  ?  Of  this  I  think  there  can  be 
no  doubt,  and  such  is  the  opinion  of  Gen.  Roberts,  given 
in  the  McDowell  Court  of  Inquiry.^  Jackson's  troops 
were  fatigued  from  a  long  march,  and  the  fury  with 
which  our  troops  charged  across  the  open,  against  the 
enemy's  selected  position,  shows  with  what  desperate 

1 15  W.R.,  185. 


20 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


tenacity  tliey  would  have  held  their  own  until,  to  adapt 
Wellington's  phrase,  night  or  Ricketts  were  come,  had 
positions  been  reversed.  The  satisfaction  expressed  by 
the  men  with  our  position  on  the  right  testified  to  their 
confidence  in  their  ability  to  repulse  any  assault,  and 
gave  renewed  assurance,  if  any  were  needed,  that  they 
never  would  retreat  until  ordered.  Had  any  man,  either 
by  language  or  conduct,  appeared  to  justify  Banks's  absurd 
description  of  "panting  for  a  fight,"  I  should  have  set 
him  down  for  a  recruit  who  had  never  smelt  powder,  and 
the  most  likely  man  to  set  an  example  of  panic  when  he 
did  smell  it.  Had  Banks's  military  career  commenced 
with  a  little  of  the  experience  of  a  line  officer  in  a  march- 
ing regiment,  he  would  have  realized  that  that  thirst  for 
combat  which  causes  the  political  general,  like  the  Script- 
ure war-horse,  to  snuff  the  battle  afar  off,  is  apt  to  get,  in 
the  words  of  the  immortal  Sawin,  "  kind  o'  lodged  before 
it  gets  as  low  down  as  the  ranks,"  and  that  good  fighting 
by  enlisted  men  is  more  likely  to  be  the  result  of  dis- 
cipline than  of  martial  rage  or  the  hope  of  glory.  Indeed, 
private  Sawin  very  well  expresses  their  state  of  mind  in 
the  next  lines  to  those  just  quoted :  — 

'*  "We  git  the  licks,  we're  just  the  grist  that's  put  into  war's  hoppers, 
Leftenants  is  the  lowest  grade  that  helps  pick  up  the  coppers." 

Let  us  here  compare,  very  briefly,  the  conflicting  testi- 
mony concerning  the  orders  under  which  Banks  was  act- 
ing when  he  ordered  the  fatal  advance  on  the  left  and 
abandoned  the  strong  position  selected  for  him  by  Pope's 


GEK.  HALLECK'S  ADMINISTRATION. 


21 


chief  of  staff.  We  have,  first,  Gen.  Gordon's  testimony 
that,  on  meeting  Pope  immediately  after  the  battle,  the 
latter,  in  Banks's  presence,  and  in  reply  to  a  remark  of 
Gordon's  that  the  battle  should  not  have  been  fought, 
replied,  "  I  never  ordered  it  fought,  sir,"  and  that  Banks 
was  silent.  Four  days  after  the  battle  Pope  sends 
Halleck  a  long  telegraphic  report,  published  in  all  the 
papers,  and  in  which,  while  complimenting  Banks  and  his 
troops  for  their  gallantry,  he  states  that  Banks  departed 
from  his  order  by  leaving  the  position  he  was  ordered  to 
take  up,  and  advancing  to  attack  the  enemy, ^  and  Banks 
is  silent.  In  Pope's  official  report,  made  in  the  following 
January,  he  repeats  this  statement  very  forcibly,  that 
Banks  was  ordered  to  take  a  strong  position  and  hold 
on  until  he  could  be  re-enforced ;  but  that,  against  the 
urgent  representations  of  Gen.  Roberts,  Banks  left  his 
strong  position,  believing  that  the  enemy  were  not  in 
force,  and  that  he  could  crush  their  advance  before  their 
main  body  came  up,^ —  and  Banks  is  still  silent. 

But,  at  last,  on  December  14th,  1864,  after  testifying 
before  the  Congressional  Committee  in  regard  to  the  Red 
River  campaign,  he  volunteers  a  statement,  in  contradic- 
tion of  Pope,  in  regard  to  the  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain, 
and  in  which,  from  the  words  of  an  order,  as  transcribed 
by  his  Adjutant-General,  he  tries  to  make  it  appear  that 
he  was  ordered  to  fight  the  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain  as 
he  did  fight  it.^  That  order,  as  written  down  in  presence 
of  the  officer  who  verbally  delivered  it,  is  as  follows :  — 

1 16  W.R.,  133-134.  2  lb.,  25-28. 

3  3C.W.,  1865,  ''Miscellaneous,"  44-46. 


22 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


CuLPEPER,  9.45  A.M,  August  9, 1862. 
From  Col.  Lewis  Marshall  :  — 

Gen.  Banks  will  move  to  the  front  immediately,  assume 
command  of  all  the  forces  in  the  front,  deploy  his  skirmishers 
if  the  enemy  approaches,  and  attack  him  immediatelj'  as  soon 
as  he  approaches,  and  be  re-enforced  from  here.* 

On  his  way  to  the  front,  under  these  orders.  Banks  calls 
at  Pope's  headquarters,  and  from  his  own  lips  receives  the 
following:  have  sent  an  officer  .  .  .  who  will  desig- 
nate the  ground  you  are  to  hold,  and  will  give  you  any 
instructions  he  may  deem  necessary."  Thus  by  the  order 
received  through  the  staff-officer  he  is  directed  what  to  do 
'*if  the  enemy  approaches,"  and  is  promised  re-enforce- 
ments, while  from  Pope's  own  lips  he  is  told  that  the 
ground  he  is  to  hold  will  be  shown  him.  The  absurdity 
of  supposing  it  to  have  been  Pope's  intention,  that  from 
the  ground  thus  selected  he  should  furiously  advance  por- 
tions of  his  command  at  a  time  against  the  selected 
ground  of  the  enemy,  seems  self-evident.  But  this  is 
exactly  what  he  did  as  soon  as  it  became  clear  that  if  he 
wanted  a  fight  that  afternoon  he  must  force  it. 

As  late  as  1865  no  official  report  of  the  battle  was  made 
by  Banks,  though  often  called  for  by  Pope.  In  his  vol- 
unteered testimony  before  the  committee  he  tries  to 
make  it  out  that  the  enemy  advanced  and  commenced  the 
attack,  when  he  was  encountered  by  our  troops,  who  were 
obliged  to  fight  or  retreat.  Nothing  can  be  farther  from 
the  fact.  Confederate  testimony  in  abundance  will  show 
that  by  our  furious  and  utterly  unexpected  charge  their 

^3  C.W.,  1865,  "Miscellaneous,"  45. 


GEN.  HALLECK'S  ADMIXISTRATIOy. 


23 


troops  were  tliroTm  into  confusion,  and  for  the  time 
routed,  and  that  it  needed  Jackson's  utmost  exertions  and 
reserves  to  turn  the  tide  of  battle.  As  Gen.  Gordon  says 
in  the  paper  alluded  to  :  If  there  had  been  no  reserve  to 
the  enemy,  and  no  brigades  on  Cedar  Mountain  to  rush  in 
and  take  Prince  in  flank  and  rear,  and  if  I  had  been 
ordered  to  move  forward  simultaneously  with  my  bri- 
gade as  a  support,  the  chances  are  that  we  should  have 
whipped  Jackson.'' 

This  volunteered  testimony  of  Banks  before  the  com- 
mittee soon  elicited  a  most  crushing  reply  from  Pope,  in 
which,  by  the  evidence  of  both  his  staff-offlcers,  that  of 
Roberts  having  been  taken  before  a  previous  court  of  in- 
quiry, he  utterly  demolishes  Banks,  and  characterizes  his 
attempt  to  shirk  responsibility  as  it  deserves.^  But  the 
secret  of  Banks's  state  of  mind  and  impatience  for  a  fight 
that  afternoon  is  furnished  by  himself.  He  was,  he  says, 
a  little  desperate  because  he  thought  that  Pope  thought 
that  he  (Banks)  didn't  want  to  fight,  and  this  he  gathered 
from  the  repeated  remark  of  Gen.  Roberts  that  there 
must  be  no  backino^  out  this  daA'."  -  This  lanoTiao^e,  if 
used  as  Banks  describes  it,  was  mos":  unfortunate,  as  it 
was  like  spurring  a  too  willing  horse.  AVant  of  personal 
bravery,  or  "  stomach  for  a  fight,''  was  never  Banks's  fault, 
and  the  backing  out  which  Roberts,  in  igTLorance  of  the  facts, 
alluded  to, — the  retreat  to  the  Potomac,  —  was  reprehen- 
sible only  because  too  long  delayed,  because,  in  Banks's 
own  words,  "he  feared  the  opinions  of  his  friends  more 
than  the  bayonets  of  his  enemies.''  Had  Roberts  re- 
frained from  stinging  Banks  with  unmerited  and,  to  a 

1 3  C.W.,  1865,  "  MisceUaneous,"  47-51.  2  jb.,  46. 


24 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


superior  officer,  unmilitary,  reproach,  the  latter  might 
have  been  content  to  remain  in  position,  and  that  after- 
noon's battle  of  Cedar  Mountain  would  not  have  been 
fought. 

But  it  was  fought,  and  the  effect  seems  to  have  been, 
as  we  have  stated,  that  of  opening  Halleck's  eyes  to  the 
fact  that  Lee  did  not  propose  to  wait  for  him,  and  he 
therefore  commenced  a  shower  of  despatches  and  orders 
upon  McClellan  to  hasten  him,  if  possible,  in  bringing 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  Pope's  rescue.  McClellan  is 
told  that  the  enemy  is  massing  to  crush  Pope  ^  —  then  that 
he  is  fighting  him  ^  —  that  Pope  and  Burnside  were  hard 
pushed,  and  required  immediate  aid^  —  that  his  delay  has 
been  unsatisfactory,  unexpected,  in  view  of  the  amount 
of  transportation  at  his  disposal,*  and  that  it  must  be  ex- 
plained.^ It  was  not,  however,  until  the  14th  that  McClel- 
lan commenced  moving  his  effective  troops  by  land  to 
Fortress  Monroe.  Porter  was  in  the  advance,  and  is  re- 
ported to  have  shown  a  most  praiseworthy  desire  to  bring 
his  troops  to  Pope's  rescue  in  time.  He  was  under 
orders  to  halt  the  advance  at  Williamsburg  until  the 
crossing  of  the  Chickahominy  should  be  complete,  but, 
intercepting  there  a  letter  which  told  him  that  the 
enemy  were  concentrating  to  crush  Pope  before  he  could 
be  re-enforced,  he  took  the  responsibility  of  pressing  on, 
marched  sixty  miles  in  three  days,  and  on  the  20th  his 
corps  had  embarked  at  Newport  News.  Heintzelman  em- 
barked at  Yorktown  on  the  21st,  Franklin  at  Fortress 
Monroe  on  the  22d.  Keyes  covered  the  embarkation  at 
Yorktown,  but  there  was  no  molestation  whatever,  the 

1 12  W.R.,  85.  2lb.,  86.  3  ib.,  92.  *  lb.,  85.  ^  lb.,  87. 


GEN.  HALLECK'S  ADMINISTRATION. 


25 


enemy  being  after  other  game.  McClellan  himself  arrived 
at  Alexandria  on  the  26th,  was  put  in  command  of  all  the 
forces  in  and  about  Washington,  and  intrusted  with  the 
duty  of  forwarding  the  much-needed  re-enforcements  to 
Pope.  As  to  the  manner  in  which  this  work  was  per- 
formed previous  committees  of  the  society  have  reached 
opposite  conclusions,  and  the  task  of  reviewing  the  evi- 
dence on  wliich  these  contradictory  verdicts  have  been 
based  has  been  assigned  to  abler  hands  than  those  of  your 
chairman. 

Without,  therefore,  anticipating  the  work  of  others  by 
an  examination  of  evidence  in  detail,  the  writer  will 
simply  state  that  the  result  of  his  study  thereof  has 
brought  his  mind  to  a  concurrence  in  the  verdict  of  con- 
demnation of  Gen.  McClellan,  and  this  without  having  at 
the  present  time  of  writing  read  or  heard  either  of  the 
previous  papers  on  the  subject.  That  Gen.  McClellan 
honestly  believed  at  the  time  of  making  his  report Hhat 
he  had  really  done  all  in  his  power  to  forward  re-enforce- 
ments to  Pope  without  delay  may  be  true,  and  at  the 
same  time  such  belief  be  widely  divergent  from  actual 
fact.  There  is  a  state  of  mind  in  which  a  man  will  per- 
suade himself  into  the  belief  that  a  mole-hill  is  a  moun- 
tain; that  an  obstacle  really  is  insuperable,  because  he 
ardently  wishes  it  to  be  so.  Now  what  was  McClellan's 
state  of  mind  sufficiently  appears ;  first,  by  his  accusation 
that  Gen.  Halle ck,  his  superior,  had  done  his  best  to  ruin 
or  destroy  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  ;  and  secondly,  while 
his  immediate  superior  was  showering  upon  him  orders  for 
haste,  by  what  seems  to  the  writer  nothing  less  than  an 

1  August  4,  1863.    12  W.R.,  5-105. 


26 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


appeal  against  such  orders  to  the  President.  "Which 
shall  I  do,"  he  says  to  Lincoln,  "  devote  all  energies  to 
opening  communication  with  Pope "  (as  if  he  were  not 
under  orders  to  do  that  very  thing),  "  or  leaving  Pope  to 
get  out  of  his  scrape  "  (significant  words),  "  turn  all  our 
attention  to  the  safety  of  the  capital  ?  "  ^  There  does  not 
seem  to  the  writer  much  room  for  doubt  as  to  the  answer 
which  was  desired.  Instead  of  forwarding  re-enforce- 
ments, had  McClellan  been  ordered  to  march  with  them, 
supersede  Pope,  and  take  command,  the  writer  cannot  but 
think  that  he  would  have  thrown  away  the  convex  spec- 
tacles through  which  he  was  regarding  obstacles,  and  that 
the  mountain  would  have  quickly  dwindled  to  a  mole-hill- 
Franklin  would  have  marched,  ready  or  not  ready,  and 
the  vexatious  "  marking  time  "  been  exchanged  for  a  "  for- 
ward double-quick." 

Had  not  Gen.  Halle ck,  on  arriving  from  the  West  and 
taking  command,  every  reason  to  suppose  that  the  with- 
drawal of  the  army  from  the  Peninsula  would,  when 
ordered,  be  accomplished  in  far  less  time,  very  far  less, 
than  that  actually  taken  ?  If  so,  the  reasons  for  deciding 
upon  the  step  appear,  as  he  states  them,  cogent  and 
unanswerable.  On  this  point  the  opinion  of  a  corps 
quarter-master,  promoted  to  that  position,  according  to 
Greeley,  for  eminent  efficiency,  —  General  Victor  Le  Due, 
■ — may  throw  some  light.  In  his  private  diary  he  thus 
sums  up  the  results  of  his  experience  and  observation :  — 

"  I  am  confident  that  there  has  been  gross  mismanage- 
ment in  this  whole  affair.  With  all  the  resources  that 
Government  places  in  the  hands  of  officers,  the  Army  of 

1 12  W.R.,  98. 


GEN.  HALLECK'S  ADMINISTRATION. 


27 


the  Potomac  should  have  been  transferred  from  the 
Peninsula  to  Acquia  Creek  or  Alexandria,  and  landed,  and 
in  as  good  condition  as  when  they  embarked,  all  within 
two  weeks.  Each  corps  as  a  unit  should  have  been 
embarked  and  landed  by  itself,  and  its  transportation 
have  accompanied  it ;  and  with  the  two  wharves  at  New- 
port News,  inconvenient  as  they  are,  three  days  and 
nights  was  ample  time  in  which  to  put  the  transportation 
on  shipboard ;  three  days  more  would  have  been  occupied 
in  discharging  it  off  and  setting  it  up,  and  one  day  in 
transitu  —  seven  days.  Three  corps  could  have  shipped 
at  the  same  time  —  one  at  Fortress  Monroe,  one  at  New- 
port News,  and  one  at  Yorktown.  It  has  taken  in  fact 
nearly  one  month."  ^ 

Our  conclusion,  therefore,  is  briefly  this,  —  that  Hal- 
leck's  order  of  removal  was,  according  to  liis  lights,  a 
wise  one,  as  he  could  not  have  been  expected  to  foresee 
the  manner  in  which  it  would  be  executed. 

Nor  is  it  well  seen  how  Halleck  can  be  held  responsible 
for  the  blunders  and  unfortunate  issue  of  Pope's  cam- 
paign. The  latter  moved  his  troops  as  he  chose,  the 
tenor  of  his  instructions  from  Washington  being  simply 
to  hold  on  and  fight  like  the  devil  until  the  promised  reen- 
f  or  cements  should  arrive.  And  he  did  hold  on  much 
beyond  the  time  which  Halleck  assured  him  would  be 
sufficient.  There  is  a  natural  disposition  to  make  no 
allowances  for  Pope,  and  to  show  liim  no  mercy,  for 
obvious  reasons.  Had  his  entrance  upon  the  scene  been 
distinguished  by  that  modesty  which  characterizes  the 
true  soldier,  he  would  have  received  a  lenient  judgment, 

1  2  Greeley,  171. 


28 


POPE'S   VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


for  at  the  last  he  was  outnumbered,  and  the  promised  re- 
enforcements  failed.  But  he  showed  none  of  the  qualities 
of  a  great  general,  and  had  let  slip  priceless  opportunities. 
Jackson  was  at  one  time  so  compromised  that  Pope  could 
not  fail  to  see  his  opportunity  for,  in  his  own  words,  "  bag- 
ging his  whole  crowd."  ^  And  he  is  said  to  have  planned 
the  bagging  operation  well  enough,  but,  before  he  could 
pull  the  string  which  was  to  close  the  bag's  mouth, 
Jackson  was  out  of  it.  Pope  must  also  be  credited  with 
having  acted  much  more  wisely  than  he  wrote  or  talked. 
When  Lee  did  advance.  Pope  certainly  did  his  best  to 
block  his  way  in  front,  instead  of  lying  off  on  his  flanks  and 
endeavoring  to  draw  him  off  to  the  mountains,  according 
to  the  programme  so  confidently  announced  to  the  com- 
mittee. When  he  had  reason  to  think  that  Jackson's 
forces  before  Culpeper  greatly  outnumbered  his  own  at 
that  point,  he  very  sensibly  recalls  to  Banks's  mind  the 
previously  scouted  idea  of  taking  a  strong  position  and 
holding  it  until  a  concentration  could  be  made.  And 
Banks's  rash  and  meaningless  assault  was  certainly  in 
consonance  with  the  spirit  of  Pope's  general  orders,  if  in 
violation  of  his  special  instructions.  Again,  after  telling 
the  committee  how  his  brave  Westerners  marched  to 
victory  without  trousers  and  with  musket  locks  tied  with 
string,  when  assigned  to  command  in  Virginia  his  first 
labors  are,  as  he  tells  us  in  his  report,  directed  to  sup- 
plying his  troops  with  much  of  the  material  absolutely 
necessary  for  troops  in  the  field. 

And,  so  far  as  Halleck  is  concerned,  it  should  be 
remembered  that  Pope  had  supreme  command  of  the 

^  16  w.  R.,  72. 


GEN.  EALLECK'S  ADMINISTRATIOX. 


29 


Army  of  Yirginia  for  a  montb.  before  the  former  assumed 
the  command-irL-chief.  Nothing  is  more  strikingly  in- 
structive than  to  note  the  contrast  between  the  spirit  of 
Pope's  general  orders  on  taking  command,  and  that  of  his 
official  report  of  the  accomplished  campaign.  By  the 
former,  victory  is  announced  as  the  sure  result  of  a  bold 
advance  under  his  leadership. 

"  Where  breathes  the  foe  but  flies  before  us,"  he  seems 
to  say,  if  you  vill  only  "  charge  where  you  see  my  white 
plume  shine,"  etc. 

But  Avhile  sounding  this  gallant  onset,  he  was  yet,  if  we 
are  to  believe  his  report,  taking  the  field,  after  an  unsuc- 
cessful attempt  to  be  relieved,  with  grave  forebodings  of 
the  result. 1  How  difficult  and  thankless  was  liis  duty  he 
says  every  military  man  will  understand.  "  At  no  time," 
he  says,  could  I  have  hoped  to  fight  a  successful  battle 
with  the  immensely  superior  force  of  the  enemy  which 
confronted  me,  and  which  was  able  at  any  time  to  outflank 
me  and  bear  my  small  army  to  the  dust."-  He  had 
learned  by  this  time  that  his  boasted  view  of  the  Western 
rebels'  backs  was  not  so  much  due  to  his  own  ao^oTessive 
policy  as  to  the  fact  that  he  had  never  yet  been 
confronted  by  the  numbers  or  the  generalship  of  a  Lee  or 
Stonewall  Jackson. 

Pope  has  received  generally  that  harsh  judgment  which 
a  boaster  who  fails  must  expect.  As  time  passes  we  are 
comfinced  that  that  judgment  will  be  modified.  His 
abilities  may  not  have  been  more  than  mediocre,  and  yet 
to  ascribe  his  defeats  simply  and  entirely  to  his  own 
incapacity  seems  grossly  unjust.     I   cannot  persuade 

^C.W.,  1865-1866,  2  Supplement,  111.  »Ib.,  172. 


30 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


myself  that  Porter  obeyed  him  as  he  should,^  or  that 
McClellan  forwarded  re-enforcements  as  he  ought,  and, 
this  being  so,  the  charge  of  utter  incapacity,  so  confidently 
made  by  their  partisans,  deserves,  in  my  opinion,  the 
Scotch  verdict  of  "not  proven." 

The  foregoing  comprises,  as  stated  in  the  outset,  merely 
the  general  conclusions  to  which  such  study  as  I  have 
been  able  to  give  to  the  subject  of  the  withdrawal  from 
the  Peninsula  and  Pope's  campaign  has  brought  my  own 
mind.  It  is  hoped  that  nothing  of  historic  value,  as  bear- 
ing upon  disputed  facts,  was  expected ;  for,  except  in  the 
matter  of  personal  testimony  as  to  the  attack  at  Cedar 
Mountain,  nothing  of  the  sort  has  been  attempted.  It 
should  be  also  kept  in  mind  that  the  policy  of  appointing 
Gen.  Halleck,  or  any  General,  to  direct  from  Washington 
the  movements  of  armies  in  the  field  has  not  been  our 
subject,  but  simply  whether,  on  being  so  appointed,  his 
order  of  withdrawal  from  the  Peninsula  was  a  wise  one, 
and  whether  for  subsequent  disasters  he  should  be  held 
responsible.  On  these  points  our  verdict  would  be  in  his 
favor. 

^  This  was  the  writer's  opinion  when  this  article  was  written. 


II. 

THE  CAIMPAIGN  OF  GENERAL  POPE  IX  ^^ROINIA, 
ITS  OBJECTS  AXD  GEXERAL  PLAN. 


First  Paet  :  to  the  19th  of  August,  1862. 


By  Byt.  Lieut.-Col.  CHARLES  P.  HORTON,  U.S.V. 


COMMITTEE. 
JoHif  C.  Ropes,  Esq. 

Bvt.  Lieut.-Col.  Charles  P.  Hoeton,  U.S.V. 
Bvt.  Capt.  HonvARD  Stocktox,  U.S.A. 


Read  before  the  Society  o?i  Monday  evening,  Feb.  12,  1877. 


GENERAL  POPE  IN  VIEGINIA. 


the  26tli  of  June,  1862,  the  head  of  Stonewall 
Jackson's  columns  reached  Ashland,  Ya.,  and  he 
effected  a  junction  with  the  army  of  Lee. 

On  the  same  day  the  scattered  commands,  which  had 
been  withdrawn  at  the  last  moment  from  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  and  to  whose  absence  McClellan  attributed  the 
failure  of  his  advance  on  Richmond,  were  united  under 
one  commander. 

During  the  preceding  thirty  days  Jackson  had  had 
pretty  much  his  own  way.  Banks  had  been  driven  out  of 
the  valley  of  Virginia,  after  a  sharp  engagement  at  Win- 
chester, with  considerable  loss  of  men  and  material. 

Fremont,  endeavoring  to  bar  the  return  of  Jackson  to 
Richmond,  had  been  defeated  at  Cross  Keys,  and  had 
retired  again  into  the  mountains  whence  he  came. 

McDowell's  advance  having  been  very  roughly  handled 
at  Port  Republic,  he  had  withdrawn  to  Fredericksburg, 
whilst  Jackson  proceeded  to  Richmond,  having  succeeded 
beyond  his  hopes. 

The  authorities  at  Washington  were  thoroughly  panic- 
stricken,  and  at  last,  apparently  realized  the  fact  that  the 

83 


34 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


object  of  the  war  was  not  solely  to  provide  popular  politi- 
cal Generals  with  independent  commands. 

The  officer  chosen  for  the  command  of  the  Army  of 
Virginia,  as  the  force  in  front  of  Washington  was  now 
termed,  was  Maj.-Gen.  John  Pope.  He  had  served  up  to 
this  time  in  the  Western  Army,  where  he  had  gained 
some  reputation  in  the  reduction  of  Island  No.  10,  and  in 
the  operations  before  Corinth. 

To  the  country  he  was  principally  known  through  an 
extraordinary  despatch  of  Gen.  Halleck,  at  the  time  of 
Beauregard's  evacuation  of  Corinth,  in  which  he  was 
represented  as  the  captor  of  ten  thousand  prisoners  and 
of  much  material  of  war.^  It  is  true  that  the  astonished 
Beauregard  promptly  denied  this  story  ;2  but,  as  it  was 
maintained  with  much  force,  that,  rebellion  being  the  sum 
of  all  villanies,  the  man  who  would  fire  on  Fort  Sumter 
would  not  stick  at  a  lie,  this  denial  had  little  effect,  if 
indeed  it  ever  reached  those  who  were  familiar  with  the 
original  tale. 

To  the  President  and  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  now 
greatly  alarmed  at  the  failure  of  their  own  operations  in 
front  of  Washington  and  at  the  impending  retreat  of  Mc- 
Clellan,  he  brought  the  prestige  of  success.  Ascribing,  as 
they  did,  the  failure  of  McClellan's  campaign  to  his  insist- 
ance  on  its  conduct  on  military  principles,  the  advent  of 
an  officer  of  the  regular  army,  who  announced  that,  in  his 
opinion,  such  talk  was  all  bosh,  and  such  principles  suited 
only  to  the  effete  despotisms  of  Europe,  was  hailed  as  a 
dispensation  for  which  they  were  inclined  partly  to  credit 
themselves  and  partly  to  thank  Providence. 

»  10  W.R.,  774.  2  lb.,  764. 


OBJECTS  AXD  GEXERAL  FLAX. 


—  PART  I. 


35 


It  was  tlie  opinion  of  Gen.  Pope,  freely  communicated 
byliimto  committees  of  Congress,  and  announced  in  orders 
of  the  day,  tliat  the  time  had  come  for  the  adoption  of  a 
tridy  American  system  of  warfare.  Such  traditions  of  the 
past  as  lines  of  retreat,  bases  of  supplies,  positions,  maga- 
zines, etc.,  which  had  bothered,  more  or  less,  all  com- 
manders from  Agamemnon  to  Gen.  Banks,  were  to  be  at 
once  discarded. 

The  commonly  received  trtiths  of  geometry  and  arith- 
metic met  with  no  better  acceptance  from  him.  He  was 
by  no  means  disposed  to  concede  that  a  straight  line  was 
the  shortest  distance  between  two  fixed  points  :  and  main- 
tamed  that,  whilst  two  and  two  might  sometimes  make 
fiye,  there  was  no  reason  why,  in  this  coitntry,  they  should 
not  on  occasion  make  seven,  or  even  fifteen. 

As,  however,  it  was  impossible  for  even  the  inventor  of 
this  system  to  grasp  it  wholly  at  once,  we  shall  find  Gen. 
Pope,  during  his  brief  command,  sometimes  apparently 
affected  by  his  early  education  at  ^Vest  Point,  and  not 
always  carrying  out  in  practice  what  he  preached  at  the 
department  or  in  the  committee-room. 

Personally,  Gen.  Pope  was  of  quick  temper,  impatient 
of  contradiction,  rttde  in  manner,  and  gifted  with  a 
^dvid  imagination. 

With  such  a  commander  it  was  evident  that  the  experi- 
ment of  war  on  a  large  scale  was  to  be  tried  in  Virginia 
under  new  conditions  indeed. 

The  corps,  to  the  command  of  which  this  officer  was 
assigned,  were,  on  the  26th  of  June,  those  of  Fremont, 
Banks,  and  McDowell,  and  the  forces  within  the  immedi- 


36 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


ate  defences  of  Washington,  which  consisted  of  only  a  few 
thousand  men,  principally  heavy  artillery  and  three 
months'  troops.^ 

Gen.  Fremont,  disgusted  at  the  appointment  of  a  junior 
officer  to  a  command  which  he  considered  properly  his 
own,  promptly  resigned.^  To  him  succeeded  Gen.  Sigel,  a 
German,3who  stated  that  he  had  seen  some  service  in 
the  rebellion  of  '48,  and  had  held  a  command  west  of 
the  Mississi]Dpi  since  early  in  1861,  where  he  had  acquired 
a  certain  newspaper  reputation. 

It  was  thought  that  his  appointment  would  conciliate 
the  Germans  and  promote  enlistments ;  though  why  intel- 
ligent Germans  should  wish  to  "  fight  mit  Sigel,"  when 
they  could  fight  with  any  one  else,  remains  a  mystery. 
He  was  an  officer  of  little  capacity  or  experience,  but 
of  unbounded  conceit,  and  extremely  jealous  of  his  supe- 
riors and  equals  in  rank.  During  the  cam2Daign  he  did 
his  best,  by  neglect  and  disobedience  of  orders,  to  ruin 
such  chances  of  success  as  there  may  have  been.  It  is 
impossible,  after  the  lapse  of  nearly  fifteen  years,  to  read 
without  wonder  and  indignation  the  official  reports  of 
his  conduct  throughout  the  campaign,  and  to  remember 
that  at  this  time  the  fortunes  of  the  country  and  the 
lives  of  its  soldiers  were  intrusted  to  such  a  one  without 
special  remark  or  protest. 

His  corps,  originally  formed  on  the  nucleus  of  Blenker's 
division,  was  composed,  at  this  time,  principally  of  Ger- 
mans; its  division  and  brigade  commanders  were  almost 
all  foreigners,  with  two  noted  exceptions,  Schenck  and 
Milroy.  The  troops  were  not  remarkable  for  either  drill 
>  15  W.R.,  169.  2  18  W.R.,  437.  ^  lb.,  444. 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN— PART  L  37 


or  discipline,  and  during  tliis  campaign  were  not  very  ser- 
viceable in  tlie  field  against  tlie  enemy,  tliougli  terrible  to 
the  country  through  which  they  passed.  They  numbered 
about  10,500  infantry  and  950  artillery.^ 

Gen.  Banks,  who  commanded  the  Second  Corps,  had 
given  evidence  of  such  military  ability  as  Governor  of 
Massachusetts  and  as  Speaker  of  the  Xational  House  of 
Representatives,  that,  on  the  breaking  out  of  hostilities,  he 
was  appointed  a  Major-General  of  volunteers,  and,  on  the 
retirement  of  Patterson,  was  assigned  to  the  command  of 
the  troops  at  and  near  Harper's  Ferry. 

Although  he  had  not  received  a  military  education,  and 
had  not  acquired  by  service  in  lower  grades  the  experience 
wliich  might  have  supplied  that  want,  he  assumed  this 
command,  as  he  would  have  that  of  the  Army  of  the 
United  States,  with  perfect  assurance. 

He  had  strong  martial  tastes ;  that  is,  he  was  fond  of 
music,  of  blue  cloth  and  brass  buttons,  and  delighted 
to  appear  well  mounted  at  the  head  of  his  command; 
-Such  was  his  ardor,  that,  at  a  species  of  sham-fight 
that  took  place  shortly  after  Pope  assumed  command, 
he  was  with  difficulty  restrained  by  his  staff  from  charg- 
ing one  of  his  infantry  squares  at  the  head  of  his  cav- 
alry escort. 

He  was  extremely  ambitious,  and  the  key  to  much  that 
would  otherwise  be  inexplicable  in  his  conduct  may  be 
found  in  his  remark  to  one  of  his  general  officers,  when  in 
the  valley  of  Virginia  he  was  preparing  to  attack  Jackson 
who  had  about  seven  times  his  force  :  "  The  public  are 
more  remorseless  than  the  rebels ;  we  have  more  to  fear 
1  18  W.R.,  523;  C.W.,  2  Supplement,  118. 


88 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


from  the  opinions  of  our  friends  than  from  the  bayonets  of 
the  enemy." 

Had  he  entered  the  army  as  a  line  officer,  nnder  a  strict 
colonel,  he  would,  probably,  eventually,  have  become  a 
good  regimental  commander. 

As  it  was,  his  undoubted  personal  bravery,  a  certain 
military  bearing,  and  a  sonorous  voice,  with  an  owl-like 
appearance  of  wisdom,  enabled  him  to  impose  himself  on 
the  country  as  a  heaven-born  General. 

At  this  time  his  military  experience  had  been  confined 
to  the  conduct  of  the  campaign  against  Jackson  in  the 
valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  which  had  ended  in  disaster, 
only  prevented  from  becoming  disgrace  by  the  steadiness 
of  his  troops  and  the  ability  of  one  of  his  subordinate 
commanders,  whom  he  never  forgave.  His  corps  con- 
sisted of  the  divisions  of  Williams  and  Augur,  and 
numbered  on  the  31st  of  July,  according  to  his  report,^ — 

Infantry.       .       .       .       .       .  13,343 

Artillery  1,224 

Total  14,56T 

Pope,  basing  his  ideas  on  the  report  of  the  force  actually 

carried  into  action  at  Cedar  Mountain  by  Banks,  states 

that  the  real  strength  of  the  corps  was  only  8,000  men  ;2and 

this  statement,  often  repeated  in  his  official  report  of  his 

campaign,  has  misled  even  so  careful  a  historian  as  the 

Comte  de  Paris,  who  ascribes  the  error  to  the  inefficiency 

of  the  Adjutant-General's  department  at  this  time.  The 
»  C.W.,  2  Supplement,  117,  118 ;  cf.  16  W.R.,  12  and  53. 

2  2  Comte  de  Paris,  256. 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN— PART  L 


39 


figures  were,  however,  probably  about  correct  at  the  date 
when  given,  and  Pope  under-estimates  the  strength  of  this 
corps  throughout.  It  is  true  that  at  Cedar  Mountain 
Banks  carried  into  action  only  about  6,300  infantry  and 
artillery;  but  at  this  time  more  than  one-half  liis  force 
was  absent  on  various  service.  Of  Greene's  brigade  of 
Augur's  division,  less  than  500  men  were  present ;  one 
regiment  was  at  Sulphur  Springs,  one  at  Rappahannock 
Station,  one  with  the  trains  of  the  army,  and  five  com- 
panies on  the  Alexandria  railroad.  From  Geary's  brigade, 
of  the  same  division,  a  detachment  of  about  1,000  men  had 
been  sent  to  Pony  Mountain,  wliilst  a  force  of  about  3,500 
infantry  and  artillery  was  detached  to  Front  Royal.  If  to 
these  detachments  are  added  the  extra  and  daily  duty  men, 
and  the  sick  between  July  31  and  August  9,  it  appears 
that  the  discrepancy  that  so  puzzled  Pope  is  accounted  for, 
and  that  Banks's  report  was  substantially  correct. 

It  is  difficult  to  understand  how  Banks  could  have 
imagined  liis  force  so  much  larger  than  it  was,  as  the 
daily  field  returns,  if  he  took  the  trouble  to  examine  them, 
showed  the  exact  number  present  with  the  colors  for  duty 
each  day.  Both  Pope  and  Banks  saw  the  corps,  with  the 
exception  of  Crawford's  brigade,  march  out  of  Culpeper 
on  the  9th  of  August,  and  ought  to  have  been  able  to  tell 
the  difference  between  6,000  and  12,000  men. 

The  troops  of  this  command  had,  for  the  most  part, 
been  in  long  service,  and  had  had  considerable  experience 
in  marching  and  fighting  in  the  Shenandoah  valley. 
They  were  in  excellent  state  of  efficiency,  and  were  gen- 
erally well  commanded. 


40 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


The  Third  Corps  was  commanded  by  Gen.  McDowell. 
Its  two  divisions  were  commanded  by  Gens.  Ricketts  and 
King,  and  were  well  drilled  and  disciplined.  Its  num- 
bers consisted  on  July  31  of  17,604  infantry  and  971 
artillery.-^  To  it  was  later  added  a  small  force  under 
Gen.  Sturgis,  brought  from  the  defences  of  Washington. 

The  total  of  Pope's  command  on  the  31st  of  July  was 
then  as  follows :  — 2 

First    Corps  11,498 

Second    "  14,567 

Third     "  18,575 


Infantry  and  artillery  ....  44,640 

There  was  also  a  considerable  force  of  cavalry,  not  then 
united  in  one  command,  but  attached  to  the  different 
corps,  and  reporting  a  total  of  8,738 ;  of  whom  Pope  says 
3,000  were    unfit  for  service,"^  probably  dismounted. 

This  gives  the  total  of  infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry 
at  53,378.* 

It  was  the  intention  of  the  Government  that  with  this 
force  Pope  should  cover  Washington,  assure  the  safety 
of  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  and  so  operate  upon  the 
enemy's  lines  of  communication  in  the  direction  of  Gor- 
donsville  and  Charlottesville,  as  to  draw  off,  if  possible,  a 
considerable  force  of  the  enemy  from  Richmond,  and  thus 
relieve  the  operations  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  against 
that  city.^ 

Pope's  first  object  was  the  concentration  of  his  scattered 

» 16  W.E.,  53. 

2  lb.,  and  18  W.R.,  523;  C.W.,  2  Supplement,  118. 

3  16  W.R.,  53,  and  C.W.,  2  Supplement,  118. 

^  lb.  ^  C.W.,  2  Supplement,  110. 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN— PART  L  41 


forces.  Rightly  conceiving  that  no  considerable  force  of 
the  enemy  would  enter  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah 
whilst  his  forces  were  so  disposed  as  to  be  able  to  in- 
tercept its  retreat  and  fall  upon  its  rear,  he  ordered  Banks 
and  Sigel  to  cross  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  to  take  post  at  and 
near  Sperryville.^ 

Ricketts,  who  with  one  division  of  McDowell's  corps 
had  been  stationed  at  Manassas  Junction,  was  ordered  up 
to  Waterloo  Bridge,  where  the  road  from  Warrenton  to 
Sperryville  crosses  the  upper  Rappahannock. 

King's  division  of  this  corps  was  left  at  Fredericksburg 
to  cover  the  raiboad  to  Acquia  Creek  and  the  Quarter- 
master's depot  at  that  point. 

Pope's  force  was  by  no  means  large  enough  to  divide  in 
the  face  of  the  enemy,  and  this  separation  was  entirely 
against  his  judgment.  It  was,  however,  insisted  upon 
by  the  authorities  at  Washington,  who  desired  to  have  a 
finger  in  every  pie,  and  who  had  not  yet  been  forced  by  a 
long  series  of  disasters  and  an  aroused  public  opinion  to 
leave  the  command  of  troops  in  the  field  to  the  General 
they  had  themselves  selected  and  who  was  responsible  for 
the  conduct  of  operations. 

The  force  detached  was  out  of  all  proportion  to  the 
object  in  view.  The  depot  at  Acquia  Creek  might  have 
been  easily  defended  by  a  trifling  force,  with  the  aid  of  a 
couple  of  gun-boats,  and  the  railroad  to  Fredericksburg 
abandoned ;  if  it  should  be  at  any  time  required  for  use,  it 
could  have  been  entirely  rebuilt  in  about  two  days. 

However,  at  a  time  when  imperative  necessity  demanded 
the  immediate  concentration  of  all  Pope's  forces,  the  strong- 

^  Pope's  official  report  of  his  military  services,  July,  1861,  to  Novem- 
ber, 1865,  is  to  be  found  in  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  Supple- 
ment, Yol.  2.  The  account  of  the  Virginia  Campaign  of  1862  is 
comprised  in  pages  101-190.  This  contains  the  Report  of  -Tanuary  27, 
1863,  printed  in  16  W.R.,  20-87,  Avith  addition' 


42 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


est  division  then  in  the  army  was  needlessly  separated 
from  him  by  more  than  two  days'  march. 

Whilst  this  semi-concentration  of  forces  was  in  progress, 
Major-Gen.  Halle ck  was  called  from  the  West  to  the  com- 
mand of  the  armies  of  the  United  States,  and  a  new  ele- 
ment of  confusion  was  introduced  into  the  conduct  of  the 
campaign  in  Virginia. 

Since  the  arrival  of  Pope  at  Washington  the  state  of 
a:ffairs  in  Virginia  had  materially  changed.  Gen.  McClel- 
lan,  having  abandoned  his  attack  on  Richmond,  had  fallen 
back  to  the  James  River  at  Harrison's  Landing,  where, 
having  now  plenty  of  leisure,  he  was  occupied  in  writing 
letters  of  advice  to  the  President  on  the  conduct  of  mili- 
tary and  political  affairs,  and  on  such  other  matters  as  he 
considered  of  general  interest.-"-  It  then  became  a  question 
whether  the  Army  of  the  Peninsula  should  be  reinforced 
by  the  Army  of  Virginia,  or  whether  both  should  be  united 
in  front  of  Washington. 

The  President  having  finished  the  perusal  of  Gen. 
McClellan's  first  letter  of  instructions  to  him,  was  not  long 
in  making  up  his  mind  which  course  to  pursue. 

It  was  decided  to  withdraw  from  the  Peninsula,  and  to 
unite  both  armies  under  Pope.  This  decision  was,  how- 
ever, carefully  concealed  from  McClellan,  who  was  amused 
with  promises  of  reinforcements  with  which  he  proposed 
to  seize  Petersburg  and  to  commence  operations  on  the 
line  afterwards  adopted  by  Grant. 

On  the  10th  of  July,  Pope  ordered  Crawford's  brigade 
of  Banks's  corps  forward  from  Little  Washington  to  Cul- 
peper  Court-House. 

»  12  W.R.,  73. 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN.  —  PART  L  43 


On  the  14tli,  having  in  his  own  words  "  spent  two 
weeks  in  learning  the  whereabouts  of  his  army,"  and 
finding  where  letters  would  reach  them,  he  issued  a  general 
order  assuming  command,  which  for  want  of  tact  and 
judgment,  and  for  bad  taste,  probably  stands  alone  in 
military  history.  In  it  he  announced  his  peculiar  theory 
of  warfare,  to  wliich  allusion  has  already  been  made, 
bragged  of  what  he  had  done  and  of  what  he  would  do, 
and  sneered  at  the  officers  and  men  with  whom  he  was  to 
conduct  the  campaign.^  This  was  shortly  followed  by 
another,  directing  the  troops  under  his  command  to  sub- 
sist on  the  country,  —  as  far  as  practicable,  —  probably  is- 
sued in  deference  to  the  loud  outcries  of  many  patriots  at 
"Washington  who  complained  that  the  troops  who  should 
be  employed  in  fighting  the  enemy  were  occupied  in 
guarding  the  barns  and  hen-roosts  of  unrepentant  rebels.^ 

It  is  true  that  Pope  complains  that  this  order  has  been 
misconstrued, 2  and  that  the  pigs  and  chickens  which  were 
shot  at  sight  should  have  waited  imtil  they  were  ^'  called 
in  in  a  regular  way ; but,  when  considered  in  connec- 
tion with  other  orders  directing  that  all  male  inhabitants 
should  immediately  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  under  pain 
of  being  sent  across  the  lines  ;^  that  those  witliin  five  miles 
of  any  interruption  of  military  railroads  or  telegraphs,  or 
of  any  house  from  wliich  soldiers  were  fired  on  should  be 
tried  by  coui*t-martial,^  with  other  orders  of  about  the  same 
date,  and  the  known  sentiments  of  the  commander-in- 
chief,  —  it  is  not  strange  that  the  opinion  should  have  pre- 
vailed in  the  army  that  a  rebel  had  no  property  wliich  a 
soldier  was  bound  to  respect. 

^  18  "W.R.,  473.  2      W.R.,  50.  ^  jb.,  23. 


44 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


It  has  been  maintained  by  some  that  these  flaming 
orders  should  not  be  construed  literally,  as  directions 
for  the  conduct  of  a  campaign,  but  that  they  were 
intended  simply  to  frighten  the  enemy,  and  to  fill  the 
place  of  the  gongs,  painted  shields,  and  cannon  crackers 
which  have  long  been  successfully  employed  in  Chinese 
warfare. 

Others  have  regarded  them  as  the  lashings  of  the  tail  of 
the  tiger  with  which  he  excites  himself  before  springing 
on  his  prey ;  but,  unfortunately,  neither  of  these  interpreta- 
tions occurred  to  the  soldiers  of  his  army,  by  whom  they 
were  received  with  amazement,  not  unmixed  with  terror. 

As  for  the  enemy,  they  didn't  scare  worth  a  cent,  but 
retaliated  by  orders  declaring  Pope's  officers  not  entitled 
to  the  treatment  of  prisoners  of  war;  the  execution  of 
which  caused  for  a  time  considerable  suffering  to  those 
who  were  unfortunate  enough  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy. 

On  the  14th  of  July  Hatch,  with  Banks's  cavalry,  was 
ordered  to  proceed  to  Gordonsville  and  to  break  up  the 
railroad.  Pope  complains  bitterly  that  Hatch  was  too 
slow  in  his  movements,  and  that  his  failure  had  important 
results  ;^  but,  as  Jackson  reached  Gordonsville  on  the  16th, 
it  is  not  probable  that  much  could  have  been  accom- 
plished. On  the  16th,  Hatch  having  failed  to  obey  the 
orders  of  Pope  to  cross  the  Blue  Ridge  and  cut  the  rail- 
road west  of  Gordonsville,  he  was  at  once  relieved,  and 
Brig.-Gen.  John  Buford  assigned  to  command  of  Banks's 
cavalry  force. ^ 

Shortly  before  this   time   some   cavalry  expeditions, 

1 16  W.R.,  24.  2  18  W.R.,  514. 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN  — PART  L 


45 


pushed  out  from  Fredericksburg,  had  reached  the  railroad 
from  Richmond  to  Gordonsyille,  and  effected  some  slight 
damage  to  it. 

Meantime,  Lee,  uncertain  as  yet  from  which  side  attack 
was  to  come,  retained  Hill  and  Longstreet  at  Richmond ; 
but,  fearing  a  seizure  of  Gordonsville  by  Pope,  despatched 
thither,  on  the  13th,  ^  Jackson,  with  the  divisions  of  Win- 
der and  Ewell,  the  latter  reaching  that  point  on  the  16th. 
Jackson  did  not  feel  himself  strong  enough  to  take  the 
offensive,  and  asked  for  re-enforcements. 

On  the  2Tth,  Lee,  inclining  to  think  that  the  main 
moA^ement  of  the  Union  army  would  be  against  Gordons- 
ville, detached  A.  P.  Hill  to  that  point, ^  where  he  arrived 
on  the  2d  of  August. 

On  the  29th  of  July  Pope,  who  states  in  liis  report  that 
he  had  for  some  time  desired  to  follow  the  advice  of  Mr. 
Greeley  and  proceed  to  the  West,  at  last  left  Washington, 
and,  after  reviewing  the  various  divisions  of  his  army, 
arrived  on  the  8th  of  August  at  Culpeper  Court-House, 
where  Crawford  with  his  brigade  of  Banks's  corps  had 
been  stationed  for  some  time,  and  where  Ricketts  had 
arrived  on  the  Tth.^ 

During  this  time  his  commanding  officers  first  met  him ; 
and  while  personal  acquaintance  did  not  increase  their 
respect  for  his  ability,  or  remove  the  unfavorable  impres- 
sion created  by  his  proclamations,  the  rouglmess  of  his 
manners  —  to  say  the  least  —  produced  an  unfortunate 
effect. 

On  the  7th  of  August  Banks  came  up  to  Hazel  River, 
from  which  on  the  8th  he  was  ordered  forward  to  Cul- 

1  18  W.R.,  915.     ..      2  ib^^  913^  919^  s  iq  y^.^.,  24,  25. 


46 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


peper.^  Sigel,  still  at  Sperryville,  was  also  ordered  to 
Culpeper  on  the  8th  f  but,  being  unable  to  decide  between 
the  merits  of  two  parallel  roads,  and  equally  attracted  in 
either  direction,  remained  like  the  ass  between  two 
bundles  of  hay,  in  a  state  of  perfect  rest. 

Crawford  was  ordered  forward  and  took  post  at  Cedar 
Mountain,  about  seven  miles  in  front  of  Culpeper.^ 

Whilst  these  movements  were  in  progress  to  the  north 
of  the  Rapidan,  Lee,  having,  on  the  5th  of  August,  learned 
from  Col.  Mosby,  an  exchanged  prisoner  who  had  casually 
remarked  the  fact  when  passing  Fortress  Monroe,  that 
Burnside  was  proceeding  up  the  Potomac,  came  to  the 
conclusion  that  nothing  more  was  to  be  feared  from 
McClellan,  and  ordered  Jackson  to  strike  Pope  before 
Burnside  could  join  him.*  Jackson  moved  at  once  with 
the  divisions  of  Ewell,  Winder,  and  A.  P.  Hill,  and  Rob- 
ertson's cavalry  brigade,  in  all  about  30,000  men,  reaching 
the  Rapidan  on  the  night  of  the  7th  and  crossing  on  the 
8th. 

On  the  morning  of  the  9th  the  position  of  the  opposing 
forces  was  as  follows  ;  — 

Jackson,  having  passed  the  Rapidan,  was  advancing  on 
Culpeper,  —  the  cavalry  of  Pope's  command  under  Bu- 
ford  and  Bayard  falling  back  before  him.  At  Cedar 
Mountain  was  Crawford  with  one  brigade  ;  about  two 
and  one-half  miles  in  his  rear  was  Ricketts  with  his 
division  of  McDowell.  Banks  was  at  Culpeper;  and 
Sigel,  reluctantly  dragged  from  Sperryville,  was  at  Hazel 
River.    King  was  still  at  Fredericksburg. 

The  forces  present  and  available  for  action  at  and  near 

>  16  W.R.,  24,  25.         2  ib^^  25.         ^  ib,         4  13  y^,^,^  926. 


OBJECTS  AXD  GEXERAL  FLAX.— PART  I.  47 


Ciilpeper,  on  eitlier  side,  Tvere  about  equal  in  numbers, 
Pope  ha^ung  the  advantage  of  position. 

About  ten  o'clock,  on  tlie  morning  of  the  9th,  Pope 
ordered  Banks  forvrard  to  Cedar  Mountain,  directing  him. 
as  he  says  in  his  official  report,  to  take  up  a  strong  posi- 
tion ...  to  check  the  advance  of  the  enemy,  and  to 
determine  his  forces  and  the  character  of  his  movements 
"as  far  as  practicable."'^ 

It  is  possible  that  this  may  have  been  the  order  that 
Gen.  Pope  intended  to  give  :  but,  if  so,  it  vras  strangely 
transmogrified  when  it  reached  Banks  through  Col. 
Marshall.  Pope's  Aide-de-camp. 

Delivered  verbally  by  him,  and  taken  dovn  on  the  spot 
by  Banks's  Adjutant-General,  it  read  as  follows  :  — - 

CuLPEPEE.  9.45  A.M..  Ang-nst  9.  1862. 
General  Banks  to  move  to  the  front  immediately,  assume 
command  of  all  the  forces  in  the  front,  deploy  his  skirmishers 
if  the  enemy  approaches,  and  attack  him  immediately  as  soon 
as  he  approaches,  and  be  re-enforced  from  here. 

Banks  moved  vrith  promptness  and  celerity,  though 
the  day  vas  intensely  hot  and  the  road  ankle-deep  with 
dust,  so  that  many  of  his  men  fell  from  exhaustion  or  sun- 
stroke. 

Arriving  at  the  position  held  by  Cravrford.  he  deployed 
into  line,  and  found  himself  facing  the  advance  of 
Jackson,  who,  ha^dng  been  skirmishing  with  the  cavalry 
of  Bayard  all  the  morning,  was  then  arriving  at  Cedar 

^  16  W.R.,  25. 

-  This  version  of  the  order  varies  from  that,  said  to  be  the  original 
submitted  bv  Banks  to  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  printed 
in  3  C.  "VT..  ISGo.  ^vliscellaneons.  45. 


48 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


Mountain.  The  position  was  a  strong  one  against  direct 
attack,  and  could  doubtless  have  been  held  by  Banks  until 
all  the  forces  under  command  of  Pope  were  concentrated 
on  the  field,  when  the  result  of  the  action  would  not  have 
been  doubtful. 

Nothing,  however,  was  further  from  the  mind  of  the 
intrepid  Banks.  After  an  artillery  duel  which  lasted  for 
about  two  hours,  and  in  which  Winder  was  killed,  he 
descended  from  the  strong  position  he  occupied  and  ad- 
vanced to  the  attack  of  an  enemy  already  advancing  to 
attack  him. 

Banks  attempts  to  justify  this  course  by  the  order, 
already  quoted,  received  from  Pope  before  he  left  Cul- 
peper;!  whilst  Pope  maintains  that  his  staff-officer.  Gen. 
B.  S.  Roberts,  repeatedly  explained  his  intentions  to 
Banks  and  urged  him  to  remain  in  position. ^ 

This  assertion  of  Pope  is  denied  by  Banks,  who  repre- 
sents Roberts  as  "  nagging "  him,  and  rather  urging  him 
on  f  and  this,  indeed,  was  generally  believed  in  Banks's 
corps  at  the  tim_e  of  the  battle.  It  is  somewhat  difficult  to 
decide  exactly  the  truth  of  these  conflicting  tales ;  but  the 
probabilty  is  that  Banks,  believing  that  he  had  only 
Jackson's  advance  in  front,  desired  to  gather  for  himself 
some  of  those  laurels  which  had  not  fallen  to  his  share  in 
the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah.  He  felt  himself  on  trial  in 
his  first  field  under  a  conmiander  who  "  had  come  from  the 
West  where  he  had  only  seen  the  backs  of  his  enemies ;  "  * 
he  discarded  all  idea  of  a  line  of  retreat,  and  remembered 
only  what  he  had  read  and  treasured  up  but  a  few  days 
before,  —  that  "  the  strongest  position  was  that  from 
»  3  C.W.,  1865,  Miscellaneous,  45-46.  ^  lb.,  46. 

2  lb.,  48.  18  W.R.,  474. 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN.  — PART  L  49 


wMch  tlie  soldier  could  most  easily  advance  upon  the 
enemy."  ^ 

It  is  to  be  feared  tliat  these  sentiments  were  shared  to 
some  extent  by  Gen.  Roberts,  whose  language  at  the  time 
was  probably  not  quite  what  he  afterwards  remembered  it 
to  have  been,  and  that  certain  remarks  of  his,  several 
times  repeated,  about no  backing  out  here  to-day,"  ^  and  a 
certain  expressive  shrugging  of  the  shoulders,  were  inter- 
preted by  Banks  as  an  encouragement  in  his  course.  So 
he  cheerfully  prepared  to  renew  at  Cedar  Mountain  the 
tactics  of  Winchester,  when,  with  4,000  men  he  had  given 
battle  to  25,000,  and  with  less  than  6,500  men  advanced  to 
attack  30,000. 

So  impetuous  was  his  attack  that  for  a  time  he  suc- 
ceeded in  driving  back  the  enemy  and  almost  creating  a 
panic  in  their  ranks.  Southern  historians  represent  that 
on  the  narrow  front  of  a  mile  and  a  half,  the  Federals 
brought  up  30,000  men  to  attack  Jackson.  But  the  result 
could  not  long  be  doubtful.  Hill,  arriving  on  the  field, 
took  in  flank  and  rear  the  right  of  Banks's  command,  whilst 
Ewell  advanced  against  the  left.  Outnumbered  five  to 
one,  these  troops,  whose  conduct  in  action  had  extorted 
the  admiration  of  the  enemy,  fell  back  to  the  ridge  from 
which  they  had  advanced,  and  then  slowly  retired  across 
Cedar  Run  without  molestation. 

One  gun,  mired  at  the  recrossing  of  Cedar  Run,  and 

thrown  from  its  carriage,  remained  in  the  enemy's  hands, 

his  sole  trophy  of  the  action.    Passing  through  a  narrow 

belt  of  woods  to  the  rear  of  Cedar  Run,  the  retreating 

forces  came  upon  a  plain  crowded  with  masses  of  infantry 
» 18  W.R.,  474.  '  3  C.W.,  1865,  46. 


50 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CA3IPAIGN: 


and  artillery.  Pope  had  arrived  upon  the  field,  bringing 
with  him  the  division  of  Ricketts,  which  had  lain  inactive 
through  the  long  summer  afternoon,  two  miles  or  so  from 
the  field,  in  sight  and  hearing  of  every  shot  and  shell. 

Sigel,  reluctantly  moving  from  Sperryville,  had  at  last 
early  in  the  afternoon  reached  Culpeper,  but,  reporting 
that  his  men  were  tired  and  had  consequently  eaten  up 
the  three  days'  rations  they  were  supposed  to  have 
in  their  haversacks,  a  further  delay  took  place  whilst 
rations  obtained  from  McDowell's  train  were  cooked  and 
distributed  to  his  men.  But  at  last  he  too  was  up,  and,  it 
now  being  quite  dark,  with  no  prospect  of  further  fighting 
that  evening,  might  be  heard  for  a  considerable  distance 
swearing  strange  outlandish  oaths  at  what  was  left  on  the 
field  of  the  unfortunate  corps  of  Banks.  The  battle  was 
over,  and,  except  for  a  few  cannon-shots,  the  night  passed 
in  comparative  quiet. 

The  results  of  the  first  battle  of  the  campaign  had  been 
most  disastrous.  Of  a  force  of  about  6,300  men  carried 
into  action.  Banks  had  lost  1,661  killed  and  wounded,  and 
732  were  reported  missing ;  but  of  these  many  lay  dead  on 
the  field  or  mortally  wounded  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 
The  loss  in  officers  was  almost  unprecedented.  In  the  First 
Division  one  regiment  —  the  Second  Massachusetts  —  lost 
13  officers  killed  and  wounded,  and  one  a  prisoner,  two- 
thirds  of  those  engaged.  In  the  Second  Division,  Gen- 
erals Augur  and  Geary  were  severely  wounded,  and  Prince 
a  prisoner.  Brigades  were  commanded  by  lieutenant- 
colonels,  regiments  by  lieutenants,  and  companies  by 
corporals. 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN.  — PART  L 


51 


The  enemy  admitted  a  loss  of  about  1,300  killed  and 
wounded,  and  a  few  prisoners,  mostly  taken  during  the 
night  of  the  9th. 

The  responsibility  for  this  most  unfortunate  affair  must 
rest  principally  with  Gen.  Banks.  There  is  no  probability 
that  Pope  ever  contemplated  the  battle.  It  is  unfortunate 
that  so  important  an  order  as  that  sent  to  Banks  by  Pope 
on  the  morning  of  the  9th  was  not  communicated  in  writ- 
ing, but  intrusted  to  the  rather  hazy  recollection  of  a  staff- 
officer.  At  this  time,  considering  the  officer  with  whom 
he  was  dealing,  a  little  of  the  exceedingly  plain  language 
he  was  accustomed  to  use  when  speaking  to  and  of  his 
officers  would  not  have  been  misplaced.  Gen.  Banks  was 
not  an  officer  to  whose  discretion  much  could  be  left. 

It  is  probable  that  Pope  supposed  that  the  movement 
of  Jackson  was  simply  a  reconnoissance  in  force,  as  ap- 
appears  from  his  despatches  of  the  8th,  and  that  Banks, 
with  the  14,000  men  he  supposed  him  to  have  in  his  com- 
mand, would  be  able  to  resist  its  further  advance  until 
reenforcements  could  be  brought  up,  even  should  it  be 
supported  by  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy.  It  is  un- 
fortunate also,  when  so  much  depended  on  the  successful 
opening  of  the  campaign,  that  Gen.  Pope  did  not  go 
forward  at  least  to  the  position  of  Ricketts's  division. 
Had  he  done  so,  Jackson  would  probably  either  have 
been  defeated  that  afternoon,  or  have  withdrawn  without 
a  battle  across  the  Rapidan. 

Banks's  reports  from  the  field,  however,  confirmed  Pope 
in  his  idea  that  no  very  heavy  force  of  the  enemy  was  in 
his  front,  and  it  was  not  until  late  in  the  afternoon  that 


52 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


the  roar  of  battle  summoned  him  from  Culpeper,  too  late 
to  change  the  fate  of  the  day. 

As  for  the  tactical  conduct  of  the  action  it  is  only  nec- 
essary to  say  that  Gen.  Banks  did  not  know  what  troops 
he  had  on  the  field,  nor  where  they  were,  nor  what  they 
were  doing.  He  ascribed  his  failure  to  every  cause  but 
the  right  one,  —  his  own  utter  incapacity. 

The  conduct  of  his  troops  was  worthy  of  all  praise,  and 
this  was  freely  bestowed  upon  them  by  Pope  in  an  order 
in  which  he  claimed  the  Yictory,Hhough  in  his  official  re- 
port he  states  that  a  considerable  number  of  Banks's  com- 
mand fled  to  such  a  distance  that  they  never  came  back? 
This,  like  a  good  many  other  tilings  in  this  report,  is  quite 
untrue ;  the  story  is  probably  founded  on  the  curious  case 
of  a  regiment  which  during  this  campaign  deserted,  to  a 
man,  —  colonel,  colors,  band  and  baggage,  —  and  was 
after  many  months  accidentally  discovered,  haj^pily  re- 
united within  the  defences  of  Washington,  where  the 
colonel  was  provost  marshal  and  the  regiment  his  guard. 

Two  days  after  the  battle  Pope,  having  been  joined  by 
King  from  Fredericksburg,  moved  forward  to  the  Rapidan, 
behind  which  Jackson  had  already  retired.  On  the  14th 
came  Reno  with  8,000  men  of  Burnside's  corps. 

By  this  time,  however,  Lee,  relieved  of  all  anxiety  on  the 
side  of  the  Peninsula,  was  pressing  forward  his  whole 
army,  with  the  exception  of  D.  H.  Hill's  command,  to 
Gordonsville,  of  which  Pope  was  apprised  on  the  16th  by 
an  intercepted  letter.^  Pope,  on  the  18th,  therefore,  fell 
back  from  the  Rapidan  to  the  Rappahannock,  and  on  the 
19th  the  whole  of  his  army  had  repassed  that  stream,  with 
»  16  W.R.,  135.  2  lb.,  28.  ^  n,.,  29. 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN.— PART  L  53 


the  exception  of  tlie  cavalry,  wlio  were  left  to  watch  the 
movements  of  the  enemy. 

Reno  was  on  the  left  at  Kelly's  Ford,  Banks  and  Mc- 
Dowell at  Rappahannock  Station,  and  Sigel  on  the  right 
at  Sulphur  Springs. 

The  new  General  had  commenced  liis  campaign  by  a 
retreat,  which,  in  the  words  of  the  Comte  de  Paris,  "  al- 
though a  necessary  manoeuvre  in  his  situation,  nevertheless 
promptly  belied  the  promises  contained  in  his  general 
orders."^ 

1 2  Comte  de  Paris,  266, 


III. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GENERAL  POPE  IN  VIRGINIA: 
ITS  OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN. 

Second  Part:  to  the  28th  of  August,  1862. 

By  JOHN  C.  ECPES,  Esq. 


COMMITTEE, 
John  C.  Eopes,  Esq. 

Bvt.  Lieut.-Col.  Charles  P.  Horton,  U.S.V. 
Bvt.  Capt.  Howard  Stockton,  U.S.A. 


Read  hefore  the  Society  on  Monday  evening,  Feh.  12,  1877. 


The  following  is  a  list  of  the  published  writings  by  Mr.  Ropes,  concerning; 
the  Civil  War  :  — 

Life  of  James  Amory  Perkins.  In  Harvard  Memorial  Biographies.  1866. 
Vol.  1,  pp.  395  to  403. 

The  Army  under  Pope.  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War.  IV.  New  York : 
Charles  Scribner's  Sons.  1881. 

A  Few  Words  about  Secession.    Harvard  Monthly,  May,  1887. 

Memoir  of  Charles  Devens.  [In]  General  Devens'  Orations  and  Ad- 
dresses.   Boston  :  Little,  Brown  &  Co.  1891. 

The  Story  of  the  Civil  War:  A  Concise  Account  of  the  War  in  the 
United  States  of  America  between  1861  and  1865.  Part  I.  To  the  Opening 
of  the  Campaign  of  1862.    New  York  :  George  P.  Putnam's  Sons.  1894. 

See  List  of  Papers  read  before  the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachu- 
setts at  the  end  of  this  volume. 


GENERAL  POPE'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIEGINIA. 


ENERAL  POPE,  once  behind  the  Rappahannock, 


was  ordered  to  hold  the  line  of  that  river  as  long 
as  he  possibly  could.  ^  It  was  already  the  19th  of  August. 
McClellan  had  started  on  the  14th  from  Harrison's  Land- 
ing, and  it  was  confidently  expected  that  in  a  very  few 
days  the  bulk  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would  be  for- 
warded from  Acquia  Creek  by  the  line  of  the  Rappahan- 
nock, and  from  Alexandria  on  the  railroad,  to  fight  under 
the  command  of  an  officer  who  had  a  popular  reputation 
for  more  ability  and  enterprise  than  McClellan  was  sup- 
posed to  possess. 

On  the  20th  Lee  brought  up  his  main  army,  and  occu- 
pied the  next  two  days  in  vainly  endeavoring  to  force  the 
passage  of  the  river  at  various  points,  but  particularly 
near  Rappahannock  Station,  where  a  successful  battle 
would  have  deprived  Pope's  army  of  the  railroad.  Fail- 
ing in  this,  he  naturally  drew  off  towards  his  left,  higher 
up  the  river,  no  doubt  with  the  idea  that  Pope,  who 
would  feel  himself  compelled  to  hold  the  railroad,  would 
not  be  able  to  detach  to  the  northward  sufficient  force  to 
prevent  his  crossing  in  the  neighborhood  of  Sulphur 


» 16  W.R.,  56,  57 ;  18  W.R.,  591,  593. 


58 


POPE'S   VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


Springs  and  Waterloo.  His  plan  evidently  was  the  same 
as  that  followed  by  him  in  the  fall  of  1863,  when  he 
crossed  at  Sulphur  Springs,  and,  by  a  movement  directed 
thence  on  the  Warrenton  pike,  and  also  with  a  view  of 
seizing  the  railroad  between  Warrenton  Junction  and 
Manassas  Junction,  forced  Gen.  Meade  to  retreat. 
And  there  was  apparently  for  a  time  no  reason  why  this 
attempt  should  not  have  been  successful.  Pope  himself 
expected  that  the  crossing  would  be  made;  but  with 
characteristic  boldness,  for  he  certainly  was  not  a  timid 
General,  he  was  prepared  either  to  move  rapidly  to  the 
northward  and  throw  his  whole  army  against  the  force 
which  had  crossed,  or,  if  it  sholild  look  more  promising,  to 
cross  himself  and  attack  the  remainder  of  the  enemy  on 
the  further  side.  And  when,  on  the  22d,  the  advance  of 
Jackson's  corps  actually  did  cross.  Pope,  getting  from 
Halleck  his  approval  of  the  latter  course,  gave  the  neces- 
sary orders  for  crossing  at  Rappahannock  Station.^  We 
can  only  stop  for  a  moment  to  speak  of  this  project,  and 
to  say  that,  though  it  possessed  the  merit  of  being  bold 
and  unexpected,  it  can  hardly  be  defended  on  sound  prin- 
ciples. To  cross  a  river  liable  to  sudden  freshets,  with  a 
powerful  force  moving  on  the  line  of  communication,  is,  of 
course,  a  hazardous  operation.  It  is  true  Pope  might  have 
gained  a  battle  ;  but,  had  Jackson  gone  straight  on,  leav- 
ing Lee  to  take  care  of  himself,  and  seized  the  railroad  in 
Pope's  rear  (as  he  unquestionably  would  have  done). 
Pope  must  soon  have  retreated,  and  might  have  found 
himself  in  a  very  serious  situation,  without  stores  or  muni- 
tions of  war. 

1 16  W.R.,  59. 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN  — PART  IL  59 


But  tlie  sudden  freshet  on  the  night  of  the  22d  put 
an  end  to  the  projects  of  both  commanders  for  crossing 
the  river ;  and  though  Lee  wasted  some  two  or  three 
days  in  waiting  for  the  subsiding  of  the  waters,  he 
was  glad  enough,  when  Ewell  was  able,  by  re  crossing 
at  Sulphur  Springs,  to  extricate  himself  from  a  perilous 
position. 

Tired  of  waiting,  or,  more  probably,  seeing  the  impor- 
tance of  doing  something  before  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
should  have  come  up  to  Pope's  assistance,  Lee  now  deter- 
mined on  a  project  as  rash  as  it  was  unprecedented. 
Jackson,  with  three  divisions  under  Hill,  Ewell,  and  Tali- 
aferro, was  detached  from  the  main  army,  and  on  the 
morning  of  the  25th  he  began  his  famous  flank  movement, 
by  way  of  Orleans,  Salem,  White  Plains,  and  Thorough- 
fare Gap,  upon  Gainesville  and  Manassas  Junction ;  the 
larger  portion  of  Lee's  army  remaining  on  the  Rappahan- 
nock, opposite  Sulphur  Springs  and  Waterloo,  to  detain 
Pope  until  Jackson  should  have  seized  liis  depot  of  sup- 
plies at  the  Junction,  or  at  any  rate  should  have  advanced 
far  enough  on  his  mission  to  get  a  good  start  on  his 
antagonist. 

Jackson's  movement  was  known  at  once  to  our  army; 
Col.  Clark  sent  word  of  it  to  Banks  early  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  25th.  ^  Its  object  could,  of  course,  only  be 
conjectured ;  but  it  was  perfectly  manifest  that  the  com- 
munications of  the  army  might  be  cut  by  a  force  moving 
through  Thoroughfare  Gap ;  and  Pope  himself,  venture- 
some as  he  was,  never  intended  to  permit  this. 

(See  his  despatch  to  McDowell,  of  August  27,  5,30 

1  18  W.R.,  654-655. 


60 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


A.M.,  in  which  he  proposes  to  occupy  Gainesville,  to 
secure  his  communications  with  Alexandria.)  ^ 

He  at  once  determined  to  cease  guarding  the  lower 
fords  of  the  Rappahannock  River,  thereby  giving  up  the 
line  of  communications  on  which  Porter  and  Heintzelman, 
who  had  joined  him,  had  hitherto  depended  for  their  sup- 
plies ;  and  this  was  wise,  as  far  as  it  went.  But  he  did 
nothing  to  secure  the  threatened  points,  —  the  Gap, 
Gainesville,  and  the  Junction,  —  save  to  write  to  Halle ck 
to  push  forward  the  troops  arriving  from  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  upon  those  places. 2  This,  he  persuaded  himself, 
would  be  sufficient,  for  reports  were  reaching  him  con- 
stantly of  arrivals  and  expected  arrivals  of  troops,  and  he 
flattered  himself  that  he  could  safely  rely  on  a  sufficient 
force  being  pushed  forward  to  secure  his  communications. 
The  fact  was,  he  disliked  the  idea  of  retreating ;  he  had 
ostentatiously,  at  the  outset  of  his  campaign,  cast  odium 
on  the  idea  of  its  ever  being  necessary  to  retreat  for  the 
purpose  of  covering  one's  base  of  supplies ;  and,  though 
he  was  altogether  too  able  a  man  to  believe  in  any  such 
nonsense  as  this,  and  too  good  a  soldier  not  to  eat  his  own 
words  and  act  on  sound  principles  when  it  came  to  the 
point,  he  persuaded  himself  that  things  had  not  yet  come 
to  this  pass.  He  ought  to  have  known  then,  —  and  he 
afterwards  learned  the  lesson  by  bitter  experience,  —  how 
unmilitary  a  thing  it  is  for  a  General  to  rely  on  the  action 
of  officers  whom  he  does  not  at  the  moment  command ; 
and  he  knew  that  Cox,  and  Franklin,  and  Sumner  had 
not  yet  reported  for  duty.  Sound  common-sense  should 
have  brought  him  to  Manassas  Junction,  Gainesville,  and 

»  16  W.R.,  35,  352.  2  X8  W.R.,  684. 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN.— PART  IL  61 


the  Gap  on  the  26th.  But  he  could  not  brmg  himself  to 
this  so  soon ;  he  thought,  probably,  that,  if  he  should  fall 
back  so  precipitately,  he  might  find,  on  arriving  at  the 
points  mentioned,  that  they  were  already  occupied  by 
troops  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  then  people 
would  accuse  him  of  unnecessary  timidity.  Besides,  it 
was,  perhaps,  the  most  likely  supposition  that  Jackson 
might  be  marching  directly  on  Warrenton  from  Salem 
and  White  Plains,  in  wliich  case  his  dispositions  would  be 
sufficient.  Therefore  he  satisfied  himself  with  concen- 
trating the  bulk  of  his  army  near  Warrenton,  where,  on 
the  morning  of  the  26th,  were  McDowelhs  two  divisions, 
Eeynolds's  division  of  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  Reno's 
division  of  the  Xinth  Corps,  and  Sigehs  two  divisions. 
Even  now  he  was  not  certain  of  his  plans.  He  was  a 
man  subject  to  sudden  and  violent  changes  of  opinion. 
His  orders  were  often  perplexing,  and  even  contradictory. 
For  instance,  Sigel,  whose  performances,  under  the  clearest 
orders,  were  generally  open  to  criticism,  ha^dng  spent  the 
whole  day  of  the  25th  in  the  neighborhood  of  Sulphur 
Springs  and  Waterloo  Bridge,  trying  to  find  out  what  he 
was  expected  to  do,  in  the  state  of  mind  natural  to  a  corps- 
commander  who  finds  the  corps  supporting  him  moving 
away  without  a  word  of  explanation,  and  having  finally 
got  a  welcome  order  from  Pope,  directing  him  to  march 
to  Warrenton,  and  having  marched  all  the  evening  and 
got  there  at  2  o'clock  in  the  morning,  received  on  his 
arrival  an  order  from  Pope  directing  him  to  cross  Water- 
loo Bridge  at  daylight!^  These  unexpected  and  appar- 
ently capricious  changes  of  mind  shook  the  confidence  of 

1  16  W.R.,  67. 


62 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


his  officers  in  his  comprehension  of  the  situation,  and  this, 
as  we  shall  see,  exercised  a  most  injurious  effect  on  the 
results  of  the  campaign. 

As  for  the  rest  of  his  army ;  —  Banks  with  two  divis- 
ions was  at  Fayetteville,  Porter  at  Bealton,  also  with  two 
divisions,  and  Heintzelman,  with  the  divisions  of  Hooker 
and  Kearny,  was  at  Warrenton  Junction.  From  Manassas 
Junction  to  the  Gap  there  was,  so  far  as  we  know,  not 
a  regiment  except  the  guard  at  the  depot  of  supplies. 

In  this  position  Pope's  army  lay  all  the  26th.  But 
Jackson,  passing  the  night  of  the  25th  at  Salem,  marched 
through  White  Plains,  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and  Gaines- 
ville, and  reached  Bristoe  Station  at  6  o'clock  on  the 
evening  of  the  26th,  without  opposition.  There  was  no 
Cox,  no  Franklin,  no  Sumner  in  his  way,  and  it  was  not 
his  plan  to  disturb  the  security  of  the  Army  of  Virginia, 
which  was  quietly  passing  this  summer's  day  within 
fifteen  miles  of  his  line  of  march  in  total  oblivion  of  him 
and  his  movements. 

And  now  comes  the  most  interesting  part  of  the  cam- 
paign. 

Pope,  on  the  morning  of  the  27th,  having  learned  that 
the  enemy  had  cut  the  railroad  at  Bristoe  Station,  but 
believing  then  that  the  main  body  of  Jackson's  corps 
could  not  have  got  through  the  Gap,  or,  at  least,  that  it 
would  be  passing  through  Gainesville  that  day,  ordered 
a  general  concentration  of  the  army  on  Gainesville.^ 
McDowell,  Sigel,  and  Reynolds  were  to  go  straight  to 
Gainesville,  and  Heintzelman  and  Reno  to  Greenwich,  a 
village  close  by,  and  on  the  road  leading  from  Catlett's 
» 16  W.R.,  70. 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN— PART  IL 


63 


Station  to  Haymarket  and  the  Gap.  Banks  was  to  look 
after  the  trains  on  the  raiboad,  and  cover  their  moye- 
ment  towards  Manassas  Junction.  Porter,  also,  on  the 
arrival  of  Banks  at  Warrenton  Junction,  was  to  move  to 
Greenwich  to  support  Heintzelman  and  Reno. 

These  movements  were  mostly  carried  out ;  McDowell, 
Sigel,  and  Reynolds  reached  Buckland  Mills,  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  Gainesville,  on  the  evening  of  the  2Tth;  it  was 
owing  to  Sigel's  slowness  that  no  more  progress  was  made. 
Kearny  was  at  Greenwich ;  so  was  Reno.  Hooker's  divis- 
ion of  Heintzelman's  corps  had  been  directed  to  march 
along  the  railroad  towards  Manassas  Junction,  and  had 
engaged  Ewell  and  driven  him,  after  a  brisk  action.  Por- 
ter was  at  Warrenton  Junction.  Banks  was  still  in  the 
rear,  near  Bealton  Station. 

After  all,  nothing  could  be  much  better  than  the  posi- 
tion of  Pope's  army  on  that  evening.  He  had  six  divis- 
ions pretty  near  the  point  on  wliich  Lee  must  march  if 
he  would  connect  with  Jackson ;  two  more  divisions  were 
within  supporting  distance.  Hooker  and  the  two  di^ds- 
ions  of  Porter  could  move  on  Manassas  in  the  morning ; 
Banks  could  be  up  during  the  next  day  certainly. 

These  dispositions,  wliich  Swinton  calls  "  not  only  cor- 
rect," but  brilliant,"^  and  of  which  the  Comte  de  Paris 
approves,^  were  not,  however,  as  we  feel  bound  to  state, 
made  with  the  intention  of  interposing  a  force  between 
Lee  and  Jackson,  but  simply  with  the  object,  as  before 
stated,  of  attacking  Jackson  on  his  march  from  the  Gap 
to  Manassas  ;  for  when,  on  the  night  of  the  27th,  Pope  had 

become  convinced  "  ^  that  Jackson's  whole  force  was  south 

1  SAvinton,  179.  ^2  Comte  de  Paris,  279  et  seq. 

3  C.W.  2  Suppt.,  144;  16  W.R.,  36. 


64 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


of  the  Warrenton  pike,  and  in  the  neighborhood  of  the 
Junction,  he  made  a  totally  different  disposition  of  his 
army,  showing,  as  it  seems  to  me,  that  his  previous  dispo- 
sitions were  mainly  intended  (as  I  have  said)  to  prevent 
this  movement  of  Jackson's  towards  the  neighborhood  of 
the  Junction,  and  were  ordered,  when  he  supposed  that  it 
was  only  Jackson's  advanced  guard  that  had  reached 
Manassas,  and  that,  by  concentrating  at  Gainesville,  he 
(Pope)  could  still  prevent  Jackson's  whole  force  from 
passing  to  the  south  of  the  Warrenton  turnpike. 

When,  however,  he  found  he  had  been  too  late  for  this, 
and  that  Jackson's  whole  force  was  in  the  neighborhood 
of  the  Junction,  and  he  bethought  himself  of  what  Jack- 
son's object  really  was,  he  conceived  the  idea  that  Jack- 
son would  attempt  to  turn  to  the  south  and  west,  and, 
passing  to  the  south  of  the  railroad,  would  fall  upon 
our  trains  under  Banks.  This  opinion  Gen.  McDowell 
also  shared ;  ^  and  although  the  Comte  de  Paris  treats  the 
idea  as  absurd,^  and  though  Swinton  does  not  deign  to 
mention  it  at  all,  —  thereby  leaving  his  readers  very 
much  in  the  dark  as  to  Pope's  real  plans,  —  it  must  be 
confessed  that  such  an  idea,  though  at  first  sight  extremely 
unlikely,  was  not  by  any  means  an  impossible  supposi- 
tion, when  applied  to  the  probable  future  conduct  of  an 
officer  like  Jackson. 

Pope,  then,  with  his  customary  impetuosity,  and  his 
usual  carelessness  as  to  the  possibility  of  his  troops  accom- 
plishing precisely  what  he  had  ordered,  directed,  on  the 
night  of  the  27th,  that  McDowell  with  his  whole  force 


U-5  W.R.,  316. 


2  2  Comte  de  Paris,  281. 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN.  ^  PART  IL 


65 


should  marcli  at  daylight  on  the  28th  from  Gainesville  to 
Manassas,  "resting  his  right  on  the  Manassas  Gap  Rail- 
road, and  throwing  his  left  well  to  the  east."  ^  He  also 
ordered  Kearny  and  Reno  from  Greenwich  to  Manassas, 
and  Porter  from  Warrenton  Junction  to  Bristoe.  And 
he  made  not  the  least  provision  for  the  holding  of  Gaines- 
ville or  of  the  Gap. 

What  would  have  been  the  result  of  these  movements 
had  they  all  been  strictly  carried  out,  and  had  Jackson 
turned  Pope's  right  and  attacked  his  trains,  we  need 
not  stop  to  inquire.  Perhaps  Porter  and  Banks  would 
have  defended  themselves  until  the  rest  of  the  army 
had  come  up.  But  Jackson  took  the  other  horn  of  the 
dilemma.  Having  refreshed  his  army  with  our  supplies, 
and  destroyed  the  remainder,  he  marched  off  at  mid- 
night, or  soon  after,  of  the  27th,  A.  P.  Hill  going  at  1 
A.M.  to  Centreville,^  Taliaferro  to  the  north  of  the  pike 
by  the  Sudley  Springs  road,  halting,  as  he  says,  at  day- 
light on  the  old  battle-field  of  Bull  Run ;  ^  and  Ewell,  who 
brought  up  the  rear,  bivouacking  between  Manassas  and 
Bull  Run,  but  at  dawn  crossing  at  Blackburn's  Ford,  and 
thence,  after  recrossing  at  the  Stone  Bridge,  moving  north 
of  the  Warrenton  pike  to  the  same  old  battle-field.^ 
It  is  plain  that  Gen.  Pope,  when  he  says  that,  if  the 
whole  force  of  McDowell  had  moved  forward  as  directed, 
—  i.e.,  '*  resting  their  right  on  the  railroad,  with  their  left 
thrown  well  to  the  east,"  and  at  the  time  specified,  i.e., 

at  daylight,"^  —  they  would  have  intercepted  Jackson's 

UeW.E.,  36.  2  lb.,  670.  ^  lb.,  656. 

^Ib..  710.  5  lb.,  37. 


66 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


retreat  towards  Centreville  by  8  o'clock  in  tlie  morning, 
and  that  it  would  not  have  been  possible  for  Jackson  to 
have  crossed  Bull  Run,  is  in  error.  The  nearest  place 
to  Jackson's  force  occupied  by  McDowell's  troops  at 
daybreak  on  the  28th  was  Gainesville;  and,  had  they 
remained  there  until  Jackson's  whereabouts  was  defi- 
nitely discovered,  it  would  have  been  far  better  for  them. 

Still,  it  must  be  remembered  that  Jackson's  expedition 
in  evacuating  the  neighborhood  of  Manassas  Junction 
was,  perhaps,  extraordinary,  and  that  had  he  not  re- 
treated with  so  much  promptness,  and  had  Pope's  orders 
been  strictly  carried  out,  a  collision  might  have  occurred 
that  morning.  We  do  not  wish  to  judge  Gen.  Pope  by 
knowledge  obtained  after  the  campaign  has  been  fought. 
Thinking,  as  he  and  McDowell  did,  that  it  was  likely 
that  Jackson  would  move  round  to  the  south  of  the 
railroad,  there  was  a  reason  for  the  concentration  of 
the  army  at  Manassas  Junction,  and  the  order  of  march 
directed  by  Pope  was  certainly  more  likely  to  intercept 
Jackson,  if  he  should  take  the  other  course  and  move 
north,  than  any  other  order  of  march.  But  nothing,  in 
our  judgment,  excuses  leaving  Gainesville  and  the  Gap 
undefended.  Two  strong  divisions,  three  even,  might  cer- 
tainly have  been  spared  for  this  all-important  duty  of 
preventing,  or  delaying,  a  possible  junction  between 
Jackson  and  Lee. 

Lee  was  well  known,  as  we  should  have  before  stated, 
to  be  on  his  march  for  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and,  whatever 
might  be  the  supposed  necessity  for  following  up  Jackson 
in  a  raid  round  Manassas  Junction  to  Catlett's  or  War- 


OBJECTS  AXD  GEXERAL  PLAN.— PART  IT.  67 


renton  Junction,  there  was  certainly  no  earthly  reason 
why  Lee  should  be  allowed,  without  opposition,  to  attack 
us  unprepared  in  the  rear  while  engaged  with  Jackson's 
column.  The  fact  is,  Pope  never,  from  first  to  last, 
seems  to  have  realized  the  need  of  holding  the  Gap  and 
Gainesville.  It  was  otherwise  with  McDowell;  for  he, 
having  ordered  reconnoissances  early  on  the  morning  of 
the  28th  in  the  direction  of  the  Gap  with  artillery  and 
cavalry,  during  the  forenoon  sent  Ricketts's  di^-ision  to 
the  Gap,  which  delayed  the  enemy  certainly  until  sun- 
down. Yet  Gen.  Pope  actually  finds  fault  with  McDow- 
ell for  this,  or,  at  any  rate,  he  regrets,  as  he  says,  that  any 
of  his  troops  were  sent  in  tliis  direction.^ 

^Tiatever,  then,  may  be  the  result  of  our  speculations 
as  to  the  probable  utility  of  Gen.  Pope's  dispositions  for 
the  morning  of  the  28th,  in  case  Jackson  shotild  have  exe- 
cuted the  movement  of  going  round  our  army  to  the  south 
of  the  railroad  and  making  for  Banks  and  the  trains, 
it  is  pretty  clear  that  there  was  no  reason  for  Pope's 
not  leaving  a  sufficient  force  at  the  Gap,  except  that  he 
did  not  realize  the  importance  of  this  position.  We  have 
now  to  point  out  a  further  illustration  of  this  singular 
inability  to  see  what,  to  most  critics  on  the  campaign, 
seems  so  plain. 

The  orders  for  the  28th  were  partially  carried  out.  By 
noon  Sigel,  Be^Tiolds,  and  King  had  come  down  from 
Gaines^dlle  to  within  three  or  four  miles  of  the  Junction. 
Hooker,  Reno,  and  Kearny  were  at  the  Junction  with 
Pope  in  person.  Porter  was  at  Bristoe  Station.  Banks 
was  marcliing  from  Catlett's  Station  to  Manassas  Junc- 

U6  W.K.,  37. 


68  POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 

tion.  And  by  noon  Pope  had  found  out  where  Jackson 
had  gone,  or,  at  least,  where  he  had  not  gone.  What  did 
he  then  do?  Did  he  instantly  order  everybody  upon 
Gainesville  ?  Lee  was  coming  through  the  Gap,  held  in 
check  by  Ricketts  only.  It  is  true  that,  so  far  as  Pope 
knew,  Jackson  had  retreated  to  Centreville ;  but  he  must 
have  known  that  Jackson  was  going  to  unite  with  Lee,  if 
he  could.  He  must  have  supposed  that  the  Centreville 
movement  was  only  to  get  out  of  the  way  for  the  time 
being.  He  knew,  at  any  rate,  that  there  was  to  be  no 
turning  of  his  own  position  to  the  southward ;  and  he  had 
every  reason  to  suppose  that  there  would  be  a  determined 
attempt  to  unite  the  two  wings  of  Lee's  army  during  the 
coming  day.  He  knew  that,  by  concentrating  at  Gaines- 
ville and  Groveton,  and  keeping  a  competent  force  at  the 
Gap,  he  could  separate  these  two  bodies  of  the  enemy 
while  he  was  attacking  one  of  them. 

Yet  in  this  crisis  he  divides  his  forces.  It  is  true  that 
he  sent  Sigel,  Reynolds,  and  King  to  the  Warrenton  pike, 
a  part  moving  by  the  Sudley  Springs  road ;  but,  fearing,  as 
he  says,  lest  Jackson  should  escape  through  Aldie  Gap, 
he  pushed  to  Centreville,  —  to  the  east  of  Jackson's  force, 
be  it  remembered,  —  Heintzelman's  two  divisions,  under 
Hooker  and  Kearny,  and  Reno's  division,  and  he  went 
with  these  troops  himself.  The  orders  given  to  Sigel, 
Reynolds,  and  King  were  to  march  to  Centreville;  and, 
on  attempting  it  that  afternoon,  a  severe  engagement  took 
place  between  King's  division  and  the  enemy,  with  no 
decisive  result.  By  an  unfortunate  accident  Gen.  Mc- 
Dowell, who  had  been  searching  for  Pope  without  success 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN— PART  IT.  69 


that  forenoon,  was  unable  to  find  King's  division,  and 
that  officer  (King),  finding  himself  on  the  left  of  the  line, 
took  it  into  his  head  that  he  was  not  in  his  proper  place  ; 
and,  when  Ricketts,  at  dusk,  retreated  from  Thoroughfare 
Gap  and  passed  through  Gainesville,  these  two  officers, 
in  the  absence  of  their  corps-commander,  abandoned  their 
position,  and  fell  back  to  Manassas  Junction. 

The  consequence  was.  that  on  the  morning  of  the  29th 
there  was  no  force  whatever  at  the  Gap,  or  at  Gaines- 
ville;  there  was  nothing  in  the  world  to  prevent  the 
junction  of  Lee  with  Jackson,  as  soon  as  Lee  should  have 
got  through  the  Gap  :  Jackson  was  confronted  by  Sigel 
and  Reynolds  only,  and  was  actually  pushed  towards  Lee 
by  every  attack  which,  under  Pope"s  own  direction,  was 
made  tipon  him  from  the  direction  of  Centreville.  Jack- 
son all  this  time  was  in  a  strong  position  on  the  north  of 
the  turnpike  and  to  the  west  of  Bull  Run. 

Had  Pope,  when  he  learned  definitely,  at  noon  of  the 
28th.  that  Jackson  had  retreated  northward,  moved  with 
all  his  forces  upon  Gainesville  and  Groveton,  adequately 
supporting  Ricketts,  who  was  then  fighting  the  van  of 
Longstreet's  corps  emerging  from  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and 
then  moved  towards  Centreville,  he  must  have  been  able 
to  have  attacked  Jackson,  with  all  his  forces,  at  daybreak 
on  the  29th,  if  not  before.  And  there  was  not  the 
slightest  reason  why  Porter,  and,  at  least,  one  of  Banks's 
divisions  also,  should  not  on  the  afternoon  of  the  28th 
have  been  sent  in  the  same  direction.  Even  if  we  con- 
cede that  it  was  too  late  that  afternoon  to  engage  Jackson 
in  a  battle,  yet  it  was  possible  to  beat  him  before  noon  of 


TO 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


the  next  day.  Pope  might  have  had  there,  excluding 
Ricketts  and  Porter,  who  might  well  have  been  at  Hay- 
market  or  thereabouts,  King's,  Reynolds's,  Hooker's, 
Kearny's,  and  Reno's  divisions,  the  three  divisions  of 
Sigel,  and  one,  at  least,  of  Banks's  divisions,  in  all  nine  or 
ten  divisions,  against  Jackson's  three,  and  the  contest 
ought  not  to  have  been  doubtful.  Instead  of  this,  act- 
uated by  an  ill-founded  fear  that  Jackson  would  make  no 
stand,  would  not  try  his  best  to  unite  with  Lee,  who  was 
just  emerging  from  the  Gap,  Pope  divides  his  own  forces ; 
and,  although  it  was,  so  far  as  he  was  concerned,  an  acci- 
dent that  Ricketts  and  King  fell  back  on  the  night  of  the 
28th  to  Manassas,  yet  this  would  not  have  happened,  had 
not  all  the  general  officers  got  it  into  their  heads,  from  the 
extraordinary  orders  of  the  day  before,  that  Gen.  Pope 
attached  no  importance  to  the  holding  of  Gainesville; 
for,  had  Pope,  when,  on  the  night  of  the  27th,  he  ordered 
a  concentration  of  the  whole  army  at  Manassas,  provided 
especially  for  a  competent  force  to  be  left  at  Gainesville 
and  at  the  Gap,  it  cannot  be  supposed  that  Ricketts  and 
King  would  have  abandoned  without  orders  a  post  to 
which  such  importance  had  been  attributed. 

Here,  for  the  present,  we  close.  The  events  of  the  29th 
and  30th  of  August  require  careful  consideration,  which 
will  occupy  us  at  another  meeting. 


ly. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GENERAL  POPE  IN  VIRGINIA: 
ITS  OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN. 

Third  Paet  :  to  the  end  of  the  Campaign. 

By  JOHN  C.  ROPES,  Esq. 


COMMITTEE, 
John  C.  Ropes,  Esq. 

Bvt.  Lieut. -Col.  Chaeles  P.  Hortof,  U.S.V. 
Bvt.  Capt.  Howard  Stockton,  U.S.A. 


Read  before  the  Society  on  Monday  evening,  March  12,  2877. 


GENERAL  POPE'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA. 


IHE  report  of  your  committee  brought  down  the 


operations  of  the  Army  of  Virginia  to  the  morning  of 
Friday,  August  29,  1862.  Let  us,  however,  briefly  review 
the  progress  of  the  campaign  to  that  point. 

Lee,  it  will  be  remembered,  lost  no  time,  after  the  with- 
drawal of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  the  Peninsula,  in 
reenforcing  Jackson's  corps  on  the  banks  of  the  Rapidan. 
Pope,  thereupon,  wisely  retreated  to  the  Rappahannock, 
which  Lee  for  several  days  in  vain  attempted  to  cross. 
Finally,  on  the  morning  of  the  25th  of  August,  Jackson 
began  his  flank  march  to  the  north  through  Salem, 
White  Plains,  and  Thoroughfare  Gap  to  Manassas,  which 
place  he  reached  on  the  26th,  at  evening,  finding  no  oppo- 
sition in  his  path.  Our  forces  were  partly  at  and  near 
Warrenton,  and  partly  on  the  Orange  and  Alexandria 
Railroad,  between  Bealton  and  Warrenton  Junction. 
Pope  here  lost  his  great  opportunity.  Trusting  that  the 
troops,  wliich  he  was  assured  were  coming  up  from  Alex- 
andria, would  guard  his  depot  at  Manassas  Junction,  and 
that,  at  least,  a  strong  corps  of  observation  would  be 
pushed  forward  to  Gainesville  and  the  Gap,  he  himself 


» 


73 


74 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


made  no  disposition  to  secure  these  all-important  places. 
The  troops  under  his  command  were  uselessly  allowed  to 
remain  at  Warrenton  and  Warrenton  Junction,  instead  of 
being  thrown  back  to  protect  his  communications.  Not 
that  Pope  was  indifferent  to  the  importance  of  these 
points,  or  lacked  the  decision  of  character  to  order  a  re- 
treat upon  them.  Had  he  positively  known  that  Franklin 
and  Cox  could  not  be  relied  upon  to  defend  his  communi- 
cations, there  is  not  the  smallest  reason  to  doubt  that  he 
would  have  had  his  army  at  Gainesville  and  the  Gap  by 
the  morning  of  the  26th.  But  he  did  not  relish  the  idea  of 
retreating,  and,  having  plenty  of  fair  promises  from  Gen. 
Halle ck,  he  made  the  mistake  of  relying  on  them,  instead 
of  relying  on  his  own  troops  under  his  own  orders. 

When  he  first  learned  that  the  railroad  in  his  rear  was 
cut,  on  the  night  of  the  26th,  he,  it  will  be  remembered, 
supposed  that  this  had  been  done  by  the  advanced  cav- 
alry of  the  enemy,  and  that  Jackson's  corps  must  be 
somewhere  between  the  Gap  and  Manassas  Junction ;  and 
accordingly  he  ordered  an  immediate  concentration  of 
nearly  all  his  troops  on  that  line.  By  the  evening  of  the 
next  day,  however,  he  found  out  his  error ;  he  discov- 
ered that  Jackson  had  been  more  rapid  than  he  had  sup- 
posed possible,  and  that  he  was,  with  his  whole  corps,  in 
the  neighborhood  of  the  Junction.  Then  he  conceived  the 
idea  that  Jackson  might  intend  to  carry  his  corps  round 
on  the  south  side  of  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad, 
and  make  for  his  trains  under  Banks.  Under  the  influ- 
ence of  this  idea  he  ordered  all  the  troops  to  move  from 
Gainesville  and  Greenwich  to  Manassas  Junction  on  the 


OBJECTS  AKD  GENERAL  PEAK  — PART  TIL  75 

morning  of  the  28tli,  and,  witli  the  exception  of  Ricketts's 
division,  which  McDowell,  with  better  judgment,  had 
ordered  to  Thoroughfare  Gap  on  the  forenoon  of  the 
28th,  —  a  step,  by  the  way,  which,  as  it  seems  to  us,  should 
have  been  taken  twenty-four  hours  earlier, — nearly  the 
whole  army  was  in  the  neighborhood  of  Manassas  at  noon 
of  the  28th.  But  at  this  moment,  when  Pope  himself 
arrived  at  the  Junction,  he  learned  that  he  had  guessed 
wrong,  —  that  his  antagonist,  instead  of  turning  to  the 
south  and  west,  had  turned  to  the  north  and  north-east,  — 
that  a  part  of  his  forces,  at  least,  was  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Centreville,  —  and  that,  had  he  not  given  the  orders  of 
the  evening  pre^dous,  his  army  would  be  betAveen  Jackson 
and  Thoroughfare  Gap,  with  all  the  chances  in  their 
favor.  It  was  not,  however,  yet  too  late  to  get  between 
Jackson  and  Thoroughfare  Gap ;  on  the  contrary,  nothing 
was  easier.  Had  orders  been  issued  to  march  to  Gaines- 
"vdlle,  reenforce  Ricketts  at  the  Gap,  and  then  throw  the 
bulk  of  the  army  upon  Jackson,  who  would  undoubtedly 
be  somewhere  on  the  Warrenton  pike  between  Gaines- 
ville and  CentreAulle,  there  can  be  but  little  doubt  that 
Jackson  might  haA^e  been  scA'erely  handled  that  eA^ening, 
and  destroyed  the  next  forenoon.  But,  Avhile  Ave  must 
accord  to  Gen.  Pope  the  praise  AA'hich  belongs  to  courage, 
energy,  and  persistency,  we  cannot  allow  him  to  haA^e 
possessed  great  judgment.  He  seems  utterly  to  haA'e  for- 
gotten that  the  remainder  of  Lee's  army  was  to  be  hourly 
looked  for,  emerging  from  Thoroughfare  Gap.  In  fact, 
this  singular  forgetfulness  of  the  approach  of  Lee's  army 
is  the  key  to  Gen.  Pope's  conduct  on  this  and  the  two 


76 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN', 


subsequent  days.  He  was,  moreover,  led  away  with  the 
idea  that  Jackson  meant  to  retreat  to  the  north,  towards 
Leesburg  or  Aldie  Gap,  forgetting  how  much  more  prob- 
able it  was  that  he  would  remain  on  the  Warrenton  pike 
and  unite  with  Lee  if  he  could.  Therefore,  instead  of 
concentrating  his  whole  army  at  Gainesville,  he,  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  28th,  sent  three  excellent  divisions,  those 
of  Hooker,  Kearny,  and  Reno,  from  the  Junction  towards 
Centreville,  and  early  the  next  morning  actually  went  there 
himself.  A  part  of  the  army,  it  is  true,  he  sent  back  from 
Manassas  to  Gainesville  and  Groveton,  the  three  divisions 
of  Sigel,  and  those  of  King  and  Reynolds ;  but  these  two 
parts  of  his  army  were  separated  by  a  distance  of  from  six 
to  ten  miles ;  and  the  balance  of  his  army,  the  four  fine 
divisions  under  Banks  and  Porter,  he  kept  in  reserve  for 
the  present,  merely  bringing  them  somewhat  nearer  to 
Manassas  Junction. 

Such  were  Gen.  Pope's  dispositions  for  the  day  which 
was  to  prove,  and  which  he  ought  to  have  known  was  to 
prove,  the  great  and  decisive  day  of  his  campaign.  Had 
he  adopted  the  other  course,  and,  using  all  the  roads  to 
Gainesville  and  Groveton,  concentrated  his  army  there 
while  he  yet  had  the  start  of  Lee,  no  one  can  say  how  suc- 
cessful he  might  have  been.  As  it  was.  King's  division 
eno^aged  Jackson  not  far  from  Gainesville  about  sunset 
that  afternoon  of  the  28th,  and  in  the  spirited  action 
which  took  place  Ewell  and  Taliaferro  were  both  put  Jiors- 
de-comhat.  Who  shall  say  what  might  have  been  the 
result  had  Hooker,  Kearny,  Reno,  Porter,  and  Banks  been 
there  to  help  ? 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN  — PART  IIL 


77 


And  now,  fortune,  which  had  hitherto  accorded  to  him 
a  fair  share  of  her  favors,  turned  against  him.  King  aban- 
doned his  position  that  night,  bringing  Ricketts  along 
with  him.  Their  corps-commander,  McDowell,  had,  most 
unfortunately,  got  separated  from  Gen.  King's  division  in 
an  attempt  to  find  the  commanding  General,  with  whom 
he  wished  to  confer.  Pope  states  that  several  times  in 
the  course  of  the  night  he  sent  orders  to  Gen.  King  to 
hold  his  ground ;  but  they  were  not  received.  And  so  it 
came  to  pass  that  these  two  officers,  Ricketts  and  King, 
finding  themselves  on  the  extreme  left  of  the  line  without 
definite  orders,  and  with  no  plan  of  the  campaign  in  their 
minds  such  as  can  generally  be  gathered  from  previous 
orders  and  movements,  —  knowing  also,  from  Ricketts's  ex- 
perience during  the  day,  that  Lee  would  be  through  the 
Gap  early  in  the  morning,  —  fell  back  to  Manassas  Junc- 
tion, leaving  Sigel  and  Reynolds  only  in  front  of  Jackson. 

Nothing  that  the  Federal  General  could  now  do  could 
prevent  the  junction  of  the  two  portions  of  the  Confeder- 
ate army.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  this  unneces- 
sary retreat  of  King  and  Ricketts  affected  the  battle  of 
the  next  day  far  more  than  the  inaction  of  Fitz-John 
Porter,  of  which  so  much  has  been  said.  Ricketts's 
division  was  perfectly  useless  all  the  next  day.  It  was 
marching  from  morning  to  night,  as  was  also  King's,  and 
neither  division  was  in  presence  of  the  enemy,  or, 
unless  their  march  up  the  Sudley  Springs  road  was 
observed,  had,  or  could  have  had,  the  smallest  influence  on 
the  fortunes  of  the  fight,  until  after  6  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon,  when  King's  division,  led  by  Hatch,  engaged  in 


78 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA- CAMPAIGN. 


the  action.  On  the  other  hand,  Porter's  two  divisions 
were  confronted,  as  we  shall  see,  by  at  least  as  large  a 
force  of  the  enemy  during  the  entire  afternoon.  But  we 
are  going  too  fast.    Let  us  go  back  to  Gen.  Pope. 

That  officer  having,  as  we  have  said,  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  28th,  sent  Sigel's  corps,  and  King's  and  Reynolds's 
divisions  of  McDowell's  corps  back  to  the  Warrenton  pike 
from  the  neighborhood  of  Manassas  Junction,  and  ordered 
Kearny,  Hooker,  and  Reno  to  proceed  to  Centreville,  took 
up  his  head-quarters  for  the  night  near  Bull  Run,  not  far 
from  Blackburn's  Ford.  Kearny  reached  Centreville 
that  night ;  Hooker  was  not  able  to  cross  Bull  Run  till  the 
next  morning.  Reno  was  between  the  Ford  and  Centre- 
ville. That  evening  Pope  learned  that  King's  division  of 
McDowell's  corps  had  had  the  severe,  though  short,  action 
with  the  enemy,  of  which  we  have  just  spoken,  near  Gaines- 
ville that  afternoon  at  dusk.  He  at  once  communicated 
to  Heintzelman,  who  commanded  Kearny  and  Hooker,  to 
Reno,  and  to  Porter,  the  news  that  McDowell  had  inter- 
cepted the  retreat  of  Jackson,  and  he  ordered  each  of 
them  to  march  with  all  speed  to  Centreville,  there  to  turn 
to  the  west,  and  march  on  the  Warrenton  turnpike  until 
they  should  encounter  the  enemy.  Of  Banks's  two 
divisions,  however,  he  did  not  propose  to  make  any  use, 
as  he  sent  him  no  orders.  The  orders  to  Kearny  and 
Heintzelman  were  dated  about  10  in  the  evening  of  the 
28th,i  that  to  Porter  at  3,  and  that  to  Reno  at  5  in 
the  morning  of  the  29th.2  remarkable,  to  say  the 

least,  that  the  order  to  Porter,  who  was  several  miles  off, 
was  not  sent  the  evening  before. 

1  16  W.R.,  74,  75.  2  lb.,  75. 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN  — PART  IIL 


79 


These  orders  were  given  in  the  belief  that  King  and 
Ricketts  still  held  their  position  on  the  Warrenton  pike, 
on  the  extreme  left  of  the  line. 

It  is  impossible  not  to  remark  the  singular  detour  pre- 
scribed to  the  troops  in  these  orders  of  march.  How  much 
wiser  to  have  ordered  Porter  to  McDowell  by  the  Sudley 
Springs  road,  instead  of  sending  him  round  by  Centre- 
^dlle,  at  least  a  dozen  miles  out  of  his  way !  As  for  the 
original  error  in  sending  Reno,  Hooker,  and  Kearny  to 
Centreville,  we  have  before  spoken  of  it.  As  Kearny 
was  then  at  Centreville  it  was,  perhaps,  well  enough  to 
order  Hooker  and  Reno  to  join  him ;  but  Porter  certainly 
should  have  been  sent  to  the  field  of  battle  by  the  short- 
est road. 

If  the  retreat  of  King  and  Ricketts  had  not  taken 
place  that  night,  —  and  for  this  it  must  be  recollected  that 
Pope  was  in  no  way  responsible, — it  may  ^rell  be  sup- 
posed that  the  action  of  the  next  day,  the  29th,  would 
have  been  certainly  at  the  outset  more  favorable  to  our 
army  than  was  actually  the  case.  King  and  Ricketts 
could  have  attacked  together  with  Sigel  and  Reynolds  at 
daybreak,  and  Jackson's  troops,  who  were  pretty  well 
exhausted,  might  have  suffered  severely.  Kearny,  as  it 
was,  arrived  at  Centreville  before  10  o'clock.  Hooker  at 
11,  and  Reno  at  12,  and  it  is  possible  that  before  Lee's 
army  could  have  got  into  position,  Jackson  might  have 
been  defeated.  Yet  before  9  A.M.  seventeen  regiments, 
we  know,  joined  Jackson,  and  Longstreet's  corps  was  un- 
doubtedly in  line  about  11  o'clock. 

There  would  have  been  an  opportunity  for  Lee  to  try  the 


80 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


manoeuvre,  —  which  he  tried  the  next  day  so  successfully, 
but  which  he  was  deterred  from  attempting  on  Friday  by 
the  presence  of  Porter's  corps  on  the  railroad,  —  that  of 
turning  our  left.  But  all  we  can  affirm  confidently  is 
that,  even  if  King  and  Ricketts  had  held  on,  Lee  would 
have  had  as  large  a  force  on  the  ground  at  noon  as  Pope. 

But  King  and  Ricketts  did  not  hold  on:  they  aban- 
doned their  position.  Pope  learns  this  about  6  or  7  o'clock 
in  the  morning,  and  at  once,  with  characteristic  prompt- 
ness, and  evidently  under  the  impression  that  Jackson 
will  retreat  to  the  Gap,  orders  Porter  to  march  direct  to 
Gainesville,  taking  with  him  King's  division  (Ricketts's 
whereabouts  Pope  had  not  then  learned)  ;  and  to  "  be  ex- 
peditious about  it,  or  we  will  lose  much,"^  as  he  puts  it; 
telling  him  also  that  he  himself  was  following  the  enemy, 
z.e.,  Jackson,  down  the  Warrenton  pike  upon  Gainesville. 
Nothing  was  said  to  Porter  as  to  the  course  to  be  pur- 
sued in  the  event  of  Lee's  reenforcing  Jackson.  Still,  had 
Gen.  Pope  issued  no  other  order  than  this,  the  spirit  of 
which  is  thoroughly  in  keeping  with  the  emergency,  and 
the  language  of  which  is  perfectly  consistent  and  intelli- 
gible, there  would  probably  have  been  no  court-martial  of 
Gen.  Porter.  With  three  fine  divisions  under  his  com- 
mand, with  orders  enjoining  speed,  defining  the  point  to 
be  reached,  allowing  of  no  alternative,  and,  above  all, 
breathing  the  spirit  of  an  impending  battle,  we  do  not 
doubt  that  Gen.  Porter  would  have  carried  out  the  simple 
task  set  before  him,  and  attacked  whatever  force  came  in 
his  way. 

But,  unfortunately  for  both  Pope  and  Porter,  something 

1 17  W.R.,  846;  18  W.K.,  729. 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  FLAN— PART  III 


81 


occurred  wliicli  induced  the  former  to  -^rite  another 
order.  Gen.  McDo^vell  had  found  his  corps,  T^'here  he 
least  expected  it,  at  Manassas  Junction,  and  naturally 
and  properly  conceived  himself  to  be  the  proper  person 
to  lead  it.  He  so  wrote  to  Gen.  Pope,  who  had  put 
King's  division  under  the  orders  of  Porter,  and  Pope 
thereupon  penned,  about  9  o'clock  in  the  morning,  the 
celebrated  Joint  Order "  to  Generals  McDowell  and 
Porter.    This  order  is  as  follows: — ^ 

^  Head-quaetees  AE:iiT  of  Viegixia, 

Centretille,  Augnst  29,  1862. 

You  will  please  move  forward  with  your  joint  commands 
towards  Gainesville.  I  sent  Gen.  Porter  written  orders  to  that 
effect  an  hour  and  a  half  ago.  Heintzelman,  Sigel.  and  Reno 
are  moving  on  the  Warrenton  turnpike,  and  must  now  be  not 
far  from  Gainesville.  I  desire  that,  as  soon  as  communica- 
tion is  estabhshed  between  this  force  and  your  own,  the  whole 
command  shall  halt,  It  may  be  necessary  to  fall  back  be- 
hind Bull  Run,  at  Centreville.  to-night.  I  presume  it  wiU  be  so 
on  account  of  our  supplies.  I  have  sent  no  orders  of  any  de- 
scription to  Ricketts.  and  none  to  interfere  in  any  way  with 
the  movements  of  McDowell's  troops,  except  what  I  sent  by 
his  aide-de-camp  last  night,  which  were  to  hold  his  position 
on  the  TVarrenton  Pike  until  the  troops  from  here  should  fall 
on  the  enemy's  [Jackson's]  flank  and  rear.  I  do  not  even 
know  Ricketts'  position,  as  I  have  not  been  able  to  find  out 
where  Gen.  McDowell  was  until  a  late  hour  this  morning. 
Gen.  McDowell  will  take  immediate  steps  to  communicate 
with  Gen.  Ricketts,  and  insti'uct  him  to  rejoin  the  other  divis- 
ions of  his  corps  as  soon  as  practicable. 

ne  W.R.,  76;  17  VT.R.,  825. 


82 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


If  any  considerable  advantages  are  to  be  gained  by  de- 
parting from  this  order,  it  will  not  be  strictly  carried  ont. 
One  thing  must  be  had  In  view,  that  the  troops  must  occupy 
a  position  from  which  they  can  reach  Bull  Run  to-night  or  by 
morning.  The  indications  are  that  the  whole  force  of  the 
enemy  [Lee]  is  moving  in  this  direction  at  a  pace  that  will 
bring  them  here  [Centreville]  by  to-morrow  night  or  the  next 
day.  My  own  head-quarters  will  be,  for  the  present  with 
Heintzelman's  corps  or  at  this  place  [Centreville]. 

John  Pope, 
Major-Qeneral  Commanding. 

Generals  McDowell  and  Portek. 

This  order,  of  conrse,  superseded  all  the  previous  orders. 
Its  tone  is  plainly  different  from  the  tone  of  the  two  pre- 
ceding orders.  There  is  nothing  in  it  that  looks  as  if  it 
were  written  in  expectation  of  a  battle  that  day.  The 
order  of  3  o'clock  in  the  morning  ^  was  written  when 
Pope  supposed  that  Jackson's  retreat  down  the  Pike  was 
barred  by  McDowell's  corps,  and  that  a  severe  engage- 
ment was  impending.  The  order  of  7  in  the  morning^ 
was  written  in  the  first  flush  of  indignation  at  the  news 
that,  by  th-e  unlucky  retreat  of  King  and  Ricketts,  there 
was  no  obstacle  to  Jackson's  retreat,  and  in  the  heat  of 
an  angry  resolution  to  pursue  him  at  all  costs.  But  by 
9  o'clock  Pope  had  had  time  to  consider.  While  he  sent 
orders  to  Sigel  and  Reynolds  to  attack  at  once,  and 
pushed  forward  Kearny,  Hooker,  and  Reno  on  the  pike, 
he,  nevertheless,  did  not  really  believe  that  Jackson 
would  stay  to  be  attacked.  He  was  not  a  man  given  to 
over-estimating  his  adversary's  courage  or  strength,  and 

U6W.R.,  75.  MSW.R.,  729. 


OBJECTS  AND  GEXERAL  PLAN. 


—  PART  III 


83 


he  could  not  suppose  that  Jackson  tvouIcI  voluntarily 
await  an  attack  by  our  whole  army.  As  for  Lee,  he  erro- 
neously supposed  him  to  be  thirty-six  hours'  march  dis- 
tant, as  he  says.  All  these  three  orders,  it  must  be  remem- 
bered, were  issued  on  the  su^Dposition  that  the  affair  was 
with  Jackson  only.  Pope  doubtless  thought  it  not  un- 
likely that  his  army  would  make  a  promenade  to  Gaines- 
ville, merely  picking  up  stragglers  and  some  of  Jackson's 
recently  captured  stores.  But  beyond  Gainesville  he 
could  not  afford  to  pursue  the  retreating  Jackson.  He 
had  had  time  to  reflect  on  the  scarcity  of  his  stipplies, 
and  on  the  absolute  necessity  of  forming  some  new  depot; 
and  he  had  very  wisely  fixed  upon  Centreville  as  the 
proper  place.  He  therefore  mentions  Centreville  as  the 
point  to  which  the  troops  of  McDowell  and  Porter  were 
to  fall  back  that  night  or  the  next  morning.  Besides,  he 
did  undoubtedly  expect  that  within  tliirty-six  or  forty- 
eight  hours  Lee  would  make  his  appearance  with  the  rest 
of  liis  army  to  support  Jackson,  and  he  had,  as  we  think 
the  language  of  the  Joint  Order  "  shows  by  clear  im- 
plication, made  up  his  mind  that  Centreville  would  offer 
the  greatest  advantages  for  fighting  the  entire  army  of 
Lee.  Here  Pope  could  expect  supplies  and  reenforce- 
ments,  and  there  was  here  a  strong  defensive  position. 

Xow,  all  this  was  doubtless  clear  enough  in  the  mind  of 
Gen.  Pope  when  he  wrote  the  order.  But  it  must  be 
admitted  that  this  "  Joint  Order  "  wore  rather  an  ambigu- 
ous look.  There  is  nothing  in  it  showing  he  expected  a 
battle,  yet,  of  course,  it  would  not  have  been  issued  had 
not  Pope  thought  it  possible  that  Jackson  would  stand  at 


84 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


bay.  There  is  nothing  in  it  enjoining  haste ;  though  Pope 
says  there  is.  It  is  an  order  to  march  west,  but  to  retreat 
at  evening  a  dozen  miles  to  the  east.  It  is  an  order  to 
cooperate  in  the  pursuit  of  one  corps  of  the  enemy  which 
is  retreating  west,  and  it  finishes  by  saying  that  their 
whole  army  will  be  a  dozen  miles  to  the  east  of  Gaines- 
ville by  to-morrow  night  or  the  next  day. 

Finally,  it  was  an  order  which,  by  its  terms,  provided 
that  it  might  be  departed  from.  It  is,  in  fact,  an  order 
requiring  some  previous  knowledge  of  what  was  passing 
in  Gen.  Pope's  mind.  When  we  remember  that  he 
undoubtedly  supposed  that  his  march  after  Jackson  would 
be  unavailing,  because  Jackson,  now  that  King  and 
Ricketts  had  gone,  would  retreat  to  the  Gap  as  fast  as  he 
could;  that  Lee  was  twenty-four  hours'  march  away,  and 
could  not,  of  course,  support  him;  that  the  question  of 
supplies  was  assuming  great  importance,  and  that  there 
was  an  evident  necessity  of  getting  to  Centre ville,  w^here 
the  army  could  get  them;  when  we  also  take  into 
account  that  Pope  ex2Dected  that  Lee  would  make  his 
appearance  with  his  whole  army  to  assault  the  lines  of 
Centreville  the  day  after  to-morrow,  —  the  "  Joint  Order  " 
becomes  intelligible. 

There  was  certainly  a  good  deal  of  delay  in  the  move- 
ments of  our  army  that  morning.  Pope,  to  be  sure,  sent 
orders,  which  were  obeyed,  to  Sigel  and  Reynolds  to 
attack  Jackson,  "  as  soon  as  it  was  light  enough  to  see, 
and  bring  him  to  a  stand  if  it  were  possible  to  do  so."^ 
But  Kearny,  who  came  from  Centreville,  did  not  arrive 
till  nearly  10,  and  Hooker  and  Reno,  who  had  to  cross 

1 16  W.R.,  38. 


OBJECTS  AXD  GENERAL  PLAN.— PART  IIL 


85 


Bull  Run,  march  to  Centreville.  and  thence  to  the  field, 
did  not  get  up  till  11  and  12  res^^ectively.  Pope  himself 
did  not  arrive  till  noon.i  Six  or  seven  precious  hours 
were  thus  lost  owing  to  Pope's  movement  to  Centre^ulle 
the  day  before. 

The  troops  of  Gens.  Sigel  and  Reynolds  seem  to 
have  fought  well  that  morning,  unsupported  as  they  were, 
and  to  have  even  gained  ground,  though  naturally  suffer- 
ing severely. 

Meanwhile  Porter  had,  on  the  receipt  of  the  first  order, 
moved  towards  Centreville  with  his  own  corps  and  King's 
division  of  McDowell's  corps,  but  on  getting  the  second 
order  he  had  faced  about,  and  had  passed  the  junc- 
tion of  the  Sudley  Springs  road  with  the  Manassas  Rail- 
road, proceeding  towards  Gainesville,  when,  towards  noon, 
he  was  overtaken  by  McDowell,  who  had  received  the 
"  Joint  Order."  The  rear  of  Porter's  column  had  passed 
the  junction  of  these  roads  at  this  moment  by  a  consider- 
able interval.  McDowell's  two  divisions  were  in  the  rear 
of  Porter's  corps.  The  column  had  halted,  and  skirmish- 
ers of  Morell's  division  had  been  sent  out,  who  had 
reported  the  presence  of  the  enemy  directly  in  front.- 
The  enemy  cotdd  also  be  seen  marching  from  Gaines- 
ville to  Groveton  on  the  AVarrenton  turnpike ;  all 
these,  of  cotirse,  belonged  to  Longstreet's  corps,  and 
had  left  the  neighborhood  of  the  Gap  that  morning. 
Gen.  McDowell  read  to  Gen.  Porter  a  note  he  had 
received  from  Buford,  written  about  9  o'clock,^  in  which 
he  states  that  seventeen  regiments  of  infantry,  one  bat- 
tery, and  five  hundred  cavalry  had  been  seen  by  him  nt 

U6W.R.,39.  nzW.R.,  968.  ^j^.,  903. 


86 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


a  quarter  before  9  that  morning  on  the  Warrenton  pike 
marching  from  Gainesville  towards  Grove  ton.  These 
troops  must  have  preceded  those  which  could  now  be 
seen  on  the  same  road  moving  in  the  same  direction.  It 
was  evidently  too  late  to  prevent  the  junction  of  Lee  with 
Jackson.  It  was  plain,  also,  that  our  advance  moving  from 
Centreville  had  been  arrested,  and  that  there  had  been 
some  fighting,  though  how  much  was  not  very  clear. 
The  two  Generals  held  a  consultation  together.  What 
was  best  to  be  done  ?  Between  them  they  had  more  than 
20,000  men,  excellent  troops,  well  commanded.  They 
could,  doubtless,  accomplish  something,  if  they  should  act 
in  concert.  It  was,  however,  plain,  that  by  pursuing  their 
present  line  of  march  they  would  strike  the  enemy,  and 
not  approach  Pope's  army,  which  had  been  brought  to  a 
stand  on  the  Warrenton  pike  at  a  point  north,  or  a 
little  north-east,  of  where  they  were.  It  was  evidently  a 
case  which  the  "  Joint  Order  "  did  not  contemplate,  —  a 
case  where  the  discretion  contained  in  the  Joint  Order" 
could  be  availed  of. 

Should  they,  then,  attack  the  enemy  in  their  front,  and 
drive  him  back  on  Gainesville  ?  Or  should  they  endeavor 
to  rejoin  the  main  army?  Or  should  they  separate,  the 
foremost  corps  (Porter's)  remaining  where  it  was,  fighting 
or  not,  as  occasion  might  require,  and  McDowell  marching 
north  by  the  Sudley  Springs  road  to  Groveton?  Unfor- 
timately,  as  we  think,  they  determined  upon  the  latter 
course,  and  McDowell,  whose  troops  were  in  the  rear, 
marched  up  the  Sudley  Springs  road,  reaching  the  field 
of  battle  about  5  or  6  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.    He  was 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN  — PART  IIL  87 


too  late  to  be  of  mucli  service,  though  Kmg's  division, 
then  led  by  Hatch,  King  having  been  taken  ill,  was  put  in 
at  a  threatened  point. 

Porter,  meanwhile,  remained  where  he  Avas  all  the  after- 
noon, occasionally  reconnoitring  somewhat  to  ascertain 
the  position  of  the  enemy.  He  was,  he  states,  directed 
by  McDowell  to  remain  where  he  was  without  attacking ; 
but  McDowell,  on  the  contrary,  states  that  he  told  Porter 
to  attack  the  enemy,  and  he  expected  he  would  do  so.  It 
is  not  our  province  this  evening  to  try  again  the  case  of 
Fitz-John  Porter.  All  we  need  say  here  is,  that  we  are 
satisfied  that  there  was  all  that  afternoon  a  large  force  in 
his  front ;  that  any  attack  he  could  have  made  must  have 
been  made  directly  in  front,  and  not  on  the  enemy's  flank ; 
that  it  is  extremely  doubtful  whether  anything  of  impor- 
tance would  have  been  gained  had  he  attacked,  and  that 
his  presence  on  the  railroad  prevented,  as  we  have  before 
pointed  out.  Lee's  turning  the  left  of  our  army  on  the 
Warrenton  Pike,  as  he  did  the  next  day  with  such  crush- 
ing effect.  We  believe,  also,  that  the  reiterated  statements 
in  the  "  Joint  Order  "  about  the  necessity  of  retreating  to 
Centreville,  combined  with  the  mention  of  the  probability 
of  the  enemy's  reaching  Centreville  the  next  day,  created 
a  well-founded  doubt  in  Gen.  Porter's  mind  as  to  Gen. 
Pope's  intention  to  hazard  a  general  battle  with  the  army 
of  Lee  anywhere  beyond  Centreville  ;  in  fact,  this  seems 
to  us  to  be  a  legitimate  inference  from  the  terms  of  the 
order.  It  must  also  be  remembered  that  Porter  had  only 
two  divisions ;  that  the  country  between  him  and  Pope 
was  difficult,  and  not  traversable  by  an  army  corps ;  and 


88 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


that  the  only  means  of  reaching  the  main  army  was  by 
the  Sudley  Springs  road  in  his  rear,  over  which  McDowell 
was  marching  all  the  afternoon.  Moreover,  he  had  no 
troops  on  his  flanks,  —  unless  we  may  call  McDowell's 
column  on  the  Sudley  Springs  road  on  his  right  flank,  — 
and  no  reserves.  The  fact  is  he  never  should  have  been 
left  alone  there  at  all.  Had  the  six  divisions  of  Mc- 
Dowell, Porter,  and  Banks  been  united,  and  attacked  the 
enemy  together  while  taking  up  their  positions  in  support 
of  Jackson,  the  result  of  the  day  would  have  been  wholly 
different.  But  to  Porter,  who  was  confronting  alone  the 
divisions  of  Longstreet,  the  question  of  attacking  was 
certainly  not  a  perfectly  plain  one. 

It  was  with  him  a  question,  it  must  be  remembered,  not 
of  attacking  a  force  already  engaged  with  Pope,  but  of 
attacking  another  force  in  his  own  front,  which  might  or 
might  not  be  as  strong  or  as  strongly  posted  as  his  own, 
and  which  certainly  could  be  reenforced  sooner  than  he 
could  possibly  expect  to  be.  We  do  not  say  that  a  less 
cautious  officer  would  not  have  attacked  boldly  whatever 
was  before  him.  By  2  or  3  in  the  afternoon,  at  the 
farthest,  doubtless,  and  probably  long  before  that  time,  he 
could  have  made  his  dispositions,  and  could  have  opened 
his  battle  with  Jones's  and  Kemper's  divisions  of  Long- 
street's  corps.  He  might,  of  course,  have  had  some  very 
great  success.  On  the '  other  hand,  he  might  have  met 
with  a  severe  repulse.  But  at  any  rate,  whether  defeated 
or  successful,  he  would  have  drawn  upon  himself  the 
whole  of  Longstreet's  corps,  or  at  least  three  out  of  his 
four  divisions,  —  those  of  Jones,  Kemper,  and  Wilcox, — 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN  —  PART  IIL 


89 


and  thus  enabled  Pope  to  contend  with  Jackson,  sup- 
ported only  by  Hood  and  Evans.  This  would,  however, 
have  made  no  difference  to  Gen.  Pope ;  for,  as  it  was. 
Hood  and  Evans  were  the  only  troops  of  Longstreet's 
corps  that  were  actually  engaged  with  him,  as  we  know 
from  the  reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  But, 
whatever  would  have  been  the  result,  the  operation  would 
have  been,  as  Porter  maintained  at  the  time,  and  as  the 
subsequently  published  reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  now  show  beyond  a  doubt,  a  very  different  opera- 
tion from  what  Gen.  Pope  believed  at  the  time  of  the 
battle.  He  thought  that  there  were  no  troops  in  front 
of  Porter,  and  he  expected  him  to  attack  tlm  enemy  with 
whom  he,  Pope,  was  fighting,  in  flank.  This,  as  we  now 
know,  was  out  of  the  question.  All  that  Porter  could 
have  done  was  to  have  engaged  the  enemy  in  his  imme- 
diate front.  This  he  did  not  think  best  to  do.  As  for 
liis  alleged  disobedience  of  the  order  dated  half-past  4 
that  afternoon,  it  arrived  too  late  for  any  action  to  be 
taken  in  obedience  to  it. 

The  battle  of  the  29th,  then,  as  it  turned  out,  was 
fought  by  Pope  in  person,  commanding  Sigel,  Heintzelman, 
Eeno,  and  Reynolds.  It  was  not  skilfully  fought,  tacti- 
cally. Besides  the  error  of  beginning  the  battle  by  Sigel 
and  Reynolds  alone,  and  making  no  serious  attack  until 
afternoon,  by  which  delay  ample  time  was  afforded  to  Lee 
to  get  his  troops  into  line  and  well  in  hand,  there  was  a 
great  lack  of  ensemble  in  the  assaults  that  were  made. 
The  troops  seem  all  to  have  behaved  well.  Grover's 
brigade  made  a  famous  charge.    Jackson's  and  Long- 


90 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN-. 


street's  veterans  resisted  with  tlieir  usual  tenacity,  and 
took  the  offensive  from  time  to  time.  As  a  rule,  in  this, 
as  in  our  other  battles,  the  force  which  was  attacked,  if 
not  outflanked,  held  its  own.  On  the  whole  we  gained 
ground,  and  the  advantage  was  with  us,  though  it  was  un- 
doubtedly a  drawn  battle. 

Gen.  Pope,  whose  mind  seems  to  have  been  unable 
from  first  to  last  of  this  campaign  to  comprehend  that  he 
had  anybody  but  Jackson  to  deal  with,  states  in  his 
report  that  he  is  positive  "  that  at  5  o'clock  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  29th  Gen.  Porter  had  in  his  front  no  con- 
siderable body  of  the  enemy."  "  I  believed  then,"  he 
goes  on  to  say,  "  as  I  am  very  sure  now,  that  it  was  easily 
practicable  for  him  to  have  turned  the  right  flank  of  Jack- 
son, and  to  have  fallen  upon  his  rear ;  that,  if  he  had 
done  so,  we  should  have  gained  a  decisive  victory  over 
the  army  under  Jackson  before  he  could  have  been  joined 
by  any  of  the  forces  of  Longstreet."  ^  This  is  now  known 
to  be  an  entire  mistake ;  and  we  can  hardly  pardon  Gen. 
Pope  for  not  having  known  it  at  the  time  he  wrote  his 
report.  Gen.  Buford  saw  17  regiments  of  infantry, 
averaging  800  men  each,  with  a  battery  and  500 
cavalry,  say  14,000  men,  marching  from  Gainesville 
towards  Groveton  as  early  as  9  in  the  morning. ^ 
But  Pope  did  not  get  on  the  field  till  noon,  as  he 
himself  says.  He  had  come  from  Centre ville,  where, 
of  course,  he  could  know  nothing  personally.  His 
head  was  full  of  Jackson,  and  only  of  Jackson.  And 
he  has  chosen  since  to  shut  his  eyes  to  the  truth  when 
he  could  have  learned  it.    The  report  of  Gen.  Longstreet 

'  16  W.R.,  40.  W.R.,  903,  1010. 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN.  —  PART  IIL  91 


states  that  the  division  of  Hood  was  on  their  left,  sup- 
ported by  Evans's  brigade  and  by  three  brigades  under 
Wilcox.  Kemper's  three  brigades  were  on  their  right, 
and  D.  E.  Jones's  di^dsion  "  was  placed  upon  the 
Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  to  the  right  and  in  echelon  with 
regard  to  the  three  last  brigades."  ^  At  half-past  4  or  5 
in  the  afternoon  Wilcox's  brigades  were  withdrawn  from 
the  left  and  carried  to  the  support  of  Jones,  to  the  railroad, 
as  Wilcox  himself  says,^  where  they  remained,  however, 
only  a  short  time.  This  was,  probably,  in  response  to  a 
slight  demonstration  made  by  ]Moreirs  division  of  Porter's 
corps  towards  dusk.  AMiile,  therefore,  Lee  was  able  to 
use  Hood's  and  Evans's  troops,  the  rest  of  his  army  hardly 
fired  a  shot.  Jones,  Kemper,  and  Wilcox  —  Anderson 
had  not  yet  arrived  —  were  contained  by  Porter's  corps. 
The}'  may  also  have  supposed  that  the  troops  of  McDowell, 
which  they  may  possibly  have  seen  marching  on  the 
Sudley  Springs  road,  were  probably  about  to  deploy  on 
Porter's  right,  thus  connecting  the  wings  of  the  Federal 
army.  Pope,  however,  in  a  letter  to  the  Comte  de  Paris, ^ 
actually  quotes  that  portion  of  Longstreet's  report  relat- 
ing to  the  movement  of  Wilcox's  divisio?i  as  showing  the 
only  movement  of  Longstreet's  corps  made  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  column  of  Porter,  and  omits  what  Longstreet 
had  just  stated  about  Jones's  division,  supported  by 
Kemper's  division,  being  sent  down  to  the  Manassas  Gap 
Railroad  as  soon  as  they  got  through  the  Gap. 

We  cannot  help  recurring  again  to  our  wish,  before 


1  16  564-565.  2  jb.,  598. 

3  Army  and  Navy  Journal,  Jan.  6,  1877,  346. 


92 


POPE* 8  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


expressed,  that  the  three  corps  of  Banks,  McDowell,  and 
Porter  had  been  put  in  together  that  morning.  The  right 
of  the  enemy  could  have  then  been  turned  with  a  ven- 
geance. These  six  fine  divisions  would  have  driven  Lee 
back  to  the  Gap,  broken  and  badly  defeated. 

It  is,  perhaps,  safe  to  say  that  Pope  would  not  have 
fought  the  battle  of  the  30th  of  August  but  for  this  ignor- 
ing of  Lee's  presence  on  his  part,  of  which  we  have  before 
spoken.  Having,  as  we  have  before  said,  arrived  on  the 
field  only  at  noon,  and  then  having  come  from  Centreville, 
and  having  found  that  Sigel  and  Reynolds,  who  were  en- 
gaged early  in  the  morning,  had  been  engaged  only  with 
the  troops  of  Jackson,  having  also  been  entirely  ignorant 
that  any  troops  from  Longstreet's  corps,  save  the  division 
of  Hood,  which  was  engaged  against  him  at  Groveton,  had 
been  able  to  reach  the  field,  —  for  the  division  of  Wilcox 
and  the  brigade  of  Evans,  although  supporting  Jackson 
during  the  greater  part  of  the  day,  were  not  actually  in 
conflict  with  our  army,  —  Pope  determined  to  call  up 
Porter  to  Groveton,  and  fight  the  next  day.  He  had,  as 
has  been  stated,  rather  gained  ground  in  Friday's  battle, 
and  with  the  exception  of  some  aid  rendered  by  King's 
division  towards  the  close  of  the  day  he  had  not  had  the 
assistance  of  McDowell's  or  Porter's  corps  at  all.  He 
naturally  argued  that,  with  the  reenforcement  of  these 
four  divisions,  he  could  beat  the  enemy  with  whom  he 
had  been  fighting  in  his  front.  And  so,  perhaps,  he  could 
have  done ;  but,  unfortunately  for  him,  he  had  to  reckon 
not  only  with  Jackson  and  Hood,  but  with  Wilcox,  and 
Evans,  and  Kemper,  and  Jones,  and  also  with  Anderson, 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN,  — PART  IIL  93 


wlio  came  up  that  morning.  And  for  tliis  battle,  as  for 
tlie  one  of  the  day  before,  he  entirely  neglected  to  sum- 
mon Banks's  corps.  Why  this  was  so  we  shall  never 
probably  know. 

On  this  30th  day  of  August  Gen.  Pope  was  to  learn 
by  a  severe  experience  the  folly  of  obstinately  closing 
one's  eyes  to  facts.  Had  he  been  willing  to  believe  Porter 
and  his  experienced  officers  in  their  statements  that  the 
enemy's  right  the  day  before  extended  across  the  Manas- 
sas Gap  Railroad  he  would  have  known  that  Lee  must 
have  arrived  with  his  whole  army,  or  certainly  with  the 
bulk  of  it :  and  he  would  very  probably  have  fallen  back 
across  Bull  Run  that  morning  and  quietly  taken  up  posi- 
tion on  the  Heights  of  Centreville,  where  he  would  have 
been  reenforced  by  Franklin  and  Sumner,  and  might  have 
defied  Lee  to  do  his  worst.  But  he  was  angry,  and  would 
not  see  the  facts,  or  hear  the  truth.  He  persisted  in 
believing  that  he  had  had  to  deal  in  the  battle  which  he 
had  fought  the  day  before  with  the  whole  of  the  reenforce- 
ments  which  had  arrived  from  Lee's  army,  and  that  it  was 
well  worth  while  for  him  to  fight  another  battle  with  this 
force  now  that  his  own  army  had  been  increased  by  Mc- 
Dowell's and  Porter's  corps. 

But,  now  that  the  absence  of  Porter's  corps  on  our  left 
flank  was  reported  to  Lee,  that  General  occupied  himself 
in  getting  his  troops  through  the  difficult  country  to  the 
south  of  the  turnpike ;  and  in  the  afternoon,  just  after  our 
right  had  met  with  a  sanguinary  repulse  in  attacking 
Lee's  left,  in  which  Porter's  corps  suffered  severely,  Lee 
tkrew  forward  an  overwhelming  mass  of  troops,  consisting 


94 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


of  Longstreet's  whole  command,  30,000  strong,  upon  our 
centre  and  left  flank,  driving  it  back  in  disorder,  and,  by 
threatening  Stone  Bridge  over  Bull  Run,  rendering  our 
retreat  imperative.  Warren,  Ricketts,  Tower,  Meade, 
Koltes,  and  Buchanan  distinguished  themselves  by  their 
firmness  and  gallant  fighting,  and  the  retreat  of  the  army, 
which  was  at  one  time  imperilled,  was  assured.  The 
army  fell  back  over  Bull  Run,  and  encamped  on  Centreville 
Heights  on  Sunday  morning,  August  31,  in  good  order. 
There  was  no  disorganization,  no  rout,  though  the  con- 
trary has  frequently  been  affirmed  by  partisan  writers. 

Gen.  Pope  had,  in  the  battle  of  the  30th,  suffered  a 
severe,  though  by  no  means  a  disastrous,  defeat.  He 
repaired,  however,  all  his  losses  by  the  reenforcements  of 
the  Sixth  and  Second  corps ;  and  the  army  under  his 
command  was,  on  the  1st  of  September,  fully  equal  in 
strength  to  that  of  his  adversary.  It  had,  however, 
suffered  greatly  in  confidence  in  its  chief.  The  failure  to 
inflict  any  severe  blow  upon  the  corps  of  Jackson,  so 
audaciously  exposed;  the  constant  marching  and  counter- 
marching; the  perpetual  orders  and  counter-orders;  the 
brave  promises  and  the  never-ending  retreats ;  finally,  the 
severe  handling  which  the  army  received  on  the  second 
day,  —  all  combined  to  render  Pope's  army  far  inferior 
to  that  of  Lee  for  all  practical  purposes.  But,  whatever 
might  have  been  Pope's  intentions,  Lee  gave  him  no  time 
to  mature  them.  He  realized,  with  that  sagacity  which  he 
afterwards  so  brilliantly  displayed  at  Chancellorsville,  the 
moral  advantage  he  had  obtained,  and,  without  pausing, 
he  threw  his  left  up  to  the  great  turnpike  which  runs 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN.— PART  IIL  95 

soutli-eastwarclly  from  Aldie  Gap  to  Fairfax  Court-House, 
and,  passing  about  four  or  fiA'e  miles  to  the  north  of 
Centreville,  through  Chantilly  and  Ox  Hill,  undertook  to 
turn  the  right  of  the  Federal  army. 

In  the  action  which  followed,  the  gallant  Kearny  was 
killed,  as  was  also  the  brave  Gen.  Stevens,  who  commanded 
a  division  of  the  Xinth  Corps.  This  seemed  to  cap  the 
climax  of  the  misfortunes  of  this  campaign,  and  even  Pope 
made  no  strenuous  remonstrance  against  the  army  being 
withdi^awn  under  the  guns  of  the  forts  surrounding 
"Washington. 

In  reviewing  the  campaign  we  ought  freely  to  accord 
to  Gen.  Pope  the  merit  of  courage,  energy,  and  decision 
of  character.  It  is  impossible,  however,  to  credit  him 
with  strategic  skill.  It  was  his  fault  that  Jackson  was 
not  utterly  defeated,  due  entirely  to  his  failure  to  seize 
Gainesville  on  the  28th  of  August.  It  was  liis  fault  that 
the  battle  of  the  30th  was  fought  where  it  was,  and  in 
the  way  it  was,  and  without  the  re  enforcement  that  two 
or  three  days  would  have  brought  him ;  for,  had  he  un- 
derstood the  battle  of  the  29th,  —  that  it  was  fought 
by  nearly  the  whole  of  Lee's  army,  only  a  part  of 
whom,  owing  to  the  menacing  position  of  Porter's  corps 
on  our  extreme  left,  were  employed  by  Gen.  Lee  against 
the  troops  commanded  by  Pope  in  person,  —  Pope  would 
have  fought  his  great  battle  with  Lee  at  Centreville,  in 
a  strong  defensive  position,  and  with  an  army  well  fed, 
and  stronger  by  25,000  men  at  least.  Those  familiar 
with  the  Peninsular  war  will  readily  recall  Talavera  and 
Salamanca  as  instances  where  Napoleon  found  great  fault 


96 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


with  Victor  and  Marmont  for  risking  so  mucli,  when 
reenforcements  were  soon  to  arrive.  Circumstances,  how- 
ever, can,  of  course,  be  imagined  where  the  peculiar  self- 
confidence  and  the  great  persistence  of  Gen.  Pope  might 
have  accomplished  a  great  deal.  Had  he,  for  instance, 
commanded  at  Antietam,  he  would,  unquestionably,  have 
fought  the  next  day,  and  would  probably  have  been  suc- 
cessful. 

Among  other  defects  of  Gen.  Pope's  military  character 
was  his  exacting  too  much  from  his  men.  He  tired  his 
army  out.  And  this  was  aggravated  by  his  continual 
changes  of  mind.  Countermarching  followed  marching 
with  almost  undeviating  regularity. 

Of  Jackson's  operation  against  our  depot  at  Manassas 
no  one  can  speak  too  highly  of  the  manner  in  which  it 
was  effected.  The  silence  and  secrecy  and  celerity 
of  the  march,  —  the  thorough  execution  of  the  task, — 
the  prompt  retreat,  —  the  wise  direction  given  to  the  re- 
treat, —  all  show  the  hand  of  a  master.  But  to  imperil  a 
corps  of  25,000  men.  by  throwing  them  in  rear  of  an 
army  of  50,000  or  60,000,  with  supports  two  days'  march 
or  more  distant,  cannot  be  defended  on  any  recognized 
principles  of  warfare.  It  was  a  rash  and  perilous  ma- 
noeuvre, and  the  object  was  not  worth  the  risk.  Still,  it 
was  bravely  carried  out. 

A  single  word,  in  closing,  on  the  alleged  demoralization 
of  the  army  at  the  close  of  the  campaign.  That  the 
moral  of  the  army  was  impaired  was  true  enough.  But 
its  structure,  its  organization,  had  not  been  broken  up  or 
in  any  way  affected.    The  troops  had  lost  confidence  in 


OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN— PART  IIL 


97 


Gen.  Pope  undoubtedly,  and  tlie  advent  of  McClellan  was 
hailed  with  joy.  That  the  partisans  of  McClellan  made 
the  most  of  the  loss  of  moral  in  the  troops  may  be  easily 
belieyed.  And  South  Mountain  and  Antietam  furnish  too 
sharp  a  contrast  to  Chantilly  and  Bull  Run  not  to  tempt 
the  picturesque  historian.  Gen.  Pope  had  lost  at  the 
outside  30  cannon,  9,000  prisoners,  and  perhaps  12,000 
killed  and  wounded, — but  these  are  the  highest  estimates. 
Of  his  army,  however,  Banks's  corps  was  comparatively 
untouched.  As  for  those  divisions  which  had  suf- 
fered the  most,  Gen.  McClellan  disposed  of  several  of 
them  in  and  about  Washington.  Sigel's  and  Heintzel- 
man's  corps  were  left  in  garrison.  He  took  with  him 
McDowell's  corps  under  Hooker,  Banks's  under  Mansfield, 
Porter's  corps  and  Reno's  division,  of  the  troops  that  had 
gone  through  the  campaign  of  Bull  Run,  and,  adding  to 
these  the  fresh  corps  of  Sumner  and  Franklin,  and  three 
fresh  divisions,  to  fill  up  the  Ninth  Corps  under  Burnside, 
he  was  able  to  control  a  very  effective  army. 

It  is  inexcusable  for  a  man  like  Swinton  to  say  that 
**the  structure  of  the  army  was  completely  dislocated; 
half  the  men  had  abandoned  their  colors,  .  .  .  and 
only  these  broken  battalions  lay  between  Lee  and  Wash- 
ington." ^  It  is  our  duty  to  reprove  severely  all  attempts 
to  add  to  the  interest  of  history  by  such  unconscientious 
coloring  of  the  facts ;  and,  therefore,  I  trust  to  be  excused 
for  having  dwelt  so  long  on  this  point. 

^  Swinton,  Decisive  Battles,  149. 


Y. 

THE  TWENTY-SEVENTH  DAY  OF  AUGUST,  1862 
(BEING  CHAPTER  YII.  OF  THE  HISTORY  OF  THE 
CAMPAIGN  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  VIRGINIA,  FROM 
CEDAR  MOUNTAIN  TO  ALEXANDRIA). 

By  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.  GEORGE  H.  GORDON,  U.S.V. 


Eead  before  the  Society  on  Monday  evening,  April  8. 1878. 


The  following  is  a  list  of  the  published  writings  by  General  Gordon,  concern- 
ing the  Civil  War :  — 

Brook  Farm  to  Cedar  Mountain  in  the  War  of  the  Great  Eebellion 
18G1-62.  A  revision  and  enlargement  (from  the  latest  and  most  authentic 
sources)  of  papers  numbered  I.,  II.  and  III.,  entitled  "  A  History  of  the 
Second  Massachusetts  Regiment,"  and  "  The  Second  Massachusetts  Regiment 
and  Stonewall  Jackson."  Boston:  James  R.  Osgood  and  Company.  1883 
Later  editions  published  by  Houghton,  Mifflin  and  Company. 
The  "  papers  numbered  I.,  II.  and  III."  referred  to  above  are :  — 

The  Organization  and  Early  History  of  the  Second  Mass.  Regiment 
OF  Infantry  :  An  Address  delivered  ...  at  the  Annual  Meeting  of  the 
Second  Mass.  Infantry  Association,  on  the  11th  May,  1873.  Boston  :  Rock- 
well and  Churchill,  1873. 

History  of  the  Second  Mass.  Regiment  of  Infantry  :  Second  Paper.  De- 
livered ...  at  the  Annual  Meeting  of  the  Second  Mass.  Infantry  Association 
on  May  11,  1874.    Boston  :  Alfred  Mudge  &  Son,  Printers,  1874. 

History  of  the  Second  Mass.  Regiment  of  Infantry  :  Third  Paper.  De- 
livered ...  at  the  Annual  Meeting  of  the  Second  Mass.  Infantry  Association, 
on  May  11,  1875.    Boston  :  Alfred  Mudge  &  Son,  Printers,  1875. 

This  paper  was  also  named  "The  Second  Massachusetts  and  'Stonewall 
Jackson." 

History  of  the  Campaign  of  the  Army  of  Virginia,  under  John  Pope, 
Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  A. ;  late  Major- General,  U.  S.  Volunteers ;  from  Cedar 
Mountain  to  Alexandria,  18G2.  Boston  :  Houghton,  Osgood  and  Company. 
1880.    Later  editions  published  by  Houghton,  Mifflin  and  Company. 

A  War  Diary  of  Events  in  the  War  of  the  Great  Rebellion.  1863- 
1865.  Boston:  James  R.  Osgood  and  Company,  1882.  Later  editions  pub- 
lished by  Houghton,  Mifflin  and  Company. 

See  List  of  Papers  read  before  the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachu- 
setts, at  the  end  of  this  volume. 


♦ 


GENERAL    JACKSON    AT  MANASSAS 
JUNCTION.^ 

"pv  AYLIGHT  of  the  27tli  revealed  to  the  Confederate 
Gen.  Trimble  a  wealth  of  treasure.  He  had  capt- 
ured military  stores  and  equipments  of  great  value  and 
vast  in  amount.  Indeed,  he  had  no  conception  of  the  real 
magnitude  of  his  prize  until  daylight  revealed  it.  The 
night  had  been  to  him  a  season  of  great  anxiety.  At  any 
moment  the  roar  of  an  approaching  train  from  Alexandria, 
filled  with  Federal  troops,  might  be  the  signal  of  an  open- 
ing conflict,  in  which  the  results  of  this  gallant  attack 
might  be  wrested  from  his  grasp.  Through  the  slow 
hours  Gen.  Trimble  awaited  with  impatience  the  coming 
day.  His  men  did  not  dare  to  close  their  eyes.  In  the 
morning  it  was  found  that  the  results  of  this  midnight 
dash  comprised  about  300  prisoners  and  200  slaves 
(recaptured),  and  that  the  loss  to  the  Confederates  was 
none  killed  and  but  15  wounded.  But  in  addition  to  the 
guns  and  equipments  an  amount  of  army  supplies  and 
valuable  material  was  disclosed  that  was  far  in  excess 
even  of  Jackson's  wildest  dreams.  In  the  official  state- 
ments, by  the  superior  officers  of  Jackson's  command,  of 

^  Gordon,  History  of  the  Campaign  of  the  Army  of  Virginia  under 
John  Pope,  143-173. 

101 


102 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


the  incidents  of  that  day's  occupation  of  Manassas,  they 
never  tire  in  the  repetition  of  the  barrels  of  bacon,  sugar, 
and  pork,  of  the  canned  delicacies  of  sutler's  stores,  of 
the  long  trains  of  new  cars  heavily  laden  with  supplies  for 
Pope's  army,  that  fell  into  their  hands.  Nor  were  they 
weary  in  gloating  over  the  delivery  to  their  emaciated 
troops  of  a  full  issue  of  "  Yankee  rations."  According  to 
reliable  statements  the  captured  storehouses  contained 
50,000  pounds  of  bacon,  1,000  barrels  of  corned  beef, 
2,000  barrels  of  salt  pork,  and  2,000  barrels  of  flour. 
Besides,  there  were  two  miles  of  burden  cars,  laden  with 
clothing,  oats,  corn,  and  whiskey.  The  list  further 
contains  175  draft-horses,  42  wagons  and  ambulances, 
4  sutler's  stores,  with  their  contents,  and  from  200  to  300 
new  tents.*  Well  might  Gen.  Jackson,  in  the  pride  of  his 
achievement,  speak  of  these  captures  as  "  vast  in  quantity 
and  of  great  value."  2  Before  turning  again  to  the  oj)era- 
tions  of  the  Federal  army  in  its  efforts  to  thwart  the  plans 
of  the  Confederates,  we  may,  by  first  following  the  move- 
ments of  the  latter  during  the  day  of  the  27th,  receive  a 
clearer  impression  of  the  campaign. 

Shortly  after  Trimble  had  arrived  at  Manassas,  he 
became  so  much  alarmed  at  his  situation  that  he  called 
for  reenforcements.  Jackson  sent  to  him  a  brigade  of 
infantry,  which  arrived  after  dispersing,  with  a  few  shots 
from  a  battery,  a  regiment  of  Federal  cavalry  that  con- 
fronted it.^ 

1  Official  Reports  of  Generals  Jackson  and  Trimble.  16W.R.,643- 
644 ;  721,  723.    cf.  2  Dabney's  Life  of  Jackson,  266-269. 

2  16  W.R.,  644.  3  Twelfth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 


AUGUST  27TE,  1862. 


103 


At  daylight  Gen.  Jackson  marclied  mth  two  of  his 
divisions  from  Manassas.  Gen.  ETrell,  with,  his  division, 
was  left  at  Bristoe  Station,  where  he  encountered  the 
Federal  advance  along  the  railroad  from  Warrenton  Junc- 
tion, as  will  hereafter  appear.  In  the  concentration  of 
the  remainder  of  Jackson's  corps  at  the  Junction,  the  six 
brigades  of  Gen.  A.  P.  HilFs  division  took  the  lead.  Gen. 
Taliaferro's  division  followed.  To  the  left  of  the  depot  at 
Manassas  Station,  Hill  drew  up  his  division  in  columns  of 
brigades. 

The  ground  occupied  by  the  Confederate  troops  was 
familiar  to  them.  Here  were  the  redoubts  which  they  had 
thrown  up  in  1861.  The  hospital  on  the  left,  the  ground 
around  the  railroad  station,  the  path  of  the  railway,  and 
the  run  over  which  it  crossed  about  three  miles  to  the  east, 
the  roads,  hills,  and  forests  were  the  same  that  had  known 
them  daily  for  many  weeks  after  their  triumph  on  the  bat- 
tle-field of  Manassas.  From  here,  in  1861,  the  Confederates 
had  threatened  the  national  capital,  and  from  here  had 
they  withdrawn  when  their  own  capital  at  Richmond  was 
in  danger  from  the  march  of  McClellan's  army  up  the 
Peninsula.  And  now  that  the  Federal  army  had  been 
vanquished ;  now  that  the  Confederate  capital  was  no 
longer  tln-eatened  by  a  hostile  force,  again  had  they 
returned  to  Manassas  to  strike  the  first  blow  in  a  series  of 
strategetical  movements  whose  boldness  and  whose  vigor 
more  than  ever  before  or  ever  after  threatened  the  very 
existence  of  our  national  life. 

When  Jackson  arrived  at  Manassas  Station  instant 
measures  were  taken  to   meet  any  force  that  might 


104 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


threaten  Mm  from  Washington.  That  Halleck  would  send 
along  the  railway  all  his  available  infantry,  to  recover  the 
stores  at  Manassas,  could  not  be  doubtful.  What  that 
force  was  may  have  been  known  to  Jackson  through  spies 
that  swarmed  at  Alexandria ;  for  he  did  not  move  as  if  he 
were  apprehensive  of  serious  danger  from  the  front, 
though  he  posted  his  troops  to  meet  whatever  might 
come.  Muzzles  of  field-guns  again  looked  over  parapets 
of  deserted  earthworks,  and  again  the  plains  of  Manassas 
were  dotted  over  with  compact  columns  of  infantry,  while 
the  wooded  hill-tops,  that  look  down  upon  the  historic 
Bull  Run  at  their  feet,  were  filled  with  skirmishers  of 
infantry  and  dismounted  cavalry.  The  Confederates  were 
soon  apprised  of  the  appearance  of  the  enemy.  At  about 
7  o'clock  in  the  morning  a  long  train  of  cars  coming  from 
the  direction  of  Washington  drew  up  on  the  eastern  side 
of  the  railroad  bridge.  The  troops  disembarked  at  the 
stream,  crossed  the  bridge,  and  formed  in  line  of  battle, 
facing  towards  Manassas.  Their  commander  was  Gen. 
Taylor,  of  New  Jersey,  and  his  troops  were  regiments  of 
New  Jersey  volunteers.  An  order  to  move  forward  was 
given,  and  obeyed  with  a  spirit  and  determination  to 
which  Gen.  Jackson  himself  bore  witness  in  his  report. 
The  Federal  brigade  had  advanced  without  serious  mo- 
lestation to  a  point  near  the  hospital  building,  which  is 
about  800  yards  from  Manassas  Station,  when  Gen.  Jack- 
son rode  up  to  Gen.  Archer,  of  Hill's  division,  with  a 
battery,  and  ordered  him  to  support  it.  For  a  brief  period 
there  were  exchanges  of  shots  from  Federal  and  from 
Confederate  artillery.    From  the  redoubts  and  from  the 


AUGUST  27 TH,  1862. 


105 


plain  on  the  east  and  on  the  west  of  the  raiboad,  six 
different  batteries  of  Hill's  division  concentrated  their  fire 
on  this  single  brigade  of  raw  levies.  The  result  could 
not  be  doubtful;  it  was  too  uneven  to  last  long.  The 
Federal  troops  broke  in  confusion  and  turned  towards  the 
railroad  bridge  in  flight.  The  Confederate  batteries  fol- 
lowed, firing  upon  the  retreating  column.  The  infantry 
of  Hill's  division  took  up  the  pursuit.  The  Federals 
reached  the  railroad  bridge,  crossed  it,  and  attempted  a 
stand  upon  the  eastern  bank  of  Bull  Run.  But  they  were 
soon  driven  away.  The  Confederates  crossed  the  river, 
destroyed  the  train  of  cars  which  brought  Gen.  Taylor 
to  the  scene  of  action,  burned  the  railroad  bridge,  and 
advanced  for  half  a  mile  beyond  the  run.  The  gallant 
conduct  of  Gen.  Taylor  called  forth  from  Jackson  com- 
mendation for  his  character,  and  condemnation  of  his 
cause.  Gen.  Taylor  was  mortally  wounded  in  this  fight, 
and  this  was  his  eulogy.  The  Federal  dead  and  wounded 
were  left  on  the  field;  many  prisoners  were  taken.' 

When  the  Confederate  troops  were  recalled  from  the 
pursuit  their  attention  was  turned  to  the  captured  stores, 
which  there  had  been  some  attempt  to  preserve  from  the 
hungry  men  that  swarmed  around  them.  Gen.  Trimble 
had  seen  with  impatience  what  he  called  an  indiscriminate 
plunder  of  his  Federal  commissariat  by  the  Confederate 

^  Gen.  A.  P.  Hill  reports  the  number  of  Tederal  prisoners  as  200.  16 
"W.R.,  670.  Gen.  Archer,  of  Hill's  division,  reports  the  loss  in  his  brigade 
as  four  killed  and  seventeen  wounded.  lb.,  699.  For  accounts  of  Fed- 
eral attack  on  Manassas  Junction,  August  27,  see  lb.,  401  et  seq.  Official 
Eeports  of  Generals  Jackson,  lb.,  643;  Hill,  lb.,  670;  Archer,  lb.,  699; 
Pender,  lb.,  697;  and  Trimble,  lb.,  720-723. 


106 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


cavalry ;  but  now  he  was  called  upon  to  bear  a  greater 
grievance. 

Gen.  Hill's  division  had  returned  from  its  pursuit.  His 
men  were  very  hungry ;  with  longing  eyes  they  looked 
upon  the  captured  rations,  over  which  Trimble's  sentinels 
had  been  keeping  guard.  Gen.  Hill  would  not  restrain 
them. 

Weak  and  haggard  from  their  diet  of  green  corn  and 
apples,  one  can  well  imagine  with  what  surprise  their  eyes 
opened  upon  the  contents  of  the  sutler's  stores,  containing 
an  amount  and  variety  of  property  such  as  they  had  never 
before  conceived  of.  Then  came  a  storming  charge  of 
hungry  men  rushing  in  tumultuous  mobs  over  each  other's 
heads,  under  each  other's  feet,  anywhere,  everywhere,  to 
satisfy  a  craving  hunger  stronger  than  a  yearning  for 
fame.  There  were  no  laggards  in  that  charge,  and  there 
was  abundant  evidence  of  the  fruits  of  victory.  It  is 
barely  possible  that  the  luckless  purveyors  of  luxuries  for 
Pope's  army  witnessed  such  amusing  scenes  without  re- 
flecting upon  an  ensuing  ruin.  Men,  ragged  and  famished, 
clutched  tenaciously  at  whatever  came  in  their  way, 
whether  of  clothing  or  food,  of  luxury  or  necessity.  Here 
a  long  yellow-haired,  barefooted  son  of  the  South  claimed 
as  prizes  a  tooth-brush,  a  box  of  candles,  a  quantity  of 
lobster  salad,  a  barrel  of  coffee ;  while  there  another, 
whose  butternut-colored  homespun  hung  around  him  in 
tatters,  crammed  himself  with  lobster  salad,  sardines, 
potted  game,  and  sweetmeats,  and  washed  them  down 
with  Rhenish  wine.  As  there  were  no  wagons  at  hand  to 
transport  these  captured  delicacies,  every  soldier  ate  what 


AUGUST  27TH,  1862. 


107 


he  could,  and  carried  away  all  the  lighter  articles  that  he 
could  not  eat.  Nor  was  the  outer  man  neglected.  From 
piles  of  new  clothing  the  soldiers  of  Jackson's  corps 
arrayed  themselves  in  the  blue  uniforms  of  the  Federals. 
The  naked  were  clad,  the  barefooted  were  shod,  the  sick  and 
wounded  were  provided  with  comforts  and  luxuries  to 
which  they  had  long  been  strangers.  Jackson's  men 
found  themselves  in  possession  of  all  they  most  required, 
and  they  fell  to  in  its  distribution  with  a  will  to  which 
Peter  in  his  vision  was  a  stranger.  But  though  all  was 
eaten  that  men  could  eat,  and  all  was  laden  that  men  or 
means  of  transportation  at  hand  could  bear,  there  yet 
remained  vast  amounts  to  be  destroyed.  The  first  step  in 
Lee's  plan  of  operations  against  Pope  had  been  taken. 
Jackson  had  met  with  a  success  that  exceeded  even  the 
most  sanguine  hopes  of  his  commander,  as  high  as  his 
hopes  may  have  been  raised  when  he  let  loose  such  an 
agent  as  Jackson  to  mar  and  destroy  the  plans  of  such 
commanders  as  Halle ck  in  his  chair  at  Washington,  and 
Pope  as  his  subordinate  in  the  field.  Therefore  Gen. 
Jackson  made  preparation  for  his  second  move  in  the 
game.  And  this  was,  to  throw  his  corps  northward  upon 
the  old  battle-field  of  Bull  Run,  taking  up  a  position  be- 
tween Sudley  Spring  and  Groveton,  and  thus,  while  con- 
trolling the  Orange  and  Alexandria  turnpike  near  Grove- 
ton,  remain  where  he  could  over  the  shortest  line  effect  the 
most  rapid  junction  with  Longstreet,  who,  in  command  of 
the  remainder  of  Lee's  army,  was  hastening  to  pour  his 
veterans  through  Thoroughfare  Gap.  And  there  were 
other  reasons  why  Gen.  Jackson  established  himself  there. 


108 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


But  now  and  here  to  discuss  the  advantages  which  this 
position  secured  to  the  Confederates,  to  meet  such  con- 
tingencies as  Halleck  and  Pope  might  evolve,  would  be 
out  of  place.    It  will  be  referred  to  hereafter. 

During  the  afternoon  of  the  27th  preparation  was  made 
to  burn  the  doomed  supplies  at  Manassas.  This  was  to 
occur  simultaneously  with  the  evacuation  of  that  place. 
At  night  two  brigades  of  Hill's  division  were  thrown  south 
of  Manassas  Junction,  and  formed  in  line  of  battle,  facing 
in  the  direction  of  Bristoe  Station,  to  guard  the  rear  of 
Jackson's  army.  As  they  stood  there  under  arms  the 
conflagration  burst  upon  them.  In  their  front  was  the  re- 
tiring division  of  Ewell,  the  last  of  Jackson's  corps,  moving 
towards  Manassas.  Beyond  them  was  that  portion  of 
Pope's  army  that  was  hurrying  on  eastward  along- the  line 
of  the  railway  to  Bristoe  Station.  To  the  north  the  divis- 
ion of  Hill  was  in  motion  for  Blackburn's  Ford,  thence  to 
march  on  the  direct  road  to  Centreville.  Taliaferro,  too, 
was  on  the  march.  By  the  nearest  road  that  led  across  the 
Warrenton  and  Alexandria  turnpike  he  pursued  the  old 
military  road  towards  Sudley  Mills,  to  halt  on  the  old 
battle-field  of  Manassas.  In  his  charge  were  all  the  Fed- 
eral spoils  that  the  Confederates  could  transport.  Ewell's 
pathway  carried  him  across  Bull  Run,  thence  up  its  north 
bank,  until  the  Centreville  turnpike  was  reached,  when  he 
was  ordered  to  move  westward  in  the  general  plan  of  concen- 
tration.   Stuart's  cavalry  covered  the  infantry  columns. 

The  Confederate  cavalry  had,  on  the  27th,  pressed  the 
good  fortune  of  the  Confederate  infantry  with  wonderful 
activity.   Gen.  Fitzhugh  Lee,  with  a  portion  of  his  com- 


AUGUST  27TH,  1862, 


109 


mand,  had.  pursued  the  terror-stricken  fugitives  from  the 
Federal  brigade  of  Taylor,  until  he  ca^Dtured  stores  and 
prisoners  at  Burke's  Station,  on  the  Orange  and  Alexan- 
dria Eailroad,  within  but  about  12  miles  of  Alexandria. 
Nor  had  other  detachments  of  the  Confederate  cavalry- 
been  wanting  in  most  zealous  endeavor.  It  is  true 
that  their  task  was  not  attended  with  either  danger  or 
difficulty.  To  hang  on  the  outskirts  of  Pope's  army,  to 
raid  over  all  the  highways  and  turnpikes,  along  which 
small  fragments  of  Federal  foot  or  Federal  horse  might  be 
found  foraging,  was  either  the  sportive  effort  which  Stuart 
claimed  to  have  found  it,  Avhenever  the  Federal  cavalry 
commander,  Buford,  was  not  present  to  oppose,  or  the 
serious  business  wliich  Buford  always  made  it  whenever  he 
led  his  men  into  action.  But  now  Buford  was  endeavor- 
ing to  find  Jackson  to  the  west  of  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and 
Stuart's  caA^alry  raided  with  impunity. 

With  their  path  illuminated  by  the  red  flames  bursting 
out  from  the  warehouses,  the  sutler's  stores,  and  the  cars, 
the  rear  guard  of  Hill's  division  witnessed  the  smoulder- 
ing ruins  of  almost  CA'ery  article  necessary  for  the  outfit  of 
a  great  army.^  The  emotions  which  such  ruin  created  in 
Pope  may  be  contrasted  Avith  the  elation  which  it  aroused 
in  Jackson.  That  both  armies  should,  under  the  circum- 
stances, be  differently  affected  could  not  but  follow.  The 
despair  of  the  Federals  excited  new  hopes  in  the  Con- 
federates. 

^See  official  reports  of  Generals  Jackson,  16W.R.,  644;  Hill,  lb., 
670;  Stuart,  lb.,  739;  Early,  lb.,  708;  Capt.  J.  K.  Boswell,  lb.,  651; 
chief  engineer  of  Jackson's  corps,  Lieut. -Col.  R.  L.  Walker,  Hill's 
diyision,  chief  of  artillery,  lb.,  673. 


110 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


It  has  been  charged  that,  but  for  grave  omissions  and 
negligences,  Gen.  Jackson  would  have  met  with  disaster 
at  Manassas ;  and  it  has  been  a  popular  belief  that  if  Gen. 
McClellan  had  forwarded  troops  from  Alexandria  as 
rapidly  as  he  could,  this  disaster  might  have  been 
averted. 

A  brief  reference  to  the  facts  of  that  campaign  will  not 
only  show  the  falsity  of  this  charge,  but  will  give,  it  may 
be  hoped,  a  clear  insight  into  the  motives  that  controlled 
the  General-in-chief  in  Washington. 

There  is  no  evidence  that  on  the  day  Jackson  cut 
Pope's  line  of  communication  at  Bristoe,  Halleck  was 
much  impressed  with  the  necessity  of  strengthening 
Pope's  army,  or  guarding  Pope's  communications,  by 
troops  from  Alexandria.  Although  Pope  in  his  official 
report  bewails  the  heavy  misfortune  that  happened  to 
him  on  the  night  of  the  26th  of  August,  through  faults 
and  negligences  not  his  own,  it  cannot  be  denied  that 
his  despatches  to  Halleck  were  the  sole  cause  of 
Halleck's  unconcern. 

That  Pope  believed  the  Confederates  were  marching  for 
the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah  on  the  26th  of  August 
plainly  appears  from  his  despatches  to  McDowell;  and 
that  he  communicated  that  belief  to  Halleck,  as  plainly 
appears  from  Halleck's  despatch  to  McClellan  as  late  as 
11  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  26th,  in  which  he  says ; 

There  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  enemy  is  moving 
in  large  force  into  the  Shenandoah  valley,"  and  that 
"  reconnaissances  will  soon  determine."  ^ 

1 12  W.R.,  94. 


AUGUST  27 TH,  1862. 


Ill 


Further  instructions  given  by  the  General-in-ehief  in 
this  despatch  to  McClellan,  who  was  then  at  Acquia  Creek, 
overlooking  the  arrival  of  troops  from  the  Peninsula,  and 
transferring  them  to  Falmouth,  —  that  he  would  draw 
no  more  troops  down  the  Rappahannock  at  present,  for 
all  would  be  wanted  in  the  direction  of  the  Shenandoah 
valley,  ^  —  only  strengthen  the  conviction  that  Pope  had 
impressed  his  fatal  blindness  upon  Halleck.  We  are  not, 
therefore,  surprised  that,  as  one  would  speak  upon  matters 
of  little  concern,  so  Halleck,  in  his  despatch  of  11  o'clock 
in  the  morning  of  the  26th,  informed  McClellan  that  he 
* '  had  better  leave  Burnside  in  charge  at  Acquia  Creek, 
and  come  to  Alexandria,  as  very  great  irregularities  were 
reported  there  ;  "  and  that  ' '  Franklin's  corps  will  march 
as  soon  as  it  receives  transportation."^  No  doubt  there 
had  been  irregularities  ;  no  doubt  there  had  been  confusion 
in  Alexandria :  officers  clamoring  for  transpoi-tation ; 
managers  in  despair  at  the  inadequacy  of  the  means  of 
transportation  at  hand ;  new  relays  of  men  and  material 
constantly  arriving  from  the  old  Army  of  the  Potomac ; 
and  a  single  line  of  railway,  crowded  to  its  utmost  capac- 
ity, and  yet  making  little  impression  upon  the  troops, 
equipments,  and  stores  that  poured  into  Alexandria. 
Had  Halleck  known  how  near  Jackson  was  to  that  single 
line  of  railway  while  he  was  sending  this  despatch,  he 
might,  perhaps,  have  overlooked  the  irregularities  of 
railway  officials,  and  censured  his  subordinate,  whose 
false  information  and  erroneous  judgment  had  lulled  him 
into  a  fatal  security. 

Upon  the  receipt   of  Halleck's  despatch  McClellan 

U2W.Il.,  94.  2  lb. 


112 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


sailed  for  Alexandria.  He  arrived  there  at  night. 
The  railway  was  then  in  the  possession  of  the  Confed- 
erates. 

At  8  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  27th  of  August 
Gen.  McClellan  telegraphed,  as  his  first  despatch  from 
Alexandria  to  Halle  ck,  that  he  had  just  heard  that  the 
enemy  had  burned  the  railway  bridge  over  Bull  Run! 
The  city  of  Alexandria  seemed  to  McClellan  to  be  quite 
full  of  soldiers;  but  he  was  told  that  those  remaining 
there  were  convalescents  chiefly.^  The  duties  devolving 
upon  the  quartermaster  were  reported  as  well  performed. 
Gen.  McClellan  saw  nothing  to  criticise.  The  officers 
and  agents  of  the  government  were  hopeful ;  their  temper 
was  serene.  That  the  Bull  Run  bridge  would  be  repaired 
by  the  morrow  McClellan  was  assured.^  All  this  was 
communicated  to  Halle  ck  as  early  as  twenty  minutes 
before  ten  in  the  morning.  It  was  therefore  to  be  ex- 
pected that  the  movements  of  his  old  army,  not  yet  com- 
pleted, should  claim  a  part  of  McClellan's  care.  The  line 
of  the  Rappahannock  had  been  the  point  along  which 
Pope  was  mustering  his  forces.  To  that  point  the  corps 
commanded  by  Fitz-John  Porter,  and  the  division  of 
Reynolds,  had  been  despatched.  Sumner's  corps,  en  route 
for  the  same  destination,  was,  on  the  26th,  landing  at 
Acquia  Creek.'*  Burnside  was  at  Falmouth.  Two  divis- 
ions of  his  corps,  under  Reno,  had,  as  we  have  seen, 
moved  up  the  Rappahannock ;  and  Burnside  was  charged 

•12W.R.,94.  ''lb,  3  lb. 

■*  That  the  Rappahannock  could  be  reached  at  an  earlier  period  from 
Acquia  Creek  than  from  Alexandria,  McClellan  gave  to  Halleck  as  his 
reason  for  disembarking  Sumner's  corps  at  Aquia.    lb.,  94. 


AUGUST  27 TH,  1862. 


113 


with  hurrying  on  the  troops  towards  Rappahannock  Sta- 
tion.^ 

A  telegram  from  Fit z- John  Porter  to  Burnside  was 
next  received  by  Halleck,  and  transmitted  to  McClellan. 
It  gave  information  of  Pope's  army.  Banks  was  at  Fay- 
etteville ;  McDowell,  Sigel,  Picketts,  and  Reno  were 
near  Warrenton.  Reno  was  on  the  right.  Porter  was 
marching  on  Warrenton  Junction  to  reenforce  Pope. 
Nothing  was  said  of  Heintzelman.  A  battle  was  reported 
by  Porter  as  imminent.  Halleck  was  now  aroused. 
Franklin's  corps  should  march  out  by  some  other  route 
than  Centre ville,  if  McClellan  preferred,  carrying  three 
or  four  days'  provisions.  He  should  move  in  forced 
marches  and  be  supplied  as  fast  as  possible  by  railroad. 
The  railway  manager,  Col.  Haupt,  should  receive  direc- 
tions from  McClellan.  He  had  asked  them  from  Halleck.^ 
There  must  have  been  a  serious  neglect  to  guard  the 
railroad.  This  should  be  immediately  remedied.  Gen. 
Casey  was  directed  to  furnish  McClellan  with  about 
5,000  of  the  new  troops  under  his  command,  and  Gen. 
McClellan  was  ordered  to  take  entire  direction  of  the 
sending  out  of  the  new  troops  from  Alexandria,  determin- 
ing questions  of  priority  in  transportation,  and  the  places 
they  should  occupy.  That  Pope's  head-quarters  were 
near  Warrenton  Junction,  Halleck  knew ;  but  he  could 
not  ascertain  the  present  position  of  his  troops,  nor  could 
he  get  any  satisfactory  information  from  the  front  of  the 
enemy. ^    There  had  been  great  neglect  and  carelessness 


'  12  W.R.,  94. 


2  lb. 


3  lb.,  95. 


114 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


about  Manassas.  Franklin's  corps  should  march  in  that 
direction  as  soon  as  possible,  and  a  competent  officer 
should  be  sent  in  that  vicinity  to  take  direction  of  affairs.' 

McClellan's  reply  was  despatched  immediately.  Orders 
had  been  sent  to  Franklin  to  prepare  to  march  at  once  with 
his  corps,  giving  information  of  his  means  of  transporta- 
tion. Kearny,  of  Heintzelman's  corps,  was  yesterday  at 
Rappahannock  Station  and  Kelly's  Ford.  Sumner,  with 
his  corps,  would  commence  reaching  Falmouth  to-day. 
Couch's  division  had  been  sent  for  at  once  to  come  from 
the  Peninsula.  McClellan  had  lent  Burnside  his  per- 
sonal escort  (the  first  squadron  of  fourth  regular  cavalry) 
to  scout  down  the  Rappahannock.  Although  Halleck  may 
have  already  received  it,  McClellan  would  forward  to  him 
all  information  he  might  secure,  and  as  fast  as  received."* 

Now  addressing  himself  to  the  task  of  finding  out  where 
Pope  was,  and  where  the  enemy,  McClellan  sent  a  telegram 
both  to  Gen.  Heintzelman  and  to  Gen.  Porter.  "  Where 
are  you  ?  "  he  asked,  and  "  What  is  the  state  of  affairs  ?  " 
He  inquired  as  to  the  troops  in  their  front,  and  on  their 
right  and  left.  Where  was  Pope's  left,  and  what  of  the 
enemy?  These  despatches,  with  the  further  information 
that  the  enemy  had  burned  Bull  Run  bridge  last  night,  with 
a  cavalry  force,  were  sent  to  Warrenton  and  to  Bealeton, 
with  directions  to  the  nearest  operator  to  those  places  to 
forward  them  to  the  officers  designated.^ 

1  12  W.R.,  94-95. 

2  lb.,  95. 

3  lb. 


AUGUST  27 TH,  1862. 


115 


Fears  of  impending  disaster  were  now  crowding  fast 
upon  McClellan.  His  despatclies  from  this  time  fortli  bear 
evidence  that  he  was  filled  with  a  sense  of  a  heavy  respon- 
sibility. An  active  quartermaster  could  have  done  all 
that  Halleck  had  thus  far  required  of  him.  But  now  steps 
should  be  taken  to  avert  the  dangers  of  a  defeat  of  Pope's 
army.  Therefore  Halleck  was  advised  that  McClellan,  in 
informing  Burnside  of  all  that  had  occurred  at  Alexandria, 
had  cautioned  him  to  look  well  to  his  right  flank  between 
the  Rappahannock  and  the  Potomac,  and  to  guard  well  his 
trains  moving  to  Porter.  McClellan  had  fears  that  the 
cavalry,  who  dashed  at  Bull  Run  last  night,  might  trouble 
Burnside.  So,  the  next  cavalry  that  he  got  hold  of  he 
should  land,  and  use  to  keep  open  communication  between 
Pope  and  Porter,  as  well  as  to  watch  the  vicinity  of  Ma- 
nassas. He  had  again  endeavored  to  communicate  with 
Porter  and  Heintzelman  from  Falmouth.  He  closed  by 
asking  for  maps  of  the  present  field  of  operations.^ 

From  this  hour  onward  on  the  day  of  the  27th  we  have 
no  further  despatches  from  Halleck  to  McClellan.  Tele- 
grams from  McClellan  to  Halleck  there  are,  however, 
from  8  o'clock  in  the  morning,  almost  hourly,  until  6 
o'clock  at  night.  Halleck's  silence  need  not  excite  won- 
der. ]\IcClellan's  cautions  and  suggestions,  though  wise 
and  prudent,  could  not  have  failed  to  fill  the  soul  of  Hal- 
leck with  wrath,  perhaps  with  shame.  Every  word  of 
every  one  of  these  messages  was  courteous,  deferential, 
and  patriotic,  and  yet  every  word  was  a  reproach.  With 


1  12  W.R.,  95. 


116 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


all  Halle ck's  conceit  lie  could  not  but  feel  the  sting.  In 
the  plan  and  in  the  performance  of  Pope's  campaign,  the 
possibility  of  a  disaster  which  might  open  the  city  of 
Washington  to  Lee,  Hallecl^  seemed  not  to  have  con- 
sidered. Of  that  reserved  strength  v^hich  a  skilful  Gen- 
eral holds  back  to  retrieve  his  failing  fortunes,  or  v^^hich 
he  opposes  as  a  barrier  behind  which  his  broken  ranks 
may  form,  and  his  feeble  columns  be  restored,  Halleck 
had  not  even  spoken  to  McClellan.  At  the  hazard  of 
being  charged  with  holding  up  Pope's  campaign  to  de- 
rision and  to  contempt,  and  with  the  feeling  that  every 
suggestion  he  might  make  to  avert  a  possible  calamity 
would  be  used  as  evidence  of  his  envy  and  hatred  of  those 
who  had  supplanted  him  in  the  field,  —  a  treasonable  envy 
and  a  malignant  hate,  damnable  enough  to  lead  him  to 
withhold,  under  the  guise  of  taking  measures  of  precau- 
tion against  Pope's  defeat,  all  means  that  could  enable 
Pope  to  win  a  victory,  —  McClellan  nevertheless  pressed 
upon  Halleck  telegram  after  telegram  filled  with  most 
suggestive  inquiries  as  to  the  course  to  be  pursued  should 
Pope  be  overtaken  with  disaster.  Should  not  Sumner's 
corps,  he  asked,  be  moved  here,  and  united  with  Frank- 
lin's ?  "Would  not  a  disaster  to  Pope  if  he  should  fight  a 
battle  at  Warrenton  be  also  a  disaster  to  troops  on  the 
lower  Rappahannock  ?  Cannot  those  troops  render  their 
best  service  in  front  of  Washington  ?  ^  At  five  minutes 
past  twelve,  noon,  it  was  reported  to  McClellan  that 
heavy  firing  had  been  heard  in  the  vicinity  of  Centre- 
ville ;  but  he  could  not  report  to  Halleck  what  had  occa- 


J 12  W.R.,  96. 


AUGUST  27 TH,  1862. 


IIT 


sioned  it,  for  he  had  no  cavalry  to  send  out.  He  could 
only  inform  Halleck  of  the  fact,  accompanying  it  with  a 
question  as  to  the  works  and  garrisons  for  the  defence  of 
Washington.^ 

Franklin  was  now  ordered  by  McClellan  to  get  his  corps 
in  readiness  to  move  at  once.  Twenty  minutes  after 
twelve  found  McClellan  making  more  minute  inquiries  of 
Halleck.  He  was  as  anxious  for  the  preservation  of 
Pope's  army  as  he  had  been  for  the  defence  of  Washing- 
ton. His  mind  dwelt  upon  every  detail  that  should  aid. 
The  bridges  over  Bull  Run,  were  they  sufficient  to  reen- 
force  Pope,  or  to  afford  him  means  for  a  retreat  ?  Was 
Pope  so  strong  as  to  be  reasonably  certain  of  success? 
And  if  not,  should  not  Gen.  Sumner's  corps  come 
to  Alexandria  ?  Two  gun-boats  should  be  sent  to  Acquia 
Creek  ;  already  the  works  near  Alexandria  and  their  gar- 
risons were  being  inspected ;  and  the  railway  should  be 
seen  to  as  soon  as  Gen.  Casey  or  any  other  commanding 
officer  could  be  found.  Whatever  he  ordered,  no  time 
would  be  lost  in  carrying  it  out,  was  McClellan's  conclud- 
ing assurance  to  Halleck.^ 

At  fifteen  minutes  past  one  in  the  afternoon  the  condi- 
tion of  Franklin's  corps  was  made  known  to  Halleck. 
There  were  horses  enough  in  his  corps  for  but  four  guns 
without  their  caissons,  and  no  cavalry  could  be  found; 
therefore,  should  not  Sumner's  corps  be  moved  as  rapidly 
as  possible  for  the  defence  of  works  in  front  of  Washing- 
ton?   Could  Franklin's  corps  without  his  artillery  or 

1  12  W.R.,  96. 

2  Ibid. 


118 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


cavalry  effect  any  useful  purpose  by  moving  to  join 
Pope  ?  Should  not  Burnside  at  once  evacuate  Falmouth 
and  Acquia,  covering  any  of  Pope's  troops  who  might  fall 
back  in  that  direction  ?  Pope's  exact  position  McClellan 
did  not  know,  nor  did  he  know  the  enemy's  force  between 
Pope  and  Washington.  Did  Halleck?  Have  we  force 
enough  in  hand,  asked  McClellan,  to  form  a  connectipn 
with  Pope,  whose  exact  position  we  do  not  know  ?  Are 
we  safe  in  the  direction  of  the  valley  ? "  *  Thus,  while 
rendering  all  possible  assistance  to  Pope,  McClellan 
revealed,  in  a  tone  not  open  to  criticism,  his  fear  that 
Halleck's  General  was  doomed  to  defeat.  In  view  of  all 
that  McClellan  had  been,  in  view  of  the  exalted  com- 
mand he  had  held  for  his  country  and  before  his  country- 
men, of  the  issues  involved  in  his  campaign,  and  the 
great  trusts  that  the  people  had  reposed  in  him,  it  was 
not  strange  that  his  despatches  were  filled  more  with 
battles  and  strategic  movements  than  with  beef,  clothing, 
and  transportation  of  troops.  Who  will  condemn  him, 
if,  perchance,  he  exposed  to  reproof  the  person,  who,  in 
elevating  such  a  commander  as  Pope,  had  degraded  such 
a  commander  as  himself ;  or,  who  will  say  that,  if,  in  the 
performance  of  his  duty,  he  expressed  his  own  fears  of  an 
impending  disaster,  he  was  not  somewhat  justified  in  the 
belief  that  a  disaster  was  inevitable,  when  incapacity  and 
ignorance  confronted  an  ability  as  marked  as  Marlbor- 
ough's, and  a  sagacity  as  unerring  as  Napoleon's? 

Within  twenty  minutes  from  the  time  his  last  message 
was  despatched  to  Halleck,  the  disaster  attending  Taylor's 


>  12  W.R.,  96. 


AUGUST  27 TH,  1862. 


119 


brigade  in  the  morning  in  its  contest  with  Jackson's  corps 
was  known  at  Alexandria.^  Five  troopers  of  tlie  Twelfth 
Pennsylvania  Cavalry  —  illustrious  remnants  of  a  whole 
company  —  rode  into  the  camp  of  the  Fifth  Wisconsin 
Regiment  to  tell  the  tale  of  their  surprise  in  the  morning, 
and  to  brag  that  they  alone  remained  to  reveal  it. 

Then  came  straggling  infantry  and  more  cavalry,  with 
wagons,  and  then  hundreds  of  fleeing  negroes,  loaded 
with  packs  and  babies,  filling  the  roadway  for  miles  as 
they  crowded  onward  away  from  the  fight  at  Manassas 
Junction,^  crowded  onward  to  Alexandria,  under  the 
very  dome  of  our  own  capital,  before  an  enemy  whose 
capital  we  believed  it  would  require  all  their  own  power 
to  defend. 

That  the  force  opposed  to  Taylor  had  many  guns,  that 
it  numbered  5,000  infantry  and  was  receiving  re  enforce- 
ments every  moment,  and  that  Gen.  Taylor's  command 
was  either  cut  to  pieces  or  captured,  McClellan,  at  thirty- 
five  minutes  past  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  reported 
to  Halleck.^  But  the  end  of  Federal  misfortunes  did  not 
come  with  this  disaster.  Gainesville  was  in  possession 
of  the  enemy.  Again  was  Halleck  implored  to  send 
cavalry  in  the  direction  of  Dranesville  and  Lewinsville, 
to  watch  the  Potomac.  This  last  disaster  confirmed 
McClellan  that  the  true  policy  to  be  adopted  in  Wash- 
ington was  to  garrison  the  forts  in  front  of  Alexandria. 

*  It  -was  brought  b  j  some  of  those  valiant  members  of  the  Twelfth  Pennsyl- 
vania Cavalry  who  had  been  driven  away  so  easily  in  the  morning  of  the  27th, 
between  Bristoe  Station  and  Manassas. 

» Ai-my  of  the  Potomac,  Behind  the  Scenes,  207, 208.  ^  12  W.R.,  96. 


120 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


to  send  cavalry  in  the  direction  of  the  upper  Potomac, 
to  observe  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  and  to  mobilize 
a  corps  as  soon  as  possible,  but  not  to  move  it  forward 
until  supplied  with  artillery  and  with  cavalry.  These 
three  expedients  he  pressed  upon  Halleck  in  his  despatch 
of  thirty-five  minutes  past  one  on  the  27th  of  August, 
from  Alexandria.^ 

In  conformity  with  these  suggestions  McClellan  ordered 
Sumner  to  send  to  Alexandria  the  whole  of  his  corps,  if  he 
could  reach  it.^  Couch,  with  his  division,  was  summoned 
to  embark  for  the  same  destination  from  Yorktown.^  One 
squadron  of  cavalry  that  had  now  arrived  McClellan 
caused  to  be  at  once  landed  and  sent  out  towards  Pope. 
More  cavalry,  if  there  was  any  at  Washington,  McClellan 
begged  Halleck  to  send  him.  For  the  defence  of  Wash- 
ington, on  both  sides  of  the  Potomac,  McClellan  again 
urged  Halleck  to  provide.^  But  while  thus  taking  upon 
himself  the  whole  catalogue  of  responsibilities  that  be- 
longed alone  to  the  Commander-in-chief,  McClellan  was 
oppressed  with  the  consciousness  that  he  was  powerless 
to  do  more  than  press  forward  troops  and  supplies  to  Pope. 
What  Halleck  had  ordered  him  to  do  was  not  what 
McClellan,  under  the  circumstances,  would  have  advised ; 
and  what  he  had  advised  he  had  no  power  to  perform. 
It  was  not  strange  that  then  there  came  over  him  a  feel- 
ing that  interference  with  his  plans  for  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  before  Richmond  was  the  cause  of  the  disaster 
then  impending  over  Pope's  army  before  Alexandria. 
Nor  was  it  to  be  wondered  at  that  such  a  feeling  should 

U2  W.R.,  96.       2  18  W.R.,  692.       ^2  W.R.,  96-97,      "lb.,  97. 


AUGUST  27 TH,  1862. 


121 


find  expression  when  McClellan  fully  appreciated  that 
before  the  magnitude  of  the  task  he  was  absolutely 
powerless.  "Please  inform  me  at  once,"  McClellan 
asked  of  Halleck,  "what  my  position  is."  He  did 
not  wish  to  act  in  the  dark.  He  was  not  responsible  for 
the  past,  nor  could  he  be  for  the  future,  unless  he  re- 
ceived authority  to  dispose  of  the  ayailable  troops  ac- 
cording to  his  judgment.^  That  the  sweetness  of  Halleck's 
dreams  was  somewhat  embittered  by  such  despatches  can- 
not be  doubted.  To  be  an  ignoble  factor  in  Halleck's 
movements,  Halleck  was  willing  to  concede  to  McClellan. 
But  now  the  sound  of  Jackson's  guns,  borne  to  the  cap- 
ital, carried  to  the  soul  of  the  General-in-chief  a  feeling  of 
dismay.  Again  might  the  salvation  of  the  nation  depend 
upon  the  skill  of  McClellan.  Bitter,  indeed,  must  have 
been  Halleck's  reflections.  Should  Pope  fail,  should  Lee 
press  forward  to  the  Potomac,  and  carry  his  triumphant 
army  into  the  Northern  States,  around  whom  would  the 
old  Army  of  the  Potomac  rally  with  such  enthusiastic 
devotion  as  around  McClellan? 

After  all  Halleck's  plans  for  the  defeat,  for  the  downfall 
of  his  rival ;  after  all  his  hopes  that  he  might,  through 
Pope's  efforts,  though  without  sharing  Pope's  perils, 
achieve  a  success  giving  assurance  that  in  a  distant  future 
he  might  grow  strong  enough  to  fill  the  chair  from  wliich 
he  had  displaced  McClellan;  after  all  his  wiles  and  his 
ways,  his  deep  schemes  and  his  unwholesome  influences,  to 
find  himself  spoken  of  with  contempt,  as  a  general-in-chief, 
by  his  countrymen ;  to  find  himself  doomed  to  a  deep,  to  a 

1  12  W.R.,  97. 


122 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


bitter  disappointment,  —  this  was  too  severe,  it  was  too  ex- 
asperating. Therefore  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  to  all 
of  McClellan's  suggestions  ranging  above  the  level  of  a 
quartermaster's  tasks  Halleck  returned  no  reply.  Not  yet 
had  fear  opened  Halleck's  mouth.  Nevertheless,  did  Mc- 
Clellan  continue  to  press  forward  despatches  filled  with 
information  and  with  most  fitting  suggestions.  It  was 
not  until  6  o'clock  at  night  that  a  copy  of  Pope's  de- 
spatch to  Halleck  of  10  o'clock  in  the  morning  was  seen 
by  McClellan.  In  this  despatch  Pope  had  requested  that 
all  forces  sent  to  him  should  move  to  his  right  at  Gaines- 
ville. Halleck  had  transmitted  this  copy  to  McClellan ; 
and  McClellan  hastened  to  avow  his  readiness  to  cooperate 
with  Pope's  desires.  If  Halleck  wished  him  to  order  any 
part  of  the  force  at  his  disposal  to  the  front  it  was  in 
readiness  to  march  at  a  moment's  notice  to  any  point 
Halleck  might  indicate.  That  force  now  consisted  of 
about  10,000  men  of  Franklin's  corps,  of  about  2,800  of 
Gen.  Tyler's  brigade,  and  of  Col.  Tyler's  First  Connecticut 
Artillery.  The  defence  of  Washington,  in  this  despatch,  as 
in  others,  appeared  as  a  necessity  constantly  pressing  itself 
upon  McClellan's  attention.  He  had  for  this  purpose  rec- 
ommended that  Tyler's  artillery  regiment  should  be  held 
in  hand ;  and  he  had  ordered  Gen.  Casey  not  to  move  his 
men  to  Yorktown  until  further  orders.*  Notwithstanding, 
such  was  the  activity  and  zeal  with  which  McClellan 
labored  on  the  27th  of  August,  men  of  the  Halleck  type 
in  journalism  labored  with  malignant  feelings,  that  they 

1  12  W.R.,  97. 


AUGUST  27TH,  1862. 


123 


might  arouse  in  the  public  mind  contempt  and  ridicule  for 
the  course  McClellan  pursued.  It  was  said  in  a  sometime 
reputable  journal  that  McClellan  was  ordered  by  Halleck 
on  the  27th  of  August  to  place  himself  within  easy  sup- 
porting distance  of  Pope ;  but  that  he  sat  idly  at  Alexan- 
dria, thus  destroying  Pope's  justifiable  reliances.' 

Nor  was  this  censure  confined  to  journalists  alone.  In 
both  the  armies  of  the  Potomac  and  of  Virginia  there 
were  men  whose  powers  of  fault-finding  and  of  complain- 
ing absorbed  their  vitality.  In  the  diaries  of  these  days 
we  find  the  first  mutterings  of  discontent  with  McClellan, 
based  upon  accusations  as  false  as  they  were  malicious. 
Censorious  officers  thanked  God  that  they  had  bidden 
farewell  to  the  Peninsula,  the  land  of  blasted  hopes,  "  the 
place  of  our  disappointment,"  the  "  hot-bed  of  disgrace  to 
the  finest  army  of  modern  times."  "  There  are  men  in  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  to  whom  Stonewall  Jackson's  offi- 
cial report  of  his  splendid  yictory  at  Cedar  Mountain 
gives  more  joy  than  would  the  winning  of  a  splendid  suc- 
cess by  McClellan."  These  are  some  of  the  grumblings  of 
the  times.  They  are  in  that  tone  and  breathe  that  spirit 
of  malicious  feeling  which  the  war  department  subse- 
quently imputed  to  McClellan  and  to  his  highest  officers. 
They  form  the  very  groundwork  upon  which  rested 
Pope's  accusations  of  treachery,  upon  which  he  attempted 
to  explain  his  defeat.  It  may,  however,  be  positively 
affirmed  that  the  bad  hearts  that  could  conceive,  or  the 
foul  mouths  that  could  utter,  such  tissues  of  baseless 

^  McClellan  from  Ball's  Bluff  to  Antietam,  pamphlet  by  Wilkes,  from 
Spirit  of  the  Times,  20. 


124 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


falsehoods  were  confined  to  but  few,  and  these  were  of  as 
little  consequence  as  is  the  author  of  a  book  of  the  war 
from  which  I  have  quoted,  who  was  a  surgeon  in  a  West- 
ern volunteer  regiment,  and  whose  book  exceeds  in  false 
statement  and  falser  inference  the  works  of  the  most 
renowned  grumblers  of  Christendom.'  But  we  must  turn 
from  a  research  among  the  spiteful  falsehoods  of  the  day 
to  follow  the  windings  and  courses  to  which  Pope  resorted 
to  beat  and  destroy  his  pursuers. 

Before  Buford's  cavalry  had  confirmed  the  rumors  and 
reports  which  McDowell  had  forwarded  to  Pope  since  10 
o'clock  in  the  evening  of  the  26th,  it  became  evident  to 
Pope  that  heavy  columns  of  the  enemy  were  approaching 
the  Federal  line  of  communication  with  Alexandria,  and 
that  the  whole  of  Lee's  army  was  moving  towards  Wliite 
Plains  and  Thoroughfare  Gap,  rather  than  toward  the 
valley  of  the  Shenandoah.  But  Pope  was  not  convinced 
that  the  reported  interruption  of  his  railway  communica- 
tions was  a  part  of  the  general  Confederate  plan.  The 
most  serious  consequences  resulting  from  this  daring  raid 
involved,  in  Pope's  estimation,  no  more  than  a  strong 
force  to  repair  damages,  to  keep  the  road  open,  and  a 
want  of  supplies  for  his  army  till  the  road  was  again  made 
serviceable.'* 

At  an  early  hour  on  the  morning  of  the  27th  the  Fed- 
eral commander  became  painfully  conscious  that,  while  a 
movement  of  his  army  was  a  necessity,  he  was  utterly 
unequal  to  the  task  of  determining  what  that  movement 

'  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Behind  the  Scenes,  202,  203. 
2  16  W.R.,  352. 


AUGUST  27TE,  1862. 


125 


slioiild  be.  He  inclined  to  the  abandonment  of  Warren- 
ton  and  the  occupation  of  Gainesville ;  but  this  he  would 
not  order  until  the  counsel  and  guidance  of  McDowell 
had  been  invoked/  Pope  must  "act  promptly  in  some 
way,"  but  in  what  way  he  frankly  confessed  he  knew  not 
until  McDowell  gave  him  liis  counsel.  Before  half-past 
8  in  the  morning  McDowell  suggested  a  movement  of 
troops,  and  at  half-past  8  Pope  approved  McDowell's 
plans.  These  plans  involved  a  movement  of  the  Federal 
army  upon  Gainesville ;  and  they  were  no  sooner  deter- 
mined upon  than  Pope  became  masterly  in  his  advice  and 
energetic  in  his  orders. 

Execute  the  movement  you  suggest,  but  you  must  be 
careful  not  to  let  the  enemy  know  it  until  the  last  moment. 
Send  the  trains  by  this  way,  and  call  Banks  to  you.  If 
the  movement  could  be  made  by  dark  it  would  be  better. 
.  .  ,  I  do  not  know  that  it  will  be  safe  to  wait,  but 
you  can  tell  better  than  I,  as  your  scouts  and  lookouts 
can  see  the  movements  of  the  enemy.  Order  Banks  to 
send  his  train  off  immediately,  and  also  the  trains  you 
have.  We  must  get  to  Gainesville  to-night."  Pope  dis- 
closed his  intention  of  moving  to  Manassas  to  open  the 
road,  and  of  joining  McDowell  when  that  was  done.^ 

No  time  was  lost  by  Gen.  McDowell  in  Ms  advance 
towards  Gainesville.  At  forty-five  minutes  past  8  Pope 
was  advised  of  the  movements  of  Sigel's  corps,  and  of  the 
purposes  for  which  they  moved;  and  at  the  same  time 
McDowell  invited  the  General  in  command  to  place  him- 

^  16  W.R.,  352. 
2  lb.,  353. 


126 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


self  near  the  telegraph  mstrument  at  Warrenton  Junction 
and  converse  with  him.^  Pope  replied  by  averring  his  in- 
tention to  be  at  the  telegra2Dh  office  the  greater  part  of  the 
day.  2  Then,  through  numerous  despatches,^  the  transfer  of 
all  kinds  of  public  property,  by  wagon  or  by  rail,  from 
Warrenton  through  Warrenton  Junction  and  Catlett's 
Station  towards  Manassas  was  agreed  upon.  Then,  too, 
the  destination  of  Banks's  corps  was  changed.  To  Mc- 
Dowell we  owe  it  that  our  command,  respectable  in  num- 
bers, undaunted  by  defeat  at  Cedar  Mountain,  active, 
willing,  and  courageous,  was  diverted  from  that  pathway 
which  would  have  thrown  us  with  Hooker,  Reno,  Porter, 
Sigel,  Reynolds,  Ricketts,  and  King  upon  Jackson  and 
Longstreet  on  the  old  battle-field  of  Manassas.  To  repair 
bridges  and  mend  highways  for  the  safe  passage  of  horse 
equipments,  salt  pork,  and  hard  bread  is  undoubtedly  a 
military  duty.  But  to  send,  under  the  circumstances  in 
which  Pope  found  himself,  a  whole  corjDS  along  a  road  up- 
on which  no  enemy  appeared,  and  where  there  seemed  no 
reason  to  apprehend  that  he  would  ajDpear,  to  defend 
wagon-trains,  instead  of  using  it  to  oppose  the  enemy,  was, 
as  we  now  know,  an  error  of  judgment  arising  from  Mc- 
Dowell's over-caution.  "  Had  not  Banks  better  retire  by 
way  of  Warrenton  Junction,  preceded  by  his  trains  ? "  * 
asked  McDowell  of  Pope,  at  the  telegraph  office ;  and  thus 
the  matter  was  settled.  McDowell  was  directed  to  send 
Banks  such  an  order  from  Warrenton,  for,  said  Pope,  he 
is  nearer  Warrenton  than  the  Junction ;  ^  and  Banks  was 


J 16  W.R.,  353. 

2  lb. 

3  lb.,  353-354. 


*  lb.,  354. 
^  lb. 


AUGUST  27 TE,  1862. 


127 


ordered  by  McDoTrell  to  move  upon  Catlett's  Station. 
Other  matters  relating  to  the  marcli  by  Reno  and  Kearny 
on  Greenwich  were  then  discussed.  Porter's  corps,  too, 
was  considered,  and  McDowell  was  informed  that  it  was 
on  the  road.  That  Sigel  would  supply  Kearny's  di^^sion 
with  artillery  was  settled;  for  Kearny  had  none  with 
him.'  The  condition  in  which  at  tliis  time  Pope  found  the 
troops  that  had  joined  him  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
and  from  North  Carolina  could  not  but  cause  uneasiness. 
The  corps  of  Fitz-John  Porter  had  neither  wagons  nor 
proA'isions,  and  there  were  but  forty  rounds  of  ammunition 
to  each  man.  The  corps  of  Heintzelman  and  the  divisions 
of  the  ninth  corps  under  Reno  were  no  better  supplied. 
They  had  no  wagons,  and  provisions  with  them  were  get- 
ting very  scarce.  So  hurriedly  had  some  of  these  troops 
been  pushed  forward  that  even  their  artillery  had  been 
left  behind. 

This  conference  between  ^McDowell  and  Pope  resulted 
in  a  general  order  for  the  immediate  movement  of  the 
Federal  army.^  Sigel's  corps  and  ^McDowell's,  with  Rey- 
nolds's division  added,  the  whole  under  the  command  of 
McDowell,  were  ordered  to  move  along  the  AVarrenton 
turnpike  and  reach  Gainesville  by  night.  Heintzelman, 
with  Kearny's  division  of  his  corps  and  Reno's  divisions 
of  Burnside's,  was  ordered  to  move  from  Catlett's  Station 
to  Greenwich,  and  to  be  there  by  night  or  early  dajdight.^ 
Gen.  Fitz-John  Porter  was  to    remain   at  Warrenton 

^  Telegraphic  communications  between  Pope  and  McDowell,  16  "W.R., 
350-355. 

2  Warrenton  Junction,  August  27,  lb.,  70-71. 

^  Greemvich  is  four  or  five  miles  from  GainesTille. 


128 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


Junction  until  Gen.  Banks  relieved  him,  when  he,  too, 
would  push  forward  for  Greenwich.  All  the  troops  at 
Greenwich  were  to  support  Gen.  McDowell  in  his  opera- 
tions against  the  enemy.  To  Gen.  Banks,  with  his  corps, 
was  assigned  the  duty  of  covering  the  movement  of 
the  army  wagons,  which,  in  immense  numbers,  and  gener- 
ally from  every  threatened  point,  had  concentrated  around 
Warrenton  Junction. 

Banks's  instructions  were  minutely  detailed.  How  the 
train  of  his  own  corps  was  to  be  guarded,  and  that  it  was 
to  move  on  a  road  south  of  the  railroad,  was  as  carefully 
prescribed  by  Pope  as  were  his  instructions  provided  he 
encountered  the  enemy.  Long  trains  of  burden  cars, 
heavily  laden  at  Warrenton  and  Warrenton  Junction, 
were  to  be  pushed  forward  as  fast  as  bridges  were  replaced 
and  the  road  was  repaired.  The  defensive  position  for 
Banks's  corps  was  to  be  on  the  eastern  bank  of  Cedar 
Run,  and  this  he  was  to  hold  as  long  as  possible.  If  he 
could  not  defend  the  public  property  until  Manassas  was 
reached  he  should  burn  it.  But  Banks  was  to  under- 
stand that  Pope  expected  a  tenacious  defence.  If  he 
needed  assistance.  Gen.  Fitz-John  Porter  would  aid  him. 
Banks  was  ordered  to  keep  in  constant  communication 
with  Porter,  whom  he  would  find  on  his  right.^  Nor  were 
the  sick  forgotten.  Those  that  could  be  removed  must  be 
transported  to  Manassas  in  the  wagon-train  of  Banks's 
corps,  even  if  it  necessitated  the  destruction  of  much  bag- 
gage and  regimental  property.  Pope  deemed  it  prudent 
to  close  his  order  with  an  avowal  of  his  belief  that  Banks 

1  That  is,  in  the  direction  of  Greenwich,  and  easterly. 


AUGUST  27TH,  1862. 


129 


would  discharge  the  very  important  duties  which  he 
had  put  upon  him  with  "  intelligence,  courage,  and 
fidelity."  1 

Upon  the  receipt  of  this  order  McDowell  moved  to  its 
instant  execution.  Of  his  whole  command,  Sigel,  at 
Warrenton,  was  the  nearest  to  Gainesville ;  Sigel,  there- 
fore, was  directed  to  push  a  strong  force  immediately  to 
Buckland  Mills,  where,  on  the  road  to  Gainesville,  a 
bridge  crossed  Broad  Run.  The  remainder  of  Sigel's 
corps  were,  as  quickly  as  possible,  to  be  held  in  hand  to 
follow  his  advance.  None  but  ammunition-wagons  were 
to  accompany  the  corps  on  the  road ;  the  baggage-trains 
were  to  proceed  to  Manassas  via  Catlett's  Station,  under 
charge  of  Banks.  The  divisions  of  Reynolds,  King,  and 
Ricketts,  in  the  order  named,  were  to  follow  Sigel.^  But 
Sigel  had  no  cavalry ;  his  own  had  accompanied  Buford, 
who,  at  daylight,  had  moved  north-westerly  towards 
White  Plains,  on  that  reconnaissance  from  which  Pope 
had  great  expectations,  about  which  McDowell  made 
many  promises,  and  of  which  Halleck  made  note  to 
McClellan  as  the  one  reliable  source  in  settling  whether 
Lee  had  gone  into  the  Shenandoah  valley.  So,  Bayard, 
with  three  regiments,  was  lent  to  Sigel.  Kearny's 
division  was,  as  we  have  seen,  coming  up  to  Greenwich 
to  aid  Sigel.  But  Kearny  had  no  artillery.  Sigel,  there- 
fore, was  directed  to  hold  three  of  his  own  batteries  in 
readiness  to  be  sent  to  him.  From  Buckland  Mills  Sigel 
was  ordered  to  push  on  with  his  corps  to  Gainesville,  but 

1  16  W.R.,  71. 

2  15  ^.n.,  175. 


130 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


not  until  the  divisions  of  Reynolds,  King,  and  Ricketts 
closed  up  on  him.' 

Thus  was  the  first  step  to  be  taken  by  Pope's  army  in 
retiring  from  Warrenton  towards  Manassas.  Gainesville 
was  the  objective  point ;  and  in  the  way  towards  Gaines- 
ville lay  the  important  bridge  at  Buckland  Mills.  Milroy 
was  ordered  to  seize  it.  For  this  purpose  he  marched 
with  his  independent  brigade.  A  small  detachment  of 
cavalry  preceded  him.  In  nearly  eight  miles  the  bridge 
was  reached.  The  condition  of  Pope's  cavalry  was  such 
that  its  arrival  in  advance  of  the  infantry  could  not  have 
been  predicted.  But  it  did  arrive.  Confederate  cavalry, 
with  one  piece  of  artillery,  were  found  on  the  eastern  side 
of  the  Broad  Run.  The  bridge  was  on  fire.  Milroy  claims 
that  Major  Krepps  charged  twice  with  his  cavalry  upon 
the  enemy  before  putting  him  to  flight.^  The  bridge  was 
saved,  but  in  a  damaged  condition.  Now  appeared  the 
intrepid  Milroy,  leading  his  infantry.  In  fifteen  minutes 
his  pioneers  had  made  the  bridge  safe  for  his  artillery. 
But  Milroy  had  not  waited  fifteen  minutes.  He  pushed 
on  with  cavalry  and  infantry  in  the  direction  of  Gaines- 
ville. But  two  of  the  three  and  one-half-miles  to  his 
goal  had  been  passed,  when  the  road  to  Haymarket 
opened  before  him.  It  was  a  dangerous  point.  If  Lee 
were  not  travelling  westward  for  the  valley  of  the 
Shenandoah,  it  was  to  be  feared  he  was  marching  east- 
ward toward  Washington.  A  mixed  force  of  infantry, 
cavalry,  and  artillery  was  posted  here,  and  Milroy  sped 

^  Official  Report  of  General  Irvin  McDowell,  16  W.R.,  334  et  seq. 
2  lb.,  318.  * 


AUGUST  27 TH,  1862. 


131 


on.  Gainesville  drew  nigh.  It  was  unoccupied,  save  by 
some  200  stragglers  from  Jackson's  army  corps.  Claim- 
ing these  as  prisoners  Milroy,  without  bloodshed  or 
resistance,  sat  down  in  GainesAdlle,  and  halted  his  brigade 
for  the  night.^  With  the  remainder  of  his  corps  Sigel 
advanced  rapidly  on  Gainesville,  leaving  Steinwehr's 
brigade  at  the  bridge  over  Broad  Run.^ 

Meanwhile  the  three  divisions  of  McDowell's  corps  were 
withdrawn  from  their  advanced  positions  on  the  Sulphur 
Springs  and  Waterloo  roads,  and  pushed  forward  to  the 
same  place. ^ 

It  was  indeed  apparent  to  McDowell  that,  wherever  else 
he  might  meet  the  enemy,  it  would  not  be  on  the  banks  of 
the  Rappahannock,  at  Sulphur  Springs,  nor  at  Waterloo. 
For,  when  the  morning  of  the  27th  dawned,  the  hill-sides 
and  the  forests  were  found  silent  and  deserted.  Suspicions 
of  the  night  before  were  fully  confirmed.  Longstreet  had 
followed  Jackson  in  the  direction  of  Salem  and  White 
Plains.' 

The  march  of  McDowell's  troops  from  their  station  near 
Warrenton  and  on  the  Rappahannock  was  both  long  and 
tedious ;  no  excitements  cheered,  no  dangers  relieved,  its 
monotony.  At  Xew  Baltimore,  Reynolds's  division  of  Penn- 
sylvania reserves  came  up.    The  men  of  this  division  had 

^  Official  Report  of  Brigadier-General  R.  H.  Milroy,  commanding 
brigade,  First  Corps,  16  W.R.,  315-323. 

2  Official  Report  of  :\Iajor-General  Sigel,  lb.,  265. 

2  McDoAvell  to  Pope,  -i.SO  A.M.,  August  27th,  in  Avhich  positions  of 
his  divisions  are  given,  lb.,  352. 

^  Longstreet's,  Hood's,  D.  R.  Jones',  and  Wilcox's  Official  Reports, 
lb.,  563-568;  60:1-606:  578-580;  595-597. 


132 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


been  old  comrades  with  those  of  King's  and  Ricketts's  two 
months  before  at  Fredericksburg,  while  McDowell  was 
awaiting  a  summons  to  strengthen  McClellanat  Richmond. 
But  circumstances  which  "  Stonewall "  Jackson  had  done 
much  to  create  had  sent  these  divisions  to  different  fields. 
In  all  their  campaigns  they  had  fought  the  same  enemy 
under  the  same  leader,  although  at  different  times  and  at 
different  places.  That  leader  was  Gen.  Jackson.  Ricketts 
had  pursued  him  through  the  Shenandoah  valley  after 
Banks  had  retreated  before  him.  Reynolds  had  fought 
with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  before  Richmond  against 
this  untiring  and  indefatigable  chief ;  while  McDowell,  with 
King's  and  Ricketts's  divisions  united,  confronted  Jackson 
near  the  Rapidan  and  behind  the  Rappahannock.  All 
these  events  had  transpired  since  the  preceding  June. 
And  now,  on  this  27th  day  of  August,  the  three  divisions 
of  McDowell's  corps  were  reunited  in  the  pursuit  of  the 
same  invincible  Jackson. 

Reynolds's  veterans  from  the  Peninsula  showed  many 
traces  of  the  severity  of  their  campaign.  Their  faces  were 
bronzed,  their  colors  pierced  and  torn  with  bullets,  and 
their  ranks  thinned.  Hearty  and  enthusiastic  sounded  the 
welcome  cheers,  as,  once  more  united  with  its  old  com- 
rades, this  division  took  its  place  in  line,  and  moved  for- 
ward, to  halt  at  11  o'clock  at  night  at  the  bridge  across 
Broad  Run.  At  the  same  hour  Ricketts's  division  halted 
at  Gainesville,  while  King  bivouacked  by  the  roadside 
somewhere  between  the  two.  By  night,  McDowell's  en- 
tire command  was  at  or  near  Gainesville,  on  the  pike  from 
Warrenton  to  Centreville  and  Alexandria. 


YI. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANTILLY. 

By  Btt.  Brig.-Gen.  CHARLES  E.  WALCOTT,  U.S.V. 


Read  before  the  Society,  May  8,  1882. 


The  following  is  the  title  of  a  eontrihution  to  the  history  of  the  Civil  War 
by  General  Waleott. 

History  of  the  Twenty-fibst  Regiment  Massachusetts  Volunteers  in 
THE  War  for  the  Preservation  of  the  Union,  1861-1865 ;  with  Statistics 
of  the  war  and  of  rebel  prisons.  Boston  :  Houghton,  Mifflin  and  Company, 
1882. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANTILLY. 


IHE  short,  sjDirited,  and  bloody  battle  of  Cliantilly  (or 


Ox  Hill,  as  called  by  the  Confederates),  which  marked 
the  end  of  Gen.  Pojdc's  campaigning  in  Virginia,  was 
fought  in  the  late  afternoon  and  evening  of  Monday,  Sep- 
tember 1,  1862.  It  is  noted,  in  the  history  of  the  war,  by 
the  heroic  death  of  Maj.-Gen.  Isaac  I.  Stevens,  commanding 
the  First  Division  of  the  Xinth  Corps,  —  a  death  strictly 
in  the  line  of  duty,  and  noble  to  the  extreme  of  chivalrous 
devotion :  and  for  the  equally  fearless,  but  rash  self-sacri- 
fice of  the  life  of  Maj.-Gen.  Philip  Kearny,  the  brilliant 
and  knightly  leader  of  the  First  Division  of  the  Third 
Corps. 

The  Union  troops  engaged  consisted  of  the  First 
(Stevens's)  Division,  and  the  Second  (Ferrero's)  Brigade 
of  the  Second  (Reno's)  Division  of  the  Ninth  Army 
Corps,  reenforced  shortly  before  dark  by  the  Second 
(Birney's)  Brigade,  of  the  First  (Kearny's)  Division  of 
the  Third  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Two  guns 
of  Benjamin's  battery  ^  (E,  Second  U.S.  Artillery)  were 
engaged  in  the  early  part  of  the  fight,  and  were  joined, 

*  Benjamin  had  with  him,  also,  two  guns  of  Cook's  (Eighth  Mass.)  batteiy. 


135 


136 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CA3IPAIGK 


towards  its  close,  by  Randolph's  battery  (E,  First  R.I. 
Artillery).  On  the  Confederate  side  the  entire  left  wing 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  (with  the  exception  of 
the  artillery)  took  part  in  the  battle,  under  the  immediate 
command  of  Gen.  T.  J.  (Stonewall)  Jackson.  The  Con- 
federates used  no  artillery,  as  they  had  no  opportunity 
to  post  any  in  an  effective  position. 

Chantilly,  from  which  the  Union  name  of  the  battle  is 
taken,  is  a  post-office  in  Fairfax  County,  situated  some 
two  miles  north-westerly  from  the  battle-field  and  about 
six  miles  north-west  from  Fairfax  Court-House,  on  the 
Little-River  turnpike,  which  enters  the  Warrenton  turn- 
pike (the  direct  road  between  Fairfax  Court-House  and 
Centreville),  near  the  hamlet  of  Germantown,  two  miles 
west  of  Fairfax  Court-House.  Chantilly  is  about  five 
miles  north  of  Centreville. 

The  name  Ox  Hill,  given  to  the  battle  by  the  Confeder- 
ates, is  taken  from  a  ridge  running  across  the  Little-River 
turnpike  half  a  mile  west  of  which  the  principal  fighting 
occurred.  The  location  of  Ox  Hill  is  given  very  exactly 
in  Cooke's  **Life  of  Jackson;"^  also  in  Gen.  Early's 
report  for  E well's  Division. ^  Mr.  Ropes,  in  his  very 
interesting  book,  '*The  Army  under  Pope,"  has  fallen 
into  a  serious  error  in  placing  Ox  Hill  about  midway 
between  the  Warrenton  and  Little-River  turnpikes. 

From  the  point  of  intersection  of  the  two  roads  near 
Germantown  the  Little-River  turnpike  runs  north-westerly 
and  the  Warrenton  turnpike  south-westerly  ;  they  diverge 

^  Cooke's  Jackson,  305. 
^  16  W.K.,  714. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CEANTILLY. 


rapidly,  and  at  the  point  of  the  engagement  are  about 
two  miles  apart. 

The  battle  was  brought  on  by  an  attempt  on  the  part 
of  Gen.  Stevens  to  reach  the  Little-River  turnpike,  and 
hold  at  bay  a  flanking  force  of  the  enemy,  of  unknown 
strength,  said  to  be  advancing  by  that  road,  while  the 
Union  army  was  retreating  from  Centreville  to  a  position 
near  Fairfax  Court-House,  where  Gen.  Pope  apparently 
persuaded  himself,  on  the  1st  of  September,  that  he  would 
dare  to  risk  the  o^eneral  eno^agement  which  he  wiselv 
shtmned  near  Centreville.  T^Hiile  Gen,  StcA'ens  was  mov- 
ing on  his  desperate  mission  Gens.  McDowell  and  Hooker 
were  sent  to  Fairfax  Court-House  and  Germantown :  and, 
taking  a  strong  position  with  Patrick's  brigade  and  Pdck- 
etts's  division  in  some  old  earthworks  and  along  Difficult 
Run,  in  front  of  Germantown,  in  connection  with  Buford's 
cavahy.  skirmished  with  and  held  their  ground  against 
Stuart's  cavalry  and  horse  artillery,  who  were  moving  on 
Fairfax  Court-House  a  mile  or  two  in  advance  of  Jackson's 
infantry.^  The  principal  fighting,  however  (the  battle  of 
Chantilly  proper),  occurred  about  one  and  a  half  miles 
west  of  the  Union  position  in  front  of  Germantowm,  a  tliird 
of  a  mile  south  of  the  Little-River  turnpike,  and  about  a 
mile  and  a  half  north  of  the  ^Varrenton  turnpike.  The 
official  Confederate  reports  of  the  battle  are  full,  and,  on 
the  whole,  fair ;  on  the  Union  side  there  are  no  official 
reports  throwing  any  light  on  the  actual  fighting  except 

^  Our  cavalry  do  not  seem  to  have  been  engaged.  Gen.  Hooker  appears  to  have 
made  no  report.  The  reports  of  Gens.  McDo-^vell  and  Eicketts  are  given  here- 
after; they  make  no  claim  to  any  serious  fighting. 


138 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


the  report  of  Gen.  Birney,  which  relates  to  the  latter  pan 
of  the  engagement  on  the  Union  left. 

The  Confederate  reports  (except  Gen.  Stuart's)  may  be 
found  in  '^Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Ya.,"  for 
1862,  and  also  in  **Eebellion  Eecord."^  General  Stuart's 
official  report  seems  to  have  been  published  only  in 
**  Southern  Hist.  Soc.  Papers,"  and  is  exceedingly  inter- 
esting in  its  detail.^ 

The  Union  reports  may  be  found  annexed  to  General 
Pope's  corrected  report  of  January  27,  1863,  published 
in  Exec.  Docs.,  3d  Sess.,  37th  Cong.,  Vol.  YIIL,  1862- 
'63.3  Qen^  Pope's  first  report  (of  September  3,  1862) 
is  published  in  Vol  11.,^  Report  of  Officers  in  Porter's 
Case,"  p.  1115;^  but,  as  before  stated,  these  reports  are 
of  little  interest  in  connection  with  the  battle  of  Chan- 
tilly,  as,  with  the  exception  of  Gen.  Birney,  the  only 
Union  Generals  immediately  concerned  with  the  fighting 
were  Kearny,  Stevens,  and  Reno,  of  whom  Kearny  and 
Stevens  were  killed  on  the  field,  and  Reno,  having 
made  no  report,  was  killed,  September  14,  in  the  battle 
of  South  Mountain. 

In  addition  to  the  sources  above  indicated  my  knowl- 
edge of  the  battle  is  derived  largely  from  my  own  obser- 
vation as  an  ofQcer  of  the  Twenty-first  Regiment  Massa- 
chusetts Volunteers,  which  was  on  the  field  from  nearly 
the  commencement  to  the  very  last  of  the  fighting.  I  am 
also  much  indebted  to  Gen.  Hazard  Stevens,  then  captain 
and  A.  A.  G.  on  the  staff  of  the  General  commanding  the 
First  Division  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  for  information  relat- 

^  2  A.  N.  v.,  9  Rebellion  Record;  16  W.R.,  551  tt  seq. 

23  Southern  Hist.  Soc.  Papers,  281;  16  W.R.,  744. 

3  16  W.R.,  20  d  seq.        ^  lb.,  12  et  seq.  ^  lb.,  513-535. 


TEE  BATTLE  OF  CHAXTILLY. 


189 


ins^  to  tlie  movement  of  tliat  division  to  the  field  and  its 
attack  upon  the  enemy. 

It  was  by  no  means  the  ordered  battle  which  it  is  rep- 
resented to  have  been  in  the  two  Union  classics  on  Gen. 
Pope's  Campaign  in  Virginia,  viz. :  Gen.  Gordon's  "  Army 
of  Virginia,"  ^  and  Mr.  Ropes's  "  Army  under  Pope  - 
neither  did  it  occur  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  V^ar- 
renton  turnpike,  as  represented  in  those  books,  but  a 
short  distance  south  of  the  Little-River  turnpike,  as 
before  stated.  The  Confederate  (as  well  as  the  Union) 
forces  boxed  the  compass  pretty  well  in  their  facings 
before  the  battle  was  over ;  but,  as  a  general  description, 
faced  south  rather  than  east,  as  stated  in  the  books  above 
named ;  and  no  fighting  occurred  south  of  the  abandoned 
railroad  line  shown  on  the  accompanying  map  and  in  Gen. 
Gordon's  book. 

Before  proceeding  to  a  detailed  account  of  the  battle  I 
will  make  a  brief  statement  of  the  position  and  condition 
of  the  Union  army  at  Centreiulle,  the  movements  of  Lee's 
army  after  the  battle  of  the  Second  Manassas,  and  the 
orders  and  circumstances  under  which  the  action  was 
brought  on.  At  daylight  of  Sunday,  August  31,  the 
Lhiion  army,  under  Gen.  Pope,  numbering  in  all  about 
50.000  men,  was  (with  the  exception  of  Gen.  Stevens's 
First  Division  of  the  Xinth  Corps,  which  had  been  left  in 
an  advanced  position  at  Cub  Run,  about  one  and  a  haK 
miles  in  front,  i.e.,  S.AV.  of  Centreville)  anywhere  and 
ever^-where  in  the  earthworks  tlmown  up  by  the  Confed- 
erates in  the  previous  winter,  and  close  about  the  village 
of  Centreville,  as  they  had  halted  during  the  early  even- 

1  Gordon,  A.  of  V.,  437-449. 

24  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War,  144-150. 


140 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


ing  and  niglit  previous  on  their  retreat  from  the  battle- 
field of  the  Second  Manassas. 

Gen.  Pope  at  once  set  vigorously  to  work  to  straighten 
things  out ;  positions  were  assigned,  and  before  the 
middle  of  the  afternoon  the  army  was  posted  as  fol- 
lows :  Porter's  corps  and  Franklin's  division,  on  the 
right  and  front  of  the  town ;  Sigel's  corps  and  Reno's  and 
Stevens's  divisions  on  the  left  and  rear  ;  McDowell's  and 
Heintzelman's  corps  (with  the  exception  of  Reynolds's 
division  of  McDowell's  corps,  which  relieved  Stevens  at 
Cub  Run)  a  mile  or  two  to  the  rear,  on  the  turnpike  road 
leading  to  Fairfax  Court-House.^ 

During  the  forenoon  Sumner's  (Second)  corps  came  up 
and  took  position  close  on  the  right  (north)  ;  and  early  in 
the  afternoon  Banks's  corps,  having  marched  up  from  Bris- 
toe  Station,  crossed  Bull  Run  at  Blackburn's  Ford,  and 
took  post  a  mile  or  two  south  of  Centreville.  Gen.  Pope's 
army  now  numbered  a  round  60,000  men. 

Gen.  Pope,  in  his  report  of  January  27,  1863,  having 
come  to  a  realizing  sense  that  his  right  was  not  suffi- 
ciently extended  on  the  31st  of  August,  states  that  Sum- 
ner, as  soon  as  he  arrived,  was  ordered  to  take  post 
between  Centreville  and  Chantilly,  and  to  occupy  Chan- 
tilly  in  force  ;^  but  this  statement,  like  many  of  Gen. 
Pope's  corrections  and  explanations,  is  not  in  accordance 
with  the  best  contemporary  evidence.  He  shows  no  written 
order  to  that  effect ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  it  appears  by 
his  orders  to  Gen.  Sumner,  of  3  A.M.  and  5.45  A.M.  of 
September  1,  directing  a  reconnoissance  by  one  or  two 
brigades  to  be  pushed  not  less  than  five  miles  due  north 

'  16  W.E.,  16,  44.  2  lb.,  45. 


TEE  BATTLE  OF  CE Ay  TILLY, 


141 


and  as  far  as  the  Little-Riyer  turnpike,^  that  he  kne^r 
that  Sumner's  corps  ^as  close  upon  Centreville,  although 
just  ^here  he  didn't  know,  as  in  the  3  A.M.  order  he 
complains  that  "  the  orderly  whom  you  sent  to  me  left  me 
without  permission,  so  that  I  find  it  very  difficult  to  find 
your  head-quarters."-  At  3  A.M.  of  the  1st,  Gen.  Pope 
had  just  learned  of  the  capture  of  a  squadron  of  the 
Second  Cavalry,  who  had  started  to  accompany  Gen. 
Sumner  on  his  march  to  Centreville  the  day  before,  and, 
getting  by  mistake  on  to  the  Little-Pdver  turnpike,  had 
been  surprised  and  captured,  about  2  P.M.  of  the  31st,  by 
Confederate  cavalry  a  mile  or  two  from  Germantown. 
Added  to  tliis,  m  the  early  evening  of  the  31st,  one  of  our 
wagon  trains  on  the  Centreville  pike  had  been  shelled  by 
a  Confederate  force  coming  from  the  Little-River  pike, 
about  half  way  between  Centreville  and  Fair^fax  Court- 
House.  But  there  is  notliing  to  show  that  Gen.  Pope 
looked  upon  these  things  as  meaning  anything  more  than 
a  mere  caA^alry  raid. 

The  bold  and  braggart  tone  of  his  despatches  to  Hal- 
leck,  the  commander-in-chief,  ought  to  deceive  nobody 
now.  They  were  written  in  the  hope  that,  somehow  or 
other,  he  should  escape  further  disgrace  by  the  inaction 
of  the  Confederates,  by  his  frightening  Gen.  Halleck 
into  ordering  the  army  back  to  ^Vasliington,  or  by  some 
other  special  pro^i-dence  ;  and  then  the  world  might  be 

'For  these  orders  see  Gen.  Pope's  Second  official  report.  16  AV.R..  81 
et  seq.  Chantilly  and  the  Little-River  pike  are  about  five  miles  north  of 
Centreville.  As  a  matter  of  fact  no  such  reconnoissance  seems  to  have 
been  made  on  Sept.  1.  -lb.,  81.       ;  .....  , 


142 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


persuaded,  or,  at  least,  his  adherents  might,  with  some 
show  of  reason,  continue  to  claim  that  the  enemy  were 
"  badly  whipped "  ^  at  the  Second  Manassas ;  that  Gen. 
Po^De  and  his  army  were  ready  to  "  fight  to  the  last "  ^  at 
Centreville ;  that  if  the  enemy  had  only  dared  to  attempt 
to  turn  his  flank  (as  Pope  "  fully  expected,'*'  not  ventur- 
ing, however,  to  say  which  flank)  he  would  have  had  "  his 
hands  full."  *  Fortunately,  however,  for  the  truth  of  his- 
tory. Gen.  Lee  did  not  leave  any  such  door  of  escape  open 
to  our  presumptuous  and  braggart  commander,  whose 
general  orders  in  his  Virginia  campaign  will  long  be 
quoted  as  the  best  specimens  of  military  blasphemy  of  the 
war,  and  whose  campaign  in  the  field  .will  always  remain 
to  the  careful  and  accurate  student  a  sad  record  of  bloody 
miscarriages.^ 

It  was,  probably,  fortunate  for  the  country  that  Gen. 

1  Pope's  despatches  to  Halleck.  16  W.R.,  78,  80,  81,  82,  84,  86,  87. 

In  the  despatches  annexed  to  his  second  official  report  he  changed  the  phrase 
"badly  whipped"  to  "badly  crippled."  lb.,  79. 

2  Gen.  Pope  evidently  learned  a  good  deal  in  this  campaign,  and  his  subsequent 
military  career  has  been  honorable,  although  it  has  offered  no  opportunity  for 
brilliant  service. 

One  of  the  best  illustrations  of  the  callow  and  sophomoric  swagger  with  which 
he  entered  on  his  command  in  Virginia  may  be  found  in  his  testimony  of  July  8, 
1862,  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  (Part  1,  p.  282),  in  which, 
after  a  little  mock  modesty,  he  is  induced  by  the  committee  to  admit  that,  if  he 
had  been  in  command  of  the  army  which  McClellan  had  in  front  of  Washington 
on  the  1st  of  March,  he  could  have  marched  to  New  Orleans  with  it.  When  he 
left  Corinth  the  rebels  in  the  West  were  "  dejected,  and  dispirited,  and  without 
hope."  While  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  had  everything  and  done  nothing, 
his  victorious  troops  in  the  West  had  gone  into  action  "with  the  locks  of  their 
muskets  tied  on  with  strings."  ....  He  also  makes  the  following  rather 
startling  statement :  "I have  seen  them"  (his  Western  heroes)  "wearing  over- 
coats to  hide  their  nakedness,  as  they  had  no  pantaloons." 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANTILLY. 


143 


Lee  did  not  force  a  battle  on  Sunday  or  Monday  at  Cen- 
treyille.  The  opj)osing  armies  were  of  equal  numerical 
strength,  and  composed  of  equally  gallant  men;  but  in 
each  —  alas  for  the  Union  Army  of  Virginia  I  —  the  char- 
acter and  conduct  of  the  respective  commanders  had 
produced  their  legitimate  fruit.  The  Confederate  army, 
led  by  real  masters  in  the  art  of  war,  who  were  trusted, 
respected,  and  loved  by  fellow-officers  and  men,  was  vic- 
torious, united,  and  fiercely  enthusiastic.  The  Union 
army,  jealousy-cursed  and  disunited,  was  split  into  two 
sections,  —  one,  the  Army  of  Virginia,  battle-wearied 
and  battle-disgusted,  di^eading  the  leadership  of  the 
man  under  whose  command  their  comrades  had  been 
slaughtered  in  detail ;  the  other,  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  hating  Gen.  Pope  as  a  matter  of  conscience 
and  duty  to  their  old  commander ,  —  a  unit  only  in 
want  of  confidence  and  respect  for  Gen.  Pope  and  his 
lieutenants. 

An  illustration  of  this  spirit  in  the  Union  army  oc- 
curred in  my  own  experience,  and,  if  I  may  be  pardoned, 
I  will  give  it.  Reno's  old  brigade  (Twenty-first  Massa- 
chusetts, Fifty-first  New  York,  and  Fifty-first  Pennsyl- 
vania), about  sundown  of  August  30,  were  transferred 
from  the  right  centre  to  the  extreme  left  of  the  battle- 
field of  the  Second  Manassas ;  and,  most  gallantly  aided 
by  Graham's  battery  of  the  First  Artillery,  under  Gen. 
Reno  in  person,  alone  and  unsupported,  held  the  Henry 
House  Hill  to  the  bitter  end.  Leaving  the  field  about 
9  o'clock,  as  victors,  the  first  troops  that  we  met,  about 
two  miles  from  the  battle-field,  were  some  of  Franklin's 


144 


POPE'S  VIROmiA  CAMPAIGN. 


division.  Never  believing  in  Gen.  Pope,  or  considering 
ourselves  a  part  of  his  army,  and  proud  of  having  pre- 
served our  discipline  in  the  midst  of  the  permitted  de- 
moralizing rapine  so  general  in  the  Army  of  Virginia, 
our  hearts  leaped  with  joy  as  we  approached  the  long- 
hoped-for  reenforcements  from  our  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac. But  to  them  we  were  only  a  part  of  Pope's 
beaten  army,  and  as  they  lined  the  road  they  greeted  us 
with  mocking  laughter,  taunts,  and  jeers  on  the  advan- 
tages of  the  new  route  to  Richmond;  while  many  of 
them,  in  plain  English,  expressed  their  joy  at  the  down- 
fall of  the  braggart  rival  of  the  great  soldier  of  the  Penin- 
sula. 

Enough  of  this^  I  have  only  digressed  into  it  to  show 
that,  try  to  blind  himself  as  he  might.  Gen.  Pope,  feeling 
in  his  heart  how  slight  his  hold  was  over  the  weary  and 
discordant  army  nominally  under  his  command,  did  not 
dare  to  risk  another  general  engagement,  either  at  Centre- 
ville  or  Fairfax  Court-House,  and  that  it  was  probably 
well  for  his  country  that  he  did  not.  Regiments,  bri- 
gades, divisions,  and  corps  in  the  Union  army  could  still  be 
relied  upon  for  gallant  and  desperate  work ;  but,  as  an 
army,  it  was  without  cohesion,  and  substantially  without 
a  commander. 

Gen.  Lee,  finding  on  Sunday,  the  31st  of  August,  that 
the  Union  army  was  posted  on  the  heights  of  Centreville, 
advanced  a  brigade  across  Bull  Run  in  his  front,  and  or- 
dered Jackson  to  move  at  once  to  turn  our  right,  while 
Longstreet's  men,  remaining  to  clear  up  the  battlefield, 
were  to  follow  Jackson  the  next  day.    During  the  31st 


TEE  BATTLE  OF  CHANTILLY. 


145 


a  cold,  drizzling  rain  fell,  but  not  enough  to  interfere 
with  military  operations. 

Jackson  crossed  Bull  Run  at  Sudley  Ford  (only  five 
or  six  miles  west  of  Centreville  in  a  straight  line),  on  Sun- 
day morning,  and  marching  north  by  obscure  country 
roads  struck  the  Little-River  turnpike,  down  which  he 
moved  towards  Fairfax  Court-House,  halting  at  night  well 
on  our  right  flank  and  about  six  miles  west  of  Chantilly. 
A  large  portion  of  the  Confederate  cavalry,  under  Fitz- 
hugh  Lee  and  Stuart  in  person,  preceded  Jackson  along 
the  turnpike,  reaching  the  immediate  vicinity  of  German- 
town  that  day.  Longstreet,  during  the  afternoon,  drew 
his  corps  out  to  Sudley  Ford,  and  followed  Jackson  the 
next  day  (Monday,  September  1). 

Early  on  the  morning  of  September  1,  a  beautiful 
morning,  Jackson  moved  slowly  forward  on  the  Little- 
River  turnpike,  reaching  Chantilly  about  noon,  while 
Longstreet  was  pressing  forward  to  join  him.  Owing, 
probably,  both  to  the  extreme  weariness  of  his  troops  and 
a  desire  to  have  Longstreet  within  close  supporting  dis- 
tance, Jackson's  three  divisions  moved  from  Chantilly  up 
the  turnpike  slowly  and  well  in  hand.  Jackson's  division 
(under  command  of  Gen.  Starke)  had  the  advance,  fol- 
lowed by  Ewell's  division  (then  commanded  by  Gen.  Law- 
ton),  with  A.  P.  Hill's  division  in  the  rear.  The  infantry 
moved  in  two  columns,  one  on  each  side  of  the  road,  with 
the  artillery  in  the  road. 

The  Union  army,  at  a  terrible  disadvantage  in  the 
broken-down  condition  of  its  cavalry,  was  unaware  of  the 
strength  of  the  Confederate  movement  until  nearly  noon 


146  POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 

of  Monday,  September  1.  No  definite  information  is  given 
by  Gen.  Pope  as  to  bow  or  bow  mucb  be  tben  learned  of 
it.  In  bis  first  official  report  of  September  3,  1862,  be 
says,  "  Neitber  on  Sunday  or  Monday  did  tbe  enemy  make 
any  advance  upon  us ;  "  and  "  Tbe  enemy  during  Monday 
again  began  to  work  slowly  around  to  our  rigbt  for  tbe 
purpose  of  possessing  Fairfax  Court-House,  and  tbus  turn- 
ing our  rear ;  "  ^  but  be  gives  no  information  as  to  bow  be 
obtained  tbis  knowledo:e. 

In  bis  elaborate  report  of  January  27,  1863,  be  evi- 
dently intends  to  bave  tbe  reader  draw  tbe  inference  tbat 
tbe  discovery  was  made  by  a  reconnoissance  sent  out  by 
Gen.  Sumner  by  bis  orders  on  Monday  morning,  Septem- 
ber 1.2  Gen.  Sumner  seems  to  bave  made  no  report ;  but, 
in  testifjdng  before  tbe  Committee  on  tbe  Conduct  of  tbe 
War,  after  saying  tbat  be  reacbed  Centreville  Sunday 
morning,  tbe  Slst  of  August,  be  states  :  I  was  ordered  by 
Gen.  Pope  "to  place  my  command  in  position  on  bis 
rigbt,  wbicb  I  did  immediately.  He  afterwards  directed 
me  to  bave  a  reconnoissance  in  force  made  towards  Cban- 
tilly,  wbicb  was  done."  He  afterwards  told  me  tbat  be  bad 
determined  tbat  I  sbould  make  an  attack  on  tbe  flank  of 
tbe  enemy  tbe  next  morning  witb  25,000  men.  .  .  .  For 
some  reason,  bowever,  wbicb  was  unknown  to  me,  instead 
of  making  tbis  attack,  I  was  ordered  that  nigbt  to  retreat 
from  Centreville  down  tbe  turnpike,  till  I  joined  on  to  tbe 
corps  tbat  bad  preceded  me.  But  I  did  not  find  any  of  tbem 
until  I  got  to  Fairfax  Court-House."^  Gen.  Sumner  says 
notbing  more  about  tbe  reconnoissance.  Gen.  Heintzelman 
(commanding  Tbird  Corps)  says,  in  bis  official  report,  tbat 

^  16  W.R.,  16.  2  ib.^  45.  3  1  C.W.,  367. 


TEE  BATTLE  OF  CEAXTILLY. 


147 


he  and  Gen.  Sumner  were  ordered,  on  September  1,  to 
march  at  daylight,  on  September  2,  from  Centreville  in 
the  direction  of  Chantilly,  but  that  the  order  was  soon 
countermanded .  ^ 

^Vhatever  reconnoissance  Gen.  Sumner  made  it  could  not 
haAX  been  made  to  the  vicinity  of  Chantilly  on  the  1st  of 
September.  In  addition  to  his  own  statement,  given  above, 
that  it  was  made  the  day  before  he  was  ordered  to  retreat 
from  Centreville  (which  was  on  the  evening  of  Monday,  Sep- 
tember 1),  Gen.  Stuart  says,  in  his  official  report,  that 
Robertson's  brigade  capttired  a  company  of  Xew  York  cav- 
alry near  Chantilly,  on  Sunday  (August  31)  ;  -  and  that, 
joining  Jackson  near  Chantilly  on  Monday,  "I  disposed 
paii:  of  Eobertson's  brigade  on  his  right  flank  between  him 
and  Centreville,  and  reconnoitred  in  person;  but  no  force 
but  a  small  one  of  cavalry  was  discernible  nearer  than 
Centreville.'"'  ^ 

Col.  Bradley  T.  Johnson,  commanding  the  Second 
Brigade  of  Jackson's  diAision,  the  head  of  Jackson's  col- 
umn, says,  in  his  official  report,  that  his  brigade  on  Monday 
covered  the  movement  up  the  Little-River  turnpike  by 
holding  the  road  leading  from  Chantilly  to  Centreville, 
and  that  he  remained  all  day  in  position,  about  two  and  a 
half  miles  from  Centreville,  watching  the  Union  force  at 
Centreville  and  exchanging  shots  with  Union  cavalry. 
Xone  of  the  Confederate  reports  make  any  allusion  to  any 
Union  reconnoissance  on  Monday.^ 

It  is  probable  that  General  Pope  was  informed  of  Jack- 
son's flanking  movement  by  stragglers  from  the  late 
battle-field,  or  by  some  fortunate  accident,  —  a  subject 
which  will  be  further  considered  hereafter.    His  first 

'  16  W.R.,  lU.  2        7^3.  3  xb.,  741.  4  lb.,  667. 


148 


POPE'S  VIRGmiA  CAMPAIGN-. 


knowledge  of  a  decided  movement  on  his  right  flank 
was  about  noon  of  September  1,  as  is  shown  by  his  de- 
spatch to  Halle ck,  stating  that  "  the  enemy  is  deploying 
his  forces  on  the  Little-River  pike,  and  preparing  to 
advance  by  that  road  on  Fairfax  Court-House,"  and  that 
he  should  attack  the  rebel  advance  as  soon  as  the  move- 
ment was  sufficiently  developed ;  but  trying  to  frighten 
Halle  ck  into  ordering  him  to  retreat  without  a  fight  by 
alluding  to  the  smallness  of  his  force,  the  desperate  nature 
of  the  impending  battle,  and  the  necessity  for  looking  out 
for  the  entrenchments  around  Washington.  This  de- 
spatch is  annexed  to  his  second  official  report.  It  is  dated 
11  A.M.  ^  It  will  be  noticed  that  Gen.  Pope  knew  very 
little  of  Jackson's  whereabouts,  as  he  supposed  that  he 
had  just  reached  the  Little-River  pike ;  whereas  he  had 
reached  it  the  day  before,  and  been  moving  up  it  all  the 
morning  of  September  1.  Although  Gen.  Pope  promises 
an  attack  upon  the  Confederate  advance,  unless  Gen. 
Halleck  restrains  his  fighting  ardor,  it  is  interesting  to 
note  that  all  his  orders  to  his  army  looked  simply  towards 
defence.  The  attach  upon  the  enemy  on  Monday  by  Gen. 
Stevens  with  a  handful  of  men  (about  3,000  all  told)  was 
not  anticipated  by  Gen.  Pope,  but  made  by  Gen.  Stevens, 
on  his  own  judgment,  in  an  unexpected  emergency. 

At  12  o'clock  Gen.  Pope  ordered  McDowell  (see 
Pope's  and  McDowell's  official  reports)^ to  hasten  with 
his  corps  to  Fairfax  Court-House,  take  command  of  the 
two  brigades  there,  and  occupy  Germantown  with  his 
whole  force,  so  as  to  cover  the  turnpike  from  Centreville 
to  Alexandria^  (in  other  words,  keep  open  his  line  of 
U6W.R.,  84.  =^  lb.,  45,  344.  2,0,1. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANTILLT. 


149 


retreat),  —  a  suggestive  order,  considering  his  pretence  to 
Halleck,^  his  order  to  Sumner, ^  and  the  statement  in  liis 
second  official  report  that  he  then  intended  to  fight  near 
Chantilly.^  Hooker,  also,  early  in  the  afternoon,  was  de- 
spatched to  Germantown  to  take  general  command  of  the 
troops  gathering  there.* 

Of  tlie  same  import,  but  showing  more  conclusively  that, 
while  talking  fight  near  Centreville,  he  always  meant  to 
retreat  if  Lee  really  tried  to  force  an  engagement,  is  his 
despatch  of  2  P.M.,  of  September  1,  to  Col.  Torbert,  com- 
manding a  brigade  at  Fairfax  Court-House,  telling  him 
to  send  word  to  Alexandria  to  hurry  up  Couch's  division 
and  all  other  troojDS  coming  from  Washington  to  German- 
town,  and  to  take  up  a  strong  position  there,  concluding 
with  the  paragraph :  "  The  whole  army  is  on  the  move  to 
join  you^^  McDowell  acted  with  great  vigor;  and,  at 
once  putting  his  troops  in  motion,  hastened  towards 
Fairfax  Court-House.  Fortunately  meeting  Gen.  Patrick's 
brigade  (Tliird  Brigade,  First  Division,  Third  Corps, 
Army  of  Virginia),  who  had  been  sent  to  Fairfax  Court- 
House  early  that  morning  to  hold  it  against  the  rebel 
cavalry,  and  who,  after  observations  from  the  hill-tops, 
seeing  no  signs  of  the  enemy,  were  on  the  return  march 
to  Centreville,  Gen.  McDowell  at  once  diverted  them  into 
the  old  intrenchments  across  the  Little-River  turnpike 
near  Germantown,  previously  alluded  to.^  This  brigade 
was  posted  with  two  guns  bearing  upon  the  turnpike 
before  4  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  just  in  time,  in  con- 
junction with  some  of  Buford's  cavalry  and  Gen.  Ricketts's 
(Second)  division  of  tlie  Third  Corps,  to  receive  and 

116  W.R.,  81,  82.  2xb.,  82.  3  lb.,  45. 

nb.,  84.  5  lb.,  85-86.  « lb.,  344. 


150 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


repulse  Stuart's  cavalry.  This  statement  of  the  seryice 
rendered  by  Gen.  Patrick's  brigade  was  made  to  me, 
through  Gen.  Hazard  Stevens,  by  Col.  Chas.  McClure,  of 
Gen.  Patrick's  staff.  Gen.  Stuart's  official  report  con- 
firms it  fully.  The  only  loss  suffered  by  the  Union  troops 
in  this  skirmishing  with  Stuart  in  front  of  Germantown 
seems  to  have  been  by  the  Twentieth  New  York  Infantry, 
which  suffered  a  loss  of  about  20  in  killed  and  wounded. 

To  aid  in  securing  time  to  get  his  army  to  the  new 
position  near  Fairfax  Court-House,  Gen.  Pope,  early  in  the 
afternoon,  sent  Reno's  command  to  gain  and  hold  the 
Little-River  turnpike  at  a  point  some  two  miles  east  of 
Chantilly.  Gen.  Pope  has  made  no  statement  in  his 
reports  of  the  orders  given  by  him  to  Reno's  command, 
and  no  record  of  them  appears  to  have  been  preserved. 
Gen.  Hazard  Stevens,  then  Captain  and  Adjutant-General 
of  his  father's  division  (First  Division,  Ninth  Corps),  in- 
forms me  that  two  cavalry-men  came  from  Gen.  Pope  soon 
after  1  P.M.  with  orders  for  the  troops  of  the  Ninth  Corps 
(which  was  then  under  Gen.  Stevens's  command,  as  Gen. 
Reno,  commander  of  the  Second  Division  and  the  ranking 
officer,  was  sick  and  off  active  duty)  to  march  at  once 
across  the  fields  to  the  Little-River  turnpike,  take  a 
position  across  it,  and  hold  in  check  a  Confederate  force 
said  to  be  advancing  by  that  road  towards  Fairfax  Court- 
House.  These  men  were  under  orders  to  accompany  Gen. 
Stevens  as  guides  on  the  march,  and  did  so.  As  they  rode 
with  Capt.  Stevens,  in  advance  of  the  division,  they  in- 
formed him  that,  while  foraging  down  the  Little-River 
pike  that  morning,  they  had  seen  a  large  body  of  Con- 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANTILLT. 


151 


federate  infantry  moving  east,  had  ridden  back  at  once 
and  informed  Gen.  Pope,  and  liad  then  been  directed  by 
him  to  guide  Gen.  Stevens  to  a  point  on  the  turnpike 
some  distance  in  advance  of  the  place  vliere  they  had 
noticed  the  head  of  the  Confederate  column. 

Getting  his  command  under  arms  with  all  possible 
haste  Gen.  Stevens  moved  rapidly  towards  the  indicated 
point,  his  division  (the  First)  haAung  the  lead,  followed 
shortly  by  the  Second  Brigade  of  the  Second  (Reno's) 
Division,  the  First  Brigade  of  wliich  had  been  so  se- 
verely handled  at  Manassas,  on  the  29th  of  August, 
that  it  was  called  on  for  no  subsequent  duty  during 
the  campaign.  Moving  a  third  of  a  mile  to  the  AVar- 
renton  pike,  which  he  followed  a  couple  of  miles  toward 
Fairfax  Court-House,  Gen.  Stevens  left  the  pike,  and, 
taking  a  cart-path  leading  off  it  to  the  left  (north), 
struck  out  for  the  Little-River  turnpike.  After  a 
march  of  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  Warrenton  pike, 
when  moving  along  elevated  ground  in  open  country, 
his  hopes  of  being  able  to  gain  a  position  across  the 
turnpike  before  the  enemy  came  up  were  dashed  by 
running  on  a  skirmish  line  in  his  front,  150  yards  away. 
The  Confederate  skirmishers  were  near  the  abandoned 
railroad  line  shown  on  the  plan :  behind  them  was  open 
ground  and  a  large  cornfield,  and  beyond  these  fields, 
and  quarter  of  a  mile  in  Stevens's  front,  were  thick 
woods,  which  also  projected  on  his  right  nearly  to  the 
old  railroad  location. 

A  strong  skirmish  line  was  thrown  out  to  the  front, 
under  the  direction  of  Capt.  Stevens,  and  the  enemy's 


152 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CA3IPAIGN, 


skirmisliers  driyen  across  the  open  land  and  cornfield 
into  the  woods  beyond,  from  which  the  fire  of  an  ex- 
tended line  was  opened,  and  Stevens's  skirmishers  fell 
back  to  the  outer  edge  of  the  cornfield,  the  enemy  not 
pursuing,  although  a  single  Confederate  regiment  ad- 
vanced from  the  woods  in  line  of  battle  on  the  (Union) 
right  of  the  cornfield,  but  immediately  retired  again  to 
the  woods. 

Meanwhile,  Stevens's  approach  having  been  noticed, 
Jackson  was  hurrying  Branch's  and  Brockenbrough's 
brigades  into  position  to  strike  him. 

Gen,  Stevens,  who  was  watching  the  development  of 
affairs  from  a  wooded  knoll  near  the  old  railroad,  as  his 
skirmishers  began  to  come  in  set  to  work  to  throw  his 
division  of  six  regiments  into  a  column  of  attack.  The 
division  numbered,  all  told,  about  2,000  muskets,  by 
actual  count,  just  half  the  number  with  which  it  had 
left  Fredericksburg  to  join  Gen.  Pope's  army  three 
weeks  before  ;  and  was  formed  in  column  with  brigade 
front  and  three  lines  deep.  The  leading  brigade,  com- 
manded by  Col.  David  Morrison,  of  the  Seventy-ninth 
New  York  (Highlanders),  was  composed  of  the  Seventy- 
ninth  New  York  and  Twenty-eighth  Massachusetts  regi- 
ments ;  the  second  line  (Col.  B.C.  Christ's  brigade)  was 
composed  of  the  Fiftieth  Pennsylvania  and  Eighth  Mich- 
igan; the  third  line  (Col.  Daniel  Leasure's  brigade) 
was  composed  of  the  One  Hundredth  Pennyslvania  and 
Forty-sixth  New  York.  This  column  of  attack  consisted 
of  every  Union  soldier  on  the  field  at  the  time,  except 
the  artillerymen  with  the  guns  of  Benjamin's  battery 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANTILLT. 


153 


which  were  placed  in  position  on  the  knoll  referred  to. 
The  only  support  then  moving  to  the  field  was  Reno's 
old  brigade  of  three  regiments  (Twenty-first  Massachu- 
setts, Fifty-first  New  York,  and  Fifty-first  Pennsylvania), 
then  half  a  mile  in  the  rear.  Nothing  else  was  between 
Gen.  Stevens  and  the  Warrenton  pike,  by  which  he 
knew  that  the  main  army  was  in  full  retreat.  The  at- 
tack about  to  be  made  was  Gen.  Stevens's  attack,  for, 
although  Gen.  Reno  accompanied  his  men  to  the  field, 
and  took  some  part  in  putting  in  the  troops  after  Gen. 
Stevens's  death,  he  considered  himself  off  active  duty, 
from  sickness,  as  before  stated,  and  let  Gen.  Stevens 
take  the  entire  responsibility  of  what  was  to  be  done 
in  the  unexpected  emergency  which  had  arisen. 

Charged  with  this  responsibility.  Gen.  Stevens,  satis- 
fied that  a  strong  Confederate  force  was  in  his  front, 
which  he  believed  was  about  to  attack  him,  came  to  the 
quick  conclusion  that  a  sharp  charge  on  his  part  was 
better  policy  than  to  receive  an  attack,  or  wait  to  allow 
his  small  force  to  be  flanked  in  its  position.  Besides, 
he  was  under  orders  to  gain  the  Little-River  pike,  and 
from  the  elevated  ground  on  which  he  had  just  been 
moving  he  had  seen  the  wagons  on  the  Centreville 
pike  hurrying  towards  Fairfax  Court-House,  and  felt 
the  greater  need  of  showing  a  bold  front.  The  time  for 
action  was  short,  as  night  was  fast  coming  on,  with  a 
heavily  clouded  and  threatening  sky. 

General  Stevens  had  formed  his  men  for  the  attack  with 
great  rapidity,  and  his  column  was  ready  to  move  as  soon 
as  his  skirmishers  had  come  in.    At  about  half-past  4 


154 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


o'clock  he  gave  the  order  to  advance,  first  sending  Capt. 
Belcher,  provost-marshal  on  the  division  staff,  back  to 
the  Warrenton  pike,  to  report  that  his  division  was  en- 
gaged with  a  heavy  force  of  the  enemy,  and  must  have 
support,  with  orders  to  give  the  message  to  Gen.  Pope,  if 
he  could  find  him  at  once,  if  not,  to  every  corps  and 
division  commander  that  he  could  find  until  support  was 
furnished. 

Dismounting  from  his  horse  the  General  had  taken  post 
in  the  centre  of  the  charging  column,  and,  to  aid  in  holding 
the  men  to  their  work  and  driving  the  charge  home  with 
all  possible  vigor,  had  assigned  a  member  of  his  staff  to 
each  of  his  regiments ;  his  Adjutant-General  (his  son,  Capt. 
Hazard  Stevens)  being  assigned  to  the  Seventy-ninth 
New  York,  of  which  regiment  the  General  had  formerly 
been  Colonel.  The  column  moved  forward  across  the 
open  land,  with  the  left  skirting  through  the  cornfield, 
some  hundreds  of  yards,  steadily  and  in  silence,  without 
a  shot  being  fired,  until  they  came  to  within  75  yards 
of  a  rail  fence  on  the  edge  of  the  woods  bordering  the 
fields  ;  then,  from  Branch's  brigade  of  five  North  Carolina 
and  Brockenbrough's  of  three  Virginia  regiments,  a  terrific 
fire  of  musketry  was  opened  from  the  cover  of  the  fence, 
and  the  Seventy-nintJi  and  Twenty-eighth,  suffering 
terribly,  came  to  a  halt.  To  be  checked  there  in  the 
open  ground  was  to  be  lost;  the  colors  of  the  Seventy- 
ninth  were  down,  and  the  column  wavered.  Passing  by 
his  son,  who  had  fallen  wounded  in  the  hip  and  arm,  Gen. 
Stevens  seized  the  flag  of  the  Seventy-ninth,  and  ran  in 
front  of  the  column,  shouting,  "  Follow  me,  my  High- 


TEE  BATTLE  OF  CEANTILLY. 


155 


landers  ! "  The  Tvavering  column  moved  on  again  with, 
resistless  force ;  surging  up  to  the  fence,  they  threw  it 
over  and  gained  the  edge  of  the  woods,  breaking  Branch's 
brigade,  and  forcing  back  Brockenbrough ;  but  Gen. 
Stevens,  their  devoted  leader,  was  now  lying  dead  upon 
the  broken  fence,  a  rebel  bullet  through  liis  brain,  with 
the  colors  of  his  Highlanders  still  held  firmly  in  liis  grasp. 
These  colors,  presented  to  his  widow  on  the  muster-out 
of  the  regiment,  are  now  a  cherished  heirloom  in  his 
family. 

For  the  next  hour  the  battle  on  the  Union  side  was  a 
desultory  fight  of  regiments,  as  the  enemy  hurried  Gregg's 
brigade  of  six  South  Carolina  regiments,  Pender's  of  four 
North  Carolina  regiments,  Thomas's  of  four  Georgia,  and 
Archer's  of  five  Tennessee,  Georgia,  and  Alabama  regi- 
ments, to  cover  and  recapture  the  position  gained  by 
Stevens's  diAision  in  its  superb  charge  upon  the  Con- 
federate right :  while,  seriously  threatened  as  they  supposed 
on  their  front  and  left,  Jackson's  division  (then  com- 
manded by  Starke)  left  the  field  in  a  causeless  panic,  and 
Ewell's  division  (then  commanded  by  Lawton),in  much 
confusion  and  uncertainty,  was  falling  back  or  moving 
from  right  to  left.  In  the  midst  of  it  a  terrifi^c  thunder- 
storm with  a  deluge  of  rain,  which  burst  upon  the  field, 
brought  on  an  early  night,  and  added  to  the  panicky  state 
of  the  Confederates,  rendering  rapid  or  effective  movements 
almost  impossible.  Just  as  Stevens's  di^dsion  gained  the 
edge  of  the  woods  Reno's  old  brigade  came  to  the  front, 
commanded  by  Col.  Edward  Ferrero  of  the  Fifty-first  New 
York,  under  orders  from  Gen.  Reno  to  cross  the  railroad 


156 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


line  and  enter  the  woods  at  some  distance  on  Gen. 
Stevens's  right,  while  Benjamin's  guns  were  shelling  the 
interval.  What  the  brigade  was  expected  to  do  when 
it  got  into  the  woods  is  micertain.  Gen.  Reno  stated 
soon  afterwards  that  he  ordered  Col.  Ferrero  simply  to 
take  position  to  cover  Stevens's  right ;  while  the  order,  as 
communicated  from  Col.  Ferrero  to  the  Twenty-first  Mas- 
sachusetts, was  to  move  through  the  woods  until  we  found 
the  enemy. 

The  Fifty-first  New  York,  the  leading  regiment  of  the 
brigade,  entered  the  woods  half  a  mile  from  Stevens's 
right,  and  soon  coming  upon  the  enemy  (by  Gen.  Early's 
official  report  for  Ewell's  division,  probably  Hayes's 
brigade  of  that  division),  became  somewhat  engaged,  and 
suffered  a  small  loss  (8  wounded  and  5  prisoners) ;  the 
Twenty-first  Massachusetts,  crossing  through  a  deep  rail- 
road-cut, was  then  thrown  into  the  woods  in  line  of 
battle  a  little  to  the  left  of  the  Fifty-first  New  York,  and 
moved  rapidly  forward  from  quarter  to  half  a  mile  before 
they  encountered  the  enemy ;  the  Fifty-first  Pennsylvania 
entered  the  woods  to  the  right  of  the  Fifty-first  New  York, 
and  were  not  engaged. 

Gen.  Early's  official  report  for  Ewell's  division  shows 
conclusively  that  the  movement  by  the  Fifty-first  New 
York,  followed  by  the  advance  of  the  Twenty-first  Mas- 
sachusetts, being  mistaken  in  the  fierce  thunder-storm 
which  had  just  broken  for  an  attack  in  force,  caused  the 
panicky  retreat  of  Hays's  brigade,  and  shook  Jackson's 
division  so  much  as  to  cause  Gen.  Starke  to  withdraw  it 
from  tlie  fie  Id.  ^ 

1  10  W.R.,  715. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CITAXTTLLY. 


157 


Tlie  Twenty-first  moved  blindly  on  in  the  pouring  rain 
until  it  ran  upon  a  portion  of  Early's  brigade  (the  Thir- 
teenth, Twenty-fifth,  and  Thirty-first  Virginia  regiments), 
and  probably  also  upon  a  part  of  Trimble's  brigade,  with 
whom  they  had  a  terribly  bloody  engagement,  and  soon 
retired  from  the  woods,  the  enemy  not  pursuing.  There 
was  no  other  fighting  on  the  Union  right  during  the 
battle. 

By  this  time  the  regiments  of  Stevens's  division,  hav- 
ing expended  their  ammunition,  had  been  withdrawn  (or 
retired)  from  their  position  along  the  edge  of  the  woods 
to  the  A'icinity  of  a  farm-house  north  of  the  old  railroad 
line ;  and  Birney's  brigade,  which  had  come  up  most 
opportunely,  was  hotly  engaged  in  a  position  a  little  to 
the  left  of  the  ground  on  which  Stevens  had  fought,  and 
close  on  the  Confederate  right,  wliich  was  now  held  by 
Gregg's  brigade,  what  there  was  left  on  the  field  of 
Branch's  brigade,  and  two  of  Pender's  regiments ;  while 
Thomas's  brigade,  supported  by  two  of  Pender's  regi- 
ments, was  silently  moving  to  attack  Birney's  exposed 
right ;  Randolph's  battery  being  in  position  on  a  knoll  to 
the  north  of  the  old  railroad  line,  and  about  an  eighth 
of  a  mile  from  Birney's  right. 

The  rain  had  now  ceased,  and,  although  it  could  hardly 
have  been  later  than  half-past  6  o'clock  in  the  evening, 
the  atmosphere  was  thick,  and  the  sky  still  so  heavily 
overcast,  that  night  coming  on  prematurely  made  it  im- 
possible to  distinguish  any  object  clearly  more  than  a  few 
rods  away.  As  the  shattered  Twenty-first  Massachusetts 
regiment  emerged  from  the  woods,  Gen.  Kearny,  who  had 


158 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


just  arrived  upon  tlie  field,  and  was  searching  for  troops 
to  cover  Birney's  right  flank,  rode  full  upon  us,  and  in 
fierce  haste  ordered  the  regiment  to  move  on  the  run  to 
take  post  on  Birney's  right,  the  position  of  whose  line  was 
indicated  only  by  the  flashes  of  their  muskets.  When  Gen. 
Kearny  came  upon  us  there  was  hardly  a  musket  in  our 
line  that  could  be  fired,  as  our  disastrous  fight  in  the  woods 
had  occurred  in  the  midst  of  the  terrific  thunder-storm 
which  had  soon  rendered  the  guns  unserviceable.  The 
officer  in  command  of  the  regiment  at  the  time  begged  the 
General  to  allow  them  a  few  moments  to  draw  the  wet 
charges  from  the  guns,  but  was  refused,  with  a  hot  sneer 
at  our  cowardice,  and  the  threat  that  unless  the  regiment 
moved  instantly,  as  ordered,  he  would  turn  a  battery  upon 
us,^  emphasizing  his  threat  by  riding  from  us  directly 
towards  Randolph's  battery,  posted  a  few  rods  in  our  rear, 
and  which  was  then  firing  with  solid  shot  (its  only  ammu- 
nition) into  the  woods  across  the  cornfield.  The  General, 
fearful  for  Birney's  right,  and  perhaps,  also,  somewhat  un- 
duly excited  by  the  reply  provoked  by  his  imputation 
upon  the  valor  of  the  regiment,  at  once  sent  an  officer  from 
the  battery  to  us,  with  his  compliments,  coupled  with  the 
assurance  that  it  would  play  upon  us  unless  the  order 
given  was  instantly  obeyed.  Luckily  two  of  our  com- 
panies, which  had  been  detached  in  the  woods  to  cover  our 
flanks,  had  escaped  the  ambuscade  into  which  the  others 
had  fallen,  and  had  now  joined  us  with  serviceable  guns, 
and  the  regiment,  about  two  hundred  strong,  moved  across 

1  Gen.  Kearny's  orders  and  remarks  were  addressed  to  the  wi'iter,  who  happened 
to  be  in  command  of  the  regiment  at  the  time  of  his  first  approach. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CHAN  TILLY, 


159 


the  open  ground  towards  tlie  cornfield  and  the  front  of 
Birney's  right,  deploying  a  thin  skirmish  line  to  cover  our 
rio'ht  and  front  as  we  advanced. 

As  our  skirmishers  came  up  to  the  rail  fence  of  the  corn- 
field they  were  fired  on  by  Thomas's  skirmishers,  whose 
brigade,  with  two  of  Pender's  regiments,  was  in  the  corn- 
field and  coming  from  the  woods,  well  on  Birney's  right. 
Crossing  the  line  of  the  fence  we  soon  halted  in  the  corn, 
under  a  dropping  fire  from  the  enemy.  Gen.  Kearny  was 
following  us  up  closely,  and  as  we  came  to  a  halt  fiercely 
tried  to  force  us  forward,  saying  that  we  were  firing  on  our 
own  men,  and  that  there  were  no  rebels  near  us.  We  had 
the  proof  in  two  prisoners  —  an  ofiicer  and  private  of  a 
Georgia  regiment — brought  in  by  our  skirmishers,  beside 
the  warning  cries  of  "  Surrender  I  "  coming  both  from  our 
right  and  front ;  but,  unfortunately,  Kearny's  judgment 
seemed  unable  to  appreciate  the  existence  of  the  peril 
which  his  military  instinct  had  caused  him  to  guard 
against.  Lieut.  Walcott,  of  the  brigade  staff,  took  our 
prisoners  to  him,  saying,  "  General,  if  you  don't  believe 
there  are  rebels  in  the  corn,  here  are  two  prisoners  from 
the  Forty-ninth  Georgia,  just  taken  in  our  front."  Crying 
out  fiercely,  "  you  and  your  prisoners  !  "  the  Gen- 
eral, entirely  alone,  apparently  in  uncontrollable  rage  at 
our  disregard  of  his  peremptory  orders  to  advance,  forced 
his  horse  through  the  deep,  sticky  mud  of  the  cornfield 
past  the  left  of  the  regiment,  passing  within  a  few  feet  of 
where  I  was  standing.  I  watched  him  moving  in  the 
murky  twilight  through  the  corn,  and,  when  less  than 
twenty  yards  away,  saw  his  horse  suddenly  rear  and  turn, 


160 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


and  lialf-a-dozen  muskets  flasli  around  him :  so  died  the 
intrepid  soldier,  Gen.  Philip  Kearny ! 

Diverted  by  our  movement  from  their  designs  upon 
Birney's  brigade,  the  enemy  surged  up  against  our  front 
and  right  flank,  took  what  fire  we  could  give  them  at  a  few 
paces'  distance  (which  they  returned  with  interest),  and,  in 
the  dark,  ignorant  of  our  weakness,  allowed  us  to  withdraw 
from  their  front  without  pursuit,  and  in  a  few  minutes 
also  drew  back  themselves  from  the  cornfield  to  the  woods 
behind  it.  Except  a  few  scattering  shots  on  Birney's  front, 
which  soon  ceased,  the  battle  of  Chantilly  was  now  over, 
neither  side  having  permanently  gained  a  foot  of  ground 
in  the  engagement. 

During  the  night  Gen.  Sumner's  command,  which  had 
remained  at  Centreville,  fell  back  on  Fairfax  Court- 
House,  and  before  daylight  of  September  2  the  Union 
troops  were  withdrawn  from  the  field  of  Chantilly  and 
the  Germantown  front,  and,  halting  for  an  hour  or  two 
near  Fairfax  Court-House,  with  the  rest  of  the  army 
completed  the  retreat  to  the  defences  of  Washington 
and  Alexandria. 

Gen.  Birney,  in  his  ofiicial  report  of  the  fight,  says  that, 
arriving  on  the  field  and  going  to  the  front,  under  orders 
from  Gen.  Reno,  he  found  the  division  of  Gen.  Stevens 
retiring  in  some  disorder  before  the  enemy,  the  officers  in 
command  of  regiments  stating  that  their  ammunition  had 
been  exhausted.  He  immediately  ordered  forward  the 
Fourth  Maine,  which  gallantly  advanced,  and  was  soon  in 
active  conflict ;  the  One  Hundred  and  First  New  York, 
Third  Maine,  Fortieth  and  First  New  York,  were  succes- 


TEE  BATTLE  OF  CEAXTILLY. 


161 


sivelT  tlirown  forward  and  held  tlie  enemy,  snstainino- 
unflincliingly  a  very  liea^y  fire  from  a  superior  force. 
Gen.  Kearnv,  now  arrhing  on  the  field,  went  to  ex- 
amine the  gronnd  on  the  right  where  Birney  had  asked 
to  have  a  brigade  posted  to  fill  the  gap  caused  by  the 
withdrawal  of  Stevens's  division.  Kearnv  not  returning, 
Birnev  assumed  command  of  the  division,  and,  ordering" 
forward  Robinson's  and  Poe's  brigades  (the  First  and 
Third  brigades  of  Kearny's  division),  relieved  his  tired 
regiments,  and  held  the  battle-gronnd  without  further 
fighting  until  3  o'clock  A.M.,  of  September  2,  when  his 
di^fision  followed  Eeno's  command  to  Fairfiix  Couit-House  ^ 
and  the  defences  of  "Washington. 

The  A'ery  incomplete  returns  indicate  that  the  losses 
in  the  fight  on  the  Union  side  were  not  less  than  1.000 
men  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners  ;  while  the  enemy 
lost  about  500  men  in  killed  and  wounded,  besides  a  few 
prisoners.  The  Confederate  loss  is  taken  from  official  re- 
turns ;  the  Union  loss  is  an  estimate,  based  principally  on 
returns  wliich  were  furnished  me  by  commanding  officers 
of  regiments,  and  through  the  Adjutant-Generals  of  Xew 
York,  Pennsylvania,  and  Micliigan.  Information  as  to 
Union  losses  has  also  been  obtained  from  the  following 
publications:  "Bates's  History  Pennsylvania  Volunteers," 
"  Maine  in  the  "War  of  the  Rebellion,  "  and  "  Michigan  in 
the  W^ar."  There  had  been,  so  far  as  I  have  been  able  to 
discover,  no  instance,  except  in  the  case  of  Poe's  brigade 
(the  only  loss  in  which  was  four  men  on  picket  during  the 
night),  where  the  loss  of  any  regiment  on  the  Union  side 
was  officially  reported. 

U6  W.R.,  418. 


162 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


The  losses,  thus  ascertained,  are  as  follows :  — 

Confederate  Loss.  —  Official. 

A.  P.  Hill's  division  :  39  killed,  267  wounded. 
Swell's  division :  24  killed,  151  wounded,  and  a  few 
missing  (number  not  given). 

Uniois-  Loss. 
In  Ninth  Corps,  Army  of  the  Potomac :  — 

First  (Stevens's)  Division. 
Brig.-Gen.  Isaac  I.  Stevens,  commanding,  killed,  and 
Hazard  Stevens,  Captain  and  A.A.G.,  severely  wounded.  I 
have  no  report  of  other  casualties  on  the  division  staff. 

First  Brigade  (commanded  by  Col.  B.C.  Christ)  :  — 
Eighth  Michigan,  7  killed,  and  many  wounded  (num- 
ber not  given). 

Fiftieth  Pennsylvania,  7  killed,  and  many  wounded 
(number  not  given). 

Second  Brigade  (commanded  by  Col.  Daniel  Leasure)  :  — 
One-hundredth  Pennsylvania,  2  killed,  and  34  wounded. 
Forty-sixth  New  York,  suffered  severely,  but  loss  not 
reported. 

Third  Brigade  (commanded  by  Col.  David  Morrison)  :  — 
Seventy-ninth  New  York,  40  killed  and  wounded  (no 

separate  report  as  to  each). 

Twenty-eighth  Massachusetts,  15  killed,  79  wounded  and 

5  missing. 


TEE  BATTLE  OF  CEANTILLY. 


163 


Second  (Reno's)  Division. 

Second  Brigade  (commanded  by  Col.  Edward  Ferrero) :  — 

Twenty-first  Massacliiisetts,  38  (including  6  commis- 
sioned officers)  killed,  76  wounded,  26  prisoners. 

Fifty-first  Xew  York,  8  wounded,  5  prisoners. 

Fifty-first  Pennsylvania ;  if  there  was  any  loss  none  is 
reported. 

Third  Corps,  Army  of  the  Potomac :  — 

First  (Kearny's)  Division, 
Ma j .-Gen.  Philip  Kearny,  commanding,  killed. 

First  Brigade  (commanded  by  Brig.-Gen.  J.  C.  Robin- 
son) :  — 

Suffered  no  loss. 

Second  Brigade  (commanded  by  Brig.-Gen.  D.  B. 
Birney)  :  — 

Third  Maine,  4  killed,  38  wounded,  8  missing. 

Fourth  Maine,  8  killed,  54  wounded,  2  missing. 

Fortieth  New  York,  163  killed,  wounded,  and  missing 
(no  separate  report  as  to  each). 

First  New  York,  loss  not  reported. 

Thirty-eighth  New  York,  loss  not  reported. 

One-hundred  and  First  New  York,  loss  heavy,  but  not 
reported. 

Fifty-seventh  Pennsylvania,  loss,  if  any,  not  reported. 

Third  Brigade  (commanded  by  Col.  O.  M.  Poe)  :  — 
Second  Michigan,  1  killed,  1  wounded  (official). 
Ninety-ninth  Pennsylvania,  1  killed,  1  missing  (official). 


164 


POPE'S   VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


No  other  loss  was  suffered  in  the  brigade. 

In  front  of  Germantown,  the  Twentieth  New  York,  of 
the  Third  (Gen.  Patrick's)  Brigade,  of  the  First  Divis- 
ion, Tliird  Corps  (Gen.  McDowell's),  of  the  Army  of 
Virginia,  seem  to  have  been  the  only  troops  engaged,  and 
suffered  a  loss  of  about  20  men  in  killed  and  wounded. 

The  only  official  reports  of  any  value  relating  to  the 
skirmishing  in  front  of  Germantown  are  by  Gens.  Mc- 
Dowell and  Ricketts.  Gen.  McDowell's  report  is  as 
follows :  On  the  1st  of  September  I  received  your  order, 
herewith,  to  move  immediately  to  Germantown  to  in- 
tercept the  march  of  the  enemy,  then  moving  down  the 
Little-River  (or  Aldie)  turnpike  to  Fairfax  Court-House. 
This  was  complied  with  within  a  few  minutes  after  its 
receipt,  and  the  corps  was  in  position  at  Germantown  in 
time  to  receive  the  enemy  at  the  crossing  of  the  Difficult. 
Here  Ricketts'  division  was  drawn  up,  under  the  direction 
of  Maj.-Gen.  Hooker,  with  a  battalion  thrown  across  the 
valley  of  the  stream,  and,  opening  on  the  enemy's  advance, 
held  it  in  check  at  the  time  Reno's  corps  attacked  him  in 
flank  and  repulsed  him."^ 

Gen.  Ricketts'  report  for  his  division  (Second  Division, 
Third  Corps)  says  only:  "  On  the  1st  September  we  took 
up  position  on  the  Aldie  road  [Little-River  pike] ,  acting 
in  conjunction  with  Gen.  Reno's  division,  and  held  this 
point  until  the  2d  September,  when,  in  compliance  with 
orders,  we  fell  back  to  Hall's  Hill,  near  Washington."  ^ 


» 16  W.R.,  344. 


2  lb.,  385. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANTILLY. 


165 


Gen.  Stuart,  in  his  official  report  of  the  part  taken  by 
his  command  in  the  battle  of  Chantilly,  after  stating  his 
arrival  at  Ox  Hill,  says,  "  I  first  tried  to  force,  with  some 
skirmishers,  our  way  down  the  turnpike  [Little-River 
turnpike]  toward  Fairfax  Court-House,  but  the  wooded 
ridges  were  firmly  held  by  infantry  and  artillery,  and  it 
was  plainly  indicated  the  enemy  would  here  make  a 
stand."  The  report  then  goes  on  to  state  that,  Jack- 
son having  halted  for  Longstreet  to  come  up,  Stuart, 
with  Lee's  brigade  of  cavalry,  moved  round  toward 
Flint  Hill,  two  miles  north  of  Fairfax  Court-House,  in 
the  thunder-storm  which  occurred  shortly  before  dark; 
but,  finding  that  the  hill  was  occupied  in  force,  returned 
at  once  to  the  vicinity  of  Germantown.  He  further 
says,  referring  to  the  time  which  elapsed  while  he  was 
makino;  this  movement  on  Flint  Hill,  "  Meanwhile  a 
heavy  engagement  had  taken  place  on  Jackson's  right, 
the  enemy  ha^dng  penetrated  to  his  flank  by  way  of 
Milieu's  house."! 

Gen.  Jackson  says,  in  his  official  report:  "It  being 
ascertained,  next  morning  [Sunday,  August  31],  that  the 
Federal  Army  had  retreated  in  the  direction  of  Centre- 
ville,  I  was  ordered  by  the  commanding  general  to  turn 
that  position,  crossing  Bull  Eun  at  Sudley  Ford ;  thence 
pursuing  a  country  road  until  we  reached  the  Little- 
Eiver  turnpike,  which  we  followed  in  the  direction  of 
Fairfax  Court-House  until  the  troops  halted  for  the 
night.  Early  next  morning  (September  1),  we  moved 
forward,  and  late  in  the  evening,  after  reaching  Ox 

1 16  W.R.,  744.    See  note,  192  supra. 


166 


POPE'S  VTRGINIA  CAMPAIGN: 


Hill,^  came  in  contact  with  tlie  enemy,  who  were  in 
position  on  our  right  and  front,  covering  his  line  of 
retreat  from  Centre ville  to  Fairfax  Court-House.  Our 
line  of  battle  was  formed,  General  Hill's  division  on 
the  right,  Ewell's  division.  General  Lawton  command- 
ing, in  the  centre,  and  Jackson's  division.  General  Starke 
commanding,  on  the  left,  all  on  the  right  of  the  turn- 
pike road.  Artillery  was  posted  on  an  eminence  to  the 
left  of  the  road.  The  brigades  of  Branch  and  Field, 
Col.  [J.  M.]  Brockenbrough  commanding  the  latter,  were 
sent  forward  to  feel  and  engage  the  enemy.  A  cold 
and  drenching  thunder-shower  swept  over  the  field  at 
this  time,  striking  directly  into  the  faces  of  our  troops. 
These  two  brigades  gallantly  engaged  the  enemy,  but  so 
severe  was  the  fire  in  front  and  flank  of  Branch's  bri- 
gade as  to  produce  in  it  some  disorder  and  falling  back. 
The  brigades  of  Gregg,  Thomas,  and  Pender  were  then 
thrown  into  the  fight.  Soon  a  portion  of  Ewell's  divis- 
ion became  engaged.  The  conflict  now  raged  with 
great  fury,  the  enemy  obstinately  and  desjoerately  contest- 
ing the  ground  until  their  Generals,  Kearny  and  Stevens, 
fell  in  front  of  Thomas's  brigade,  after  which  they  retired 
from  the  field."  ^ 

A  very  mistaken  idea  of  the  battle  has  become  prevalent, 
from  widely  circulated  works  which  have  been  published 
on  the  campaign  of  which  it  was  the  closing  engagement. 
These  represent  the  battle  to  have  occurred  in  the  imme- 

^  The  distance  from  Pleasant  Valley,  which  Jackson  left  in  the  morning, 
to  Ox  Hill  is  but  nine  miles ;  an  interesting  fact,  as  sliowing  the  slowness 
and  caution  with  which  he  was  moving.  ^  16  W.R.,  647. 


TEE  BATTLE  OF  CHANT  ILLY. 


167 


diate  vicinity  of,  and  in  an  attempt  by  Jackson  to  gain  the 
Centreville  pike,  instead  of  being,  as  it  really  was,  a  battle 
forced  npon  Jackson  to  enable  bim  to  maintain  his  own 
hold  upon  the  Little-River  pike  until  he  was  joined  by 
Longstreet.  A  few  further  extracts  from  Confederate 
official  reports  bearing  upon  this  matter  are  therefore  given. 
It  may  be  added  that  no  report  on  the  Union  side  by  any 
officer,  who  was  near  enough  to  the  fighting  to  have  an 
opinion  of  any  value  on  the  subject,  represents  the  fight 
to  have  been  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  Centreville 
pike. 

Gen.  Lee's  despatch  to  President  Davis,  dated  Chantil- 
ly,  September  3,  1862,  gives  the  following  concise 
account  of  the  battle  :  — 

"  The  next  morning  [Aug.  31]  the  enemy  was  discov- 
ered in  the  strong  position  at  Centreville,  and  the  army 
was  put  in  motion  toward  the  Little-Eiver  turnpike,  to 
turn  his  right.  L^pon  reaching  Ox  Hill,  on  September  1, 
he  was  again  discovered  in  our  front  on  the  heights  of 
Germantown,  and  about  5  P.M.,  made  a  spirited  attack 
upon  the  front  and  right  of  our  column,  with  a  view 
of  apparently  covering  the  withdrawal  of  his  trains 
on  the  Centreville  road  and  masking  his  retreat.  Our 
position  was  maintained  with  but  slight  loss  on  both  sides. 
Maj.-Gen.  Kearny  was  left  by  the  enemy  dead  on  the 
field.  During  the  night  the  enemy  fell  back  to  Fairfax 
Couit-House."! 

Branch's,  Gregg's,  and  Pender's  brigades,  of  A.  P.  Hill's 
division,  bore  the  brunt  of  the  fight,  and  their  reports  are 
of  special  value. 

n%  W.R.,  559. 


168 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


Gen.  Branch  was  killed  at  Antietam ;  Gen.  Lane,  suc- 
ceeding to  the  command  of  his  brigade,  made  the  follow- 
ing report  of  date  Nov.  14,  1862  :  — 

"  On  Monday  afternoon,  about  4  o'clock,  we  came  up 
with  the  enemy  again  at  Ox  Hill,  near  Fairfax  Court- 
House,  on  the  Alexandria  and  Winchester  turnpike " 
(Little-River  pike),  "  when  the  engagement  was  immedi- 
ately opened.  This  brigade  pressed  eagerly  forward 
through  an  open  field  and  a  piece  of  woods  to  the  edge  of 
another  field  where  we  were  for  a  short  time  exposed 
to  the  enemy's  infantry  fire  without  being  able  to  return 
it.  An  attempt  was  made  to  flank  us  on  the  right,  and 
the  Eighteenth  regiment  was  immediately  detached  from 
the  centre  of  the  brigade  and  ordered  to  the  right  to  pre- 
vent the  movement,  which  it  did,  sustaining  a  deadly 
fire,  unsupported.  The  enemy's  direct  advance  was 
through  a  field  of  corn,  in  which  he  sustained  great  loss, 
notwithstanding  most  of  our  guns  fired  badly,  on  account 
of  the  heavy  rain  which  fell  during  the  engagement.  On 
learning  that  our  ammunition  was  nearly  out  Gen. 
Branch  made  known  the  fact,  and  was  ordered  to  hold 
his  position  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  We  remained 
where  we  were  until  dark,  when  the  whole  command  fell 
back  to  the  field  in  rear  of  the  woods.  The  Twenty- 
eighth,  cold,  wet,  and  hungry,  was  then  ordered  back  to 
the  field  of  battle,  to  do  picket  duty  for  the  night, 
without  fires.  This  engagement  is  regarded  by  this  bri- 
gade as  one  of  our  severest."^ 


1  16  W.R.,  677. 


TEE  BATTLE  OF  CEANTILLY. 


169 


Branch's  brigade  lost  106  killed  and  wounded,  and  2 
missing. 

Gen.  Gregg  was  killed  at  Fredericksburg.  The  report 
for  his  brigade  was  made  by  Gen.  McGowan,  of  date 
Feb.  9,  1863.  After  describino^  the  o-eneral  flankino^ 
movement  by  Jackson's  troops,  after  the  second  battle  of 
Manassas,  he  goes  on  to  say  that  they  moved  up  the 
Little-River  pike  towards  Fairfax  Court-House,  on 
September  1,  '*and  late  in  the  evening,  near  Ox  Hill, 
suddenly  came  in  contact  with  the  enemy,  who  was 
already  in  position  on  the  right  and  front,  covering 
his  line  of  retreat  from  Centreville  to  Fairfax  Court- 
House.  While  on  the  march  the  skirmishers  suddenly 
commenced  firing,  and  the  brigade  quickly  formed  in 
line  of  battle  under  a  heavy  fire.  The  Thirteenth  and 
Fourteenth  South  Carolina  Volunteers  were  posted  in 
front,  the  Twelfth  South  Carolina  Volunteers  support- 
ing the  Fourteenth,  and  Orr's  rifles  supporting  the 
Thirteenth,  and  the  First  South  Carolina  Volunteers  in 
reserve.  In  this  order,  with  loaded  muskets  and  fixed 
bayonets,  they  were  immediately  pushed  upon  the  enemy 
south  of  the  turnpike.  They  advanced  rapidly  to  afgnce  ; 
the  Twelfth  was  thrown  out  on  the  left  of  the  Fourteenth 
to  lengthen  the  line,  and  the  rifles  were  also  thrown  for- 
ward. After  a  short  but  very  brisk  and  severe  contest 
they  drove  the  enemy  back.  A  cold  and  drenching  thun- 
der-shower swept  over  the  field  during  the  engagement, 
and  rendered  many  of  the  guns  unfit  for  use.  The  enemy 
withdrew,  and  we  slept  upon  the  field.  The  brigade  went 
into  action  unexpectedly,  but  behaved  extremely  well. 


170 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


For  the  time  they  were  engaged  and  the  small  number 
present  their  loss  was  heavy,  being  in  the  aggregate  104 
killed  and  wounded,  including  some  valuable  officers."  ^ 

Gen.  Pender,  in  his  report  of  the  operations  of  his 
brigade,  made  October  14,  1862,  says:  "In  the  after- 
noon, at  Ox  Hill,  the  head  of  the  column  coming  in 
contact  with  the  enemy,  my  brigade  was  for  a  few 
moments  ordered  under  cover  to  be  in  support.  Yery 
soon  I  received  orders  from  Gen.  Jackson  to  go  to  the 
support  of  Col.  Brockenbrough,  who  reported  he  was 
hard  pressed.  I  moved  forward  several  hundred  yards, 
when  I  came  in  rear  of  Col.  Brockenbrough's  brigade, 
which  caused  mine  to  be  thrown  slightly  out  of  order, 
two  re2fiments  bearino^  to  the  rio-ht  and  thus  o^ettins; 
separated  from  the  others  before  I  saw  the  trouble.  The 
woods  were  quite  thick.  I,  however,  moved  them 
on,  bringing  two  to  the  support  of  Col.  Thomas  and  the 
others  to  the  assistance  of  Gen.  Branch,  who  was  some 
distance  to  the  right.  My  brigade  was  thus  placed 
between  the  two  above-named  brigades,  with  a  short 
interval  in  my  centre.  Only  the  Sixteenth  and  Thirty- 
fourth  North  Carolina,  on  the  right,  were  actively  engaged. 
After  reachinsr  the  edsre  of  the  field  in  which  the  enemv 
were  posted  no,  attempt  was  made  to  advance.  My  two 
regiments  suffered  very  severely  from  direct  and  flank 
fire.  This  continued  till  about  dark,  I  having  previously 
caused  my  fire  to  cease.  Col.  Eiddick  and  Lieut.-Col. 
Miller,  of  the  Thirty-fourth,  both  received  wounds  of 
which  they  died.  Capt.  Stowe,  commanding  Sixteenth 
North  Carolina,  was  also  wounded."  ^ 

U6  W.R.,  682.  2  lb.,  698. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANTILLY. 


171 


Col.  Thomas,  in  the  report  for  his  brigade,  made  Octo- 
ber 26,  1862,  says  merely:  "  On  Monday,  September  1, 
near  Germantown,  the  Third  Brigade  [Thomas's]  was 
ordered  to  the  support  of  General  Gregg.  After  a  sharp 
conflict  with  a  hody  of  the  enemy  they  were  driven  back, 
and  the  field  was  held  by  our  troops  that  night."  ^ 

I  have  not  been  able  to  find  any  report  for  Brocken- 
brousfh's  brio-ade. 

Lieut. -Gen.  Longstreet's  report,  made  Oct.  10,  1862, 
contains  the  following  mention  of  the  battle  of  Chantilly : 
"  Crossing  the  run  [Bull  Eun,  at  Sudley  Ford]  on  the 
following  day  [Monday,  Sept.  1],  the  command  marched 
for  Chantilly  via  the  Little-River  turnpike.  The  enemy 
was  reported  in  position  in  our  front  as  we  reached 
Chantilly,  and  he  made  an  attack  upon  General  Jackson 
before  my  troops  arrived.  He  was  repulsed,  however, 
before  my  re-enforcements  got  up  and  disappeared  during 
the  night."  2 

Major-Gen.  D.  R.  Jones's  division  of  Longstreet's  corps 
were  the  first  troops  to  join  Jackson  at  Chantilly,  and  I 
will  conclude  my  extracts  from  the  Confederate  official 
reports,  and  my  account  of  the  battle,  by  quoting  what  he 
says  of  the  position  at  Chantilly,  in  the  report  for  his 
division,  made  Dec.  8,  1862:  "  On  the  morning  of  the 
31st  I  took  up  line  of  march  in  the  direction  of  Sudley 
Ford,  crossing  at  it  and  marching  to  Chantilly  the  next 
day,  whence,  under  orders  from  Gen.  Longstreet,  I  sent 
Toombs'  and  Anderson's    brigades   to  the  support  of 


1 16  W.R.,  703. 


2  lb.,  566. 


172 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


General  Jackson,  who  was  engaged  with  the  enemy  at 
Ox  Hill.  These  brigades  took  up  line  of  battle  on  the 
right  of  the  turnpike,  and  slowly  advanced  into  the  woods 
bordering  it,  supposed  to  contain  the  enemy.  Night 
coming  on  and  no  enemy  being  visible,  my  troops  were 
withdrawn  to  the  road  for  bivouac."  ^ 
1 16  W.R.,  580. 


CEANTILLY  REVISITED, 


173 


A  REVISIT   TO   THE  FIELDS  OF  MANASSAS  AND 
CHANTILLY. 

By  Bvt.  Beig.-Gen.  CHARLES  F.  WALCOTT,  U.S.V. 

SuhmiUed  to  the  Society,  Nov.  26,  1883. 


Accompanied  by  Gen.  Hazard  Stevens,  I  revisited  the 
battle-grounds  of  tlie  Second  Manassas  and  Cliantilly  on 
tlie  ISth,  19th,  and  20th  of  May,  1883. 

Taking  horses  at  Manassas  Junction  early  in  the  morn- 
ing of  the  18th,  by  10  o'clock  we  reached  the  Henry 
House,  on  the  historic  Henry-House  hill,  vhere  Jackson 
and  his  men  won  the  proud  title  "  Stonewall,"  in  the 
First  Manassas,  and  where  Reno's  command  repulsed  the 
last  surging  Confederate  charges  in  the  second  battle. 
From  the  commanding  hill  we  saw  again,  after  so  man}^ 
years,  to  the  north  the  woods  from  which  the  Union  flank- 
ing column  suddenly  emerged  in  the  first  battle,  only  to 
fritter  away  their  grand  opportunity ;  while  up  the  War- 
renton  pike  to  the  west  was  Stony  Ridge  and  the  little 
hamlet  of  Groveton,  central  points  in  the  second  battle ; 
to  the  east  was  the  line  of  Bull  Run ;  —  all  in  full  ^uew 
across  the  open  fields,  and  each  about  a  mile  and  a  half 
distant.    We  found  that  twenty  years  had  made  wonder- 


174 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


fully  few  changes  in  the  battle-ground :  the  lines  of  fields 
and  woods  and  general  appearance  of  things  were  sub- 
stantially unchanged,  and  we  soon  felt  that  we  stood  on 
familiar  ground.  The  venerable  Mr.  H.  F.  Henry,  residing 
in  the  house,  received  us  with  the  greatest  kindness,  and 
gave  us  all  the  information  in  his  power.  He  was  an  eye- 
witness of  both  battles,  and  familiar  with  many  of  their 
details  from  personal  observation,  besides  being  an  intelli- 
gent and  careful  student  of  the  large  collection  of  Union 
and  Confederate  maps,  plans,  and  reports  which  he  has  in 
his  house. 

The  monument  erected  by  the  government  in  memory 
of  the  Union  dead  in  the  first  battle  (fought  July  21, 
1861),  stands  on  the  Henry-House  hill,  close  to  the  house. 
It  is  a  cheap,  tumble-down  affair,  eight  or  ten  feet  high, 
built  of  red  sandstone,  with  a  plastered  face  bearing  an  in- 
scription to  the  patriot  dead  who  fell  in  the  battle.  A 
similar  monument  has  also  been  erected  in  memory  of  the 
Union  dead  in  the  series  of  bloody  engagements  consti- 
tuting the  second  battle  (fought  August  28-30,  1862), 
which  stands  on  high  land,  a  mile  and  a  half  westerly  from 
the  Henry  House,  near  the  old  railroad-cut,  the  farthest 
point  gained,  or  rather  touched^  by  the  Union  troops  in  the 
battle.  The  bodies  of  the  Union  dead  have  all  been  re- 
moved to  Arlington,  and  the  only  soldiers  remaining 
buried  on  the  field  are  about  500  Confederates,  closely 
packed  in  a  neglected  cemetery  on  a  prominent  knoll  in 
front  of  Groveton. 

Gen.  Bee  and  Col.  Bartow,  prominent  Confederate  offi- 
cers, were  killed  on  the  Henry-House  hill  in  the  first 


CHANT  ILLY  REVISITED. 


175 


battle,  and  tlie  places  where  the}-  fell  —  but  a  few  yards 
aj^art  —  are  now  marked  by  piles  of  stones.  The  most 
pathetic  monument  on  the  hill  is  a  marble  headstone  over 
the  grave  of  the  venerable  Mrs.  Henry,  who  was  killed  by 
a  Union  shell  in  the  first  battle.  As  I  walked  about  the 
enclosure  I  stopped  to  read  the  inscription  on  the  stone, 
when  Mr.  Henry,  who  stood  close  by,  said,  "  It  is  my 
mother's  grave."  In  answer  to  my  inquiries  he  gave  the 
following  account  of  her  death :  "  She  was  over  eighty 
years  of  age,  and,  having  been  bedridden  for  some  time, 
occupied  the  house  with  me  and  my  brother,  both  of  us 
invalids  ;  not  expecting  a  battle  on  this  ground  we  had 
not  moved  her,  and  were  much  shocked  when  we  saw  the 
Union  troops  coming  from  Sudley  Ford.  We  wished  to 
move  her  at  once,  but  she  was  unwilling  ;  as  the  fight  ad- 
vanced, shot  after  shot  struck  the  house,  and  she  at  last 
consented  to  be  moved.  We  took  her  upon  a  mattress,  and 
carried  her  out  of  the  house,  intending  to  take  her  to  Mr. 
Compton's ;  but  the  fire  grcAV  hotter  and  hotter,  and 
before  we  reached  the  woods  she  begged  so  hard  to  be 
taken  back  that  we  returned  to  the  house,  and  had 
just  replaced  her  in  bed  when  she  was  instantly  killed 
by  a  shell." 

Previously  to  this  visit  my  whole  interest  in  the  field 
had  been  in  connection  with  the  second  battle ;  of  the 
first  battle  I  had  but  a  very  general  and  dim  idea,  consid- 
ering that  its  salient  points  were  well  enough  described  in 
the  doggerel  couplet,  — 

"In  eighteen  hundred  and  sixty-one 
We  all  skedaddled  from  old  Bull  Run  "  — 


176 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  campaign: 


and  that  the  less  any  one  knew  about  it  the  better  for  the 
reputation  of  the  Union  volunteers.  On  my  recent  visit 
I  became  satisfied  that  my  former  notions  of  the  battle 
were  somewhat  erroneous,  that  there  was  some  good  fight- 
ing on  the  Union  side,  and  that  the  honors  of  the  field 
were  not  entirely  with  the  Confederates.^ 

Selecting  from  Mr.  Henry's  collection  of  trophies  a  few 
Union  bullets,  which  he  had  taken  from  the  graves  of 
Confederates  who  had  originally  been  buried  on  the  hill, 
we  rode  about  a  mile  and  a  quarter  down  the  Warrenton 
pike  to  Groveton,  where  we  were  made  welcome  to  the  hos- 
pitable house  of  Mr.  William  H.  Dogan,  and  made  it  our 
head-quarters  during  the  remainder  of  our  stay  upon  the 
field.  We  spent  a  most  interesting  afternoon  in  looking 
up  the  places  which  we  had  occupied  at  different  times  in 
the  second  battle,  and  searching  out  Jackson's  hiding-place 
in  the  railroad-cut  in  the  woods,  from  which  he  hurled 
back  Heintzelman,  Hooker,  Kearny,  Reno,  Stevens,  and 
Sigel,  in  the  bloody  struggles  of  August  29.  As  we 
looked  again  on  the  old  trees,  still  plainly  showing  count- 
less bullet-cuts,  we  realized  again,  as  no  words  can  indi- 
cate, the  horrors  of  that  day  when  thousands  of  handsome 
and  gallant  youths  were  lying  cold  in  death,  or  writhing 
in  agony  beneath  their  shade. 

Having  identified  the  Union  and  Confederate  positions 
on  that  portion  of  the  field  we  returned  to  the  Dogan 

iVol.  2,  Series  1,  Official  Records  of  Union  and  Confederate  Armies,  now 
being  published  by  the  government,  contains  the  official  reports  for  both  armies 
of  the  First  Manassas ;  and,  fortunately  for  the  historian,  no  controversies  of  any 
great  consequence  exist  amongst  the  respective  commanding  officers  as  to  move- 
ments of  troops,  and  what  was  done. 


CHANTILL  Y  RE  VISITED. 


177 


house  for  supper.  Mr.  Dogan  had  always  lived  on  the 
spot,  being  a  lad  fifteen  years  of  age  at  the  time  of  the 
second  battle,  and  was  possessed  of  much  interesting  infor- 
mation as  to  the  movements  of  the  troops  and  incidents  of 
the  battle.  As  Gen.  Warren  had  stopped  at  his  house 
while  surveying  the  field,  in  1878,  for  the  map  used 
before  the  board  of  officers  in  the  Fitz-John  Porter 
case,  he  was  much  interested  in  that  question  also,  and 
sympathized  more  or  less  with  Porter.  It  seemed  to  me, 
however,  that  liis  sympathy  for  Porter  was  rather  the  ex- 
pression of  the  universal  Virginian  dislike  for  Gen.  Pope, 
than  because  he  thought  that  Porter  had  distinguished 
himself  on  the  29th  of  August.  He  looked  up  incredu- 
lously and  changed  the  subject,  when  I  remarked,  to  try 
him,  that  if  Longstreet  and  Porter  had  changed  positions 
Longstreet  would  have  been  knocked  into  a  cocked-hat  if 
he  had  attempted  to  force  Porter ;  evidently  thinking  that 
the  Yankees  were  not  to  be  expected  to  sail  in  with  the 
customary  rebel  hardihood. 

He  narrated  an  incident  in  connection  with  the  second 
battle  of  Manassas,  which  interested  me  greatly,  on  ac- 
count of  the  coincidence  of  the  local  tradition  with  the 
story  as  told  me  at  the  time  by  a  Union  eye-witness. 

Dr.  Calvin  Cutter,  the  fighting  surgeon  of  the  Twenty- 
first  Massachusetts  Volunteers  (in  which  regiment  I  then 
served),  was  slightly  wounded  and  taken  prisoner  in  the 
woods  in  front  of  Sudley  Springs,  in  an  assault  by  por- 
tions of  Reno's  and  Heintzelman's  corps,  on  the  29th  of 
August.  Soon  after  his  capture  as  a  combatant  he  was 
taken  to  Gen.  A.  P.  Hill,  by  whom  he  was  recognized  as 


178 


POPE'S  VIROINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


entitled  to  the  privileges  of  a  non-combatant,  and  soon 
made  himself  so  useful  as  a  surgeon  that  he  was  welcomed 
as  a  guest  in  the  General's  quarters,  and  allowed  to  talk, 
go,  and  do  about  as  he  pleased  within  the  Confederate 
lines ;  and  in  a  day  or  two  after  the  battle  was  passed 
through  the  lines,  and  rejoined  us  at  Alexandria.  As  he 
had  been  oyer  almost  the  entire  field  we  were  much  in- 
terested in  his  narration  of  what  he  had  seen.  He  men- 
tioned, as  the  most  terrible  instance  of  destruction  that  he 
saw  on  the  field,  about  a  hundred  of  the  Fifth  New  York 
(a  regiment  noted  for  its  discipline  and  drill,  belonging  to 
Warren's  brigade,  of  Porter's  corps)  lying  near  Groyeton, 
nearly  all  of  whom  had  been  shot  through  the  head,  and 
who  had  fallen  as  they  had  stood  in  line  of  battle.  The 
doctor,  in  looking  oyer  the  field  the  day  after  the  fight, 
was  adyised  by  one  of  Gen.  Hood's  officers  to  take  a 
look  at  the  handiwork  of  Texan  rifles  upon  Warren's 
men  at  Groyeton,  to  tell  the  Yankees  about  on  his 
return.  On  going  to  the  place  he  found  it  a  Mecca  for 
the  Confederate  officers,  who  chuckled  with  delight  at 
the  unsuspecting  Yankees  haying  been  so  carelessly 
brought  up  and  left  standing  in  regimental  line  in  the 
oj)en  ground,  within  a  rod  or  two  of  the  Texan  rifle- 
men, who  were  lying  concealed  in  the  edge  of  the 
brush,  and  nearly  destroyed  Warren's  little  brigade  in 
half  a  minute. 

Gen.  Steyens  and  I  had  both  been  distant  witnesses  of 
the  bushwhacking  of  the  brigade,  which  was  caused  by 
an  assumption  on  Warren's  part  that  the  woods  were  as 
they  had  been  a  short  time  previous,  when  occupied  by 


CHANT  ILLY  REVISITED. 


179 


Keynolds's  division.  The  place  was  about  an  eiglith  of  a 
mile  in  front  of  tlie  Dogan  house,  and,  after  supper,  we 
walked  down  to  look  at  it.  When  we  came  back  to  the 
house  Mr.  Dogan  said,  "  That  little  slope  down  there 
where  you  went  looked  just  like  a  posy-garden  the  day 
after  the  fight :  there  were  some  Zouaves,  mth  blue  jackets, 
red  pants,  and  white  leggins  (the  Fifth  wore  a  showy 
Zouave  uniform),  marched,  without  any  skirmishers  out 
right  on  to  Hood's  Texans,  and  they  laid  'em  out  in  Kne." 
"Yes,"  said  Mrs.  Dogan,  "I  was  living  at  Sudley  then, 
and  when  the  Texans  came  by  a  crowd  of  them  stopped 
at  our  house  for  water,  and  I  heard  them  laughing  about 
it.  I  remember  one  of  them  said  to  mother,  '  We  popped 
'em  in  the  head  every  time  !  "'  As  a  matter  of  fact,  by 
the  official  report,  79  of  the  Fifth  Xew  York  were  killed 
on  the  spot  and  170  wounded  in  this  ambuscade,  out  of  a 
total  of  490  men.^ 

In  the  evening,  accompanied  by  Mr.  Dogan,  we  walked 
along  commanding  Stony  Ridge,  wliich  had  bristled  with 
belching  rebel  cannon  in  the  fighting  of  the  30th,  and 
over  the  ground  made  famous  by  the  fierce  and  bloody 
conflict  between  King's  and  EavcU's  divisions  on  the 
28th,  returning  to  the  house  well  inclined  by  the  labors 
of  the  day  to  do  full  justice  to  the  comfortable  beds 
which  awaited  us.  Making  an  early  start  on  the  19th, 
we  devoted  most  of  the  morning  to  an  examination  of 
Porter's  position  on  the  29th  of  August,  making,  during 
the  trip,  a  call  at  tlie  Compton  House,  where  we  had  a 
pleasant  chat  with  Mr.  A.  H.  Compton,  its  present  occu- 
pant, a  manly,  handsome  Confederate,  who  charged  with 

1  16  W.R.,  482,  f/.,  Warren's  Report,  lb.,  504;  also,  260,  469,  470, 
485,  609,  610,  617. 


180 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


Pickett  at  Gettysburg,  and  was  left,  severely  wounded, 
a  prisoner  in  Union  hands. 

Returning  to  the  Dogan  house  we  were  provided  by 
kind  Mrs.  Dogan  with  a  substantial  lunch,  which  we 
ate  in  bivouac  at  the  stone  bridge  over  Bull  Run,  and, 
keeping  on  two  or  three  miles,  reached  the  heights  of 
Centreville.  After  a  hasty  look  at  the  old  earthworks, 
many  of  which  are  still  in  a  good  state  of  preservation, 
we  continued  on  up  the  Warrenton  pike.  After  riding 
about  two  miles  beyond  Centreville  both  of  us  were 
satisfied  that  we  were  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the 
cart-path  by  which  Stevens's  and  Reno's  troops  had 
moved  to  the  battle-field  of  Chantilly,  but  we  could  not  find 
it.  A  new  house  was  standing  close  by,  and,  on  making 
inquiry  at  it,  we  found  that  the  owner  had  recently  come 
to  the  neighborhood,  and  knew  nothing  of  the  by-ways 
of  tv/enty  years  ago.  He,  however,  was  much  interested 
in  our  attempt  to  find  the  old  way,  and  said  that  a 
colored  man  in  his  employ,  who  had  always  lived  in  the 
vicinity,  claimed  to  have  seen  the  Union  troops,  as  they 
left  the  Warrenton  pike,  moving  to  the  field.  He  imme- 
diately sent  for  the  man  and  put  him  at  our  service. 
Somewhat  aided  by  this  man  we  soon  found  what  there 
was  left  of  the  old  cart-path,  within  a  few  rods  of  the 
place  where  we  had  been  searching  for  it.  It  had  not 
been  used  for  several  years,  and  was  fenced  off  and  con- 
siderably overgrown  with  bushes  near  the  turnpike. 
Ordering  our  horses  to  be  taken  to  the  Little-River  pike, 
we  followed  the  old  way  on  foot ;  and,  although  crossed 
by  several  fences,  and  at  times  difficult  to  trace,  we 


CHAXTILL  Y  REVISITED. 


181 


were  botli  satisfied  beyond  question  tliat  we  were  fol- 
lowing our  old  line  of  marcli  for  some  two  miles  when 
we  lost  it  liopelessly  among  cultivated  fields.  I  had 
made  up  my  own  mind  that  the  railroad-cut  which  my 
regiment  (Twenty-first  ^Massachusetts)  had  crossed  before 
it  first  went  into  action  was  to  be  the  key  to  the  situation 
so  far  as  I  was  concerned ;  and,  as  our  so-called  guide, 
who,  by  the  way,  was  of  no  assistance  to  us  beyond  his 
knowledge  of  the  old  cart-path,  said  that  there  was  a 
railroad-cut  in  the  immediate  vicinity  and  only  one,  I 
at  once  went  with  him  to  the  place  ;  but  it  recalled  no 
associations,  and  I  kncAV  that  I  had  never  seen  it  before. 
Keeping  on  towards  the  Little-River  pike  we  soon  came 
upion  the  rear  of  an  old  but  well-preserved  farm-house, 
situated  about  quarter  of  a  mile  north  of  the  unfinished 
railroad  line,  and  found  by  the  names  on  the  stones  of 
the  appurtenant  family  graveyard  that  it  was  the  old 
homestead  of  the  Eeids.  Seeing  the  proprietor  sitting 
in  the  shade  of  the  trees  in  front  of  the  house  we  told 
him  that  we  were  looking  for  the  battle-field  of  Chantilly, 
and  asked  him  if  he  could  aid  us.  "You  are  on  the 
ground  now,*'  was  his  answer ;  this  house  was  used  as 
a  Union  hospital  in  the  fight,  and  the  blood-stains  can 
still  be  seen  on  its  floors."  Introducing  ourselves  we 
commenced  an  interesting  and  valued  acquamtance  with 
Lieut.  Jolm  N.  Ballard,  a  gallant  fighting  Confederate 
from  the  bombardment  of  Fort  Sumter  to  the  end  of 
the  war,  whose  manly  heart  now  beats  for  the  Union, 
although  a  missing  leg  and  bullet-riddled  body  attest 
his  former  devotion  to  the  lost  cause. 


182 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


The  liouse  tract  had  belonged  in  Mrs.  Ballard's  family 
for  more  than  a  hundred  years,  and  Mr.  Ballard  had 
resided  there  since  the  close  of  the  war.  We  had 
actually  reached  the  field,  but  had  struck  it  at  a  point 
where  the  old  associations  did  not  aid  us  much.  Mr. 
Ballard  assured  us  that  the  lines  of  the  fields  and  woods 
were  not  changed  materially,  if  at  all,  and  walked  with  us 
over  the  old  cornfield  now  in  grass,  pointing  out  the  place 
where  Gen.  Kearny  was  said  to  have  fallen,  a  piece  of  old 
fence  on  the  northern  line  of  the  field  within  400  yards 
of  the  Little-River  pike,  full  of  bullet-holes,  and  near  it 
the  depressions  of  many  old  graves ;  but  I  could  not  bring 
the  field  back  to  my  recollection  to  feel  sure  of  anything, 
although  Gen.  Stevens  seemed  to  be  more  fortunate  in  his 
memory.  Interested  in  aiding  our  investigations,  Mr. 
Ballard,  with  warm  Virginian  hospitality,  urged  us  so 
strongly  to  remain  on  the  ground  and  spend  the  night  at 
his  house,  to  save  the  loss  of  time  in  going  back  to  Cen- 
treville  for  the  night,  that  we  gladly  consented.  Learning 
from  him  of  another  railroad-cut,  about  quarter  of  a  mile 
in  an  easterly  direction  from  his  house,  I  hastened  to  it, 
and,  although  it  was  the  one  part  of  the  field  which  was 
somewhat  overgrown  with  trees  and  brush,  I  recognized 
it  at  once  as  the  place  through  which  we  had  advanced 
into  the  woods,  and  the  battle-field  of  Chantilly  became  in 
an  instant  an  assured  reality  again. 

Meanwhile  Gen.  Stevens  had  been  getting  his  initial 
point,  and  every  moment  until  dark  was  full  of  interest 
to  both  of  us  as  we  walked  over  the  lines  of  advance, 
which  now  we  both  felt  sure  of.    Returning  to  the  house 


CHANT  ILL  Y  RE  VISITED. 


183 


at  dark,  we  found  that  Mrs.  Ballard  had  returned  from 
Fairfax  Court-House,  to  which  she  had  made  the  weekly 
drive  for  the  mail,  accompanied  by  three  ladies  on  a  visit 
over  Sunday.  We  were  ^lad  to  be  assured  by  our  kind 
host  that  the  house  was  bigger  than  it  looked,  and  that 
we  still  were  welcome  visitors.  One  of  the  visiting  ladies 
(Mrs.  Munroe)  had  passed  along  the  Little-River  pike, 
and  over  part  of  the  battle-field,  on  the  day  after  the  fight, 
and  gave  us  particular  and  valuable  information  of  the 
places  where  she  had  seen  the  bodies  of  the  dead. 

During  the  evening  we  got  the  names  of  residents  in 
the  vicinity  at  the  time  of  the  battle,  whom  we  had  not 
already  seen,  and  further  information  about  distances  and 
localities.  AYe  had  a  bountiful  supper ;  the  ladies  were 
attractive  and  witty ;  everybody  recognized  the  fact  that 
the  war  was  over,  and  we  passed  a  most  enjoyable  even- 
ing, and  made  a  late  night  of  it  before  retiring  to  our 
comfortable  beds. 

Mr.  Ballard  liked  to  hear  our  war  stories,  and  we  were 
deeply  interested  in  his  vivid  narratives  of  his  army  life. 
At  the  risk  of  being  accused  of  serious  digression  I  will 
give  some  of  his  narrated  experiences.  As  a  Confederate 
picket  he  had  fired  perhaps  the  first  mortal  shot  on  the 
field  of  the  First  Manassas.  He  and  two  or  three  other 
men  of  the  Second  South  Carolina  Volunteers  were  lying 
on  and  behind  a  stack  of  grain,  close  to  Centreville,  in  the 
early  morning  of  the  18th  of  July.  Ballard,  who  was  lying 
down,  dozing,  on  top  of  the  stack,  with  his  gun  in  his 
hand,  was  suddenly  brought  to  his  senses  by  hearing  one 
of  the  men  cry,  "  He's  a  Yankee  !   Shoot  him !  "  and  fired 


184 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


a  mortal  shot  at  a  man  running  away.  The  victim,  a 
Union  officer  named  O'Brien,  from  Maine,  belonged  to 
the  quartermaster's  department ;  he  had  lost  his  way,  and, 
stumbling  upon  what  he  supposed  were  Union  soldiers, 
betrayed  himself  by  inquiring  for  Gen.  McDowell's 
quarters.  Ballard,  as  the  shooter,  claimed  and  received 
the  money  (some  hundreds  of  dollars)  on  the  unfortunate 
man's  person ;  but,  when  one  of  the  party  started  to  pull 
off  the  victim's  boots,  he  found  that  he  was  too  early  in 
the  war  for  that  sort  of  thing,  and  was  prevented,  and 
roundly  abused  by  all  the  rest  for  being  willing  to  wear  a 
dead  man's  boots.^ 

Most  interesting,  however,  was  the  minute  account 
which  Mr.  Ballard  gave  us  of  the  organization  of  Mosby's 
command,  of  which  he  was  for  some  time  a  member. 
Minute  men,  indeed,  since  they  could  start  on  a  raid  with- 
out rations,  with  full  confidence  in  the  hos|)itality  and 
fidelity  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  nearest  house  !  In  the 
night,  when  their  scouts  were  lurking  about  in  dangerous 
proximity  to  Union  troops,  they  always  selected  a  grave- 
yard to  sleep  in,  if  there  was  one  in  the  vicinity,  knowing 
that  no  negroes,  the  only  Southerners  they  could  not  trust, 
would  dare  to  come  near  it  after  dark.  They  did  not  carry 
sabres  as  a  rule,  but  put  their  reliance  on  four  revolvers 
(two  in  the  belt  and  two  in  the  holsters),  preferring  Colt's 
to  other  kinds  requiring  fixed  ammunition,  which  was  often 
very  hard  to  get.    In  this  connection  his  story  of  a  sutler 

^  On  reading  Col.  Kershaw's  oiScial  report  for  the  Second  South  Caro- 
lina Regiment,  on  my  return,  I  found  in  it  an  interesting  confirmation  of 
Mr.  Ballard's  narrative.    2  W.R.,  452. 


CHAN  TILL  Y  RE  VISITED. 


185 


seems  worth  repeating.  This  man  came  out  several  times 
from  Alexandria,  with  a  wagon  well  supplied  with  sutler's 
stores,  as  a  Union  spy  ;  was  regularly  captured  by  Mosby's 
men,  and  well  paid  for  his  stores.  Mosby  knew  perfectly 
well  that  he  was  a  spy,  but  there  was  nothing  he  could 
discover  to  do  any  harm ;  and,  besides,  false  to  his  trust, 
he  gained  the  favor  of  his  captors  by  filling  their  orders 
for  the  coveted  ammunition. 

The  sutler,  however,  made  his  last  trip  one  day,  when 
some  of  Mosby's  men  went  through  him  in  earnest  and 
left  his  body  in  a  ditch.  One  of  the  heroes  of  the  band 
was  Ames,  a  deserter  from  a  Xew  England  regiment,  and 
the  betrayer  of  his  late  commander,  Gen.  Stoughton,  who 
was  captured  by  Mosby  at  Fairfax  Court-House  in  his  bed, 
on  the  night  of  the  8th  of  March,  1863.  Ames,  a  sergeant, 
enraged  at  missing  an  expected  promotion,  deserted  from 
Gen.  Stoughton's  command,  and  resoh'ed  to  gain  Mosby's 
favor  by  his  betrayal.  Getting  an  audience  with  Mosby, 
after  much  difficulty,  he  explained  the  position  of  the 
pickets  and  the  lay  of  things  inside  the  Union  lines,  and 
how  the  capture  might  easily  be  made,  offering  himself  as 
guide  of  the  raiding  party.  Mosby,  suspecting  treachery, 
entered  somewhat  reluctantly  into  the  scheme,  and  only  on 
the  condition  that  his  guide  should  pay  the  penalty  of  any 
deceit  or  misinformation  mth  his  life.  Ames  willingly 
consented,  and,  tied  to  his  horse,  and  with  a  cocked  pistol 
at  his  head,  led  Mosby  and  thirty  of  his  men,  with  perfect 
success,  five  miles  into  and  out  from  the  centre  of  a  strong- 
force  of  infantry  and  caA'alry.  After  this  exploit  Ames 
was  one  of  Mosby's  right-hand  men,  a  general  favorite. 


186 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


and,  till  killed  in  action,  noted  as  one  of  the  most  desperate 
and  successful  raiders  in  tlie  command.  I  was  much 
impressed  by  this  account  of  Gen.  Stoughton's  capture, 
because  Mr.  Dogan,  in  whose  house  at  Groveton  we  had 
spent  the  previous  night,  told  me  that  he  (a  youth  of 
sixteen  years  at  the  time)  pitied  the  General  that  Mosby 
captured  at  Fairfax  Court-House  more  than  any  man  that 
he  saw  in  the  war.  He  was  so  handsome,  and  looked  so 
sad  as  his  jeering  captors  took  him  through  Groveton  at 
daylight,  tied  on  to  an  old  bare-backed  horse  led  by  a 
negro.^ 

Another  Union  deserter,  a  New-Yorker,  who  joined 
Mosby,  did  not  stand  so  high  in  Mr.  Ballard's  estimation. 
He  was  "  a  mean  and  saucy  little  Yankee,"  and  the  men 
all  hated  him,  but  didn't  dare  to  kill  him,  for  fear  of 
angering  Mosby,  his  only  friend. 

"  Oh,  how  I  did  want  to  kill  that  little,  saucy  Yankee  !  " 
came  out  with  such  earnestness  that  kind  Mrs.  Ballard  gave 
a  quick,  reproving  look,  and  her  husband  disposed  of  the 
case  of  Yankee  deserter  No.  2  by  saying  quietly  that  half 
a  dozen  of  them  finally  resolved  to  kill  him  the  first  time 
Mosby  was  out  of  the  way ;  but,  much  to  their  regret,  the 
little  Yankee  got  wind  of  their  plan  and  escaped  from  the 
command. 

From  a  soldier's  point  of  view  the  service  was  demoral- 
izing in  its  tendency :  as  our  friend  pointedly  expressed 
it,  "They  got  so  that  they  would  ask  prisoners  for 
their  pocket-books  before  they  called  for  their  pistols." 

I  will  close  my  long  digression  with  one  more  thing 
bearing  somewhat  on  the  battle  of  Chantilly.  Speaking 

139  W.R.,  43,  44,  1122. 


CHAXTILLY  REVISITED. 


187 


of  the  watch  kept  upon  the  few  men  in  the  Ticinity  sup- 
posed to  have  Union  proclivities  Mr.  Balhircl  said  tliat  a 
man  near  Chantilly  was  suspected  of  having;  oiven  infor- 
mation  of  Jackson's  movement  on  Pope's  rear,  and  he  and 
others  went  to  his  house  to  hang  him,  but  their  intended 
victim  got  away  from  them. 

Simday,  May  20,  our  host  called  us  at  an  early  hour  to 
show  us  an  old  plan  of  his  farm,  wliich  he  had  spoken  of 
the  night  before ;  and  we  found  it  a  most  interesting  docu- 
ment, being  an  exact  plan  of  almost  the  whole  battle- 
ground, and  nearly  contemporaneous  with  the  fight.  It 
was  made  in  1858,  and  is  connected  with  the  will  of  Col. 
John  Reid,  and  a  deed  dated  January  IT,  1859.  It  is 
marked  Col.  John  Reid's  House  Tract,"  and  is  recorded 
T\dth  Fairfax  County  Records,  Liher  A,  Xo.  4,  folio  322. 
"We  made  an  accurate  copy  of  it  by  tracing,  and  I  give  it 
here  with  no  change  except  to  mark  the  cornfield,  the 
general  position  of  troops,  and  the  places  where  Kearny 
and  Stevens  fell.  I  have  also  indicated  the  locality  sur- 
roimding  the  four  lots  shown  on  the  plan.  The  descrip- 
tion in  the  deed  (referring  to  the  plan)  is  as  follows : 
"  Beginning  at  'A'  a  large  marked  red  oak,  corner  of  the 
purchase  from  EUgey  and  in  the  line  of  Walker,  thence 
^ith  said  purchase  from  EUgey  X.  9J°  E.  29J  poles  to  '  B  ' 
a  planted  stone  by  a  marked  chestnut,  then  continuing 
with  said  purchase  X.  53°  18J  poles  to  '  C  a  stone  in 
the  line  of  Carter,  now  Stewart,  then  with  said  line  S.  79° 
161  poles  8  links  to  D.  on  the  X.E.  edge  of  the  M.G. 
Railroad,  thence  along  the  X.E,  edge  of  said  Railroad  S. 
28f  E.  110  poles  S.  35J°  E.  20  poles  S.  411°  e.  44  poles 


188 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


S.  52  J°.  E.  20  poles.  S.  60°  E.  28  poles  16  links  to  '  E.'  — 
Several  maples  corner  of  Col.  Millan  on  a  branch.  Thence 
N.  24°  45'  E.  116  poles  and  5  links  to  a  small  marked 
white  oak,  in  the  outline,  thence  with  the  outline  N.  73j° 
W.  37  poles  and  5  links  to  the  beginning,  containing  143J 
acres."  ^ 

Immediately  after  breakfast  we  bade  good-by  to  our 
kind  and  attentive  host  and  his  interesting  household,  and 
proceeded  to  Ox  Hill  and  the  Little-River  turnpike.  As 
we  parted,  our  host  followed  us  a  little  way,  and,  with 
many  apologies  for  the  question,  flattered  us  by  inquiring, 
in  behalf  of  the  young  ladies,  if  we  were  married  men ;  in 
answer  to  which  Stevens  said  that  Lafayette,  on  liis  revisit 
to  this  country,  put  that  question  to  each  of  his  old  com- 
panions as  he  greeted  them,  and  to  the  married  ones  said, 
"  Happy  man  !  "  and  to  the  bachelors,  "  Lucky  dog  !  "  after 
which  preamble  he  requested  our  friend  to  inform  the 
ladies  that  he  was  a  lucky  dog,  while  I  sent  my  com- 
pliments, with  the  confession  that  I  was  a  happy  man. 

The  long,  high  ridge,  called  Ox  Hill,  does  not  extend 
southerly  more  than  a  few  rods,  if  at  all,  beyond  the  turn- 
pike. The  turnpike  is  a  broad,  straight  road,  in  com- 
parison with  which  the  Centreville  pike  is  like  a  cart- 
path. 

A  matter  of  great  interest  to  us  was  to  get  the  distance 

*  My  only  excuse  for  these  minute  details  of  the  battle-ground  of  Chantilly  is 
because  the  errors  of  previous  narrators,  in  respect  to  the  locality  of  the  engage- 
ment, have  tended  to  make  it  appear  to  have  been  an  attack  upon  the  Union  aimy 
on  its  retreat  up  the  Centreville  pike,  instead  of  being,  as  it  really  was,  a  Union 
check  and  attack  upon  the  Confederates  on  their  flanking  movement  up  the  Little- 
River  pike.  A  reproduction  of  this  map  will  be  found  at  the  end  of  this 
volume. 


CHANTILLY  REVISITED. 


189 


from  the  Little-River  pike  of  the  point  gained  by  Gen. 
Stevens  in  his  charge.  As  we  now  knew  the  northerly 
lines  of  the  cornfield  beyond  question,  and  a  portion  of 
the  fence  running  along  the  edge  of  the  woods,  full  of 
bullet-holes,  was  still  standing,  we  had  no  difficulty  in  fix- 
ing the  line  on  which  Gen.  Stevens  fell :  and,  by  pacing  the 
distance  to  the  Little-River  pike,  found  it  to  be  between 
395  and  400  paces.  Just  at  the  point  where  Gen.  Stevens's 
division  made  its  charge,  the  line  of  woods  lying  between 
the  narrow  field  bordering  the  turnpike  and  the  fields 
through  which  the  Union  troops  advanced  has  been  some- 
what cut  away ;  but  the  portion  of  the  bullet-riddled  fence 
remaining,  the  stumps  of  the  trees,  the  old  graves,  and  the 
lines  of  the  fields  shown  on  the  plan,  left  open  no  chance 
of  mistaking  the  line  beyond  a  yard  or  two  at  the 
farthest. 

We  then  went  to  the  house  of  Mr.  Charles  Stewart,  on 
the  Little-River  pike,  about  half  a  mile  west  of  the  line  of 
Ox  Hill,  to  whom  Mr.  Ballard  and  his  neighbor,  Mr. 
Millan,  had  both  referred  as  being  better  acquainted  with 
the  details  of  the  battle  than  any  one  else  in  the  ^dcinity. 
He  received  us  with  great  kindness,  and,  after  pointing  out 
the  localities  of  interest  in  connection  with  the  fight  near 
his  house,  went  with  us  along  the  lines  of  the  battle.  He 
was  in  his  house  at  the  time  of  the  fight,  an  eye-witness 
of  the  movements  of  the  Confederate  troops,  and  went 
over  the  battle-field  on  the  third  day  after  the  engagement. 
Jackson's  artillery,  when  the  advance  of  the  Union  troops 
was  observed,  was  drawn  out  of  the  road  and  posted  on  a 
bare  and  commanding  hill  near  the  Stewart  house,  on  the 


190 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


left  of  the  Confederate  line  of  march,  and  about  half  a 
mile  to  the  west  of  the  ridge  of  Ox  Hill.  Mr.  Stewart's 
knowledge  of  the  field  and  acquaintance  with  the  localities 
of  interest  in  connection  with  the  battle  were  very  exact. 

One  thing  peculiarly  interesting  to  me,  as  a  member 
of  the  Twenty-first  Massachusetts  Regiment,  was  being 
enabled,  through  him,  to  fix  the  spot  where  we  were  en- 
gaged in  our  disastrous  conflict  in  the  woods  with  Early's 
Virginia  regiments,  which  I  found  to  be  about  400  yards 
south  of  the  Little-River  pike,  and  100  yards  east  of  the 
road  leading  to  the  Ox  Road. 

On  the  previous  day  I  had  made  up  my  mind  pretty 
well  about  the  place,  as,  when  I  had  spoken  to  Mr.  Ballard 
of  our  passing  some  newly  split  rails  just  before  we  became 
engaged,  he  said  a  lot  of  rails  had  been  "  mauled  "  at  the 
time  in  that  locality,  and  he  knew  of  no  other  place  in  the 
vicinity  where  any  had  been  split  out.  This  was  con- 
firmed by  Mr.  Stewart,  who  saw  the  rails,  after  the  fight, 
piled  up  for  a  breastwork ;  done,  doubtless,  by  the  Con- 
federates after  our  retreat.  He  also  pointed  out  the  place 
of  burial  of  our  men  killed  in  the  woods ;  the  bodies 
had  long  since  been  removed,  but  the  depressions  of  the 
graves  were  plainly  visible.  He  also  called  our  attention 
to  the  numerous  bullet-scars  on  the  trees,  still,  as  in  the 
woods  near  Groveton,  plainly  to  be  seen ;  showing  us  one 
large  dead  tree,  which  he  said  had  died  from  bullet- 
wounds.  He,  as  Mr.  Ballard  had  previously  done,  pointed 
out  the  place  where,  by  local  tradition.  Gen.  Kearny  fell. 
It  was  very  close  to  the  spot  where  I  had  seen  him  fall ; 
and,  although  it  differed  but  a  few  rods  from  my  own  esti- 


CEAKTILLY  REVISITED. 


191 


mate,  I  was  pleased  to  feel  that  on  that  single  point  my 
knowledge  was  the  more  accurate.  When  Kearny  fell,  my 
regiment,  with  a  front  of  from  200  to  300  feet,  was  in 
line  in  the  cornfield,  with  its  right  close  to  the  woods. 
Gen.  Kearny  brushed  our  left  as  he  dashed  forward,  and 
was  shot  a  few  yards  in  front  of  our  left;  and  now, 
knowing  our  position  at  that  time  with  substantial 
certainty,  I  could  fix  the  spot  where  he  fell  very  closely. 
In  speaking  of  the  discovery  by  our  army  of  Jackson's 
flanking  movement  Mr.  Stewart  told  me  that  the  current 
story  in  the  neighborhood  was,  that  a  man  named  Camp- 
bell, who  lived  below  Chantilly,  seeing  Jackson's  men 
moving  up  the  turnpike,  had  ridden  over  to  Gen.  Pope 
with  the  information.  Added  to  the  pre^dous  similar  state- 
ment by  Mr.  Ballard,  this  story  made  a  strong  impression 
upon  my  mind,  as  showing  that  the  local  tradition  accorded 
with  my  own  well-assured  belief  that  our  discovery  of 
Jackson's  march  was  a  matter  of  good  fortune  merely,  and 
not  owing  to  any  reconnoissance  by  our  troops. 

As  Gen.  Stuart  states,  in  his  official  report  of  the  battle 
of  Chantilly,  that  the  Union  troops  penetrated  to  Jackson's 
flank  by  way  of  MoUen's  house,  I  was  desirous  of  finding 
the  house  referred  to  by  him,  and  made  many  inquiries 
about  it.  There  is  evidently  an  error  in  the  name  as 
printed,  and  "MoUen's  house  "  must  be  the  house  then  and 
now  owned  by  Mr.  Walker  Millan,  which  is  situated  about 
three-quarters  of  a  mile  south  of  the  Little-River  pike, 
on  the  road  in  continuation  of  the  Ox  Road,  leading  from 
the  Little  River  to  the  Centre ville  pike.  There  were 
but  two  houses  south  of  the  Little-River  pike  any- 


192 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


where  in  that  vicinity,  botli  of  which  are  still  standing,  -— 
the  Reid  House,  in  which  we  were  so  hospitably  entertained 
by  Mr.  Ballard,  its  present  proprietor,  and  the  Millan 
House.  Mr.  Millan  (being  in  the  Confederate  service) 
was  absent  from  home  at  the  time  of  the  battle,  and 
knew  nothing,  personally,  as  to  its  details.^  The  Reid 
House  at  the  time  of  the  battle  was  occupied  by  a  young 
man  named  Isaac  Heath,  who  has  removed  from  the 
vicinity. 

Riding  on  to  Fairfax  Court-House  we  got  a  very  good 
dinner  at  the  only  restaurant  in  the  place,  kept  by  a  colored 
man,  who  had  been  a  body-servant  and  was  still  a  wor- 
shipper of  Gen.  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  the  great  Confeder- 
ate leader. 

The  colored  man  who  had  come  with  us  from  Manassas 
Junction  had  for  some  time  been  so  restive  and  sulky  at 
our  prolonged  examination  of  things  that  were  of  no  in- 
terest to  him  that  we  were  glad  to  send  him  home  with 
the  tired  horses  from  this  point;  and,  although  rather 
heavily  laden  with  a  couple  of  rebel  cannon-balls,  bayo- 
nets, and  other  relics  from  interesting  points  of  the  fields 
which  we  had  visited,  made  a  leisurely  and  pleasant  walk 
of  four  miles  to  Fairfax  Station,  where  we  took  an  evening 
train  for  Washington.  We  had  beautiful  weather  on  our 
trip,  had  enjoyed  every  hour  of  it,  and  received  nothing 
but  courtesy  and  kind  attention  from  all  the  inhabitants 
of  the  region  visited  with  whom  we  came  in  contact ;  and 
if  there  was  a  house  on  or  near  the  battle-fields  which  we 
did  not  call  at,  it  was  because  we  didn't  happen  to  see  the 
house. 

'  Correctly  printed  Millan,  16  W.R.,  744. 


CHAJSTTILLY  REVISITED. 


193 


The  fact  that  we  had  been  soldiers  in  the  Union  army, 
and  were  revisiting  the  fields  on  which  we  had  fought, 
seemed  to  make  the  inhabitants  feel  that  we  had  a  right 
there,  and  even  to  justify  us  in  walking  through  their 
growing  wheat,  which  may,  I  think,  be  considered  a  pretty 
severe  test  to  put  a  farmer  to.  Our  experience  with  Mr. 
Henry,  at  the  first  spot  visited,  is  a  fair  illustration  of  this 
spirit.  As  we  rode  up  to  his  enclosure  we  saw  a  notice 
posted  on  the  gate,  stating  that,  in  consequence  of  the  ex- 
pense to  which  he  had  been  put  in  rebuilding,  an  admis- 
sion fee  of  fifty  cents  must  be  paid  to  enter  the  grounds. 
As  he  saw  us  approaching  he  came  out  of  the  house,  took 
our  money,  and  said  that  he  would  be  happy  to  give 
us  any  information  in  his  power,  —  an  offer  of  which  we 
gladly  took  advantage.  After  a  while  he  spoke  of  the  plans 
and  maps  in  his  house,  and  on  our  expressing  a  desire  to 
see  them  said  that  there  would  be  a  further  charge  of  fifty 
cents  each  for  entering  the  house,  which  we  paid  and 
entered.  So  far  we  had  been  principally  questioners  and 
listeners,  but  on  sitting  down  in  the  house  for  a  regular 
talk  told  him  of  our  experiences  on  the  field.  Taking  the 
money  which  we  had  paid  him  out  of  his  pocket,  he  said 
that,  poor  and  old  as  he  was,  he  could  not  take  money 
from  us,  as  we  had  a  right  to  go  where  we  liked  on  that 
field;  and  it  was  only  by  an  earnest  and  hona-fide  re- 
sistance on  our  part  that  he  was  induced  to  keep  the 
money.  On  the  field  of  Chantilly  nothing  could  exceed 
the  kindness  with  wliich  we  were  aided  in  our  researches 
by  Mr.  J.  N.  Ballard  and  Mr.  Charles  Stewart.  The  old 
saying  that  the  gods  love  a  brave  man  struggling  with 


194 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


adversity  is  well  exemplified  in  Mr.  Ballard.  With 
plenty  of  land,  but  little  money,  and  sorely  incapacitated 
by  his  wounds  suffered  for  the  lost  cause,  he  has  worked 
early  and  late  to  restore  his  fences  and  cultivate  his  farm ; 
and  now,  contented  with  his  lot  and  happy  in  his  good 
wife  and  healthy,  promising  children,  is  an  example  long 
to  be  remembered  of  success  achieved  by  indomitable 
hope  and  courage. 


VII. 


STRENGTH  OF  THE    FORCES   UNDER  POPE  AND 

LEE. 

CONTEIBUTED    BY   LlEUT.-CoL.    "WILLIAM    ALLAN,    LATE    ChIEF  OP 

Ordnance  Second  Corps  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  C.S.A. 


To  WHICH  IS  APPENDED  A  NOTE  BY  JOHN  C  ROPES,  ESQ. 


The  following'  is  a  list  of  the  published  writings  of  Lieutenant-Colonel 
William  Allan,  concerning  the  Civil  War : — 

The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  in  1862.  By  William  Allan,  A.  M. ,  LL.  D. 
With  an  introduction  by  John  C.  Ropes.  Boston :  Houghton,  Mifflin  and 
Company,  1892. 

The  Battle-fields  of  Virginia.  Chancellorsville  ;  embracing  the  opera- 
tions of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  from  the  first  battle  of  Fredericks- 
burg to  the  death  of  Lieutenant-General  Jackson.  By  Jed.  Hotchkiss  and 
William  Allan.    New  York  :  D.  Van  Nostrand,  1867. 

Historical  Sketch  of  the  Lee  Memorial  Association.  By  W.  Allan, 
a  member  of  the  Executive  Committee.    Pages  3-19  of 

Ceremonies  connected  with  the  inauguration  of  the  mausoleum  and  the  un- 
veiling of  the  recumbent  figure  of  General  Robert  Edward  Lee.  Richmond, 
Va. :  West,  Johnston  and  Company,  1883. 

History  of  the  Campaign  of  Gen.  T.  J.  (Stonewall)  Jackson  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  of  Virginia.  From  November  4,  1861,  to  June  17, 
1862.  By  William  Allan,  formerly  Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Chief  Ordnance 
Officer,  Second  Corps,  A.  N.  V.  With  full  maps  of  the  region  and  of  the 
battle-fields  by  Jed.  Hotchkiss,  formerly  Captain  and  Topographical  Engineer, 
Second  Corps,  A.  N.  V.    Philadelphia :  J.  B.  Lippincott  &  Co.,  1880. 

Jackson's  Valley  Campaign.  Address  before  the  Virginia  division  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  at  their  annual  meeting,  Oct.  30,  1878.  By 
William  Allan.    Richmond  :  G.  W.  Gary  &  Co.,  Printers,  1878. 

A  Reply  to  General  Longstreet.    3  Battles  and  Leaders,  355-356. 
[A  criticism  of  General  Longstreet's  account  of  Gettysburg,  in  the  same 

work  and  same  volume.] 

Stonewall  Jackson's  Valley  Campaign.   In  Annals  of  the  War,  724-749. 

See  List  of  Papers  read  before  the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachu- 
setts, at  the  end  of  this  volume. 


STRENGTH  OF  THE  FORCES  UNDER  POPE 
AND  LEE  IN  AUGUST,  1862. 


BOUT  no  part  of  tlie  war  in  Virginia  lias  tliere  been 


more  confusion,  uncertainty,  and  error  than  about  tlie 
forces  engaged  in  Pope's  campaign,  August,  1862.  Much 
of  this  is  due  to  the  loss  of  returns,  and  no  little  to  the 
loose  and  inaccurate  reports  and  despatches  of  Gen.  Pope. 
Though  Gen.  Pope's  statements  about  other  matters  were 
known  to  be  very  careless  and  inaccurate,  writers  upon 
this  campaign  have  not  realized  how  much  of  this  inexact- 
ness exists  in  his  estimate  of  the  number  of  his  troops, 
especially  when  he  desired  to  obtain  reenforcements  or 
to  account  for  his  rcYerses.  Mr.  Ropes,  who  has  given  us 
the  best  account  so  far  published  of  this  campaign,  sees 
that  Pope  is  evidently  in  error  as  to  his  numbers,  when 
he  puts  them  at  55,000  on  August  27.^  Mr.  Ropes  finds 
that  the  troops  composing  the  Federal  army  under  Gen. 
Pope  amounted,  after  the  battle  of  Cedar  Run,  and  before 
Manassas,  to  77,500  men,  and  he  finds  it  impossible  to 
believe  that  22,500  of  these  had  been  lost  in  the  skirmishes 
on  the  Rappahannock  and  the  retreat  to  Manassas  before 
the  battle  at  the  latter  place  had  occun^ed.-  But  even 
^Kopes,  Army  under  Pope,  195.         *See  209,  217-218,  supra. 


(197) 


198 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


Mr.  Hopes  makes  an  extravagant  allowance  for  Pope's 
losses,  and,  apparently  aiming  at  something  like  a  mean 
between  Pope's  statement  and  the  official  reports,  assigns 
him  only  65,000  at  Manassas. 

A  careful  examination  of  the  returns  on  file  in  Wash- 
ington, which  have  recently  been  put  in  shape,  shows  that 
a  reasonably  correct  knowledge  of  the  Federal  strength 
may  be  arrived  at  from  the  official  figures.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  begin  with  the  return  for  June,  as  Mr.  Ropes 
has  done.  There  is  on  file  a  full  return  of  all  the  troops 
under  Pope's  command  for  July  31,  and  this  seems  to  be 
the  latest  full  return  in  existence.^  From  this  return  we 
take  the  following :  — 


Present  for  Duty. 

Command.                     Officers.  Men. 

Head-quarters,                               35  164 

First  Corps,  Sigel,                         614  12,485 

Second  Corps,  Banks's,*                 698  14,087 

Third  Corps,  McDov^ell,               1,161  22,756 

Eeserve  Corps,  Sturgis,                  471  7,939 

White's  Brigade  (at  Winchester),     131  2,621 

Cox's  forces  (in  Kanawha),             396  8,416 


Artillery. 
Not  reported. 

52,  part  not  reported. 

554 
15 

Not  reported. 


3,506  68,468 


It  is  the  first  three  corps  named  in  this  return  that  con- 
stituted Pope's  army  on  the  Kappahannock.  Only  one 
brigade  (Piatt's)  of  Sturgis's  corps  from  the  defences  of 
Washington  was  able  to  join  Pope  before  Jackson  severed 
communication  between  him  and  his  reserves,  and  but  a 

1  18  W.R.,  523. 

^Banks's  report  includes  Hatch's  cavalry  of  158  officers  and  3,101  men 
present  for  duty. 


STRENGTH  OF  THE  OPPOSING  ARMIES. 


199 


regiment  or  two  of  Cox's  troops  took  part  in  defending 
the  bridge  over  Bull  Run  in  Pope's  rear.  It  will  be  seen 
that  Pope  had,  on  July  31,  in  the  three  corps  of  Sigel^  Banks, 
and  McDowell,  including  his  head-quarters''  escort,  just  52,000 
men    present  for  dutyT 

Pope,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War,  reports  his  forces,  "some  days"  before 
Cedar  Run,  as  follows  :  — 


1st  Corps. 

Infantry. 

Artillery. 

Cavalry. 

Total. 

1st  Corps  (Sigel), 

10,550 

948 

1,730 

13,228 

2d     "  (Banks), 

13,343 

1,224 

4,104 

18,671 

3d     "  (McDowell), 

17,604 

971 

2,904 

21,479 

Total, 

41,497 

3,143 

8,738 

53,378 

Deduct  infantry  brigade  at  "Winchester  . 

2,500 

Deduct  regiment  and  battery  at  Pront  Koyal  . 

1,000 

Deduct  cavalry  unfit  for 

service 

3,000 

6,500 


Total   46,878 

Note.  — Instead  of  14,500  infantry  and  artillery  Banks  had  only  about 
8,000,  from  his  report  to  me  after  the  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain.^ 

Comparing  the  two,  it  seems  that  the  troops  at  Win- 
chester were  included  in  Banks's  command  on  the  return 
used  by  Pope,  while  they  are  separated  on  the  return  for 
July  31.  It  seems  also  probable  that  some  of  the  cavalry 
credited  in  the  latter  statement  to  Banks  was,  on  the  return 
for  July  31,  included  in  McDowell's  corps. 

The  deduction  of  3,000  men  as  unfit  for  service  "  from 
the  cavalry  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign  seems  hardly 

^C.W.  2  Supplement,  118;  in  Avhich  the  ''total"  as  printed,  ''47,878," 
manifestly  innorrect. 


200 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


authorized.  After  two  months  of  rest  in  one  of  the  finest 
grazing  regions  in  the  country  the  cavalry  reported  as 
ready  for  duty  were  no  doubt  so.  That  in  a  week  or  two 
all  the  cavalry  force  with  tliis  army  was  greatly  run  down 
and  diminished  in  numbers  was  true ;  but  it  is  not  proper 
to  carry  back  these  losses  and  charge  them  against  the 
cavalry  at  the  outset.  On  the  return  of  July  31  the 
cavalry  is  not  in  all  cases  separated,  and  hence  it  is  not 
possible  to  compare  that  return  in  this  respect  with  Gen. 
Pope's  statement. 

Nor  does  there  seem  to  be  any  solid  foundation  for  the 
statement  that  Banks  had  largely  overstated  his  strength. 
The  return  of  July  31  shows  that  Banks  only  reported 
11,526  infantry  and  artillery  as  present  for  duty  with  the 
corps ;  and  Col.  Horton  has  well  shown  in  a  paper  quoted 
by  Mr.  Ropes,  that  the  various  detachments  absent  from 
Banks  on  August  9,  together  with  the  severe  effects  of 
marching  in  the  excessive  heat  of  that  week,  might  readily 
have  reduced  his  effective  strength  on  the  battle-field  of 
Cedar  Run  to  8,000.^  (Mr.  Ropes  thinks  that  this  8,000 
also  included  the  cavalry  Banks  had  that  day ;  but  this  is 
obviously  not  the  meaning  of  Gen.  Pope's  language  in  the 
note  on  the  return  embodied  in  his  testimony.) 

Mr.  Ropes  adopts  figures  about  half-way  between  Gen. 
Pope's  estimate  and  the  return  of  July  31,  and  assigns 
Pope  49,500  men  on  August  1.  The  official  return  for 
July  31  shows  that  he  really  had  52,000,  and  this  is  the 
force  he  had  available  for  field  operations  at  the  time  of 
the  battle  of  Cedar  Run  (August  9). 

At  this  date  Sturgis  held  the  defences  of  Washington 

^Ante,  38-39. 


STRENGTH  OF  THE  OPPOSING  ARMIES. 


201 


with,  over  8,000  men,  and  Burnsicle  had  arrh^ed  at  Fred- 
ericlvsbnrg  Avith  12,000  effectives.  Cox  was  at  the  same 
time  ordered  to  bring  the  greater  part  of  his  forces  from 
West  Virginia  to  "Washington  to  reenforce  Pope. 

Let  ns  come  clown  a  little  later.  Reno,  with  8,000  of 
Bimiside's  troops,  reenforcecl  Pope  on  August  14.  On 
August  20  Pope  telegraphed  Halleck  that  his  strength 
was  as  follows :  — ^  - 

McDowell  .       .    •  .       .       .       .  18,000 

Sigel   12,000 

Banks   7,000 

Reno  .       .       .              .       .       .  8,000 


45,000 

Let  us  see  how  this  tallies  witli  the  facts.  ' 

McDowell's  morning  report  for  August  16,  on  file  in  Wash- 
ington, shows  that  he  had  then  "  present  for  duty  "  22,618 
men  and  present  for  duty  equipped^  22,117  men.  Tins  last 
number  includes,  however,  2,698  cavalry,  and  it  is  probable 
that  Pope  meant  in  the  above  despatch  to  leaA'e  out  all 
his  cavalry.  If  so,  he  understated  McDowell's  effective 
equip2?ed  infantrj'  and  artillery  by  nearly  1,500  men.  There 
are  no  returns  of  Sigel  or  Banks  for  this  date  to  be  found. 
But  Sigel's  strength  (as  given  in  Pope's  despatch)  does  not 
differ  very  widely  from  what  it  was  on  August  1,  and  is 
probably  not  far  wrong.  li\  regard  to  Banks,  however, 
the  number  given  is  too  small.  Banks  is  said  by  Pope  to 
have  had  only  5,000  men  the  day  after  Cedar  Run,^  but 

us  W.E.,  G03.  ne  W.R.,  27. 


202 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


as  his  losses  in  that  battle  did  not  probably  exceed  2,500/ 
there  must  have  been,  if  Pope  is  correct,  a  large  number  of 
stragglers,  consequent  upon  the  demoralization  caused  by 
his  defeat.  The  mass  of  these  stragglers  soon  returned  to 
ranks.  Banks's  "return  for  the  month  of  August"  is  on 
file.  It  was,  of  course,  made  out  late  in  the  month,  about 
the  time  of  the  battle  of  Manassas,  and  it  shows  that  he 
then  had  present  for  duty  8,800  men  in  infantry  and 
artillery.  Hence  Banks's  strength  on  August  20  must 
certainly  have  been  8,000  or  more.  There  is  no  dispute 
about  Reno's  strength.  He  is  everywhere  credited  with 
8,000  men. 

Thus  it  appears  that  Pope's  despatch  of  August  20 
underestimated  his  infantry  and  artillery  by  at  least  2,500, 
and  left  his  cavalry  out  of  the  count.  The  Federal  cav- 
alry had  not  suffered  heavily  up  to  this  date,  and  Bayard's 
and  Buford's  brigades  alone  (including  the  First  R.I. 
Cavalry)  had  numbered  5,000  men  for  duty  on  the  first 
of  the  month. 

It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  Pope  had  still  not  less  than 
52,000  men  on  August  20,  when  he  had  as  yet  received  no 
reenforcements  from  McClellan,  but  had  received  8,000 
men  from  Burnside.  In  other  words,  it  is  plain  that  Pope 
had  not  sustained  losses  at  Cedar  Run,  and  in  his  subse- 
quent well-conducted  retreat  behind  the  Rappahannock, 
greater  in  amount  than  the  reenforcements  (8,000)  brought  hy 
Reno. 

But  if  Pope's  statements  about  the  numbers  of  his  own 
troops  are  loose  and  inaccurate,  they  are  not  less  so  about 
the  reenforcements  he  received  from  McClellan. 

'  Total  loss,  2,216.    Return  of  Casualties,  16  W.R.,  138. 


STRENGTH  OF  THE  OPPOSING  ARMIES.  203 


The  following  troops  from  McClellan's  army  joined 
Pope  between  August  20  and  August  27 :  — 

Reynolds's  division,  by  way  of  Fredericksburg,  August 
23. 

Heintzelman's  corps  (Kearny's  and  Hooker's  divisions) 
from  Alexandria,  August  24. 

Porter's  corps  (Morell's  and  Sykes's  divisions)  from 
Fredericksburg,  August  26.  Add  also  Piatt's  brigade  of 
Sturgis's  forces,  from  Alexandria,  August  26. 

Pope, in  his  report,  puts  Reynolds's  division  at  2,500  men.^ 
Assistant  Secretary  of  AVar  Tucker  telegraphed  Halleck, 
August  19,  from  Fort  Monroe,  that  Gen.  McCall's  [Rey- 
nolds's] division  left  here  thiis  morning,  consisting  of  about 
8,000  men."  ^  On  August  21  Burnside  telegraphed  Halleck 
from  Falmouth,  that  Gen.  Reynolds'  division  of  about 
8,000  men  are  under  orders  and  will  start  at  once ;  ought 
to  reach  him  [Pope]  early  to-morrow ;  "  ^  and  on  the  same 
day  Col.  T.  C.  H.  Smith,  of  Gen.  Pope's  staff,  telegraphed 
to  Reno  to  the  same  effect.'*  Now,  Reynolds  did  reach  Pope 
on  the  23d,  having  marched  up  from  Falmouth  (opposite 
Fredericksburg)  without  collision  or  accident.  Is  it  pos- 
sible that  this  body  of  men  dwindled  from  8,000  to 
2,500  in  two  days  without  cause?  But  Pope's  despatches, 
written  at  the  time,  do  not  agree  with  his  report.  On 
August  26,  in  a  despatch  to  Porter,  Pope  puts  Sigel, 
McDowell,  and  Reynolds  together,  at  34,000  men,^  which, 
supposing  he  intended  to  estimate  Sigel  and  McDowell 
as  high  as  he  had  done  on  the  20th  (30,000  men), 
leaves  4,000  for  Reynolds.  But  between  the  20th  and 
26th  Sigel  and  McDowell  had  suffered  considerable  losses 

U6W.R.,  46.  2  18W.R.,  600.  ^b.,  615. 

nb.,  611.  6 lb.,  675. 


204 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


along  the  Rappahannock,  beside  the  stragglers  due  to  the 
marches  and  countermarches  these  corps  had  made  in  that 
interval.  These  commands  were  certainly  smaller  on  the 
26th  than  on  the  20th ;  and,  if  so,  Reynolds  must  have  had 
more  than  4,000  in  order  to  make  up  Pope's  total  of  34,000 
for  the  three  commands.  The  whole  shows  the  looseness 
of  Gen.  Pope's  statements  about  his  numbers.  Gen.  G. 
H.  Gordon,  whose  statements  of  the  forces  in  this  cam- 
paign are  inaccurate,  especially  as  to  the  Confederates, 
places  Reynolds's  strength  at  4,500  ;  ^  and  this  accords  with 
an  estimate  found  among  the  papers  in  the  F.  J.  Porter 
trial. ^  There  seems  no  good  reason  for  doubting  that  Rey- 
nolds had  from  7,000  to  8,000  when  he  first  joined  Pope. 

No  returns  for  Heintzelman's  corps  for  this  period  are 
found,  and  there  are,  therefore,  no  means  of  testing  the 
accuracy  of  the  estimate  of  from  10,000  to  10,500  assigned 
by  Mr.  Ropes  ^  and  others  to  this  corps.  There  is  a  tele- 
gram from  Gen.  Kearny  to  Halleck,  dated  Acquia  Creek, 
August  21,  when  Kearny  was  on  his  way  to  Alexandria, 
in  wdiich  he  says,  "  My  division  is  7,000  marching  men."^ 
Kearny  and  Hooker  commanded  the  two  divisions  of 
Heintzelman's  corps,  and  Mr.  Ropes  and  Gen.  Gordon 
both  make  Hooker  the  stronger;  but,  if  these  divisions 
were  equal  in  size,  Heintzelman  must  have  reached  Alex- 
andria with  at  least  14,000  men.  It  is  possible,  however, 
that  some  men  were  left  there,  and  that  only  from  10,000 
to  10,500  reached  Pope ;  and  there  is  no  evidence  at  pres- 
ent to  disprove  this  supposition. 

In  regard  to  Porter's  corps  we  have  his  return  for 

1  Gordon,  A.  of  V.,  484. 

2  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  37,  Part  I.,  508,  46th  Congress,  1st  Session. 
3 Ropes,  Army  under  Pope,  194.  "  18  W.R.,  614. 


STREXGTH  OF  TEE  OPPOSIXG  AR^ITES. 


205 


August  SI.  Tvliicli  makes  liis  strengtli  -  present  for  duty" 
10.056.  This  return  was  of  course  made  out  before  tlie 
battle  of  the  SOtli,  and  it  possibly  includes  Piatt's  brigade 
of  Sturgis's  division.  Trhicli  bad  been  assigned  to  Porter's 
corps  a  few  days  before. 

It  thus  appears  that  Reynolds.  Heintzelman,  and  Porter 
(including  Piatt)  brought  to  Pope's  assistance,  between 
August  22  and  August  27.  not  less  than  28.000  men.  If 
these  be  added  to  the  forces  which  Pope  had  on  August 
20  that  General  had  about  80.000  troops  in  his  twelve 
days'  campaign  from  the  Pvappahannock  to  Tv^ashington. 

As  to  the  Confederate  strength  the  nearest  return  ex- 
tant, before  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  is  that  for  July 
20,  wliich  is  published  by  Col.  Taylor,  in  his  "  Four  Years 
with  Gen.  Lee."  ^  The  strength  of  Jackson's  forces  then 
at  Gordonsville  is  not  given  in  this  return :  but  part  of 
them,  at  least,  can  be  obtained  from  other  sources.  Thus 
Gen.  Early  gives,  fr^om  the  retui^ns  of  the  di-\usion,  now 
in  his  possession,  the  strength  of  Ewell's  division  on 
August  9,  the  day  of  the  battle  of  Cedar  Pvun: — 

In  Ewell's  division  (three  brigades)  ofncers  and 

men  "present  for  duty"  in  infantry  .  .  4.780 
Officers  and  men    present  for  duty  "  in  artillery  ,  237 


Total  5,017 

In  Lawton's  brigade,  August  13.  officers  and 
men  present  for  duty  "  in  infantry  and  ar- 
tillery ^    2,159 

■  Tavlor,  Tout  Years.  165.  2  cf..  IS  VT.R..  965. 

^  cf..  Report.  August  20.  1S62.    lb..  966. 


206 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


The  16  regiments  of  Ewell's  division,  therefore,  did 
not  average  quite  300  officers  and  men  to  a  regiment  on 
August  9.  Jackson's  old  division,  now  under  Winder,  con- 
tained but  13^  regiments,  including  the  Forty-seventh  and 
Forty-eighth  Alabama,  recently  added  to  Taliaferro's 
brigade.  This  division  (except  the  two  new  regiments)  had 
seen  the  severest  service  in  the  Shenandoah  valley,  and  was 
most  depleted  thereby.  The  only  two  of  its  regiments 
whose  strength  at  Cedar  Run  is  given  in  the  official  reports 
did  not  average  150  each.  If  we  estimate  the  regiments  of 
this  division  at  the  average  of  Ewell's,  the  division 
would  have  numbered  about  4,000  men,  which  is  certainly 
above  the  truth.  Adding  proportionately  for  artillery,  it 
is  plain  that  the  infantry  and  artillery  that  Jackson  had  at 
Gordonsville,  in  the  commands  of  Winder,  Ewell,  and 
Lawton,  did  not  reach  11,500  men  on  July  20.  In  addi- 
tion to  this  he  had  Robertson's  brigade  of  cavalry,  of  4J 
regiments,  and  numbering  some  1,200  to  1,500  men. 

Near  the  end  of  July  A.  P.  Hill's  division  and  Staf- 
ford's brigade  were  sent  to  reenforce  Jackson.  By  the 
return  of  July  20,  A.  P.  Hill  had  10,623  officers  and  men 
"  present  for  duty."  One  of  his  regiments  (Sixtieth  Vir- 
ginia) was  detached  and  sent  to  West  Virginia,  however, 
and  the  Third  Louisiana  battalion  was  incorporated  into 
Stafford's  brigade  as  the  Fifteenth  Louisiana  regiment. 
Stafford's  brigade  was  composed  of  5  regiments  and  a 
battalion,  and  if  we  deduct  from  it  the  IJ  regiments 
Hill  had  lost,  we  see  that  4  regiments,  or  about  1,200 
to  1,400  men,  are  to  be  added  to  the  strength  of  Hill's 
division  on  July  20,  in  order  to  arrive  at  the  entire 


STRENGTH  OF  THE  OPPOSING  ARMIES.  207 


number  that  joined  Jackson  under  Hill  and  Stafford. 
This  makes  the  number  about  12,000,  and  gives  Jackson 
some  24,000  or  25,000  at  Cedar  Run.  This  number 
was  not  on  that  field,  however,  for  Lawton's  and  Gregg's 
brigades  were  not  present,  and  the  same  excessive  heat 
that  so  greatly  depleted  Banks's  forces  seriously  affected 
Jackson's  also.  Jackson's  losses  in  battle  at  Cedar  Run 
were  1,314.  We  may  take  his  strength  after  the  battle  as 
certainly  not  beyond  23,000  men  of  all  arms. 

Having  determined  Jackson's  forces  at  the  middle  of 
August,  the  next  question  is,  how  many  troops  did  Lee 
bring  up  from  Richmond  ?  This  can  be  determined  pretty 
closely  from  the  return  of  July  20.^  Gen.  Lee  brought 
with  him  the  following  commands :  — 

Officers.   Men.  Total. 

Longstreet's  division.  Present  for  duty,  July  20,  557  7,929  8,486 
Whiting's  or  Hood's  division.  Present  for  duty,  July  20,  2^2  3,600  3,852 
Jones's  "  "  "  "        213    3,500  3,713 

Anderson's  "  "  "  357    5,760  6,117 

Evans's  and  Drayton's  brigades,  estimated  by  Col.  Taylor,  4,600 
Fitz  Lee's  cavalry,  "  "       "  2,500 

Artillery,  "  "       "  2,500 

31,768 

Col.  Taylor's  estimates  are  very  liberal.  For  instance, 
Evans's  brigade  contained  2,200  aggregate  for  duty  at  the 
outset  of  the  campaign,  according  to  Gen.  Evans's  official 
report,  which  leaves  2,600  for  Drayton's  brigade,  which 
was  the  smaller  of  the  two.  So,  too,  as  to  the  cavalry  and 
artillery.  Stuart's  two  cavalry  brigades  (Fitz  Lee's  and 
Hampton's)  contained  but  4,035  on  July  20,  and  Hamp- 

^  Taylor,  Four  Years,  165. 


208 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


ton's  remained  at  Richmond.  The  total  artillery  on  July 
20  was  3,252,  not  more  than  half  of  which  accompanied 
Gen.  Lee  to  the  Rapidan. 

Adding  Jackson's  23,000,  we  find  that  Lee's  entire 
strength  could  not  have  exceeded  54,000  to  55,000.  It 
really  never  reached  that  amount. 

Gen.  G.  H.  Gordon,  in  his  "  Army  of  Virginia,"  is  greatly 
in  error  as  to  the  Confederate  forces,^  but  Mr.  Ropes  has 
o^iven  a  fair  statement  of  them.  The  three  estimates  aiven 
by  Mr.  Ropes  vary  from  47,000  to  54,268.^  The  variation 
is  mainly  in  Jackson's  forces,  the  returns  of  which,  as  we 
have  seen,  are  imperfect.  It  should  be  remembered  that 
the  figures  we  have  given  above  include  all  officers  and 
men  "  present  for  duty.^  These  figures  are  too  great  for 
the  "  effective "  strength,  or  for  the  "  present  for  duty 
equipped."  There  is  little  doubt  that  the  Confederate 
strength  "present  for  duty"  was  somewhere  between 
50,000  and  55,000  men  on  August  20 ;  or,  in  other  words. 
Lee's  forces  were  about  equal  to  those  which  Pope  had  at 
that  date,  before  any  of  McClellan's  troops  had  joined 
him. 

The  figures  we  have  arrived  at,  80,000  for  the  Federal 
army  and  55,000  for  the  Confederate,  apply  only  to  the 
entire  strength  of  the  armies  engaged  in  the  campaign, 
without  deducting  any  losses.  Of  course  these  numbers 
were  lessened  as  the  campaign  progressed.  Neither  army 
mustered  its  full  strength  on  the  field  of  Manassas. 
Before  that  battle  they  had  both  been  diminished  by  the 
fighting  along  the  Rappahannock  and  by  hard  marching, 
and  this  diminution,  up  to  the  27th  of  August,  had  taken 

1  Gordon,  A.  of  V.,  489.       ^  j>opes,  Army  under  Pope,  197-199. 


STREXGTH  OF  THE  OPPOSIXG  ARMIES. 


209 


place  in  both  armies  in  probably  not  widely  different  pro- 
portions. 

Mr.  Ropes  finds  that  Pope  had  77,500  men  in  all,  bnt 
assumes  that  he  lost  12.500  in  one  way  or  another  before 
Manassas,  thus  reducino-  the  Federal  strength  in  the  final 
struggle  to  65,000  :  ^  while,  at  the  same  time,  he  assumes  that 
Gen.  Lee  had  his  n'lirAe  original force  (55,000,  as  Mr.  Eopes 
puts  it)  in  that  battle.-  Of  course  this  is  impossible.  The 
losses  along  the  Eappahannock  were  not  very  unequal, 
and  surely,  as  to  marching  and  short  rations,  Lee's  troops 
were  not  better  off  than  Pope's.  Jackson's  march  of  over 
40  miles  in  two  days,  with  green  corn  for  food,  was  as 
severe  a  trial  as  anything  done  by  the  Federal  army  up  to 
that  time. 

Ill  his  report,  written  after  the  campaign  was  over,  and 
when  he  was  anxious  to  make  out  the  best  case  he  could, 
Pope  states  that  on  the  morning  of  August  27  he  esti- 
mated liis  available  forces  at  55,000  men.°  It  is  tliis  state- 
ment that  has  misled  so  many  writers.  Xow,  there  is  on 
file  an  order  (already  referred  to)  of  Pope  to  Fitz-John 
Porter,  dated  at  7  P.M.,  August  26,  in  which  he  gives  the 
disposition  and  strength  of  his  various  commands  with 
reference  to  the  battle  he  then  thought  at  hand.  In  this 
paper  he  puts  ^ 

McDowell.  Sigel,  Reynolds,  at    .       .  34,000 
Reno  .       .       .       .       .       .       .  8,000 

Banks  6,000 


48,000 

^ Eopes.  Armv  under  Pope,  1881.  (first  edition),  195;  supra,  217-219. 
2  10.  edition  of  1892.  32  ;  218,  supra.  ^  16  W.E.,  34. 

ns  W.E.,  675;  ante,  203. 


210 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


Next  morning,  according  to  Pope's  report^  "  McDowell, 
Sigel,  Reynolds,  Banks,  and  Reno  had  fallen  from  48,000 
to  36,500 !  ^  The  above  paper  of  Pope,  written  at  the  time, 
shows  at  what  he  then  estimated  the  available  strength  of 
these  commands.  It  is,  doubtless,  far  nearer  the  truth  than 
the  report  written  some  time  after,  and  when  a  terrible 
disaster  was  to  be  accounted  for.  If  we  add  Heintzelman's 
and  Porter's  forces,  20,000,  to  the  48,000  Pope  assigned  to 
the  other  commands,  we  have  68,000.  This  number  does 
not  include  the  Federal  cavalry  and,  in  one  case  at  least^ 
it  certainly  is  too  small.  Banks  had,  by  the  official  return 
made  out  a  day  or  two  after,  8,800  men  present  for  duty. 
It  is  plain,  from  Pope's  statement  at  the  time,  combined 
with  such  official  returns  as  exist  of  his  army,  that  on 
August  27  he  had  considerably  over  70,000  men  present 
for  duty.  This  day  was  that  of  the  fight  at  Bristoe. 
Next  day  began  the  three  days'  battle  of  Manassas. 

This  order  to  Porter  has  no  doubt  escaped  Mr.  Rope's 
attention.    Our  conclusions,  then,  are  :  — 

1.  That  early  in  August  (before  Cedar  Run)  Pope  had 
52,000  men,  when  Jackson  was  opposing  him  with  from 
23,000  to  25,000. 

2.  That  on  August  20,  when  Lee  confronted  Pope 
along  the  Rappahannock,  the  latter,  having  been  reen- 
forced  by  Reno  with  8,000  men,  had  still  52,000  or  more 
to  oppose  about  the  same  number  of  Confederates. 

3.  That  during  the  next  ten  days  28,000  men  from 
McClellan  were  added  to  Pope,  giving  him  80,000  men  in 
all  with  which  to  oppose  a  Confederate  force  that  never 
exceeded  55,000. 

1 16  W.R.,  34. 


STRENGTH  OF  THE  OPPOSING  ARMIES.  211 


4.  That  up  to  the  28th,  though  Pope  had  suffered  from 
the  fights  on  the  Rappahannock,  forced  marches,  and  from 
the  engagement  at  Bristoe,  his  losses  were  not  so  excessive 
or  exceptional  as  to  be  entirely  out  of  proportion  to  those 
incurred  by  the  Confederate  army  from  the  same  causes. 

5.  That,  therefore,  if  12  or  15  per  cent,  is  to  be  de- 
ducted from  Pope's  numbers  for  losses  before  August  28, 
some  10  or  12  per  cent.,  at  least,  should  be  subtracted 
from  Lee's  numbers  for  the  same  reason. 

6.  That  Pope  had  fully  70,000  men  on  the  28th  of 
August,  and  Lee  about  49,000. 

In  his  statement  of  losses  Mr.  Ropes  thinks  no  guns 
were  captured  by  Lee  on  the  29th,  and  says,  "  The  one 
gun  which  was  taken  on  the  evening  of  the  29th,  was  left 
on  the  ground."  ^  He  refers  to  the  gun  taken  in  Hood's 
charge,  and  which  Longstreet  says  was  cut  down  and  left. 
As  it  fell  into  Confederate  hands  next  day  it  was  probably 
included  in  Gen.  Lee's  count.  But  Mr.  Ropes  has  over- 
looked the  fact  that  Gen.  Bradley  T.  Johnson's  brigade 
captured  one  three-inch  rifle,  and  Starke's  brigade  another, 
in  the  repulse  of  Hooker's  troops.^  These  were  brought 
off  at  that  time.  These  three  guns  make  up  the  count  to 
twenty-nine ;  and,  were  the  reports  all  on  file,  we  should 
no  doubt  be  able  to  trace  the  one  yet  required  to  make 
the  thirty,  in  all,  claimed  by  Lee.^ 

Mr.  Ropes,  finding  that  Jackson's  loss  was  3,501,  as 
reported  at  Manassas,  while  his  total  loss  between  the 
Rappahannock  and  the  Potomac  was  4,387,*  supposes  the 
first  incomplete.^    The  difference  is  due  to  Jackson's  loss 

^ Ropes,  Army  under  Pope,  190;  218,  supra.       ^16  W.E.,  666. 
3 lb.,  558.       *  16  W.R.,  648.         ^  Ropes,  Army  under  Pope,  191. 


212 


POPE'S   VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


at  other  points  than  Manassas.  Thus,  the  reports  for 
Ewell's  division,  as  published,  show  that  it  lost  45  at  the 
Rappahannock,  and  200  on  the  26th  and  27th  of  August,  at 
Bristoe,  and  200  on  September  1 ;  or  445  in  other  fights 
than  those  on  the  28th,  29th,  and  30th  of  August,  to  which 
the  title  of  "Second  Battle  of  Manassas"  is  usually  re- 
stricted. ^  So  A.  P.  Hill  lost  38  before  the  28th  of  August, 
and  306  on  September  1.  If  the  reports  of  the  other  divi- 
sion could  be  found  no  doubt  the  entire  difference  could  be 
accounted  for.^ 

So,  too,  perhaps,  for  Longstreet.  His  loss  at  Manassas 
was  3,743  (Mr.  Ropes  has  accidentally  transposed  the 
figures  belonging  to  Jackson  and  Longstreet),  and  in  the 
whole  campaign  it  was  4,725.^ 

The  total  Confederate  loss  in  battle  in  the  campaign 
was :  — 

Jackson  4,387 

Longstreet  4,725 

Stuart  (about)  100 

9,212 

This,  of  course,  does  not  include  the  men  worn  out  and 
broken  down  by  the  exertions  and  privations  of  the  cam- 
paign. 

As  to  the  Federal  losses  the  reports  are  very  imperfect. 
There  are  some  indications,  however,  of  their  severity.  Pope 
telegraphed  to  Halleck  that  he  had  lost  8,000,  killed  and 
wounded,  on  the  29th, ^  and  in  his  report  he  adheres  to  the 

1  16  W.R.,  813.  2  i^oss^  Aug.  24-Sept.  1,  1864,  lb.,  673. 

3  lb.,  568 ;  Ropes,  Army  under  Pope,  191.  ^  18  741. 


STRENGTH  OF  THE  OPPOSIXG  ARMIES. 


213 


statement  that  his  losses  on  that  day  were  from  6,000  to 
8,000.^  His  losses  next  day  Trere,  of  course,  more  severe. 
The  Confederates  captured  and  paroled  7,000  prisoners, 
the  vast  majority  of  whom  were  taken  on  the  30th.  Mr. 
Eopes  doubts  about  the  number  of  these  prisoners ;  ^  but 
more  on  general  principles,  and  because  he  does  not  clearly 
realize  the  severity  of  Pope's  defeat,  than  for  any  good 
reason.  King's  division  of  McDowell's  corps  reported 
9,500  men  for  duty  (exclusive  of  cavalry)  on  August  16. 
It  numbered  on  the  monthly  return  for  August,  6,700, 
while  the  field  return  for  September  1  showed  only  1,622 
present  for  duty.  Porter,  on  September  1,  reported  but 
7,356  for  duty.  Of  the  losses  in  Heintzelman's  and  Sigel's 
corps,  which  were  very  heavy,  there  are  no  full  returns. 

Pope,  in  a  despatch  to  Halleck,  dated  September  2,  says  : 
"  The  whole  force  I  had  for  duty  yesterday  morning  was 
57,000,  exclusive  of  Couch's."  ^  In  his  report  he  makes  his 
strength  on  this  day  to  have  been  63,000.^  Of  these,  how- 
ever, 19,000^  are  credited  to  Franklin  and  Sumner,  who 
joined  him  the  day  after  the  battle.  Thus,  from  38,000  to 
44,000  were  all  that  remained,  with  their  colors,  of  the 
army  that  had  been  defeated  at  Manassas.  How  near  the 
truth  these  statements  are  it  is  impossible  to  tell.  In  the 
report  Banks  is  credited  with  only  5,000,  instead  of  8,800 
men  :  while,  on  the  other  hand,  Porter  is  said  to  have  10,000, 

1  16  W.R.,  40.  '  Ropes,  Army  under  Pope,  190-191. 

3 18  W.R.,  797.         C.W.,  2  Sup.  163 ;  stated  as  62.000,  16  W.R.,  44. 

^Pope's  inaccuracy  is  illustrated  here.  McClellan,  in  despatches  from 
Alexandria,  August  28  and  29,  said^  "  Sumner  has  about  14,000  infantry, 
\rithout  cavalry  or  artillery,  here."  18  "W.R.,  710.  "  Pranklin  has  only 
between  10,000  and  11,000  for  duty."  12  AY.R..  99.  This  Avouldmake  the 
forces  that  joined  Pope  at  Centreville  24,000  or  25,000,  instead  of  19,000. 


214 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN-. 


while  he  really  had  only  7,356.  McDowell's  strength  is 
put  down  at  10,000,  which  seems  probable  enough  from 
King's  return  for  September  1. 

The  returns  are  too  fragmentary  for  an  accurate  conclu- 
sion, but  one  thing  seems  pretty  plain.  It  is,  that  Gen. 
Pope's  available  strength  in  the  commands  which  had  been 
engaged  in  the  campaign  was  some  40,000  less  on  the 
second  day  after  the  battle  of  Manassas  than  it  had  been 
ten  or  twelve  days  before.  His  army  had  sunk  from  80,000 
to  about  40,000.  Of  this  loss  probably  more  than  one-third 
were  stragglers  or  fugitives,  who  gradually  rejoined  their 
commands. 

It  appears  probable  that,  at  a  cost  not  exceeding  10,000 
men,  Gen.  Lee  had  inflicted  on  the  Federal  army  a  loss  of 
more  than  double  that  amount  in  killed,  wounded,  and 
prisoners.  In  addition  to  this  the  forces  in  his  front  were 
diminished  for  the  time  by  a  number  of  fugitives  and 
stragglers  greater  than  the  entire  Confederate  loss.  Pope's 
account  of  his  army  on  September  2  makes  its  condition 
deplorable.  He  did  not  take  as  bright  a  view  of  it  as  does 
Mr.  Kopes,^  when  he  telegraphed  to  Halleck :  Unless 
something  can  be  done  to  restore  tone  to  this  army  it  will 
melt  away  before  you  know  it.  .  .  .  The  enemy  is 
in  very  heavy  force  and  must  be  stopped  in  some  way. 
These  forces  under  my  command  are  not  able  to  do  so  in 
the  open  field,  and  if  again  checked  I  fear  the  force  will 
be  useless  afterwards."^ 

^  Eopes,  Army  under  Pope,  ITQ.  ^     W.R.,  797. 


STRENGTH  OF  THE  OPPOSING  ARMIES. 


215 


Abstract  from  consolidated  morning  report  of  the  Third  Army  Corps, 
Army  of  Virginia,  Maj.-Gen.  Irvin  McDowell  commanding ,  for  Aug. 
16,  1862:  —  ! 


Present 

for  Duty. 

2 

'o  . 

Command. 

a 

f"  ?! 

Officers. 

Men. 

Pieces 
Arti 

24 
8 

24 

24 

24 

14 

22 

24 

Pontoniers  (Third  Maine  Bat- 

5 

127 

132 

140 

146 

37 

141 

156 

186 

194 

King's  Division. 

7 

7 

7 

7 

TAT 

9  A7K 
Z,'±  i  O 

oo 

J  yOOJ 

130 

2,44G 

2,576 

2,660 

3,207 

124 

2,611 

2,735 

2,845 

3,522 

8 

275 

283 

300 

319 

12 

Second  New  York  cavalry  . . 

39 

691 

451 

757 

870 

541 

9,804 

10,066 

10,820 

13,365 

12 

EiCKETTs's  Division. 

Staff 

a 
o 

a 
o 

n 
0 

107 

2,125 

2,232 

2,371 

D 

3,131 

lib 

O  IfM 
ji,  /U4 

o  r\c\Q 

o,uyo 

111 

2,661 

2,772 

2,926 

3,487 

94 

1,488 

1,582 

1,739 

2,793 

9 

182 

191 

202 

833 

Division  artillery  (Tillson's) . 

15 

384 

399 

421 

487 

22 

24 

468 

492 

531 

701 

482 

9,652 

10,134 

10,900 

14,036 

22 

^  18  W.K.,  580. 

216 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


Command. 

Present  for  Duty. 

Present  for 

Duty, 
Equipped. 

Aggregate 
Present. 

Aggregate 
Present  and 
Absent. 

Officers. 

Men. 

Bayard's  cavalry  brigade  

First  Ehode  Island  cavalry. 

80 
35 

1,115 
531 

1,189 
566 

1,253 
606 

1,613 
780 

1,175 

21,243 

22,117 

23,765 

29,988 

Abstract  from  return  of  the  Second  Army  Corps,  Army  of  Virginia,  Maj.- 
Gen.  N.  P.  Banks  commanding ,  for  the  month  of  August,  18G2  :  — 


Command. 


Staff   

FikstDivision  (Williams's) 

Staff  

First  brigade  (Crawford's)  . . 

Third  brigade  (Gordon's)  . . . 

Total  

Second  Division( Augur's). 
Staff  

First  brigade  (Geary's)  

Second  brigade  (Prince's)  . . 

Third  brigade  (Greene's)  • . . 

Total    

Artillery  

Cavalry  


Present  for  Duty 


Officers.  Men 


11 


50 
60 
113 


246 


399 


1,338 
1,501 


2,839 


2,202 
1,241 
1,420 


4,863 


705 
45 


8,452 


«2 


11 


s-  S  « 


11 

3 

1,862 

1,846 


3,711 


3 

2,629 
1,715 
1,928 


6,275 


766 
60 


10,823 


11 

5 

2,618 

2,750 


5,373 


7 

3,903 
2,805 
2,792 


9,507 


944 
67 


=)-i  a) 
o  s 


40 


15,902 


40 


STRENGTH  OF  THE  OPPOSING  ARMIES.  21T 


Abstract  from  Return  of  the  Fifth  Army  Corps,  3Iaj.-Gen.  Fitz-John 
Porter,  U.S.  Army,  commanding,  for  Aug.  31,  1862:  — 


Command. 


Corps,  field,  and  staff. 

Morell's  division  

Sykes's  division  

Reynolds's  division  ^ . . 
Artillery  reserve  


Total 


Present  for  Duty. 


Officers. 


7 

290 
141 


473 


Men. 


5,345 
3,211 


1,027 


9,583    11,79G 


7 

G,613 
3,985 


1,191 


c  a  o) 

!-   S  to 


7 

13,677 
6,995 


2,349 


23,028 


15 


80 


95 


Detached  pursuant  to  orders  from  head-quarters  Army  of  the  Potomac. 


NOTE  BY  MR.  ROPES. 

The  figures  cited  by  Col.  Allan,  from  my  volume  entitled  The  Army 
under  Pope,"  in  the  Scribner  Series  of  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War,"  are 
taken  from  the  first  edition  of  that  work,  published  in  1881.  Subsequently 
to  this  date  I  became  possessed,  through  the  courtesy  of  Col.  George  Meade, 
of  a  copy  of  the  Field  Return  of  Gen.  Reynolds's  division,  —  the  Penn- 
sylvania Reserves, — at  Fairfax  Court-House,  on  September  2,  1862, 
showing  an  aggregate  of  4,047  officers  and  men.  I  also  received,  through 
the  same  channel,  a  copy  of  the  report  of  the  casualties  in  that  division  on 
the  28th,  29th,  and  30th  of  August,  1862,  showing  an  aggregate  of  637 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing.  Tliis  proved  that  on  the  morning  of  the 
28th  the  strength  of  the  division  was  4,684.  Mr.  Sypher,  in  his  valuable 
"  History  of  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves,"  states  (p.  356)  that  the  division 
went  into  the  campaign  with  about  6,000  men,  and  the  aggregate  loss  was 
652.    This  statement  of  the  losses  is  very  close  to  the  return  for  the  three 


218 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


days'  battles  at  Manassas,  and  cannot,  I  think,  include  the  casualties  up 
to  the  28th  of  August.  Be  that  as  it  may,  however,  I  did  not  hesitate  to 
adopt  Mr.  Sypher's  estimate  in  my  second  edition,  which  was  published 
in  1882.  By  this  change  my  statement  of  the  strength  of  the  Army  of 
Virginia  was  increased  by  3,500  men,  which  would  raise  its  numbers  to  a 
total  of  81,000  men;  and  for  the  losses  up  to  the  2Sth  of  August,  exclu- 
sive of  those  at  Cedar  Mountain,  I  considered  11,000  to  be  a  fair  estimate. 
This  gives  a  force  of  70,000  men  on  the  morning  of  the  28th  of  August. 
(Army  under  Pope,  p.  197,  2d  ed.)  I  see  Col.  Allan  has  arrived  at  the 
same  conclusion. 

I  must  confess  that  I  accidentally  omitted  to  make  any  deduction  from 
Gen.  Lee's  total  strength  up  to  August  28,  and  I  thank  Col.  Allan  for 
having  pointed  out  the  omission.  I  quite  agree  with  him  that,  making  a 
deduction  from  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  similar  in  amount  to  that 
wliich  I  have  made  above  from  Gen.  Pope's  army,  Gen.  Lee's  force  could 
not  well  have  exceeded  Col.  Allan's  estimate  of  it,  viz.,  49,000  men,  on 
the  morning  of  the  28th. 

In  regard  to  the  loss  of  guns  on  the  29th  I  must  also  admit  that  Gen. 
Bradley  T.  Johnson's  statement  of  the  two  guns  captured  by  his  own  and 
Starke's  brigades  escaped  me.  Whether  the  gun  that  was  left  on  the  field, 
after  Hood  had  withdrawn  on  the  evening  of  the  29th,  was  captured  the 
next  day  or  not,  I  do  not  know.  No  doubt  Col.  Allan  is  correct  about 
this. 

I  wish  to  add  a  word  on  a  point  that  I  should  have  called  attention  to  in 
my  history  of  the  campaign.  The  advantage  possessed  by  an  army  com- 
posed of  troops  who,  for  a  year,  have  been  organized  as  an  army,  who  are 
under  a  General  to  whom  they  are  accustomed  and  in  whom  they  trust,  in 
fighting  an  army  that  is  a  mere  collection  of  three  or  four  independent 
armies,  or  parts  of  armies,  drawn  together  and  organized  as  an  army  a 
very  few  weeks  only  before  the  first  battle  of  the  campaign,  placed  under 
the  command  of  a  General  of  whom  they  know  absolutely  nothing,  and 
who  knows  nothing  either  of  the  troops  or  of  their  officers,  is  simply 
enormous.  It  outweighs  disparity  of  numbers,  at  any  rate,  to  a  very  great 
degree.  The  former  army  is  a  military  machine,  welded  together,  and  a 
fit  instrument  of  war,  in  the  hands  of  a  man  who  knows  what  it  is,  and  how 
to  use  it.    The  latter  is  an  aggregation  of  troops,  and  not  an  army  at  all. 


STRENGTH  OF  THE  OPPOSING  ARMIES. 


219 


Gen.  Pope's  army  was  ordered  to  be  made  up  from  the  independent  and 
widely  separated  armies  of  Sigel,  Banks,  and  McDowell,  on  June  26. 
While  the  concentration  was  going  on,  and  the  organization  of  the  Army 
of  Virginia  was  being  effected,  Gen.  Pope  remained  in  "Washington.  He 
joined  liis  new  command  on  July  29.  The  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain  was 
fought  on  August  9,  only  twelve  days  later.  As  for  the  troops  from  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  coming  up  as  they  necessarily  did  in  detachments, 
it  was  obviously  out  of  the  q^uestion  to  incorporate  them,  in  any  proper 
sense  of  the  word,  with  the  Army  of  Virginia ;  in  fact  it  was  not  even 
attempted.  In  my  judgment  far  too  little  has  been  made  of  these  disad- 
vantages under  which  the  Federal  commander  and  his  troops  labored. 
They  account  for  a  great  part  of  the  failure  that  attended  the  campaign. 

JOHN  C.  POPES. 


VIII, 

THE  CASE  OF  FITZ-JOHN  PORTER. 
By  Brr.  Beig.-Gen.  STEPHEN  M.  WELD,  U.S.Y. 


Read  before  the  Society  on  Monday  evening,  April  16,  1877. 


THE  CASE  OF  FITZ-JOHX  PORTEE. 


"X  revieTvino^  the  case  of  Gen.  Fitz-Jolin  Porter  I  shall 


be  obliged,  from  the  short  space  of  time  allo^-ed 
me.  to  discuss  as  briefly  as  possible  Ms  conduct  up  to  the 
29th  of  August,  reserving  the  main  portion  of  my  paper 
for  the  events  of  that  day.  His  previous  record  was  so 
honorable  and  so  well  knovm  that  even  Ins  accusers  did 
not  venture  to  attack  it.  Tlie  extraordinary  energy  and 
zeal  displayed  by  him  in  marching  from  Harrison's  Land- 
ing to  Xewport  Xews.  and  in  embarking  and  hastening 
his  troops  to  Acc£uia  Creek,  and  forwarding  them  from 
there  to  Pope,  are  admitted  even  by  Judge-Advocate 
Holt.  Xo  complaint  or  fault  is  found  with  him  until  the 
day  after  joining  Pope,  which  he  did  on  the  27th  of 
August.  His  marches  had  been  rapid,  his  vigilance  un- 
ceasing, his  obedience  to  all  orders  uncjuestioned,  and. 
in  a  word,  his  conduct  in  ad  military  matters  had  been 
that  of  a  sldlfuh  practised  soldier  and  of  one  who  deserved 
well  of  the  Republic.  Let  us  see  what  the  charges  were 
before  the  court-martial :  —  ^ 

Charge  First,   Violation  of  dth  Article  of  War,  or  diso- 


U6  AY-E.,  507-511:  17  W.R..  82i-S27. 


223 


224 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


bedience  of  orders,  under  which  were  five  specifica- 
tions :  — 

1.  Failure  to  march  at  1  o'clock  A.M.,  August  28, 
when  so  ordered  to  do  by  Pope. 

2.  Disobedience  of  the  so-called  "joint  order"  of 
August  29. 

3.  Disobedience  of  order  to  attack  at  4.30  P.M., 
August  29. 

4  and  5.  Disobedience  of  order  to  march  to  Groveton, 
A.M.,  August  30,  by  allowing  two  brigades  of  his  com- 
mand to  march  to  Centreville. 

He  was  acquitted  on  the  last  two. 

Charge  Second,  Violation  of  52d  Article  of  War^  or 
misbehavior  before  the  enemy,  under  which  were  four 
specifications:  — 

1.  Alleging  disobedience  of  4.30  P.M.  order  of  29th 
August,  and  shameful  retreat. 

2.  That,  knowing  a  severe  action  was  pending  on  the 
29th  of  August,  he  failed  to  bring  his  corjDS  on  to  the 
field,  and  did  shamefully  retreat  and  fall  back  from  the 
advance  of  the  enemy,  without  knowing  the  force  from 
which  he  retreated. 

3.  Practically  same  as  2. 

4.  That  he  made  a  weak  and  feeble  attack  on  30th 
August.    I  shall  refer  to  this  further  on. 

As  the  events  happening  on  August  27  and  28 
are  practically  of  no  importance  I  shall  pass  directly  to 
the  affairs  of  the  29th  August.  Porter  received  an  order 
at  Bristoe  Station,  at  6  A.M.  of  this  day,  dated  3  A.M., 


^ASB  OF  FITZ-JOHy  PORTER. 


225 


to  march  to  Centreville.  and  to  be  there  at  daylight. 
Like  most  of  Pope's  orders  it  was  antedated,  or  much 
delayed  in  delivery.    I  vrill  read  the  order: — ^ 

Head-quaeters.  Army  of  Yirgixia, 

Xear  Bull  Rux,  Aug.  29.  1862,  3  A.M. 
Gexeeal  :  —  McDowell  has  intercepted  the  retreat  of  Jack- 
son. Sigel  is  immediately  on  the  right  of  McDowell.  Kearny 
and  Hooker  march  to  attack  the  enemv's  rear  at  early  dawn. 
Major-Gen.  Pope  directs  you  to  move  upon  Centrevihe  at 
the  first  dawn  of  day  with  your  whole  command,  leaving  your 
trains  to  follow.  It  is  A^ery  important  that  you  should  be  here 
at  a  very  early  hour  in  the  morning.  A  severe  engagement  is 
likely  to  take  place,  and  your  presence  is  necessary. 

I  am,  General,  very  respectfully,  your  obdt.  serv't, 

Geo.  D.  ElXtGles, 

Col.  and  Chief  of  Staff. 

2^Iajoe-Ge>-.  Poetee. 

Porter  vas  much  surprised  at  this  order.  It  ordered 
him  away  from  the  field  of  battle.  He  started  the  corps 
at  once,  and  rode  on  ahead  to  get.  if  possible,  correct 
orders  before  the  corps  had  marched  too  far  out  of  the 
way.  At  the  '\Veir  house  near  Manassas  Junction  he  met 
Gen.  McDowell,  vrho  was  as  much  stirprised  at  the  order 
as  himself.  McDowell  gave  Porter  some  information  as  to 
the  position  of  the  various  troops.  Porter  pushed  on  to- 
wards Bull  Run,  and  met  a  messenger  with  an  order  to  hast- 
en to  Centreville,  and  to  leave  guards  at  Bull  Run  to  pro- 
tect the  trains,  etc.,  showing  that  Pope  still  misunderstood 
the  state  of  affairs.    Further  on  he  received  still  another 

'  IG  W.R.,  75. 


226 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


message  (verbal),  to  marcli  to  Gainesville,  and  to  take  King 
with  him.  Annoyed  at  these  contradictory  orders  he 
sent  a  message  to  Pope,  aclmowledging  the  receipt  of  this 
order,  giving  also  the  information  he  had  received  from 
McDowell,  and  asking  in  the  future  to  have  his  orders 
in  writing.  This  request  gave  much  offence.^  The  corps 
was  at  once  faced  about,  and  headed  towards  Gainesville. 
At  Manassas  Porter  met  Gen.  Gibbon,  with  a  written 
order,  the  same  as  the  last  verbal  one,  to  march  to  Gaines- 
ville, to  take  King  with  him,  and  to  "  be  expeditious,  or  we 
will  lose  much.  J.  Pope,  M.-G."  ^  Porter  at  once  sought 
McDowell  to  obtain  information  of  the  roads,  and  also, 
if  possible,  what  were  the  plans  of  the  day.  Gen.  Porter 
has  informed  the  writer  that  Gen.  McDowell,  speaking 
of  the  present  and  future,  said  that  there  was  to  be  no 
general  battle,  at  least  until  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  came 
up ;  that  they  would  probably  fall  behind  Bull  Run,  and 
form  a  new  line ;  that  it  was  not  the  policy  to  fight  any 
general  battle  until  reenforcements,  so  near,  could  come 
up.  He  also  stated  that  he  did  not  think  Porter  would 
reach  Gainesville ;  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  prevent 
the  junction  of  Longstreet  and  J ackson.  King  and  Ricketts 
having  fallen  back.  The  former  had  had  a  successful 
contest  with  Jackson  the  night  previous  at  Groveton,  and, 
although  ordered  twice  to  hold  on  by  Pope  until  he  could 
be  reenforced,  had  fallen  back  to  Manassas,  fearing  he 
would  be  crushed  between  Longstreet  and  Jackson ;  but 
the  latter,  Ricketts,  after  a  feeble  resistance,  had  fallen 
back,  in  violation  of  orders,  towards  Bristoe,  and  was 
then  moving  on  Manassas.    McDowell  did  not  blame 

U7W.R.,  885.  M8  W.R.,  729. 


CASE  OF  FIT Z- JOHN  PORTER. 


227 


King,  as  lie  did  not  consider  Iiim  in  a  condition  to  be 
responsible  for  anything,  although  he  was  excessively 
annoyed  at  his  retreat.  While  at  Manassas  cannonading 
was  heard  at  Groveton.  McDowell  characterized  it  as 
of  no  importance,  only  "one  of  Sigel's  artillery  duels, 
amounting  to  nothing ;"  again  saying  there  was  to  be  no 
general  battle.  Porter,  believing  McDowell  to  be  the 
ruling  mind  of  the  campaign,  gave  his  suggestions  all 
the  consideration  due  to  the  highest  authority,  although 
McDowell  did  not  then  command  him.  The  language  of 
the  "joint  order  "^received  soon  afterwards  confirmed  his 
belief,  as  it  coincided  with  what  McDowell  had  already 
told  him. 

The  object  of  the  order  to  move  upon  Gainesville  was 
of  course  evident.  It  was  to  recover,  if  possible,  what  had 
been  lost  by  the  retreat  of  King  and  Richetts  ;  and  to 
accomplish  it  speed  was  necessary,  and  also  an  increase  of 
force,  which  last  Pope  effected  by  assigning  to  Porter 
King's  division  of  McDowell's  corps.  McDowell,  how- 
ever, wanted  Porter  to  wait  until  ha  (McDowell)  could 
receive  orders  from  Pope,  which  were  expected  every 
moment,  giving  him  back  King,  as  he  naturally  did  not 
want  to  lose  him  from  his  command.  McDowell  asked 
Porter  to  place  King  on  his  right,  so  as  to  have  him  join 
Sigel  and  Reynolds,^  where  McDowell  could  reclaim 
him.  Porter  proceeded  on  the  road  to  Gainesville,  and 
found  Morell,  some  mile  and  a  half  from  Bethlehem 
Church,  deploying,  with  his  skirmishers  out,  having 
encountered  and  captured  some  of  the  enemy's  videttes. 

U6  W.R.,  76. 

2  Gibbon's  Letter.    Army  and  Navy  Journal,  March  19,  1870. 


228 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


Morell  was  on  a  comparatively  open  hill-side  sloping  to  the 
west,  his  men  deploying  about  half  way  down  the  side. 
The  country  in  front  was  open  for  about  1,000  to  1,200 
yards,  with  bushes  and  thickets  scattered  here  and  there, 
traversed  by  a  ravine,  with  a  small  creek  at  the  foot 
about  200  yards  to  the  front.  Beyond  this  open  space  were 
woods,  running  out  to  a  point  some  700  yards  distant  and 
along  the  line  of  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  the  general 
direction  of  which  was  east  to  west.  Our  line  of  battle 
was  at  right  angles  to  the  railroad,  with  the  right  on  or  near 
it.  The  country  road,  on  which  we  came  up,  was  about 
parallel  to  the  railroad.  Our  skirmishers  were  in  the  edge 
of  these  woods,  which  trended  off  to  the  south-west, 
making  an  acute  angle  with  the  raiload,  and  were  engaged 
with  the  enemy.  The  woods  were  thick  and  heavy, 
screening  from  view  the  Warrenton  pike,  running  ob- 
liquely across  our  front,  at  a  distance  of  about  two  miles. 
Porter  joined  Morell  about  11.30  A.M.,  and  received  soon 
afterwards  the  so-called  "joint  order,"  which  I  will  now 
read,  and  under  which  McDowell,  about  12  M.,  assumed 
command :  —  ^ 

Head-quarters  Army  of  Va., 
Centreville,  Aug.  29,  1862. 
You  will  please  move  forward  with  your  joint  commands 
toward  Gainesville.  I  sent  Gen.  Porter  written  orders  to 
that  effect  an  hour  and  a  half  ago.  Heiutzelman,  Sigel,  and 
Reno  are  moving  on  the  Warrenton  turnpike,  and  must  now 
be  not  far  from  Gainesville.  I  desire  that  as  soon  as  communi- 
cation is  established  between  this  force  and  your  own  the  whole 

'  16  W.R.,  76. 


CASE  OF  FITZ-JOHX  PORTER. 


229 


command  shall  halt.  It  may  be  necessary  to  fall  back  behind 
Bull  Run  at  Centreville  to-night.  I  presume  it  will  be  so,  on 
account  of  our  supplies.  I  have  sent  no  orders  of  any  descrip- 
tion to  Ricketts,  and  none  to  interfere  in  any  way  with  the 
movements  of  McDowell's  troops,  except  what  I  sent  by  his 
aide-de-camp  last  night,  which  were  to  hold  his  position  on  the 
^Yarrenton  pike  until  the  troops  from  here  should  fall  on 
the  enemy's  flank  and  rear.  I  do  not  even  know  Ricketts' 
position,  as  I  have  not  been  able  to  find  out  where  General 
McDowell  was  until  a  late  hour  this  morning.  General  Mc- 
Dowell will  take  immediate  steps  to  communicate  with  General 
Ricketts,  and  instruct  him  to  rejoin  the  other  divisions  of  his 
corps  as  soon  as  practicable.  If  any  considerable  advantages 
are  to  be  gained  by  departing  from  this  order  it  will  not  be 
strictly  carried  out.  One  thing  must  be  had  in  view,  that  the 
troops  must  occupy  a  position  from  which  they  can  reach  Bull 
Run  to-night  or  by  morning.  The  indications  are  that  the 
whole  force  of  the  enemy  is  moving  in  this  direction  at  a  pace 
that  will  bring  them  here  by  to-morrow  night  or  the  next  day. 
My  own  head-quarters  will  for  the  present  be  with  Heiutzel- 
man's  corps,  or  at  this  place. 

John  Pope, 
Jlojor- Genera^  Commanding. 

Gens.  McDowell  and  Poetee. 

Gen.  McDovi'ell  rode  up  ^vhiile  this  deployment  was 
going  on.  and  said,  ••Porter,  yon  are  too  far  to  tlie  front; 
tMs  is  no  place  to  figlit  a  battle."  ^  The  two  Generals  tlien 
went  one  side,  and  were  engaged  in  conversation  some 
twenty  minutes,  after  which  the  deployment  was  stopped. 
I  Trill  here  read  a  letter  from  General  AVarren  on  tliis 
subject :  — 

1  17  TV.E.,  956,  963. 


230 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN-. 


Newport,         Nov.  7,  1876. 
Gen.  F.  J.  Porter,  Morristown,  Nf.J. :  — 

Dear  General, —  .  .  .  That  "  contradictory  debate  on 
McDowell's  verbal  orders  to  Porter,"  is  about  a  matter  there 
was  never  any  doubt  about  in  my  mind.  Our  dispositions  were 
going  on  rapidly  for  the  attack  as  soon  as  we  confronted  the 
enemy,  and  skirmishing  was  begun,  when  McDowell's  arrival 
and  consultation  with  you,  whatever  may  have  been  said, 
stopped  it.  Col.  W.  A.  Roebling,  on  McDowell's  staff  as  lieu- 
tenant, and  not  then  known  to  me,  has  told  me  that  was  his 
impression  too.    It  is  only  to  be  attributed  to  McDowell  that 

the  attack  was  not  made  then  

Yours  truly, 

G.  K.  Warren. 

During  this  interview  clouds  of  dust  were  seen  moving 
down  the  Warrenton  pike  along  the  railroad  and  cross- 
roads between  the  two,  and  skirmishing  was  going  on,  the 
enemy's  bullets  frequently  whizzing  by.  Some  artillery 
was  also  opened  on  us,  but  was  soon  silenced.  Artillery- 
firing  was  also  heard  to  the  right ;  but  McDowell  again 
characterized  it  as  of  no  consequence,  —  an  artillery  duel 
at  long  range.  Shell  bursting  high  in  air  seemed  to  con- 
firm this. 

Porter  and  McDowell  now  rode  off  to  the  right,  cross- 
ing the  railroad  to  see  if  connection  could  be  made  with 
Pope  at  Groveton.  The  country  on  the  right  was  found 
to  be  impassable  for  infantry  in  any  order,  and  absolutely 
so  for  artillery.  It  was  rough,  thickly  wooded,  and  full  of 
ravines.  Porter  and  McDowell  separated  in  these  woods. 
As  to  what  took  place  during  this  interview  there  is 


CASE  OF  FIT Z- JOHN  PORTER. 


231 


much  dispute.     McDowell's   version  is  that  tliey  dis- 
cussed the  "joint  order,''  and  the  necessity  of  falling  back 
to  Bull  Run  that  night,  etc. ;  that  Porter,  pointing  to  the 
front,  said,  "  We  can't  go  in  there  anywhere  without 
getting  into  a  fight."  ^  [This  remark,  if  made  at  all,  was 
with  reference  to  McDowell's  saying  we  were  too  far  to 
the  front,  etc.    Strong  stress  was  laid  on  this  remark  by 
the  JudoT-Advocate,  as  showino^  Porter's  unwillino;ness  to 
fight.]    That  he  ordered  Porter  to  put  his  troops  in  there, ^ 
meaning  for  him  to  attack,  and  that  he  would  go  round 
and  join  Sigel.    Porter's  side  is,  that  he  told  McDowell 
that  two  scouts  who  had  just  been  captured  reported  Lee 
and  Longstreet  in  our  front  :  that  McDowell,  to  confirm 
this  and  the  correctness  of  his  remark  about  our  being  too 
far  to  the  front,  showed  him  a  despatch  from  Buford,  an- 
nouncing the  passage  of  seventeen  regiments  of  infantry 
and  some  artillery  and  cavalry  through  Gainesville  at 
8.45  that  morning ;  that  McDowell  ordered  him  to  remain 
where  he  was,  prepared  to  fall  back  to  Bull  Run  that 
night;  that,  as  he  understood  McDowell,  and  as  it  seems 
fair  to  infer  in  view  of  the  facts,  no  connection  could 
be  made  with  Pope  across  this  country ;  that  there  was  a 
large  force  in  their  front :  that  they  were  ordered  not  to 
go  so  far  that  they  could  not  reach  Bull  Run  that  night 
or  next  morning  ;  that  they  were  already  far  from  the  main 
forces ;  that  Longstreet  and  Jackson  were  united,  and  the 
object  of  uniting  Porter  and  himself  subverted,  —  the 
latter  (McDowell)  decided  to  go  by  the  Sudley  Springs 
road,  behind  the  woods  separating  them  from  Sigel,  tak- 
ing King  and  Ricketts  with  liim,  and  to  connect  on 

M_7W.R..905.  2ib..90j,. 


232 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


Sigel's  left.  The  facts  in  the  case  seem  to  the  writer  to 
confirm  Porter's  understanding  of  the  conversation.  At 
all  events,  by  McDowell's  departure  with  his  command, 
Porter,  with  some  9,300  men  opposed  by  18,000,  or  a 
much  larger  force  than  his,  strongly  posted,  had  forced 
upon  him  a  policy  wliich  should  hold  this  large  force  in 
his  front  and  prevent  its  being  thrown  against  Pope.  On 
his  way  back  to  his  command  Porter  saw  the  enemy 
marching  up  the  railroad,  and  still  going  into  position. 
Believing  the  time  to  strike  Longstreet,  if  at  all,  was 
before  his  forces  were  all  posted,  and  while  King  was 
present,  Porter,  McDowell  having  disappeared,  sent 
back  word  suggesting  King's  remaining,  and  resumed  his 
deployment.  The  messenger,  Col.  Locke,  found  Gen. 
McDowell  near  Bethlehem  Church,  with  Gen.  King„ 
After  receiving  the  message,  McDowell  said,  "  Give  my 
compliments  to  Gen.  Porter,  and  say  to  him  that  I  am 
going  to  the  right,  and  will  take  Gen.  King  with  me.  I 
think  he  (Porter)  had  better  remain  where  he  is ;  but  if 
it  is  necessary  for  him  to  fall  back  he  can  do  so  upon 
my  left."^  Col.  Locke's  recollection  of  this  message,  and 
of  delivering  it  to  Porter,  was  very  strong  indeed.  Being 
called  in  rebuttal,  he  reiterated  the  fact,  saying  it  made 
a  strong  impression  on  his  mind,  as  it  changed  Porter's 
plans,  who  was  relying  upon  King  as  his  support  in  an 
attack  which  he  (Locke)  knew  was  to  be  made.  This 
message  fixed  Porter's  policy.  He  kept  the  greater  por- 
tion of  Longstreet's  force  in  his  front  during  the  day, 
and  caused  one  division  to  be  brought  from  Longstreet's 
left  to  the  right,  where  Porter  was  threatening  him.^ 

^  17  W.R.,  955,  1129.  ^  kj  W.R.,  556,  564-565,  598. 


CASE  OF  F IT Z- JOHN  PORTER. 


233 


McDowell  remembered  neither  of  these  orders ;  in  fact, 
said  he  ordered  Porter  to  attack.  Is  it  prol)a])le  he  is 
right?  Would  he  have  abandoned  the  only  chance 
of  separating  Longstreet  and  Jackson  unless  he  knew 
it  was  useless  to  try  it?  Would  he  have  ordered 
Porter  to  attack  a  large  force  in  his  front,  and  then 
have  left  him  unsupported  and  isolated?  Would  he 
have  marched  off  without  any  chance  of  getting  into  a 
fight  for  several  hours,  unless  the  policy  was  to  have 
no  general  battle,  but  to  wait  and  form  a  new  line? 
Would  he  not  rather  have  remained  and  crushed  the  force 
in  his  front,  in  conjunction  with  Porter  ?  He  could  have 
had  a  battle  in  half  an  hour  by  remaining  there  and 
attacking.  As  it  was  King  did  not  get  into  a  fight  until 
Hood  attacked  him,  five  hours  later,  about  6  P.M,  on  his 
arrival  near  Groveton,  and  Ricketts  did  not  reach  the 
Warrenton  pike  till  after  dark. 

Porter  now  ceased  his  deployment,  and  moved  his 
troops  into  the  following  position,  from  which  practically 
no  change  was  made  until  the  next  morning.  Two  of 
Morell's  brigades  were  posted  in  front,  and  one  in  rear. 
Sykes's  division  was  on  the  road  in  rear,  V<^arren's  brigade 
connecting  Morell  and  the  Regulars.  Porter  established 
his  head-quarters  near  Bethlehem  Church,  with  Sykes, 
where  the  Sudley  Springs  road  joins  the  Manassas- 
Gainesville  road.  No  portion  of  the  command  went  any 
farther  towards  Manassas  this  day  except  Piatt's  brigade 
of  about  800  men,  and  these  were  recalled,  and  this 
movement  was  made  before  the  despatch  saying  he  should 
fall  back.    The  objects  of  this  disposition  were  as  fol- 


234 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


lows:  Sykes's  diyision  was  in  supporting  distance  of 
Morell,  in  case  lie  were  attacked ;  he  could  move  more 
rapidly  to  Pope,  if  called  there,  and  at  tke  same  time  was 
in  the  proper  place  to  fall  back  to  Bull  Run,  if  ordered. 
Porter  was  likewise  in  the  most  suitable  place  for  reaching 
McDowell,  with  whom  he  was  in  constant  communication, 
cavalry  having  been  left  for  that  purpose.  About  an  hour 
or  so  after  McDowell  left  a  report  came  from  Gen. 
Morell,  that  the  enemy  were  advancing,  and  our  forces 
retiring  on  the  right  where  Pope  was.  Porter,  thinking 
if  our  troops  were  falling  back  it  might  be  necessary  to 
retire,  sent  the  following  order  to  Morell,  and  at  the  same 
time  a  note  to  McDowell  and  King.  I  will  read  them 
both :  — 

Gen.  Morell  :  —  Push  over  to  the  aid  of  Sigel  and  strike 
in  his  rear.  If  you  reach  a  road  up  which  King  is  moving,  and 
he  has  got  ahead  of  you,  let  him  pass  ;  but  see  if  you  cannot 
give  help  to  Sigei.  If  you  find  him  retiring,  move  back  towards 
Manassas,  and,  should  necessity  require  it,  and  you  do  not 
hear  from  me,  push  to  Centreville.  If  you  find  the  direct 
road  filled,  take  the  one  via  Union  Mills,  which  is  to  the  right 
as  you  return. 

F.  J.  Porter, 

Major- General } 

Gens.  McDowell  and  King: — I  found  it  impossible  to 
communicate  by  crossing  the  woods  to  Groveton.  The  enemy 
are  in  great  force  on  this  road,  and,  as  they  appear  to  have 
driven  our  forces  back,  the  fire  of  the  enemy  having  advanced 
and  ours  retired,  I  have  determined  to  withdraw  to  Manassas. 
1  16  W.R.,  523. 


CASE  OF  FITZ-.JOHN  PORTER. 


235 


I  have  attempted  to  communicate  with  McDowell  and  Sigel,  but 
my  messengers  have  run  into  the  enemy.  They  have  gathered 
artillery  and  cavalry  and  infantry,  and  the  advancing  masses 
of  dust  show  the  enemy  coming  in  force.  I  am  now  going  to 
the  head  of  the  column  to  see  what  is  passing  and  how  affairs 
are  going,  and  I  will  communicate  with  you.  Had  you  not 
better  send  your  train  back? 

F.  J.  Porter, 

Major-  GeneraW^ 

This  note  is  incorrectly  printed  in  some  portions  of 
record. 

Before  acting  on  this  note  Porter  went  to  the  front,  as 
lie  said  lie  would  do,  and  found  tliat  the  report  arose  from 
the  artillery-fire  at  Grove  ton  ceasing,  and  opening  on  our 
extreme  right  at  Sudley  Springs,  showing  that  Reno  and 
Kearny  had  arrived,  and  not  that  our  troops  were  falling 
back.  As  there  was  no  necessity  for  retiring,  no  retiring 
was  done.  This  note,  though,  was  the  cause  of  Porter's 
being  found  guilty  of  disobeying  the  "  joint  order."  No 
other  evidence  was  offered  against  him  on  this  point ;  it 
was  all  in  liis  favor.  To  show  Porter's  activity  and  desire 
to  do  all  he  could  to  hold  the  enemy  in  his  front,  and  his 
willingness  and  desire  to  fight,  I  will  give  here  various 
orders  and  notes  passing  between  him  and  Morell  this 
afternoon.  Most  of  them,  like  the  preceding  note  to 
Morell,  were  not  used  on  the  court-martial,  having  come 
into  Porter's  possession  since.  Col.  Marshall,  referred  to 
here,  commanded  the  skirmishers.  He  was  a  regular 
army  officer. 

1  16  W.E.,  524. 


236 


POPKS  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


No.  1.  Gen.  Porter  :  —  Col.  Marshall  reports  that  two  bat- 
teries have  come  down  in  the  woods  on  our  right,  toward  the 
railroad,  and  two  regiments  of  infantry  on  the  road.  If  this 
be  so,  it  will  be  liot  here  in  the  morning. 

G.  W.  MORELL, 

Major 'General.^ 

Endorsed  and  returned  to  Morell : 

Move  the  infantry  and  everything  behind  the  crest  and  con- 
ceal the  guns.  We  must  hold  the  place  and  make  it  too  hot 
for  them.  Come  the  same  game  over  them  they  do  over  us, 
and  get  your  men  out  of  sight. 

F.  J.  Porter.' 

No.  2.  Gen.  Porter:  — I  can  move  everything  out  of  sight 
except  Hazlett's  battery.  Griffin  is  supporting  it,  and  is  on  its 
right,  principally  in  the  pine  bushes.  The  other  batteries  and 
brigades  are  retired  out  of  sight.  Is  this  what  you  mean  by 
everything  ? 

Geo.  W.  Morell, 

Major-  General,  ^ 

Endorsed  as  follows  :  — - 

No.  3.  Gen.  Morell: — I  think  you  can  move  Hazlett's 
battery,  or  the  most  of  it,  and  post  him  in  the  bushes  with  the 
others,  so  as  to  deceive.  I  would  get  everything,  if  possible, 
in  ambuscade.    All  goes  well  with  the  other  troops. 

F.  J.  P.' 

To  a  verbal  report  that  the  enemy  was  being  reen- 
forced^  from  in  front  of  Gen.  Pope,  and  threatening 
attack,  the  following  was  sent :  — 

18  W.R.,  734. 

^  Showing  Porter  was  informed  of  the  approach  of  Wilcox's  division 
from  Longstreet. 


CASE  OF  FIT Z- JOHN  PORTER. 


237 


Gen.  Morell  :  —  Tell  me  what  is  passing  quickly.  If  the 
enemy  is  coming  hold  to  him,  and  I  will  come  up.  Post  your 
men  to  repulse  him. 

F.  J.  POETER.' 

This  was  followed  immediately  by :  — 

Gen.  Morell  :  — Hold  on,  if  you  can,  to  your  present  place. 
What  is  passing  ? 

F.  J.  Porter, 

Major-General.^ 

No.  4.  Gen.  Morell  :  — The  enemy  must  be  in  much  larger 
force  than  I  can  see;  from  the  commands  of  the  officers,  I 
should  judge  a  brigade.  They  are  endeavoring  to  come  in  on 
our  left,  and  have  been  advancing.  Have  also  heard  the  noise 
on  our  left,  as  the  movement  of  artillery.  Their  advance  is 
quite  close. 

E.  G.  Marshall, 

Colonel  13th  N.  Y.^ 

Eeceived  and  endorsed  as  follows  :  — 

Gen.  Porter  :  —  Col.  Marshall  reports  a  movement  in  front 
of  his  left.  I  think  we  had  better  retire.  No  infantry  in  sight, 
and  I  am  continuing  the  movement. Stay  where  you  are,  to 
aid  me  if  necessary. 

Morell.^ 

Returned  with  the  following  note  :  — 

Gen.  Morell  :  —  I  have  all  within  reach  of  you.    I  wish  you 
to  give  the  enemy  a  good  shelling  without  wasting  ammunition, 
18  W.R.,  734. 

^  Probably  relates  to  the  injunction  to  get  his  men  in  ambuscade  and 
come  the  same  game  over  them  they  did  over  us  and  entice  them  to 
attack.    See  preceding  page.  =  18  W.Il.,  734-735. 


238 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


and  push  at  the  same  time  a  party  over  to  see  what  is  going  on. 
We  cannot  retire  while  McDowell  holds  his  own. 

F.  J.  P.^ 

These  despatches  made  Porter  think  he  would  soon  be 
engaged.  In  pursuance  of  the  course  carried  out  during 
the  afternoon  of  informing  Pope  and  McDowell  of  every- 
thing that  was  going  on,  and  to  see  if  his  course  met  with 
approval,  Porter  sent  the  writer  to  McDowell  and  King, 
and  also  to  Pope,  with  a  verbal  and  written  message, 
the  verbal  message  saying,  "  Morell  will  now  be  strongly 
engaged ;  there  were  large  clouds  of  dust  in  our  front, 
and  a  large  force  "  of  the  enemy. ^  The  written  message 
was  to  the  same  effect,  going  more  into  detail.  Pope 
could  not  find  this  message  at  the  court-martial.  Porter 
has  been  severely  criticised  for  not  attacking  during  the 
afternoon  of  the  29th.  There  was  nothing  in  the  attitude 
of  the  opposing  force  to  induce  any  attack  on  Por- 
ter's part.  They  were  strongly  posted  and  in  large 
force,  and  continually  threatening  attack,  which  Porter 
desired  and  invited,  as  these  preceding  orders  show.  The 
true  policy  was  to  keep  as  large  a  force  as  possible  in  his 
front,  to  invite  attack  by  concealing  his  strength,  and 
at  the  same  time  to  push  small  forces  out  to  attract 
attention  and  to  find  out  what  was  going  on.  This  policy 
was  carried  out.  After  5  P.M.  Porter  received  a  note 
from  the  writer,  giving  information  from  Hatch,  now 
commanding  King's  division,  that  he  had  ''driven  the 
enemy  into  the  woods  ;  "  ^  and  from  McDowell  that  All 
goes  well  on  our  right ;  the  enemy  are  retiring  up  the 

1  18  W.R.,  735.  2  17  w.R.,  949.  z^^,^  950. 


CASF  OF  FIT Z- JO  EN  PORTER. 


239 


pike."  Porter  at  once  sent  an  order  to  Morell  to  attack 
with  a  force  large  enough  to  engage  the  enemy's  atten- 
tion, and  to  find  out  what  was  going  on  in  his  front. 
The  order  was  as  follows :  — 

Gen.  Moeell  :  —  I  wish  you  to  push  up  two  regiments,  sup- 
ported by  two  others,  preceded  by  skirmishers,  the  regiments 
at  intervals  of  200  yards,  and  attack  the  party  with  a  section 
of  a  battery  opposed  to  you.  The  battle  works  well  on  our 
right,  and  the  enemy  are  said  to  be  retiring  up  the  pike. 
Give  the  enemy  a  good  shelling  when  our  troops  advance. 

F.  J.  Porter, 
Ma]. -Gen.  Commanding.'^ 

Morell  protested  strongly,  saying  the  enemy  were 
preparing  to  attack  him.  He  thought  the  attack  would 
bring  on  a  disastrous  repulse,  followed  by  a  strong  pur- 
suit, and  so  called  up  his  whole  command.^  During  the 
delay  of  this  preparation  Porter  became  satisfied  that 
Morell  w^as  right,  and,  as  the  day  was  nearly  ended,  it 
being  about  sunset,  suspended  the  attack  by  the  following 
order : — 

Put  your  men  in  position  to  remain  during  the  night,  and 
have  out  your  pickets.  Put  them  so  that  they  will  be  in  line, 
and  on  rising  will  be  in  position  to  resist  any  attack.  I  am 
about  a  mile  from  you.  McDowell  says  all  goes  well,  and  we 
are  getting  the  best  of  the  fight.  I  wish  you  would  send  me 
a  dozen  men  from  that  cavalry. 

F.  J.  Porter, 

Major- General. 

Keep  me  informed.  Troops  are  passing  up  to  Gainesville, 
pushing  the  enemy.    Ricketts  has  gone ;  also  King.^ 

1  18  W.R.,  735.  2  ij  W.E.,  968,  969.  ^  ig  ^jY.U.,  735. 


240 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


At  about  6.30  the  writer  returned,  having  seen  Pope 
and  McDowell,  but  bringing  no  orders.  Pope's  only  mes- 
sage was,  "  Tell  Gen.  Porter  we  are  having  a  hard  fight,"^ 
this  at  or  near  the  junction  of  Sudley  Springs  road  and 
Warrenton  turnpike.  Very  soon  after  Capt.  Douglas 
Pope  arrived  with  this  order :  — 

Head-quarters  in  the  Field, 

Aug.  29,  1862,  4.30  P.M. 
Your  line  of  march  brings  you  in  on  the  enemy's  right 
flank.  I  desire  you  to  push  forward  into  action  at  once  on 
the  enemy's  flank,  and,  if  possible,  on  his  rear,  keeping  your 
right  in  communication  with  Gen.  Reynolds.  The  enemy 
is  massed  in  the  woods  in  front  of  us,  but  can  be  shelled 
out  as  soon  as  [you]  engage  their  flank.  Keep  heavy  reserves 
and  use  your  batteries,  keeping  well  closed  to  your  right  all 
the  time.  In  case  you  are  obliged  to  fall  back,  do  so  to 
your  right  and  rear,  so  as  to  keep  you  in  close  communica- 
tion with  the  right  wing. 

John  Pope, 
Major- Gen .  Commanding.'^ 

Major-Gen.  Porter. 

Before  proceeding  any  further  I  wish  to  call  your 
attention  to  these  maps.^  No.  2  shows  the  position  of  the 
contending  forces,  as  understood  by  Pope  at  the  time,  and 
for  three  years  afterwards.  It  is  an  official  map,  originally 
published  in  Pope's  report  to  the  Committee  on  the  Con- 
duct of  the  War,  and  made  official  by  the  War  Depart- 
ment. The  original  is  here,  and  marked  No.  2.  No.  3 
shows  the  actual  position  of  the  forces,  mainly  as  Porter 
understood  it  at  the  time.    Gen.  R.  E.  Lee,  Col.  Marshall 

1 17  W.R.,  950.  2  iQ  ^Y.Tl.,  18. 

Copies  of  these  maps  will  be  found  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 


CASE  OF  FITZ-JOHN  PORTER. 


241 


(a  direct  descendant  of  Cliief-Justice  Marshall,  and  confi- 
dential A.D.C.  to  Gen.  Lee),  Gen.  Longstreet,  and  Gen. 
Wilcox,  all  testify  to  its  correctness.  Gen.  Lee  and 
Major  Marshall  saw  the  map  marked  3  A,  and  Gens. 
Longstreet  and  Wilcox  the  same  map,  and  also  map 
marked  3  B,  from  both  of  y-liicli  this  is  copied.  The 
arrangements  of  the  brigades,  with  reference  to  each  other 
in  the  same  division,  may  not  be  exact  on  the  extreme 
right:  but  in  the  main  they  are  correctly  placed. 

Stripped  of  redundancy  and  repetition  the  order  I  haye 
just  read  is  simply  one  to  attack  Jackson's  right  flank, 
and  to  keep  close  communication  yitli  Gen.  Reynolds. 
It  showed  entire  ignorance  on  Pope's  part  of  Longstreet's 
separate  force,  then  lying  between  Jackson  and  Porter, 
and  also  of  the  impenetrable  country  between  Porter 
and  the  "  right  wing,"  with  which  he  was  "  to  keep  close 
communication."  Its  execution  inyolyed  an  attack  upon 
this  superior  force, — an  attack  which  Porter  had  been 
attempting  in  a  smaller  degree,  and  which  in  as  large  a 
degree  he  had  regarded  as  leading  to  disaster,  and  had 
suspended.  He,  howeyer,  immediately  despatched  Col. 
Locke  to  order  Gen.  Morell  to  prepare  to  attack  with  his 
whole  force,  and  that  he  (Porter)  would  join  him  before 
he  was  ready. 

Porter  at  once  acknowledged  the  receipt  of  the  order 
and  time  (6.30  P.M.)  by  Gen.  Pope's  returning  aid.  He 
also  wrote  that,  although  hebelieyed  the  order  had  arrived 
too  late  to  be  executed,  and  would  probably  lead  to  dis- 
aster, he  would  do  all  that  was  possible  to  carry  it  into 
effect.    He  said  he  did  not  believe  any  impression  could 


242 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  campaign: 


be  made  on  the  strong  force  in  Ms  front,  unless  aided  by 
the  divisions  taken  away  by  McDowell.^  The  aid,  Capt. 
Pope,  although  ordered  to  make  all  speed  possible  on  his 
return,  did  not  reach  Gen.  Pope  till  8  o'clock.^  The  dis- 
tance is  some  five  miles.  The  fair  inference  is  that  he  did 
not  leave  Porter  till  7  o'clock,  about  twenty  minutes  to 
half  an  hour  after  his  arrival.  Gen.  Pope  could  not,  or 
would  not,  produce  this  note  at  the  court-martial,  yet  he 
acknowledged  its  receipt.  It  would  have  shown  the  time 
of  receipt  of  the  ''4.30  order,"  and  the  reasons  for  not 
attackino\  Porter's  order  to  attack  found  Morell  executing 
the  previous  order,  to  put  his  troops  in  line  for  the  night. 
It  hastened  his  movements  ;  but,  when  Porter  joined  him  a 
few  minutes  after,  darkness  prevailed,  and  ended  all  aggres- 
sive movements.  A  few  volleys  of  musketry  heard  on  the 
right  at  this  time  and  cheers  were  the  only  notice  of  an  in- 
fantry contest  heard  during  the  day  by  Porter,  or  his  Gener- 
als. In  this  position,  Morell  in  line,  and  Sykes  in  rear,  the 
corps  rested  for  the  night.  At  4  the  next  morning,  30th, 
they  started  to  join  Pope  by  orders  from  him,  dated  8.30 
P.M.,  29th,  and  received  after  3  A.M.,  30th.3  Porter's  force 
during  this  day  was  9,200  strong,  consisting  of  Sykes's  and 
Morell's  divisions.    Piatt,  who  had  been  assigned  to  him, 

^  Porter  supposed  that  McDowell  had  sent  all  his  despatches  to  Pope, 
which  he  should  have  done,  giving  full  information  of  the  situation,  and 
that  Pope  gave  the  order  with  these  despatches  in  his  possession  ;  and  hence 
he,  Porter,  considered  he  was  bound  to  obey  the  order  as  if  Pope  was  pres- 
ent with  him  and  undertook  to  execute  it ;  at  the  same  time  he  protested 
against  it.  It  appears  McDowell  did  not  send  forward  the  despatches,  and, 
worse  still,  did  not  even  inform  Pope  of  Buf ord's  despatch,  and  of  the  fact 
that  he  had  parted  from  Porter.    17  W.R.,  879. 

2  lb.,  849,  879.  ^  16  W.E.,  18. 


CASJE  OF  FIT Z- JOHN  PORTER. 


243 


was  left  behind  at  Warrenton  Junction  to  guard  trains, 
and,  although  arriving  at  Manassas  on  the  29th,  did  not 
report  to  Porter  till  the  30th.    Piatt  had  about  850  men. 

Let  us  now  examine  the  record  of  the  court-martial  for 
this  day.  The  charges  are,  stripped  of  all  technicalities, 
that  Porter  disobeyed  the  "  joint  order "  by  retiring  to 
Manassas.  Practically  no  evidence  is  brought  forward  to 
proA^e  this,  except  Porter's  message  to  McDowell  and 
King,  announcing  his  intention  of  so  doing,  but  saying 
"  I  will  communicate  with  you,"  —  meaning  before  retir- 
ing. This  was  given  under  the  impression  —  and  a  natural 
one  to  have  under  the  terms  of  the  order  itself — that  Pope 
was  retiring.  As  this  impression  was  found  to  be  incor- 
rect, no  retiring  was  done ;  yet  he  was  found  guilty. 

Second.  I^isobedience  of  the  order  to  attack,  dated 
(or  antedated)  4.30  P.M.  The  witnesses  for  the  Gov- 
ernment were  Gens.  Pope,  McDowell,  and  Roberts, 
Capt.  Pope,  Charles  Duffee  (his  orderly),  and  Cols.  B.  F. 
and  T.  C.  H.  Smith.  What  they  testified  to,  and  what 
the  Court  believed  they  proved,  and  in  consequence  found 
Porter  guilty  of,  is  stated  by  Judge-Advocate  Holt  in  his 
rcTOW  of  the  case  for  President  Lincoln,  and  was  :  — ^ 

1.  That  there  was  no  force  in  Porter's  front  that  day, 
except  possibly  a  squadron  of  cavalry,  with  a  section  of 
artillery,  or   a   few   skirmishers  from   Jackson's  force. 

2.  That  the  country  between  Porter  and  Jackson  was 
open  and  easily  crossed  by  troops,  and  that  the  enemy 
crossed  over  it  in  their  flank  attack  on  Pope  the  next 
day,  August  30.  3.  That  in  consequence  of  the  above 
state  of  affairs  an  attack  as  ordered,  if  obeyed  by  Porter, 

1  17  W.R.,  1112,  et  seq. 


244 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


would  have  routed  Jackson,  and  given  us  an  overwhelm- 
ing victory.  4.  That  the  order  was  received  by  5  to 
5.30  P.M.,  in  plenty  of  time  to  have  attacked.  5. 
That  Porter  failed  to  make  this  attack  deliberately,  and 
with  design  to  injure  Pope.  6.  That  the  sounds  of 
a  general  battle  on  his  right  ought  to  have  made  him 
attack  or  move  to  Pope's  assistance.  Almost  all  the 
officers  above  mentioned  testified  on  these  points,  except 
as  to  the  time  of  delivery  of  the  "  4.30  order."  Capt.  Pope 
and  his  orderly  were  the  only  witnesses  on  this  point. 
The  evidence  was  almost  entirely  opinions  or  suppo- 
sitions made  by  men  two  or  three  miles  away,  and  looking 
through  thick,  impenetrable  woods,  which  no  ordinary  eye 
could  see  through.  McDowell  testified  that  he  left  Porter 
on  the  29th,  with  the  understanding  that  he  was  to 
attack ;  that  he  did  not  remember  saying  to  Porter  that 
he  was  to  attack;  that  he  did  not  remember  saying  to 
Porter  that  he  was  "  too  far  to  the  front ; "  that  "  it  was 
no  place  to  fight  a  battle  ; "  that  he  did  not  remember 
sending  any  message  to  Porter  about  taking  King,  and 
that  he  (Porter)  was  to  remain  where  he  was.  (This 
was  said  by  Col.  Locke  to  have  been  delivered  in  King's 
presence.)  *  King,  a  member  of  the  Court  trying  Porter, 
was  called,  and  testified  that  he  did  not  see  McDowell 
after  10  o'clock  that  morning.  Allowing  King  to  testify 
was,  to  say  the  least,  a  great  piece  of  irregularity.  Gen. 
McDowell  knew  that  he  (King)  was  in  no  condition  to 
do  or  remember  anything  that  day. 

'  17  W.R.,  956.  Col.  Locke  was  sustained  by  Leipold,  his  orderly, 
who  stated  in  an  affidavit  made  Feb.,  18G3,  that  he  was  present  at  the 
interview  between  Locke  and  McDowell. 


CASE  OF  FITZ-JOHN  FORT  EE. 


245 


For  the  defence  the  following  officers  testified :  Gens. 
Sykes,  Morell,  Griffin,  Butterfield,  Reynolds,  and  Buford ; 
Cols.  Locke,  Ruggles,  and  Marshall ;  Maj.  Hyland ;  Capts. 
Monteith  and  Martin ;  and  Lients.  Stevenson,  Ingham, 
and  Weld.  Gens.  Morell,  Griffin,  and  Butterfield,  and  Col. 
Marshall,  Maj.  Hyland,  and  Lieut.  Stevenson  (the  last 
three  of  the  Thirteenth  New  York,  on  the  skirmish  line 
that  day),  testified  to  the  large  force  in  Porter's  front,  — 
from  10,000  to  15,000 ;  Morell,  that  his  division  was  at  the 
front  till  the  morning  of  the  30th,  and  hence  could  not 
have  fallen  back  or  retreated ;  Reynolds,  Morell,  Griffin, 
and  Stevenson,  to  the  rough  and  impenetrable  nature  of 
the  country  on  our  right  between  Porter  and  Pope, 
making  it  impassable  for  infantry  in  any  order,  and  abso- 
lutely so  for  artillery;  Reynolds,  that  he  could  not 
move  his  force  over  it  on  the  28th,  unopposed  by  any 
enemy;  also  that  there  was  no  battle  this  day  till  5  P.M. 
Pope  also  admits  that  there  was  no  battle  till  5.30  P.M.^ 
Locke  and  Martin,  both  as  honorable,  gallant  officers  as 
there  were  in  our  service,  testified  to  hearing  McDowell  say 
to  Porter  on  riding  up  to  him  at  noon  of  the  29th,  "  Porter, 
you  are  out  too  far  ;  this  is  no  place  to  fight  a  battle."  Locke 
also  testified  to  McDowell's  sending  his  compliments  to 
Gen.  Porter ;  that  he  would  take  King  with  him,  and  he 
(Porter)  was  to  remain  where  he  was."  This  in  answer 
to  Porter's  request  for  King  to  aid  in  his  attack. 
Sykes,  Locke,  Monteith,  Ingham,  and  Weld  testified  to 
the  time  of  the  receipt  of  the  4.30  order,"  giving  the  time 
as  6.30  P.M.,  —  it  will  be  remembered  that  Capt.  Pope 

1  17  W.R.,  832,  833. 


246 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


and  his  orderly  were  tlie  only  witnesses  in  contradiction, 
—  Morell  and  GrifQn,  that  they  heard  no  musketry-firing 
and  no  signs  of  a  battle  till  nightfall.  Lieut.  Ingham 
also  gave  evidence,  showing  that  Capt.  Pope,  the  bearer 
of  the  "  4.30  order,"  came  by  way  of  Manassas  Junction, 
and  hence  the  delay  in  its  receipt.  He  expected  to  find 
Porter  there,  —  from  his  falling-back  message.  Porter's 
grounds  of  defence  to  these  charges  then  were  as  fol- 
lows :  — 

That  he  did  not  fall  back  that  day  one  foot ;  Morell's 
division  being  at  the  front,  at  the  farthest  point  of  its 
advance,  the  whole  day,  and  until  ordered  away  the  next 
morning  by  Pope ;  Sykes  meanwhile  being  in  rear,  in 
support,  or  ready  to  move  to  Pope's  assistance,  as  the 
case  might  be.  This  disposed  of  the  charges  of  retreat- 
ing, etc.; 

That  he  ordered  an  attack,  which  he  countermanded 
(and  rightly,  too),  owing  to  the  earnest  remonstrances  of 
Morell,  whose  reasons  he  found  good  and  sufficient,  viz. ; 
that  the  enemy  were  in  large  force,  and  were  evidently 
on  the  point  of  attacking  us; 

That  he  felt  certain  he  was  doing  more  good  holding  a 
large  force  in  check,  and  so  keeping  them  from  attacking 
Pope  ; 

That  he  received  two  distinct  requests,  or  orders,  from 
McDowell  not  to  attack,  but  to  remain  where  he  was ; 

That,  under  McDowell's  action  in  withdrawing  Eang 
and  directing  Ricketts  to  follow,  he  was  forced  to  take 
this  policy ; 

That,  under  the  "  joint  order,"  he  had  the  right  to  do 


I 


CASE  OF  FITZ-JOEN  PORTER.  247 

T^'liat  seemed  to  lilm  best,  discretion  to  do  so  being  given 
in  tlie  order  itself ; 

That  lie  kne^^'  of  no  general  battle  tliat  day,  nor  did 
any  general  officer  under  liis  command ; 

That,  as  to  tlie  "  order  of  4.30  P.M.,"  it  was  an  abso- 
lutely impossible  order  to  obey,  even  if  given  earl}-  in  the 
afternoon,  without  any  enemy  in  his  front,  on  account  of 
the  nature  of  the  ground :  that,  with  an  enemy  in  his  front, 
it  was  doubly  impossible,  and  an  attempt  to  obey  it  sui- 
cidal and  wicked,  as  it  would  result  in  extreme  disaster, 
not  only  to  himself,  but  to  the  whole  army :  that  it  was 
given  under  a  total  misapprehension  of  the  true  state  of 
affairs :  and  that  it  reached  him  too  late  to  obey ; 

That  the  only  thing  left  to  do  was  an  attack  in  front ; 
wliich  he  attempted  to  make,  but  which  darkness  rendered 
impossible  ; 

That  his  whole  conduct  this  day  was  that  of  a  soldier, 
and  an  honorable  man,  striving  to  do  his  best; 

That  the  record  of  his  life  was  entitled  to  some  weight, 
as  showing  him  incapable  of  doing  what  he  was  accused  of. 

The  Court  convicted  him  on  all  these  charges. 

Porter  now  has  new  evidence,^  pro^dng  :  — 

That  there  was  a  large  force  in  his  front, — some  18,000 
men  of  Longstreet's  corps ; 

That  an  attack  would  have  been  hazardous,  and  one 
that  no  prudent  military  man  would  have  made  ; 

That  the  "  order  of  4.30  "  was  received  at  6.30  ; 

That  there  was  no  general  battle  to  the  knowledge  of 
the  Confederate  commanders  till  late  in  the  day ; 

That  the  enemy  did  not  march  over  this  country  in 

^  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  37,  Part  1,  551,  et  seq. 


248 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


their  flank  attack  next  day,  but  drew  in  towards  the  pike, 
and  then  out,  to  avoid  these  "  bad  lands  " ; 

That  the  enemy  were  anxious  to  have  him  attack ; 

That  an  attack  by  him  would  not  have  relieved  Pope 
or  weakened  Jackson. 

This  new  evidence  consists  of  reports  of  the  Confeder- 
ate officers  and  letters  from  Gens.  Lee,  Longstreet,  Early, 
Hood,  and  Robertson,  and  Col.  Marshall  (the  latter, 
confidential  aide  to  Lee).  Let  us  see  at  what  time  of 
the  day  the  Confederate  Generals  were  first  aware  of 'Por- 
ter's movements.  Gen.  Early,  of  Jackson's  corps,  says: 
"Early  next  morning"  (29th)  "I  received  an  order 
.  to  move  .  .  .  so  as  to  prevent  the  enemy 
from  flanking  our  forces  on  the  right,  a  movement  from  the 
direction  of  Manassas  indicating  that  purpose  having  been 
observed."^  In  a  letter  he  says  that  it  was  8  A.M.  when 
this  was  done,  and  that  his  forces  were  relieved  by  12  M. 
by  Longstreet's  forces  intervening  between  his  force  and 
the  enemy.  This  shows  that  Lee  must  have  known  of 
Porter's  movement  on  Gainesville  early  in  the  morning,  or 
as  soon  as  he  arrived  on  the  field.  As  to  the  time  of  the 
arrival  of  Lonostreet's  forces  on  the  field  the  accounts 
given  in  the  reports  and  in  letters  from  Confederate 
officers  all  agree  (the  fact,  I  believe,  is  not  disputed)  in 
saying  that  the}"  were  in  supporting  distance  of  Jackson 
by  9  to  10  A.M.,  29th,  and  on  the  ground  in  position  by 
11.30  to  12  M.2 

Longstreet  says  his  line  was  formed  as  follows  :  Hood's 
division,  supported  by  Evans's  brigade,  was  drawn  up  at 


1 16  W.R.,  711. 


2  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  37,  Part  1,  551  et  seq. 


CASE  OF  FIT Z- JO  EN  PORTER. 


249 


right-angles  to  the  Warrenton  pike  and  crossing  it,  con- 
necting with  Jackson's  right ;  Wilcox  (3  brigades)  sup- 
porting the  left,  and  Kemper  (3  brigades)  supporting  the 
right;  D.  K.  Jones  (3  brigades)  on  the  right  on  Manassas 
Gap  Railroad,  in  echelon  with  regard  to  Kemper.^  This 
would  give  the  line  as  represented  in  this  map,  except  as 
to  Wilcox,  who  was,  later  on,  moved  round  to  the  right  to 
support  Jones.  Longstreet  says  in  a  letter  that  his  line 
reached  to  and  crossed  the  Manassas  Gap  Eailroad ;  that 
they  were  ready  and  anxious.  Gen.  Lee  particularly  so, 
to  bring  on  a  battle  at  any  time  after  12  M.  ;  that  his 
force  was  25,000  to  30,000.  Lee,  Longstreet,  and 
Wilcox,  all  speak  of  the  nature  of  the  ground  in  their 
front  as  difficult  to  handle  infantry  on,  and  especially 
artillery.^ 

Col.  Marshall  says  :  "  The  facts,  as  far  as  the  movements 
of  the  Confederate  forces  were  concerned,  were  not  cor- 
rectly stated  to  the  Coui-t."  ^  Lee,  Longstreet,  and  Wilcox 
say  that  an  attack  with  12,000  men  before  12  M.  ought  to 
have  been  repulsed ;  after  12  M.  it  would  have  been  re- 
pulsed, and  the  force  severely  handled,  and  Pope  over- 
whelmed, as  he  was  the  next  day.  Longstreet,  Lee, 
Marshall,  and  Wilcox  say  that,  owing  to  Porter's  approach 
and  threatening  demonstrations,  Wilcox  was  detached 
from  the  left,  and  moved  over  to  support  Jones  in  Porter's 
front.  Wilcox  says  they  were  moved  back  again  at  dusk, 
but  not  in  time  to  be  in  Hood's  battle  or  reconnoissance. 
In  other  words  Porter  kept  1  cavalry  division  and  8 
infantry  brigades  of  Longstreet's  12  from  firing  a  gun 
against  Pope's  forces  that  day. 

^  16  W.E.,  564-565.  2  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  37,  Part  1,  551  et  seq. 

2  lb.,  474;  Porter's  Statement,  Morristown,  1878. 


250 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


Longstreet  had  from  25,000  to  30,000  men  that  day, 
divided  into  some  53  regiments,  averaging,  say,  500  men 
each.  There  were  36  regiments  in  Porter's  front,  and 
17  in  Pope's  front.  These  figures  are,  of  course,  approx- 
imate. 

Pope,  in  his  numerous  letters  opposing  a  reopen- 
ing of  Porter's  case,^  makes  much  importance  of  Stuart's 
report.^  The  most  probable  explanation  of  this  report 
seems  to  the  writer  to  be  as  follows :  Lee,  as  we  have 
seen,  must  have  known  at  an  early  hour  of  Porter's 
approach.  When  forming  his  line  he  made  dispositions 
to  meet  him,  and  sent  Jones's  division  to  the  Manassas 
Gap  Railroad,  which  he  reached  by  12  M.  Stuart's 
cavalry  were  scouting  quite  a  distance  in  front  of  Jones, 
and,  while  he  was  forming,  dragged  bushes,  etc.,  as  he 
says.  Lee,  on  receiving  news  from  Stuart  of  the  large 
force  approaching,  detached  Wilcox's  three  brigades  to 
aid  Jones,  by  this  time  in  position.  Wilcox  sets  the  time 
of  his  going  to  the  right  at  4  to  5  P.M.  I  think  the 
weight  of  the  evidence  is  against  him.  It  was  probably 
3  P.M.,  at  the  latest.  The  only  other  explanations  are, 
that  Stuart  dragged  bushes  on  the  direct  road  from 
Gainesville  to  Bristoe,  or  that  he  did  not  drag  them  at  all, 
as  Gen.  Eobertson  says  in  two  letters,  I  am  inclined  to 
think  Gen.  Robertson  is  correct,  and  that  no  dragging 
of  bushes  was  done. 

The  force  Stuart  speaks  of  as  retiring  to  Manassas 
was  McDowell ;  ^  and  Pope  knows  it,  yet  still  continues  to 
assert  it  was  Porter. 

1  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  37,  Part  1,  478.  ^         .U.,  735-736. 

3  lb.,  565. 


CASE  OF  FITZ-JOny  PORTER. 


251 


Galt  House,  Louistille,  Kt.,  IMay  27,  1870. 
Major-Gex.  F.  J.  Porter  :  — 

Sir. — Your  letter  with  sketcli  enclosed  came  to-day;  and, 
as  YOU  request  an  early  response,  I  sliall  be  as  brief  as  pos- 
sible. 

On  the  afternoon  of  Thursday.  August  28,  1862,  I  proceeded 
with  my  cavalry  brigade  ...  to  Haymarket.  ...  As 
soon  as  I  could  get  feed  for  my  horses  the  next  morning, 
Friday,  29th  (my  men  had  no  breakfast),  I  returned  to  Hay- 
market,  expecting  to  renew  the  fight  of  the  previous  evening. 
It  could  not  have  been  more  than  8  or  8.30  o'clock  when  I 
reached  Haymarket.  Looking  to  my  left  and  front  I  saw  an 
immense  body  of  troops,  which  I  supposed  to  be  Longstreet's, 
—  having  witnessed  in  the  distance  his  fight  with  Eicketts  the 
evening  before.  In  a  very  short  time  a  courier  from  General 
Lee,  requesting  to  see  me,  proved  the  supposition  correct.  I 
joined  Longstreet  with  my  whole  command,  passed  him  on 
the  left  flank  of  his  column,  and  when  his  line  was  formed 
took  position  on  his  right. 

.  There  was  considerable  artillery  (Stephen  Lee,  I 
think)  on  Jackson's  right.  Longstreet  formed  his  line  to  the 
right  of  this  force,  and  perhaps  as  near  on  the  prolongation 
of  Jackson's  line  as  the  nature  of  the  ground  would  permit.  It 
was  very  broken,  consisting  of  a  number  of  small,  high  hills 
and  ravines,  skirted  with  timber  and  thick  undergrowth. 
My  recollection  here  is  perfect,  as  I  assisted  in  placing 
several  batteries  of  artillery  in  position,  and  found  it  very 
difficult. 

Longstreet's  right  extended  beyond  your  left  flank,  and  my 
orders  were  to  protect  his  right.  L^pon  making  a  recon- 
noissance  a  large  body  of  Federal  troops  was  discovered  (after- 
wards known  to  have  been  yours) ,  and  I  was  instructed  to 


252 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


watch  their  movements.  This  was  about  12  o'clock  (Friday, 
29th) ,  and  I  am  quite  sure  that  most  of  Longstreet's  forces  were 
in  line  of  battle  by  11  A.M.,  or  very  shortly  afterwards. 
There  was  no  cavalry  in  that  direction  but  mine,  which  was 
held  there  the  remainder  of  the  day  to  guard  the  right  and 
watch  you. 

A  look  at  the  map  will  at  once  show  that  troops  moving 
from  Manassas  to  Gainesville  would  have  struck  our  line  to 
the  right  of  its  centre. 

With  the  foregoing  data  you  can  easily  locate  Longstreet 
and  myself.  He  was  on  Jackson's  right,  extending  in  an 
almost  perpendicular  direction  across  Warrenton  turnpike 
and  the  Manassas  Gap  R.E.  My  brigade  was  on  his  right 
flank. 

Stuart  was  on  the  field,  but  was  constantly  moving  about, 
chiefly  that  day  among  the  artillery.  I  was  with  my  com- 
mand nearly  the  whole  time,  and  neither  saw  nor  heard  any- 
thing of  "dragging  bushes  along  the  road."^  What  was  the 
object?  Our  forces  were  ready  for  action;  and  I  think  such 
an  order  would  have  come  through  me. 
So  much  for  the  29th. 

Very  respectfully,  sir. 

Your  obedient  servant, 

B.  H.  Robertson. 

^In  another  letter  General  Robertson  says,  I  have  no  knowledge  of 
bushes  having  been  dragged  by  cavalry,  to  create  the  impression  of  large 
forces  coming,  or  for  any  purpose.  Had  these  directions  been  given  the 
order  would  naturally  have  been  transmitted  through  me.  I  heard  no 
order  on  that  subject. 

B.  H.  Robertson." 

There  was  no  dragging  of  bushes,  no  such  a  project  thought  of,  — 
although  General  Stuart  so  states  in  his  report  [16  W.R.,  736],  and  Gen- 
eral Pope  harps  upon  it. 

F.  J.  P. 


CASE  OF  FIT Z- JO  EN  PORTER. 


253 


17  Caeondelet  St.,  New  Orleans,  Jan.  12,  1870. 
Dear  Porter  :  —  Your  letter  of  the  6tli  inst.  and  pamphlet 
have  been  received.  You  ask  for  criticisms  from  me,  whether 
favorable  or  the  reverse.  I  think  the  ground  has  been  so 
thoroughly  covered  by  yourself,  McClellan,  and  Franklin,  that 
there  remains  nothing  more  to  be  said.  The  disobedience  of 
the  order  of  the  27th  was  only  partial,  and  that'  literal,  and 
not  from  any  refractory  or  insubordinate  spirit,  but  only  from 
the  conviction  on  your  part  that  the  spirit  of  the  order 
could  be  better  complied  with  by  this  slight  departure  from 
its  literal  readiug.  There  are  but  few  cases  where  officers, 
even  of  the  lowest  grade,  are  not  allowed  some  discretion  in  the 
execution  of  orders.  As  to  the  order  of  the  29th,  to  attack 
Jackson's,  right  and  rear,  Longstreet  being  beyond  the  Bull  Run 
Mountains,  according  to  my  understanding  of  it  you  did  not 
disobey  this  either  in  essence  or  literally.  When  Pope  gave  the 
order  the  situation  was  not  such  as  he  supposed,  and  had  he 
known  the  true  state  of  affairs  the  order  would  not  have  been 
given ;  and  had  you  attempted  to  execute  the  order  you  would 
have  failed,  and  been  truly  worthy  of  all  censure,  and  would 
have  been  ridiculed  and  denounced  for  this  attempt  of  literal 
obedience  of  an  order  that  any  sensible  man  should  have  known 
ought  not  to  have  been  obej'ed,  it,  as  above  stated,  being  given 
under  a  misconception  of  the  true  condition  of  things.  The 
order  late  in  the  afternoon  was  to  go  into  action  at  once  on 
the  enemy's  flank,  and,  if  possible,  his  rear,  the  enemy  being 
Jackson  alone,  according  to  Pope  ;  when,  in  fact,  all  of  Long- 
street's  command  was  on  Jackson's  right,  and  all  of  these  would 
have  been  in  your  way  and  first  to  be  disposed  of  before  you 
could  have  reached  Jackson.  Pope's  letter  of  September  16 
is  truly  characteristic  of  him.  I  never  knew  of  any  general  and 
terrible  conflict  that  raged  on  the  29th ;   he  is  wrong  when 


254 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


referring  to  the  difliculties  of  the  ground  over  which  you  were 
required  to  move  when  he  says  "the  enemy  moved  over  this 
very  ground.'^ 

We  did  not  move  over  it,  but  only  on  a  very  small  part  of  it, 
and  that  near  the  pike,  where  it  was  mostly  open  field.  Frank- 
lin has  the  correct  idea, — it  was  an  after- thought  with  Pope, 
and  after  some  one  had  put  it  in  his  head.  The  sentence  of  the 
Court  is  extraordinary,  and  its  findings  little  less  so.  McDowell 
and  yourself  are  at  issue  about  an  order  he  says  he  gave  you.  It 
seems  to  me  that  Pope's  ignorance  of  our  movements  was  inex- 
cusable, and  gives  proof  conclusive  of  his  unfitness  for  his  posi- 
tion. His  orders  to  you  and  McDowell,  and  his  telegrams  to 
Washington,  all  show  great  ignorance  or  want  of  truth,  in  fact 
both.  Had  Gen.  Lee  been  like  Pope,  I  could  Ixave  been 
tried  by  a  court  for  disobeying  his  orders  tome  late  the  evening 
of  the  29th ;  but  as  I  moved  to  the  front  I  saw  that  matters 
were  not  what  he  believed  them  to  be,  and  did  not  attempt  what 
I  was  ordered  to  do.  I  think  Dick  Anderson  failed  to  obey  an 
order  there  also,  though  I  am  not  certain. 

I  have  written  with  many  interruptions,  and  after  reading 
your  pamphlet,  w^liich  is  rather  long  for  me  to  remember  in  de- 
tail ;  but,  as  I  said  in  the  beginning,  there  was  nothing  left  for 
me  to  say,  so  thoroughly  had  the  case  been  handled  by  your- 
self, Franklin,  and  McClellan.  The  latter's  letter  expresses  my 
own  convictions  in  the  case.  I  believe  in  "  ante-bellum  "  da3's 
it  was  generally  conceded  that  Pope  acknowledged  fealty  to  no 
one  of  the  inculcations  of  the  decalogue,  and  the  war  did  not 
produce  au}^  change.  Had  I  known  you  would  have  published 
my  letter  given  you  in  New  York,  in  1866, 1  would  have  written 
it  with  more  care ;  though  I  beheve  the  points  are  all  clear, 
though  the  eighth  line  from  bottom  of  30th  page  should  have 
read  "  Law's  brigade,  Hood's  division,"  and  that  meant  on  the 


CASE  OF  FIT Z- JOHN  PORTER. 


255 


left  of  the  pike,  all  of  Longstreet  being  on  the  (our)  right  of 
that  road.  Hood  was  not  regarded  as  under  Longstreet's  com- 
mand. Truly, 

CM.  Wilcox. 

Gen.  R.  E.  Lee,  commanding  the  enemy,  Tvrites,  9th 
September,  1870:  "As  far  as  I  can  judge,  the  position 
assigned  to  the  troops  of  the  army  of  Ya.,  on  the 
map  sent  me,  or  a  little  in  advance,  is  that  held  l)y  them 
on  the  29th  Aug.,  1862."^ 

Again,  31st  October,  1867,  he  writes  :  "Longstreet's 
command  arrived  within  supporting  distance  of  Jackson 
on  the  29th  August,  1862,  between  9  and  10  A.M.,  and 
his  line  was  formed  by  noon." 

"It  was  after  12  M.  that  Gen.  Stuart  reported  the 
approach  of  a  column  of  troops  which  threatened  our 
right  and  Gen.  Wilcox  with  his  three  Inigades  was  sent 
to  reinforce  it.  .  .  .1  was  with  the  portion  of  his 
[Longstreet's]  troops  south  of  the  GainesAdlle  turnpike." 

"Gen.  Longstreet's  command  was  formed  by  12  M., 
on  the  29th  August,  in  two  lines  on  Jackson's  right, 
Gen.  Hood's  division  crossing  the  Gainesville  turnpike, 
and  Gen.  D.  R.  Jones's  division  the  Manassas  Gap  R.R.  ; 
artillery  was  massed  between  Jackson's  right  and  Long- 
street's  left,  and  cavalry  under  Gen.  Stuart  guarded  the 
extreme  right  flank." 

"  The  probable  result  of  an  attack  on  Longstreet  after 
12  M.,  with  less  than  12,000  men,  would  have  been  a 
repulse." 

"The  result  of  an  attack  before  12  M.  with  25,000 
men  cannot  be  certainly  pronounced,  but  it  ought  to 

^  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  37,  Part  1,  551. 


256 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


have  been  repulsed  if  made  after  bis  [Longstreet's]  troops 
were  formed.  His  wbole  force  except  Anderson's  divis- 
ion was  up,  and  tbat  arrived  before  next  morning."  ^ 

18tb  February,  1870,  he  says  that  the  result  of  an 
attack  upon  Longstreet  after  12  M.,  August  29,  1862,  with 
about  12,000  men,  would  have  been  a  repulse ;  and  if  a 
repulse,  especially  at  an  early  hour,  or  before  5  P.M.,  the 
effect  would  have  been  an  attack  on  Gen.  Pope's  left  and 
rear  by  Longstreet  and  Stuart,  which,  if  successful,  would 
have  resulted  in  the  relief  of  Jackson,  and  have  probably 
rendered  unnecessary  the  battle  of  the  next  day. 
If  the  attack  had  been  made  after  5  P.M.  on  Longstreet, 
he  would  have  been  able  to  have  resisted  it  with  his  whole 
corps,  which,  if  successful,  would  have  equally  secured 
Jackson's  safety."^ 

And  July,  1870:  ''I  had  no  anxiety  for  Jackson  at 
Second  Manassas.  I  knew  he  could  hold  on  till  we  came, 
and  that  we  should  be  in  position  in  time." 

Porter  could  not  take  Jackson  in  flank,  while  he  was 
attacked  in  front.  He  could  do  nothing  of  the  sort.  I 
was  there  then.  I  saw  Porter  approach,  I  went  out  and 
reconnoitred  his  corps,  and  made  the  proper  dispositions  to 
meet  it.    We  flanked  him.    He  could  not  flank  Jackson." 

' '  I  suppose  we  should  have  cut  Porter  to  pieces  if  he 
had  attacked  to  get  at  Jackson's  flank."  ^ 

Gen.  Longstreet  says:  '*My  command  was  deployed 
in  double  line,  for  attack,  between  10  A.M.  and  12  M.,  on 
the  29th,  extending  from  Jackson's  right  across  turnpike 
and  Manassas  Gap  Railroad."  * 

1  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  37,  Part  1,  551.  ^  ji^. 

^pQj^tgr's  Statement,  Morristown,  1878,  79. 
*  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  37,  Part  1,  552. 


CASE  OF  FIT Z- JOHN  PORTER. 


257 


Col.  Charles  Marshall,  aide-de-camp  to  General  Lee. 
says  :  "  Most  of  Longstreet's  troops  had  reached  or  Trere 
reaching  their  position,  Trhen  Stuart,  Trho  was  on  our 
right,  reported  the  approach  of  a  force  from  the  direction 
of  Manassas."  ...  "  Those  troops,  I  understood  after- 
wards, were  Porter's,  and  I  am  positive  that  they  ap- 
proached the  field  after  Longstreet's  arrival." 

"  The  map  is  just  received,  and,  after  a  careful  exami- 
nation of  it,  I  have  only  to  suggest  one  slight  change  in 
the  position  of  the  Confederate  line  on  the  29th."    .  . 

"  On  the  morning  of  August  29,  when  Longstreet 
came  on  the  field,  Jackson's  whole  command  lay  on  the 
west  side  of  the  turnpike,  his  right  reaching  the  road. 
The  general  direction  of  his  line  was  as  follows :  His  left, 
under  A.  P.  Hill,  was  disposed  along  the  line  of  the  un- 
finished branch  of  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  extend- 
ing towards  Sudley  Springs  Ford.  His  centre  (Ewell's 
diA-ision),  under  Lawton,  followed  the  general  direction 
of  that  railroad :  and  his  right  (Jackson's  own  division), 
under  Starke,  extended  in  the  same  general  direction,  but 
on  the  right,  a  little  in  advance  of  the  railroad  line." 

"  Upon  the  arrival  of  Longstreet,  Jackson's  right  was 
somewhat  advanced,  and  occupied  the  line  on  which  the 
battle  was  fought." 

"This  advance  of  the  right  of  Jackson  threw  still 
more  of  the  railroad  line  in  rear  of  Jackson." 

"  On  the  arrival  of  Longstreet,  Hood's  two  brigades, 
supported  by  one  under  Evans,  was  formed  on  Jackson's 
right.  Hood's  left  lay  some  three  hundred  yards  west  of 
the  turnpike,  and  his  line  extended  across  the  road  ob- 


258 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


lique.  On  liis  left  he  was  supported  by  three  brigades 
under  Wilcox,  and  on  his  right  by  three  more  under 
Kemper.  D.  R.  Jones  extended  from  Hood's  right  to  the 
old  line  of  the  M.  G.  R.R. ;  and  Stuart  with  the  cavalry 
extended  beyond  that  road." 

"  About  11.30  A.M.  or  12  M.  (I  am  not  sure  of  the 
time,  but  it  was  after  Jones  had  nearly  or  quite  gotten 
into  position),  Stuart  reported  Porter's  approach.  .  . 
Inquiry  was  made  at  the  time  whether  the  approaching 
force  came  from  Bristoe  or  from  Manassas  Junction.  .  .  . 
I  think  Anderson  came  up  before  noon.^  I  am  sure  that 
about  the  time  he  arrived,  or  shortly  before,  the  three 
brigades,  under  Wilcox,  were  moving  across  from  Hood's 
left  to  support  D.  R.  Jones,  in  consequence  of  the  report 
made  by  Stuart.    Wilcox  took  some  artillery  with  him." 

"D.  R.  Jones  had,  I  think,  six  brigades,  including 
Wilcox's  three,  and  artillery  also." 

Gen.  B.  H.  Robertson  says:  "Longstreet  was  on  Jack- 
son's right,  extending  in  an  almost  perpendicular  direction 
across  Warrenton  tu.rnpike  and  the  Manassas  Gap  Rail- 
road. My  brigade  was  on  his  right  flank.  Longstreet's 
right  extended  beyond  Porter's  left  flank,  and  my  orders 
were  to  protect  his  right.  Upon  making  a  reconnoissance 
a  large  body  of  Federal  troops  was  discovered,  —  after- 
wards known  to  be  Porter's.  I  was  instructed  to  watch 
their  movements.  This  was  about  12  o'clock  (Friday, 
29th),  and  I  am  quite  sure  that  most  of  Longstreet's 
forces  were  in  line  of  battle  at  11  A.M.,  or  very  shortly 
afterwards.    Although  Stuart  was  present  I  had  imme- 

*  Corrected  in  subsequent  letter  to  "  night." 


CASE  OF  FIT Z- JOHN  PORTER. 


259 


diate  command  of  all  the  Confederate  cavalry  at  Second 
Manassas;  and  there  was  no  cavalry  in  that  direction 
but  mine,  which  was  held  there  the  remainder  of  the  day 
to  guard  the  right  and  watch  Porter." 

On  the  30th  Porter  was  ordered  to  report  with  his  com- 
mand to  Pope,^  which  he  did.  Pope,  laboring  under  the 
idea  that  the  enemy  were  in  full  retreat,  ordered  Porter  to 
pursue  the  retreating  enemy,  and  that  Gen.  McDowell 
would  take  charge  of  the  pursuit.  Porter  knew  such  was 
not  the  case,  from  the  strong  resistance  made  to  his  recon^ 
noissances,  and  endeavored  to  get  Pope  to  the  front  to  con- 
vince him.  It  was  of  no  avail,  and  Porter  attacked  with 
his  own  corps  and  Hatch's  (late  King's)  division  on  his 
right.  After  heavy  and  gallant  fighting  against  Jackson's 
corps  he  was  repulsed,  and  the  repulse  was  followed  by 
an  attack  on  our  left  by  Longstreet.  Porter  (at  Mc- 
DowelFs  earnest  request)  put  in  the  Regulars,  and  with 
the  aid  of  Reynolds  repulsed  this  attack,  when  the  enemy 
were  witliin  a  very  short  distance  of  the  pike,  our  only 
line  of  retreat.  His  losses  this  day  were  2,200  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing,  out  of  a  total  force  of  7,000, 
Griffin  being  absent  through  his  own  mistake. 

Among  the  charges  of  the  court-martial  was  one  that 
Porter,  being  ordered  to  attack  and  take  a  rebel  battery, 
did  proceed  to  the  attack  so  slowly  as  to  give  the  enemy 
full  notice  of  his  plan,  and  did  then  attack  so  feebly  as  to 
make  no  impression  on  their  lines,  etc.,  referring  to  this 
attack  on  the  30th.  This  is  the  charge  the  Judge- Advo- 
cate said  he  would  withdraw ;  but  would  not  mutilate  the 
record  by  striking  it  out,  simply  saying  that  it  was  with- 

1  16  W.R.,  18;  339. 


260 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


drawn.  In  the  official  order  promulgating  tire  proceeding 
and  findings  of  the  court-martial  this  fact  was  not  stated ; 
and  to  a  casual  observer  it  would  appear  as  if  he  were 
tried  on  this  also. 

Porter  endeavored  to  offer  proof  as  to  his  conduct  this 
day,  but  was  not  allowed  to  do  so.  I  quote  from  Jack- 
son's report  to  show  the  nature  of  Porter's  attack  :  < '  After 
some  desultory  skirmishing  and  heavy  cannonading  during 
the  day  the  Federal  infantry,  about  4  o'clock  in  the  even- 
ing, moved  from  under  cover  of  the  wood,  and  advanced 
in  several  lines,  first  engaging  the  right,  but  soon  extend- 
ing its  attack  to  the  centre  and  left.  In  a  few  moments  our 
entire  line  was  engaged  in  a  fierce  and  sanguinary  strug- 
gle with  the  enemy.  As  one  line  was  repulsed  another 
took  its  place  and  pressed  forward  as  if  determined  by 
force  of  numbers  and  fury  of  assault  to  drive  us  from  our 
positions.  So  impetuous  and  well-sustained  were  these 
onsets  as  to  induce  me  to  send  to  the  commanding 
General  for  reenforcements ;  but  the  timely  and  gallant 
advance  of  General  Longstreet  on  the  right  relieved  my 
troops  from  the  pressure  of  overwhelming  numbers,  and 
gave  to  those  brave  men  the  chances  of  a  more  equal 
conflict."^  B.  T.  Johnson's  (commanding  Second  Vir- 
ginia Brigade,  Taliaferro's  Division,  Jackson's  Corps) 
report  says  :  ' '  Before  the  railroad-cut  the  fight  was  most 
obstinate.  I  saw  a  Federal  flag  hold  its  position  for  half 
an  hour,  within  ten  yards  of  a  flag  of  one  of  the  regi- 
ments in  the  cut,  and  go  down  six  or  eight  times,  and 
after  the  fight  a  hundred  dead  were  lying  twenty  yards 

1  16  W.R.,  647. 


CASE  OF  FITZ-JOHX  PORTER. 


261 


from  the  cut,  some  of  them  Tvithm  twenty  feet  of  it. 
The  men  fought  until  their  ammunition  was  exhausted, 
and  then  threw  stones.  Lieut.  Lewis  Randolph,  of  the 
battalion,  killed  one  with  a  stone,  and  I  saw  him  after 
the  fight  with  his  skull  fractured."  ^  General  Lee's 
report  says:  "  About  3  P.M.  the  enemy,  having  massed 
his  troops  in  front  of  General  Jackson,  advanced 
against  his  position  in  strong  force.  His  front  line 
pushed  forward  until  engaged  at  close  quarters  hj  Jack- 
son's troops,  when  its  progress  was  checked  and  a 
fierce  and  bloody  struggle  ensued.  A  second  and  third 
line  of  great  strength  moved  up  to  support  the  first, 
but  in  doing  so  came  within  easy  range  of  a  position 
a  little  in  advance  of  Longstreet's  left."' ^  A.  P.  Hill's 
report  says:  "  On  the  30th,  about  2  o'clock,  the  enemy 
again  made  an  attack  along  our  whole  line.  Tlie 
attack  on  my  part  of  the  line  was  gallantly  resisted 
by  Archer  and  Thomas,  Gregg  still  holding  the  e^rtreme 
left.  This  onset  was  so  fierce  and  in  such  force  that  at 
first  some  headway  was  made,  but  throwing  in  Pender 
and  Brockenbrough,  their  advance  was  again  checked  and 
eventually  repulsed  with  great  loss."  °  The  army  fell  back 
to  Centre ville  that  night,  and  remained  there  during 
the  31st. 

Most  of  the  evidence  which  I  have  read  to  you  to-night 
is  capable  of  proof  from  official  documents,  ever}i:hing,  in 
fact,  except  some  unimportant  facts  of  inter^'iew  at  Ma- 
nassas Junction.  I  have  stated,  as  fairly  as  I  know  how 
to  do,  the  evidence,  and  it  seems  to  me  a  simple  act  of 


1  16  W.E.,  666. 


2  lb.,  557. 


3  lb.,  671. 


262 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CA3IPAIGN. 


justice  that  Porter  sliould  have  his  case  reopened,  so  as 
to  allow  this  new  evidence  to  be  put  in  and  weighed  with 
the  old  evidence  for  what  it  is  worth.  Porter  does  not 
demand  a  new  trial ;  he  does  not  raise  any  new  issue  by 
which  to  clear  himself ;  he  simply  asks  a  reopening  of  his 
case.  He  could  not  produce  the  most  important  part  of 
this  evidence  at  his  trial,  on  account  of  the  war.  The 
remainder  of  it  he  could  not  produce  in  the  hurried 
course  of  a  trial  by  court-martial,  where  it  was  difficult 
to  see  his  witnesses  beforehand,  or  to  know  what  eac^li  one 
would  testify  to  until  the  moment  he  went  on  to  the 
stand. 

If  Porter's  evidence  does  not  sustain  what  he  claims  it 
will  his  condemnation  will  be  all  the  heavier.  If  it  does 
sustain  the  grounds  of  his  defence  at  the  court-martial 
it  is  only  fair  and  right  that  justice  should  be  done  him, 
and  his  sentence  revoked. 


IX. 


THE  CONDUCT  OF  GENERAL  McCLELLAN  DUUINO 
HIS  STAY  AT  ALEXANDRIA  IN  AUGUST,  1862; 
THE  NATURE  AND  EXTENT  OF  HIS  COMMAND, 
AND  HIS  ALLEGED  NEGLECT  TO  SUPPORT  THE 
ARMY  OF  GENERAL  POPE. 

By  Lieut.-Col.  FRANIvLIN  HAVEN,  Jr. 


COMMITTEE. 

Lieut.-Col.  Franklin  Havkn,  Jr.,  U.S.V. 
Bvt.  Capt.  Howard  Stockton,  U.S.A. 


Read  before  the  Society  on  Monday  evening^  Oct.  9,  1876. 


THE  CONDUCT  OF  GEN.  McCLELLAN  AT 
ALEXANDRIA. 


rpHE  subject  submitted  for  our  inquiry  embraces  a 
period  of  four  days,  —  from  the  night  of  August  26, 
1862,  when  Gen.  McClellan  arrived  at  Alexandria,  to  the 
night  of  August  30,  when  the  army  of  Pope  retired  from 
the  field  of  Second  Bull  Run.  The  31st  was  a  day  of 
quiet  and  of  little  moment. 

The  consideration  of  this  subject  may  properly  be  pre- 
ceded by  a  brief  summary  of  the  events  and  circumstances 
therewith  connected,  and  which  occurred  in  the  month  of 
August. 

August  4,  1862,  McClellan  received  orders  to  withdraw 
from  the  Peninsula. 

August  9  was  fought  the  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain. 

August  14  Gen.  Reno,  with  8,000  men  of  the  forces 
which  had  arrived  at  Falmouth  under  Gen.  Burnside, 
joined  Gen.  Pope,  who  then  advanced  towards  the 
Rapidan. 

Information  obtained  through  reconnoissances  and  the 
capture  of  a  signal-station,  and  certain  papers  of  the 
enemy  (among  which  was  an  autograph  letter  of  Gen. 

265 


266 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CA3IPAIGK 


Robert  E.  Lee  to  Gen.  Stuart,  dated  Gordonsville,  August 
15),  showed  Pope,  on  the  18tli,  that  he  had  not  only  the 
corps  of  Ewell,  A.  P.  Hill,  Jackson,  and  Longstreet  in 
his  front,  but  Lee,  in  person,  with  the  majority  of  Lee's 
forces.  ^ 

On  the  night  of  the  18th,  and  during  the  19th,  Pope 
retired  with  his  army  behind  the  Rappahannock,  closely 
pressed  by  the  enemy,  but  without  loss  of  men  or  material. 

August  18,  Halleck,  General-in-Chief,  telegraphed  to 
Pope:  Stand  firm  on  the  line  [of  the  Rappahannock], 
till  I  can  help  you.    Fight  hard,  and  aid  will  soon  come."^ 

On  the  20th,  21st,  and  2 2d  the  enemy  made  repeated 
and  unsuccessful  efforts  to  cross  the  river  at  numerous 
fords.  On  the  night  of  the  2 2d  a  heavy  rain  caused  the 
river  to  rise  six  or  eight  feet,  and  temporarily  destroyed 
all  the  fords. 

On  the  23d  and  24th  the  enemv  maintained  a  strono: 
force  in  Pope's  front,  at  Rappahannock  Station,  but  con- 
tinued at  the  same  time  a  steady  movement  of  troops 
towards  Pope's  right.  The  army  was  beginning  to  suffer 
from  scarcity  of  provisions.  Even  as  early  as  the  20th 
Charles  James  Mills,  of  the  Second  Massachusetts,  wrote  in 
his  diary :  ' '  I  begin  to  appreciate  how  little  an  officer  has 
to  eat  on  the  march.  It  is  rather  ridiculous  !  "  On  the 
23d  :  ' '  We  were  aroused  by  the  pleasant  process  of  having 
our  wood  shelled  by  the  rebels  .  .  .  could  not  raise 
anything  to  eat  but  a  few  unripe  apples."  On  the  24th  he 
wrote  :  ' '  Last  nii^ht  one  of  the  officers  said  he  wished  he 
was  dead,  or  a  prisoner,  or  with  the  wagon  train,  he  did  not 
much  care  which.    .    .    .    ]^ow  that  we  have  feasted  on 

'  16  W.K.,  6,  29.  nh.,  56. 


GEN.  McCLELLAN  AT  ALEXANDRIA. 


267 


mutton,  we  feel  better ;  "  and,  further  on,  he  said  :  "  This 
starving  takes  a  man's  strength  down  awfully."  ^ 

Capt.  Mudge  wrote  to  liis  father,  September  1  :  "  For 
the  last  ten  days  I  have  eaten  what  might  pass  for  eleven 
meals.  For  three  days  our  principal  food  was  green 
apples  and  water,  with  occasionally  a  cracker.  "We  have 
marched  somewhere  every  day,  generally  bringing  up 
where  we  started  from.  ...  I  don't  think  there  has 
been  an  hour  since  I  have  been  here,  when  I  was  awake, 
that  I  haven't  heard  firing;  .  .  .  but  we  are  in  the 
best  of  spirits  under  it  all ;  in  fact,  joking  more  when  we 
expected  to  starve,  than  if  we  were  in  some  comfortable 
place  enjoying  ourselves."  ^ 

There  was  throughout  Pope's  army  a  scarcity  of  food, 
and  there  was  also  all  the  extra  hard  work  (the  constant 
movement,  marches  by  night,  and  sldrmishes  by  day) 
which  a  small  army  must  go  through  to  successfuU}'  hold 
in  check  an  enemy  of  double  its  numbers.  On  the  21st 
Halleck  had  telegraphed  to  Pope  :  "  Gen.  Cox's  forces 
.  .  .  will  be  here  to-morrow  and  the  next  day.  Dis- 
pute every  inch  of  ground,  and  fight  like  the  devil  till  we 
can  reenforce  you.  Forty-eight  hours  more  and  we  can 
make  you  strong  enough.  Don't  yield  an  inch  if  you  can 
help  it ;  "  ^  and  twice  forty-eight  hours  Pope  held  his  ground. 
On  the  night  of  the  2 2d  a  small  cavalry  force  of  the 
enemy  had  crossed  at  Waterloo  bridge,  and  made  a  raid 
on  the  baggage-wagons  in  rear  of  the  army.  On  the  23d 
a  force  also  crossed  at  Sulphur  Springs,  but  was  driven 
back  on  the  following  day,  and  our  troops  then  destroyed 
the  bridges  at  Sulphur  Springs  and  at  Waterloo. 

^  2  Harvard  Mem.  Biog.,  143.        ^  j^,^  154^        3  ^3  ^y.i>.,  57. 


268 


FOrF'S   VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


On  the  evening  of  the  26th — the  evening  that  Gen. 
McClellan  arrived  at  Alexandria  —  the  advance  of  Jack- 
son's force  passed  through  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and  cut 
the  railroad  in  the  neighborhood  of  Kettle  Run,  about 
six  miles  east  of  Warrenton  Station. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  27th  a  severe  engagement 
occurred  between  Ewell's  division  of  Jackson's  force 
and  Hooker,  about  four  miles  west  of  Bristoe  Sta- 
tion, in  which  Ewell  was  driven  back  along  the  rail- 
road. 

J ackson  was  now  in  a  critical  position :  he  had  placed 
himself  with  20,000  men  between  Alexandria  and  War- 
renton, between  McClellan's  forces  at  the  former  place 
and  Pope's  army  at  the  latter.  Longstreet  and  the 
rest  of  Lee's  army  were  still  on  the  other  side  of 
the  river  at  Sulphur  Springs,  Waterloo,  and  above 
towards  Salem. 

About  3  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  28th  the 
enemy  commenced  evacuating  Manassas  Junction,  retiring 
towards  Centre ville.  Pope  in  person,  with  Kearny's 
division  and  Reno's  corps,  reached  Manassas  Junction 
about  12  o'clock  on  the  28th,  less  than  an  hour  after 
Jackson  in  person  had  retired.  In  the  afternoon  of 
the  28th  Kearny  drove  the  rear-guard  out  of  Centre- 
ville,  and  Jackson,  retiring  on  the  Warrenton  turnpike 
towards  Thoroughfare  Gap,  met  and  had  a  severe  fight 
with  King's  division,  near  Groveton. 

On  the  following  days,  29th  and  30th,  was  fought 
the  battle  of  Second  Bull  Run. 

Of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  Gen.  Reynolds,  with 


GEy.  McCLELLAX  AT  ALEXAXDRIA. 


269 


2,500  men,  and  Gen.  Kearny  ^itli  4,500,  had  joined 
Pope  prior  to  the  25th. 

On  the  24th  Haupt  had  telegraphed  to  Pope  from 
Alexandria:  "30,000  troops  or  more  demand  transpor- 
tation. .  .  .  AVe  can  manage  12,000  troops  per  day, 
with  supplies,  if  no  accident  occurs ;  "  ^  and  on  the  fol- 
lowing day,  25th,  Haupt  telegraphed:  "We  expect 
to  clean  out  all  the  troops  now  here,  and  all  that  are 
expected  to-day."^ 

On  the  26th  Gen.  Porter  reported  to  Pope.  His 
corps  had  been  forwarded  with  a  very  small  supply  of 
provisions  and  with  only  forty  rounds  of  ammunition 
to  the  man.  On  the  26th  the  corps  of  Pleintzelman 
had  also  arrived,  but  without  wagons,  without  artillery, 
and, with  only  forty  rounds  of  ammunition.  On  the 
evening  of  the  26th  Gen.  McClellan  arrived  at  Alex- 
andria, and  from  that  moment  no  additional  troops 
reached  Gen.  Pope's  army  until  after  the  battle  of 
Second  Bull  Run. 

Reo^ardino'  the  nature  and  extent  of  Gen.  McClellan's 
command,  and  his  conduct  during  his  stay  at  Alex- 
andria, we  first  look  for  information  to  his  own  report, 
ptiblished  in  1864.  He  therein  states,  after  quoting  a 
part  of  the  despatches  which  passed  between  him  and 
the  Department  at  Washington :  "  It  will  be  seen  from 
what  has  ceded  .  .  .  that,  after  my  arrival  at 
Alexandria,  I  left  nothing  in  my  power  undone  to  for- 
ward supplies  and  reenforcements  to  Gen.  Pope.  I  sent 
with  the  troops  that  moved  all  the  cavalry  I  could  get 
hold  of.    Even  my  personal  escort  was  sent  out  upon 

U6  W.E.,  63.  2  1b. 


270 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


the  line  of  the  railway  as  a  guard,  with  the  provost 
and  camp  guards  at  head-quarters,  retaining  less  than 
one  hundred  men,  many  of  whom  were  orderlies,  inya- 
lids,  members  of  bands,  etc.  All  the  head-quarters  teams 
that  arrived  were  sent  out  with  supplies  and  ammuni- 
tion, none  being  retained,  even  to  move  the  head-quarters 
camp.  The  squadron,  that  habitually  served  as  my  per- 
sonal escort,  was  left  at  Falmouth  with  Gen.  Burnside, 
as  he  was  deficient  in  cavalry."  ^ 

Gen.  McClellan  omits  from  his  report  many  important 
despatches,  written  by  himself  at  Alexandria,  and  some 
of  the  orders  of  the  General-in-Chief  received  by  him. 
These  omitted  orders  and  despatches  can  be  found  in  the 
first  volume  of  the  "  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War," 
printed  the  year  before  his  report  was  published.  ^  And, 
unfortunately,  the  orders  and  despatches  relied  upon  by 
Gen.  McClellan  to  substantiate  his  statement  do  not 
appear  in  any  way  to  confirm  it. 

To  the  inquiry  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War :  "  What  was  the  position  of  Gen.  McClellan  in 
regard  to  the  troops  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  as  they 
landed  at  Acquia  Creek  and  Alexandria?  Were  they 
under  his  command ;  and  if  so  how  long  did  they  remain 
under  his  command  ?  "  Gen.  Halleck  stated  as  follows :  — 

"  Answer.  Gen.  McClellan  retained  the  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  as  it  landed  at  those  two  points,  ex- 
cept such  portions  of  it  as  were  sent  into  the  field  under  Gen. 
Pope.  Those  portions  were  considered  as  temporarily  de- 
tached from  his  command,  but  still  belonging  to  his  army, 
and  he  was  directed  that  all  orders  sent  from  him  to  the 

1  McClellan's  Keport,  342;  O.S.,  527;  omitted  from  12  W.R.,  104. 

2  Printed  in  12  and  18  W.R. 


GEN.  McCLELLAN  AT  ALEXANDRIA. 


2T1 


troops  so  detached,  while  under  Gen.  Pope's  immediate 
command,  must  be  sent  through  the  head-quarters  at  "Wash- 
ington. He  retained  command  of  all  the  troops  of  his  army 
as  they  landed  at  those  places,  until  sent  into  the  field,  and 
reported  to  Gen.  Pope  ;  and  they  continued  to  remain 
under  his  command,  with  the  exception  of  the  detach- 
ments, until  Gen.  Pope's  army  fell  back  on  Washington, 
when  all  came  under  Gen.  McClellan's  command.  On  liis 
arrival  at  Alexandria  he  was  told  to  take  immediate  com- 
mand of  all  the  troops  in  and  about  Washington,  in  addi- 
tion to  those  which  properl}-  belonged  to  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac.  Some  days  after  he  had  been  A'erbally  directed 
to  take  such  command  he  asked  for  a  formal  order,  Avhich 
was  issued  from  the  Adjutant-General's  office.  The  order 
issued  from  the  Adjutant-General's  office  was  after  Gen. 
Pope's  army  commenced  falling  back,  and  was  dated  Sep- 
tember 2 ;  but  Gen.  McClellan  had  been  in  command  ever 
since  liis  arrival  in  Alexandria. 

"  Question.    At  what  time  did  he  arrive  in  Alexandria  ? 

"  Ansiver,  He  arriA^ed  at  Alexandria  on  the  26th  of 
August.  The  formal  order  was  issued  that  he  might  have 
no  difficulty  with  Gen.  Pope's  forces ;  that  they  might  not 
question  his  authority. 

"  Question,  Who  ordered  the  troops  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  as  they  landed,  to  join  the  army  under  Gen. 
Pope  ?  And  were  such  orders  given  directly  to  the  troops, 
or  through  Gen.  McClellan  ? 

Ayisiver.  In  regard  to  the  first  troops  that  landed  at 
Acquia  Creek  the  orders  were  given  through  Gen.  Burn- 
side.    Those  troops  that  came  to  Alexandria  before  Gen. 


272 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


McClellan's  arrival  received  their  orders  direct  from  me  to 
go  out.  After  Gen.  McClellan  arrived  they  received  their 
orders  through  him,  with  the  exception  of  one  or  two 
orders  that  were  issued  while  he  was  in  Washington  city 
or  coming  to  or  returning  from  Washington  to  Alexan- 
dria. 

"  Question,  Who  ordered  Gen.  Franklin's  corps  to  join 
Gen.  Pope's  command?  When  were  such  orders  given, 
and  what  was  the  cause  of  the  delay,  if  there  was  any 
delay,  in  obeying  those  orders? 

"  Answer.  The  general  instructions  to  Gen.  McClellan 
were  to  send  out  the  troops  as  fast  as  they  landed.  On 
the  27th  of  August  I  telegraphed  to  him  that  Franklin's 
corps  should  march  in  the  direction  of  Manassas  as  soon  as 
possible.  I  submit  herewith  the  copies  of  the  telegrams 
which  passed  between  myself  and  Gen.  McClellan  in 
regard  to  the  movements  of  Gen.  Franklin.  It  will  be 
seen  that  Gen.  McClellan  assumed  the  responsibility  of 
stopping  Gen.  Franklin  after  he  had  started."  ^ 

Gen.  McClellan  arrived  at  Acquia  at  daylight,  August  24, 
and  reported  as  follows :  — ^ 

Head-quarters  Army  of  the  Potomac, 

AcQuiA  Creek,  August  24,  1862. 

I  have  reached  here,  and  respectfully  report  for  orders. 

On  the  26th  the  General-in-Chief  directed  him  to  leave 
Burnside  in  charge  at  Acquia  Creek,  and  to  come  to  Alex- 
andria, as  very  great  irregularities  were  reported  there ; 
adding,     Gen.  Franklin's  corps  will  march  as  soon  as  it 

'  C.W,,  452-453.  2 12  W.R.,  93. 


GEN.  McCLELLAN  AT  ALEXANDRIA. 


273 


receives  transportation."^  McClellan  immediately  sailed 
for  Alexandria,  and  the  next  day  reported  as  follows :  — 

Alexandria,  August  27,  1862,  8  A.M. 
I  arrived  here  last  night,  and  have  taken  measures  to  ascer- 
tain the  state  of  affairs  here,  and  that  proper  remedies  may  be 
applied.    Just  received  a  rumor  that  railway  bridge  over  Bull 
Run  was  burned  last  night.  ^ 

August  27  Gen.  Halleck  instructed  Gen.  McClellan  to 
direct  Gen.  Casey  to  furnisli  liim  about  5,000  of  tbe  new 
troops  under  his  command,  and  "  take  entire  direction  of 
the  sending  out  of  the  troops  from  Alexandria.^' ^  On  the 
same  day,  at  9  P.M.,  McClellan  repoii;s :  ''I  find  part 
of  Cox's  command  under  orders  to  take  the  cars.  Will 
halt  it  with  Franklin's  until  morning."*  And  Cox  never 
went !  Two  days  afterwards,  when  Franklin  did  start, 
Gen.  McClellan  still  held  back  Cox,  and  telegraphed  :  I 
propose  moving  Gen.  Cox  to  Upton's  Hill,  to  hold  that 
important  point  with  its  works,  and  to  push  cavalry  scouts 
to  Vienna  via  Freedom  Hill  and  Hunter's  Lane.  Cox  has 
two  squadrons  of  cavalry ^ 

Before  the  Committee  of  the  Conduct  of  the  War  Gen. 
McClellan  testified  as  follows  :  — 

Question,  Did  that  portion  [of  the  Army  of  the 
Peninsula]  which  landed  at  Alexandria  receive  their  in- 
structions to  march  to  the  assistance  of  Gen.  Pope  from 
you,  or  from  Gen.  Halleck? 

Ansiver,  All  received  the  orders  direct  from  Gen. 
Halleck,  except  the  commands  of  Franklin  and  Sumner. 

n2W.R.,  94.  2  lb.  3  lb.,  95. 

n8W.R.,692.  5  12W.R.,  97. 


274  POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 

.  .  .  The  orders  for  Franklin  and  Sumner  were  given 
through  me,  but  by  direction  of  Gen.  Halleck."  ^ 

It  is  curious  to  read  the  repeated  orders  relative  to 
movement  of  Franklin's  corps,  contained  in  the  despatches 
of  the  General-in-Chief.  We  find  ten  successive  orders 
issued  in  four  days :  — 

1.  August  26, 11  A.M.  In  despatch  to  Gen.  McClellan 
at  Acquia :  "  Gen.  Franklin's  corps  will  march  as  soon  as 
it  receives  transportation."  ^ 

2.  August  27,  10  A.M.  In  despatch  to  McClellan  at 
Alexandria  :  Franklin's  corps  should  march  in  that  direc- 
tion [Manassas]  as  soon  as  possible."  ^ 

3.  August  27,  12  M.  "  Porter  reports  a  general  bat- 
tle imminent.  Franklin's  corps  should  move  out  by  forced 
marches."  ^ 

4.  August  28.  Gen.  Halleck  telegraphs  to  Gen. 
Franklin  directly:  "On  parting  with  Gen.  McClellan, 
about  2  o'clock  this  morning,  it  was  understood  that  you 
were  to  move  with  your  corps  to-day  toward  Manassas 
Junction,  to  drive  the  enemy  from  the  railroad.  I  have 
just  learned  that  the  General  has  not  yet  returned  to 
Alexandria.  If  you  have  not  received  his  order  act  on 
this."  5 

5.  August  28,  3.30  P.M.  "  Not  a  moment  must  be 
lost  in  pushing  as  large  a  force  as  possible  toward  Ma- 
nassas, so  as  to  communicate  with  Pope  before  the  enemy 
is  reenforced."  ^ 

The  General-in-Chief,  supposing  that  his  orders  have 
been  obeyed,  directs  McClellan  to  maintain  a  telegraphic 
communication  with  Franklin,  and  receives  reply :  — 

1 1  C.W.,  439.  2 12  W.R.,  94.  ^  j^,^  95. 

^Ib.,  94.  ..  ..    nsW.K.,  707.  ^b.,  709. 


GEX.  McCLELLAX  AT  ALEXANDRIA. 


275 


ALEXANDRIA;  August  28,  4.40. 
G-en.  Franklin  is  with  me  here,  etc.^ 

6.  August  28,  8.40  P.M.  There  must  be  no  further 
dehiy  in  moAung  Franklin's  corps.  They  must  go  to- 
morrow morning,  ready  or  not  ready."  ^ 

August  29,  three  days  after  receipt  of  first  order, 
McClellan,  at  Alexandria,  telegraphs  that  Franklin's  corps 
is  in  motion  :  started  about  6  A.I\L  ;  and  adds,  "  I  should 
not  have  moved  him  but  for  your  pressing  order  of  last 
nidit.'-^!  : 

7.  August  29,  3  P.M.  "  I  want  Franklin's  corps  to 
go  far  enough  to  find  out  something  about  the  enemy. 
Perhaps  he  may  get  such  information  at  Annandale  as 
to  prevent  his  going  farther :  otherwise  he  will  push  on 
toward  Fairfax.  .  .  .  Our  people  must  move  more 
actively,  and  find  out  where  the  enemy  is.  I  am  tired  of 
guesses.*'  ^ 

8.  August  29,  7.50  P.M.  "  I  have  just  been  told  that 
Franklin's  corps  stopped  at  Annandale,  and  that  he  was  this 
evening  in  Alexandria.  This  is  all  contrary  to  my  orders  ; 
investigate  and  report  the  facts  of  this  disobedience."  ^ 

9.  August  30,  9.40  A.M.  ''I  am  by  no  means  satisfied 
with  Gen.  Franklin's  march  of  yesterda3\  Considering  the 
circumstances  of  the  case,  he  was  very  wrong  in  stop- 
ping at  Annandale.  Moreover  I  learned  last  night  that 
the  Quartermaster's  Depaii:ment  could  have  given  him 
plenty  of  transportation,  if  he  had  applied  for  it,  anytime 
since  his  arrival  at  Alexandria."  ^ 

10.  August  30,  2.10  P.M.    ''Franklin's  and  all  of 

1  12  W.R.,  97. 

2  18  W.R.,  710;  cf.  McClellan  to  Halleck.  Aug.  28,  4.45  P.M..  lb..  709. 
3 12  W.E..  97.  98.  ^  18  W-R.,  722.       =  lb.,  723.       e  xb.,  744. 


276 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


Sumner's  corps  should  be  pushed  forward  with  all  possible 
despatch.  They  must  use  their  legs,  and  make  forced 
marches."^ 

At  4  o'clock,  August  30,  Franklin  was  between  one 
and  two  miles  of  the  battle-field  (so  his  Adjutant-General 
told  one  of  your  committee  on  the  following  day) ,  and  he 
turned  about,  and  marched  back  to  Centre ville.  About 
5  o'clock  the  enemy  made  their  last  and  great  rush 
against  Pope's  left,  and  were  repulsed.  At  quarter  of  6 
our  troops  were  still  masters  of  the  field,  but  Pope  gave 
the  order  to  retire,  because  the  army  was  without  pro- 
visions. 

The  movement  of  Sumner's  corps  is  briefly  told  in  his 
own  language.  Gen.  Sumner  says  that,  on  reaching 
Acquia  Creek,  and  before  he  was  able  to  debark  all  of  his 
command,  he  received  orders  to  proceed  directly  to  Alex- 
andria, which  he  did  as  speedily  as  possible.  He  marched 
through  the  town  out  on  the  Little-Eiver  turnpike,  about 
two  miles  beyond  Alexandria,  where  he  remained  twenty- 
four  hours ;  was  then  ordered  to  retrace  his  steps  through 
Alexandria  and  to  march  to  the  Aqueduct  bridge  at 
Georgetown ;  after  he  had  been  there  three  hours  re- 
ceived an  order  to  move  to  Centreville.  He  says :  ''If 
I  had  been  ordered  to  advance  right  on  from  Alexandria 
by  the  Little-River  turnpike  I  should  have  been  in  that 
Second  Bull  Run  battle  with  my  whole  force.  As  it  was, 
I  lost  some  forty-eight  hours  by  remaining  in  camp  for  a 
time  near  Alexandria,  and  then  marching  up  to  the 
Aqueduct  bridge."^ 


'  18  W.R.,  747. 


2 1  C.W.,  366-367. 


GEN.  McCLELLAN  AT  ALEXANDRIA. 


211 


And  tliiis  Cox  Tvas  detained  when  abont  to  take  the 
cars ;  and  Franklin,  after  a  dehav  of  two  days,  was  x^er- 
mitted  to  start  on  the  morning  of  the  29tli,  and  was  then 
halted  at  Annandale,  a  distance  of  only  seven  miles  from 
Alexandria ;  and  Sumner  was  put  into  camp  on  the  turn- 
pike two  miles  from  Alexandria,  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
28th,  and  there  kept  for  twenty-four  hours :  and  in  the 
meantime  Pope,  only  twenty-five  miles  from  Alexandria, 
was  fighting  the  enemy,  and  there  were  three  or  four 
broad,  hard,  excellent  roads  leading  straight  to  his  army, 
and  after  12  o'clock  on  the  28th,  a  staff  officer  could  have 
ridden  alone  and  in  safety  to  Pope's  head-quarters. 

But  may  we  not  say  that  Gen.  McClellan,  after  his  ar- 
rival in  Alexandria,  was  charged  with  the  duty  of  defend- 
ing T\^ashington,  as  well  as  of  re  enforcing  and  supplying 
Pope's  army ;  that  on  the  evening  of  the  2Tth  he  knew  of 
Jackson's  advance  through  Thoroughfare  Gap  :  that  on  the 
28th  communication  was  interrupted  between  Pope's  army 
and  Alexandria,  and  that  it  had  then  become  evident  that 
a  large  body  of  the  Confederate  forces  was  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  Manassas  (extravagant  reports  were  brought  in 
by  stragglers,  and  rumors  of  the  advance  of  Lee's  whole 
army,  120,000  strong,  on  AVashington  were  current)  ; 
that,  under  these  circmnstances.  Gen.  McClellan  might 
well  feel  the  paramount  necessity  of  providing  for  the 
protection  of  the  capital,  and  of  organizing  a  line  of 
defences  which  might  cover  the  retreat  —  perhaps  the 
flight  —  of  a  broken  and  demoralized  army ;  that,  sup- 
posing Lee  had  defeated  Pope  and  was  tln-eatening 
Washington,  it  was  prudent  to  keep  back  Franklin  from 


278 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


an  advance  wliicli  miglit  liave  resulted  in  his  capture  or 
destruction  ? 

Unfortunately  McClellan's  was  a  twofold  duty,  and 
any  promptness  and  zeal  in  providing  for  the  defence  of 
Washington  cannot  excuse  his  neglect  of  the  army  in 
the  field. 

McClellan  had  no  right  to  base  his  action  on  vague 
rumors  and  untrustworthy  reports.  He  should  have 
known,  or  at  least  attempted  to  know,  something  of  the 
actual  state  of  affairs.  Besides,  it^was  only  during  a  ]Dart 
of  the  28th  that  the  excuse  of  uncertainty  can  avail  him. 
Early  on  the  29th  Haupt  had  reported  that  Pope  was  at 
Centre ville  and  in  good  spirits,  and  Hooker  driving  the 
enemy ;  ^  while  Halleck,  even  on  the  evening  of  the  28th, 
having  heard  directly  from  Pope,^  reiterated  his  orders  to 
move  Franklin's  corps  to  Manassas. 

On  the  27th  Haupt  had  sent  out  towards  Bull  Eun 
a  number  of  railway  employes  and  telegraph  operators 
(who  had  volunteered  for  the  service),  ''with  instruc- 
tions to  conceal  themselves  in  the  bushes,  send  out 
scouts,  make  connection  with  the  wire,  and  report  all 
that  they  saw  or  heard."  Haupt  says,  "Nearly  all 
the  information  given  to  the  department  at  "Washington 
for  the  remaining  days  of  the  fight  was  received  through 
this  channel."^  McClellan's  desjiiatches  show  that  he 
took  no  positive  measures  to  ascertain  the  condition 
of  afiairs  in  the  direction  of  Pope's  army.  On  the  27th 
he  had  telegraphed  to  Halleck :  "If  you  will  give  me 
even  one  squadron  of  good  cavalry  here,  I  will  ascertain 


» 18  W.E.,  736.  2  ib,^  720.  ^  i  Q,y^,^  330. 


GEN.  M^CLELLAN  AT  ALEXANDRIA. 


279 


the  state  of  the  case."  ^  And  after  he  had  received 
several  squadrons,  if  he  sends  them  out  at  all,  it  is  in  any 
direction  except  in  the  direction  of  Pope's  army  and  of 
the  enemy. 

At  12  o'clock,  August  29,  he  says:  *'Have  ordered 
most  of  the  Twelfth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry  to  report  to 
Gen.  Barnard  for  scouting  duty  toward  Eockville, 
Poolesville,  etc."  (places  in  Maryland  about  sixteen  and 
twenty  miles  N.N. W.  of  Washington) .  Besides  the  two 
squadrons  of  cavalry  halted  with  Franklin  at  Annan  dale, 
besides  Cox's  two  squadrons  which  he  sends  to  scout 
towards  Vienna  and  up  along  the  Potomac  towards 
Dranesville,  and  besides  the  Twelfth  Pennsylvania,  which 
he  sends  across  the  river  to  the  other  side  of  Washing- 
ton, he  had  at  Alexandria  on  the  morning  of  the  29th 
three  squadrons  of  cavalry  (so  we  understand  his  de- 
spatch dated  29th)  And  yet  on  the  29th,  at  quarter 
before  3  in  the  afternoon,  more  than  twenty-four 
hours  after  Pope  had  driven  Jackson  from  Manassas 
Junction,  and  nearly  twenty  hours  after  Kearny  had 
driven  Jackson's  rear-guard  out  of  Centre ville,  and  when 
there  had  not  been  a  single  enemy  all  that  day  between 
Pope's  head-quarters  and  Alexandria,  McClellan  responded 
to  President  Lincoln's  inquiry,  "  What  news  from  direc- 
tion of  Manassas  Junction  —  what  generally  ?  "  ^ :  ' '  The  last 
news  I  received  from  the  direction  of  Manassas  was  from 
stragglers,  to  the  effect  that  the  enemy  were  evacuating 
Centreville  and  retiring  toward  Thoroughfare  Gap.  This 
is  by  no  means  reliable.  I  am  clear  that  one  of  two 
courses  should  be  adopted,  —  first,  to  concentrate  all 

U2  W.R.,  96.  2  xb.,  99.  3xb.,  98. 


280 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


our  available  forces  to  open  comrQunication  with  Pope ; 
second,  to  leave  Pope  to  get  out  of  his  scrape,"  etc.^ 

Even  after  the  most  peremptory  orders  of  Halleck 
(repeated  during  three  days)  to  push  his  troops  to  the 
scene  of  action,  and  learn  something  of  the  enemy,  he 
could  only  at  10  o'clock  P.M.,  August  29,  communicate  a 
despatch  from  Franklin  containing  information  picked  up 
from  sources passiiig  along  the  road  at  Annandale.  Frank- 
lin said,  From  all  the  evidence  the  inference  is  that  we 
met  with  no  disaster  and  that  Stonewall  is  in  a  tight 
place.  .  .  .  All  of  the  best  witnesses  and  all  of  the 
citizens  who  have  passed  consider  Jackson  in  a  dangerous 
position.    Pope's  train  is  parked  this  side  of  Centreville. 

.  Pope  is  said  to  be  very  short  of  provisions,  and 
the  country  will  not  support  him."  ^ 

The  employment  of  his  staff  appears  in  McClellan's 
despatch,  dated  August  29,  1862  :  *'  I  am  having  inspec- 
tions made  of  all  the  forts  around  the  city  by  members 
of  my  staff,  with  instructions  to  give  all  requisite  orders. 
I  inspected  Worth  and  Ward  myself  this  evening ;  found 
them  in  good  order."  ^  This  employment  was  very  well ; 
but  could  he  not  have  used  one  intelligent  officer  of  his 
staff  to  ascertain  the  truth  of  some  of  the  rumors  which 
he  reported? 

Prior  to  his  departure  from  the  Peninsula  Gen.  Halleck 
had  instructed  McClellan,  under  date  of  August  21 :  By 
all  means  see  that  the  troops  sent  have  plenty  of  ammuni- 
tion.   We  have  no  time  here  to  supply  them.  Moreover 

112W.R.,  98.  nSW.R.,  724.  3i2W.R.,  100. 


GEN.  M^CLELLAN  AT  ALEXANDRIA. 


281 


they  may  have  to  fight  as  soon  as  they  land."  ^  To  which 
McClellan  replied  :  If  you  wish  it,  I  can  probably  ship 
quite  an  amount  of  ammunition  for  other  troops  than  this 
army."^  And  three  hours  later,  same  day,  August  21,  he 
telegraphed  from  Fort  Munroe  :  '  ^  I  have  ample  supplies 
of  ammunition  for  infantry  and  artillery.,  and  will  have  it 
up  in  time.  I  can  supply  any  deficiency  that  may  exist 
in  Gen,  Pope's  army,  ,  .  .  The  forage  is  the  only 
question  for  you  to  attend  to."  ^ 

August  30,  at  1.45,  Gen.  Halleck  telegraphed  :  Ammu- 
nition, and  particularly  for  artillery,  must  be  immediately 
sent  forward  to  Centre ville  for  Gen.  Pope.  It  must  be 
done  with  all  possible  despatch."*  To  which  command, 
made  while  the  battle  of  Second  Bull  Eun  was  being 
fought.  Gen.  McClellan  replied  :  ''I  know  nothing  of  the 
calibre  of  Pope's  artillery,  etc."  ^ 

On  the  28th  Pope  says  he  telegraphed  to  the  General- 
in-Chief  the  condition  of  his  army,  and  asked  that  rations 
and  forafi^e  should  be  sent  from  Alexandria  with  all  de- 
spatch.^  Early  on  the  30th  Pope  received  the  following- 
note  :  — 

August  29,  8  P.M. 

To  Commanding  Officer  at  Centreville :  — 

I  have  been  instructed  by  Gen.  McClellan  to  inform  you 
that  he  will  have  all  the  available  wagons  at  Alexandria  loaded 
with  rations  for  your  troops,  and  all  the  cars  also,  as  soon  as 
you  will  send  in  a  cavalry  escort  to  Alexandria  as  a  guard  to 
the  train. 

W.  B.  Franklin, 
Major-Gen.  com'd'g  jSixth  Corps, 

112W.R.,  92.  2  lb.  3  lb.  ^b.,  101.  ^i^. 

6  16  W.R.,  41 ;  cf.  18  W,R.,  721.  '  lb.,  17. 


282 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


In  his  despatch  to  Gen.  Halleck  that  morning,  at  5 
A.M.,  Pope  said :  "  Such  a  request,  when  Alexandria  is 
full  of  troops  and  we  fighting  the  enemy,  needs  no 
comment."^ 

August  30  McClellan  finds  he  must  render  some  excuse 
for  his  conduct  regarding  movement  of  troops,  and  he 
writes  to  the  Greneral-in-Chief :  Ever  since  Gen.  Franklin 
received  notice  that  he  was  to  march  from  Alexandria  he 
has  been  endeavoring  to  get  transportation  .  .  .  but 
he  has  uniformly  been  told  that  there  was  none  disposable, 
and  his  command  marched  without  wagons.  After  the 
departure  of  his  corps,  he  procured  twenty  wagons  to  carry 
some  extra  ammunition  by  unloading  Banks's  supply  train. 

.  The  great  difficulty  seems  to  consist  in  the  fact 
that  the  greater  part  of  the  transportation  on  hand  at 
Alexandria  and  Washington  has  been  needed  for  current 
supplies  of  the  garrisons."  ^  So  it  appears  that  Banks's 
wagons  were  coming  into  Alexandria  from  Manassas  for 
supplies  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  and  yet  Franklin's 
corps,  so  McClellan  wrote,  could  not  with  safety  pass  over 
the  same  road  beyond  Annandale.  And  it  also  appears 
that  the  scarcity  of  transportation  was  owing  to  the  fact 
that  the  greater  part  of  it  at  Alexandria  and  Washington 
was  needed  for  the  current  supplies  of  the  garrisons,  and 
that  the  garrisons  must  not  be  subjected  to  any  incon- 
venience for  the  sake  of  sending  reenforcements  to  the 
field,  or  of  feeding  hungry  soldiers  engaged  in  fighting  the 
enemy. 

From  the  despatches  contained  in  McClellan's  Report, 


1 18  W.R.,  741. 


=^  12  W.R.,  100. 


GEN.  McCLELLAN  AT  ALEXANDRIA. 


283 


and  in  the  Congressional  Eeport  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War,  and  from  the  testimony  of  Gens.  McClellan,  Halleck, 
and  Sumner,  and  Col.  Haupt,  your  committee  find  the 
following  facts :  — 

That  Gen.  McClellan  was  ordered  from  Acquia  to  Alex- 
andria to  check  irregularities  at  the  latter  place,  and  to 
push  forward  troops  and  supplies  to  Pope's  army ; 

That  he  had  command  over  all  troops  in  front  of  Wash- 
ington until  they  had  reported  to  Gen.  Pope ; 

That  after  his  arrival  at  Alexandria  no  troops  reached 
Pope's  army  till  after  the  battle  of  Second  Bull  Run ; 

That  Gen.  McClellan  could  and  should  have  forwarded 
80,000  troops;  that  18,000  should  have  reached  Pope's 
army  by  the  28th,  and  the  remainder  on  the  morning  of 
the  29th ; 

That  Gen.  McClellan  disobeyed  the  orders  of  the  Gen- 
eral-in-Chief. 

That  his  despatches  evince  apathy  regarding  the  fate 
of  Pope's  army,  and  especially  the  despatch  containing 
the  suggestion  ''to  leave  Pope  to  get  out  of  his 
scrape  ".^ 

That  his  reply,  that  he  "  knew  nothing  of  the  calibre 
of  Pope's  artillery,"^  after  he  had  assured  the  General-in- 
Chief  from  the  Peninsula  that  he  could  furnish  ammuni- 
tion for  the  whole  of  Pope's  army,  and  at  a  moment  when 
he  could  obtain,  by  telegraph,  i-nformation  from  the  ord- 
nance bureau  at  Washington  (where  a  record  of  every 
gun  is  kept),  and  his  statement  to  Pope  through  Frank- 
lin that  he  would  load  wagons  with  rations,  etc.,  if  Pope 
would  send  in  cavalry  to  escort  them,  show  that  he 
»  12  W.R.,  98.  2  lb,,  101. 


284 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


evinced  neither  judgment  nor  zeal  regarding  the  forward- 
ing of  provisions  and  ammunition  to  Pope's  army. 

That  very  little  information  was  received  by  the  Depart- 
ment at  Washington  in  consequence  of  any  action  of  Gen. 
McClellan,  notwithstanding  that  he  had  more  than  30,000 
men  and  several  squadrons  of  cavalry  with  which  to 
obtain  information,  and  was  repeatedly  directed  to  do  so  ; 

That  he  reported,  without  attempting  to  ascertain  their 
truth,  rumors,  which,  if  the  Department  had  not  been 
otherwise  and  better  informed,  would  have  tended  to 
create  a  panic  in  the  capital. 

That  his  plea  of  want  of  transportation,  as  an  excuse 
for  not  sending  Franklin  forward,  was  unjustifiable  ;  as 
shown  by  Halle ck's  statement  that  the  quartermaster's 
department  asserted  there  was  abundance  of  transporta- 
tion in  Alexandria,  and  his  own  acknowledgment  that  he 
believed  the  difficulty  to  be  that  the  trains  were  needed 
for  supplies  of  the  garrisons.  " 

That  the  conduct  of  McClellan  was  an  immediate  cause 
of  the  escape  of  Jackson,  when  the  latter  was  cut  off 
from  the  rest  of  Lee's  army,  and  a  chief  cause  of  the 
failure  of  our  army  on  the  29th  and  30th. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  the  conduct  of  McClellan 
was  the  result  of  some  constitutional  peculiarity  of  tem- 
perament, slowness  of  perception,  timidity  of  action, 
sluggishness  of  judgment,  or  incapacity  to  come  to  a 
decision !  Certainly  moderate  intelligence,  united  with 
ordinary  patriotism,  in  the  commanding  officer  at  Alex- 
andria, a  simple  obedience  to  the  orders  of  the  General-in- 
Chief,  would  then  have  saved  the  country  from  immense 


GEN.  M^CLELLAN  AT  ALEXANDRIA. 


285 


losses.  McClellan  showed  no  want  of  action,  no  hesitancy 
to  assume  responsibility,  even  to  moving  without  orders, 
when  such  movement  was  in  accordance  with  his  personal 
preferment. 

McClellan  stated  to  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War  that,  before  he  started  on  the  Antietam  campaign, 
it  had  not  been  decided  whether  he  was  to  go.  He  says, 
"  I  asked  the  question  two  or  three  times  of  Gren.  Hal- 
leck,  whether  I  was  to  command  the  troops  in  the  field, 
and  he  said  it  had  not  been  determined ;  and  /  do  not 
think  it  ever  teas.  I  think  that  icas  one  of  those  things 
that  grew  into  shai^e  itself.     When  the  time  came  I  went 

outr^ 

Did  not  his  conduct  at  Alexandria  indicate  his  purpose 
to  be  that  things  should  so  shape  themselves  that  he 
should  again  be  General  in  command? 

1  1  C.W.,  438-439. 


X. 

THE  CONDUCT  OF  GENERAL  McCLELLAN  DURING 
HIS  STAY  AT  ALEXANDRIA  IN  AUGUST,  1862; 
THE  NATURE  AND  EXTENT  OF  HIS  COMMAND, 
AND  HIS  ALLEGED  NEGLECT  TO  SUPPORT  THE 
ARMY  OF  GENERAL  POPE. 

By  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.  STEPHEN  M.  WELD,  U.S.V. 


C0M3IITTEE. 
Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.  Stephen  M.  Weld,  U.S.V. 
Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.  Charles  A.  Whittier,  U.S.V. 


Read  before  the  Society  on  Monday  evening ^  Oct.  9,  1876. 


THE   CONDUCT   OF   GEN.  McCLELLAN  AT 
ALEXANDRIA. 


EN.  McCLELLAN  was  in  command  at  Alexandria 
from  the  evening  of  August  26, 1862,  to  September  1, 
— a  period  of  five  days.  In  considering  the  question  of  the 
nature  and  extent  of  his  command  while  there,  and  the 
aid  he  furnished  Gen.  Pope,  it  is  necessary  to  go  back 
somewhat,  and  see  what  had  been  done  for  a  few  days 
previous  to  the  26th  of  August.  Porter  and  Heintzelman 
had  been  moved  forward  to  Gen.  Pope  with  vigor  and 
promptitude.  Keyes  had  been  left  at  Yorktown,  appar- 
ently with  the  approval  of  Gen.  Halleck.  Sumner  and 
Franklin  alone  remain  to  be  accounted  for.  Franklin 
had  been  embarked  from  Fortress  Monroe  on  the  23d, 
and  Sumner  reached  Acquia  Creek  on  the  26th.  McClellan 
left  Fortress  Monroe  on  the  23d  of  August,  immediately 
after  the  departure  of  Franklin's  corps.  He  reached 
Acquia  Creek  on  the  morning  of  24th  of  August,  and  im- 
mediately reported  to  Gen.  Halleck  for  orders,  and  to 
ascertain  his  position  and  duties,  and  also  the  whereabouts 
of  Gen.  Pope.^  Halleck  answers  (the  same  date)  that 
McClellan  asks  for  information  that  he  (Halleck)  cannot 

'  12  W.R.,  93,  94. 

289 


290 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


give,  and  which  he  is  most  anxious  to  have  himself.  ^  On 
the  26th  Halleck  telegraphs  McClellan  that  he  had  better 
come  to  Alexandria,  as  "  great  irregularities  are  reported  " 
to  exist  "  there."  2 

He  adds:  "Franklin's  corps  will  move  as  soon  as  it 
receives  transportation."  McClellan  immediately  sailed 
for  Alexandria,  reaching  there  the  evening  of  the  same 
day,  and  reported  to  Halleck  by  telegraph  early  in  the 
morning  of  the  27th.  ^  He  reports  Sumner  as  disembark- 
ing at  Acquia  Creek  on  the  evening  of  the  26th.  * 

On  the  morning  of  the  27th  he  received  a  despatch, 
which  he  had  asked  for  three  days  before,  defining  his 
duties  and  position,  as  far  as  they  were  defined  at  all, 
as  follows :  Take  entire  direction  of  the  sending  out  of 
the  troops  from  Alexandria.  Determine  questions  of 
priority  in  transportation,  and  the  places  they  shall  oc- 
cupy." ^  From  this  time  until  the  30th  of  August  Gen. 
McClellan  seems  to  have  had  command  of  but  few  troops 
except  Sumner  and  Franklin,  although  his  advice  and  co- 
operation were  constantly  sought  by  Halleck  and  others. 
As  to  his  power  to  give  orders  to  Generals  Casey  or 
Barnard,  or  other  Generals,  except  those  going  forward 
to  Pope,  he  seems  to  have  had  none. 

On  the  30th  a  War  Department  order  was  issued,  de- 
fining his  command  as  "  that  portion  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  that  has  not  been  sent  forward  to  Gen.  Pope's 
command."^  This  embraced  a  few  men  at  Yorktown  and 
Fortress  Monroe,  about  100  men  at  head-quarters,  and  his 
stafi\ 

On  the  31st  of  August,  at  10  P.M.,  Gen.  Halleck  ordered 

H2W.R.,  94.       2  3  '^Ib.       5  lb.,  95.       ^b.,  103. 


GEN.  McCLELLAN  AT  ALEXANDRIA. 


291 


him  to  take  command  of  the  troops  in  the  vicinity  of 
Washington  not  acting  under  Gen.  Pope ;  ^  which  order 
was  further  increased,  or  rather  defined,  on  the  morning 
of  September  1,  by  an  order  (verbal)  from  Halleck  to 
take  charge  of  the  defences  of  Washington,  embracing, 
of  course,  the  works  and  their  garrisons.  ^ 

As  to  the  extent  of  aid  furnished  Pope  it  seems  that 
there  can  be  no  question  raised,  except  as  to  Franklin's 
corps.  Generals  Halleck  and  McClellan  seem  to  have 
been  in  perfect  accord  as  far  as  the  movements  of  Sum- 
ner's corps  were  concerned.  The  whole  question  as  to 
whether  he  furnished  proper  aid  and  support  to  Pope  seems, 
therefore,  to  hinge  on  Franklin's  corps.  Let  us  examine  the 
record  here.  Franklin's  corps  disembarked  at  Alexandria 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  26th.  Halleck,  in  his  despatch  of 
26th,  ordering  McClellan  to  Alexandria,  says  that  "  Frank- 
lin's corps  will  march  as  soon  as  it  receives  transporta- 
tion." ^  Ought  not  Gen.  Halleck  to  have  seen  that  trans- 
portation was  ready  for  Franklin,  if  there  was  such  press- 
ing need  for  his  presence  with  Pope  ?  McClellan  was  at 
this  time  at  Acquia  Creek,  and  Franklin  at  Alexandria. 

On  the  27th  Halleck  telegraphs  McClellan,  10  A.M., 
that  "there  seems  to  have  been  great  neglect  and  care- 
lessness at  Manassas.  Frankhn's  corps  should  march  in 
that  direction  as  soon  as  possible."  ^  Later,  12  M.,  on  the 
same  day  :  "  Franklin's  corps  should  move  out  by  forced 
marches,  carrying  three  or  four  days'  provisions,  and  be 
supplied  as  far  as  possible  by  railroad."  ^  McClellan,  un- 
doubtedly supposing  that  transportation  had  been  looked 
out  for  by  Halleck,  at  once  sends  an  aide  to  order  Franklin 

112W.R.,  103.  nsW.R.,  807.  n2W.R.,  94. 

4  lb.,  95.  nb.,  94. 


292 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


out  in  obedience  to  these  orders.  The  aide  finds  Franklin, 
Smith,  and  Slocum  at  Washington,  and  leaves  the  order 
with  the  officer  next  in  command. 

It  is  important  now  to  bear  in  mind  the  state  of  affairs 
at  and  around  Manassas.  This  place,  with  all  its  immense 
stores,  had  been  captured  by  J ackson,  early  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  27th.  Gen.  Taylor's  brigade,  sent  out  to  Bull 
Run  bridge  by  train  on  the  morning  of  the  27th,  had 
been  defeated  and  almost  annihilated  by  Jackson.  The 
extent  of  the  enemy's  force  there  no  one  at  Washington 
could  ascertain,  as  "  Stuart's  cavalry,"  according  to  the 
Comte  de  Paris,  screened  all  Jackson's  movements  as 
with  an  impenetrable  veil,  and  had  even  appeared  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Fairfax  Court-House."^  McClellan  had 
no  cavalry  to  act  as  scouts,  or  to  bring  him  any  infor- 
mation of  the  movements  of  the  enemy.  Franklin  re- 
ported that  he  had  only  horses  for  four  guns,  without 
caissons,  and  no  means  of  transporting  ammunition.^ 
These  facts  seem  to  justify  McClellan  in  detaining  Frank- 
lin as  he  did  during  the  afternoon  of  the  27th,  and  during 
the  28th  of  August.  With  a  strong  force  in  his  front, 
of  cavalry,  artillery,  and  infantry,  no  one  knowing 
whether  it  was  the  whole  of  Lee's  army  or  not,  would 
it  not  have  been  folly  or  madness  to  send  Franklin 
out  with  no  cavalry,  almost  no  artillery,  and  but  forty 
rounds  of  ammunition  per  man,  with  no  wagons  for 
conveying  reserve  ammunition?  When  Heintzelman 
went  to  join  Pope  it  was  well  enough  to  let  him 
go  forward  unprovided  with  artillery  and  transportation. 
He  was  marching  through  a  country  free  from  the 
V2  Comte  de  Paris,  278.  =  ^2  W.R.,  96. 


GEy.  McCLELLAX  AT  ALEXAXDRIA. 


293 


eiieniv.  vritli  uninterruptecl  railvray  commuiiication  with. 
Ms  base  of  supplies. 

On  the  28th  Halleck  sent  tliree  orders  to  move :  one  to 
Franklin  direct  ^  and  two  to  McClellan,- the  last  one  being 
a  peremptory  order  for  him  to  go  on  the  morning  of  the 
29th.  wlietlier  he  was  ready  or  not.  This  order  was  obeyed 
at  once,  as  it  admitted  of  no  discretion.  It  seems  to  us 
that  the  other  orders  were,  to  a  great  extent,  discretionary 
with  McClellan.  He  felt  that  Halleck  was  misinformed 
as  to  the  state  of  the  transportation  facilities  (which  his 
letter  of  Angust  30  shows  to  be  so)  ;  ^  that  he,  McClellan, 
being  on  the  spot,  and  personally  cognizant  of  all  the  facts 
in  the  case,  had  a  certain  discretion  allowed  to  him  in  the 
case.  Most  certainly  Halleck's  action  in  the  whole  matter 
shows  that  lie  felt  so  himself.  With  his  large  staff  at 
Washington  why  did  he  not  personally  attend  to  Frank- 
lin's starting?  He  must  have  known  that  his  orders 
were  not  carried  out.  and  it  was  liis  duty  to  have  them 
obeyed  at  once  if  they  were  not  discretionary,  even 
if  he  had  to  arrest  McClellan  and  Franklin  for  disobe- 
dience. It  was  an  easy  thing  to  send  an  aide  to 
Alexancbia,  and  ascertain  the  truth  or  falsity  of 
McClellan's  statements  as  to  transportation.  Perhaps 
it  was  easier  to  sit  in  kis  office  and  telegrapk  impos- 
sibilities or  absurdities. 

Gen.  Franklin  started  at  6  A.M.,  on  the  29th.  and  pro- 
ceeded as  far  as  Annandale,  some  nine  miles,  where  he 
was  halted  by  McClellan.  His  reasons  for  so  doing  are 
given  in  a  despatch  to  Halleck.  dated  August  29, 
8  P.M..  which  I  will  now  read  in  full :  — 

^  18  W.E.,  707.  2  lb.,  709,  710.  ^  12  W.E.,  100-101. 


294 


POPE'S   VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


"  On  the  same  day  I  received  a  despatch  from  the  General- 
in-Chief,  in  which  he  asked  me  why  I  halted  Franklin  in  Annan- 
dale,  to  which  I  replied  as  follows  :  — 

Camp  near  Alexandria,  Aug.  29,  1862,  8  P.M. 
By  referring  to  my  telegrams  of  10.30  A.M.,  12  M.,  and  1 
P.M.,  together  with  your  reply  of  2.48  P.M.,  jo\x  will  see  why 
Franklin's  corps  halted  at  Annandale.  His  small  cavalry  force, 
all  I  had  to  give  him,  was  ordered  to  push  on  as  far  as  possible 
towards  Manassas.  It  was  not  safe  for  Franklin  to  move 
beyond  Annandale,  under  the  circumstances,  until  we  knew 
what  was  at  Vienna.  Gen.  Franklin  remained  here  until  about 
1  P.M.,  endeavoring  to  arrange  for  supplies  for  his  command. 
I  am  responsible  for  both  these  circumstances,  and  do  not  see 
that  either  was  in  disobedience  to  your  orders.  Please  give 
distinct  orders  in  reference  to  Franklin's  movements  to-morrow. 
I  have  sent  to  Col.  Haupt  to  push  out  construction  and  supply 
trains  as  soon  as  possible ;  Gen.  Tyler  to  furnish  the  necessary 
guards.  I  have  directed  Gen.  Banks'  supply  trains  to  start 
out  to-night  at  least  as  far  as  Annandale,  with  an  escort  from. 
Gen.  Tyler.  In  regard  to  to-morrow's  movements  I  desire 
definite  instructions,  as  it  is  not  agreeable  to  me  to  be  accused 
of  disobeying  orders  when  I  have  simply  exercised  the  discre- 
tion you  committed  to  me. 

Geo.  B.  McClellan, 

Major-  General} 

It  would  certainly  seem  from  this  that  he  had  au- 
thority and  power  to  do  as  he  did,  and,  moreoyer,  that 
he  was  wise  in  so  doing.  Franklin  was  ordered  forward 
to  Manassas  on  the  evening  of  the  28th,  and  started  on 
the  29th,  at  6  A.M.  In  answer  to  a  despatch  of  the 
30th,  from  Halleck,  which  denies  that  there  was  any 

»  12  W.R.,  99-100. 


GEN.  McCLELLAN  AT  ALEXANDRIA. 


295 


want  of  transportation  at  Alexandria,  Gen.  McClellan 
sent  the  following  :  — 

Camp  neae  Alexandria,  Aug.  30,  1862,  11.30  A.M. 
Maj.  Gen.  H.  W.  Halleck,  General-in-Chief:  — 

Your  telegram  of  9  A.M.  received.  Ever  since  Gen.  Frank- 
lin received  notice  that  he  was  to  march  from  Alexandria 
he  has  been  endeavoring  to  get  transportation  from  the 
quartermaster  at  Alexandria,  but  he  has  uniformly  been  told 
that  there  was  none  disposable,  and  his  command  marched 
without  wagons.  After  the  departure  of  his  corps,  he  pro- 
cured twenty  wagons  to  carry  some  extra  ammunition  by 
unloading  Banks'  supply  train.  Gen.  Sumner  endeavored,  by 
application  upon  the  quartermaster's  department,  to  get 
wagons  to  carry  his  reserve  ammunition,  but  without  success, 
and  was  obliged  to  march  with  what  he  could  carr}^  in  his  car- 
tridge boxes.  I  have  this  morning  directed  that  all  my  head- 
quarters wagons  that  are  landed  be  at  once  loaded  with  ammu- 
nition for  Sumner  and  Franklin,  but  they  will  not  go  far 
towards  supplying  the  deficiency.  Eighty-five  wagons  were 
got  together  by  the  quartermasters  last  night,  loaded  with 
subsistence,  and  sent  forward  at  1  A.M.  with  an  escort  via 
Annandale.  Every  effort  has  been  made  to  carry  out  your 
orders  promptly.  The  great  difficulty  seems  to  consist  in  the 
fact  that  the  greater  part  of  the  transportation  on  hand  at 
Alexandria  and  Washington  has  been  needed  for  current 
supplies  of  the  garrisons.  Such  is  the  state  of  the  case  as 
represented  to  me  by  the  quartermasters,  and  it  appears  to  be 
true.  I  take  it  for  granted  that  this  has  not  been  properly 
explained  to  you. 

Geo.  B.  McClellan, 

Maj  or- General.'^ 

^  12  "W.E.,  100,  cf.  -with  another  version,  supposed  to  be  the  original. 
18  W.R.,  744-745. 


2m 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


You  will  have  to  decide  which  was  in  the  right, — 
McClellan  and  Franklin,  who  were  on  the  spot,  or  Hal- 
leck,  in  his  office  at  Washington.  Despatch  of  August 
30th,  9  A.M. :  "  I  am  by  no  means  satisfied  with  Gen. 
Franklin's  march  of  yesterday.  Considering  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case,  he  was  very  wrong  in  stopping  at 
Annandale.  Moreover,  I  learned  last  night  that  the 
Quartermaster's  Department  could  have  given  him  plenty 
of  transportation,  if  he  had  applied  for  it,  any  time  since 
his  arrival  at  Alexandria.  He  knew  the  importance  of 
opening  communication  with  Gen.  Pope's  army,  and 
should  have  acted  more  promptly."  ^ 

It  seems  to  us  that  McClellan  did  all  that  a  man  could 
do  to  aid  Pope,  and  to  give  him  a  full  and  hearty  support. 
Is  he  to  be  blamed  for  having  greater  foresight  than  those 
over  him,  and  for  endeavoring  to  bring  order  out  of  chaos, 
and  to  render  the  capitol  safe  ?  It  may  be  of  some  inter- 
est to  this  Society  to  hear  the  following  letters,  one  from 
McClellan,  and  the  other  from  an  officer  high  in  rank  in 
our  army :  — 

Orange,  New  Jersey,  June  20,  1876. 

My  dear  WmTTiER :  —  Your  most  welcome  letter  of  the 
13th  reached  me  only  yesterday,  on  my  return  from  a  week's 
absence,  and  it  afforded  me  very  great  pleasure  to  hear  from 
one  so  closely  associated  with  Generals  Sedgwick,  McMahon, 
and  my  brother. 

Of  all  the  charges  made  against  me  during  the  time  I  held 
command,  that  of  not  supporting  Pope  was  perhaps  the  most 
unfounded,  for  I  certainly  left  nothing  in  my  power  undone  to 
aid  him.  You  will  find  in  my  report  a  pretty  complete  history 
U8  W.R.,  744. 


GEN.  McGLELLAN  AT  ALEXANDRIA. 


297 


of  the  case,  — as  complete  as  the  data  then  in  my  possession 
pennitted.  But  in  reading  it  you  must  go  back  to  the  com- 
mencement of  the  preparations  for  the  withdrawal  from  Harri- 
son's Landing,  on  the  James.  The  Washington  authorities 
were  entirely  mistaken  in  regard  to  means  of  water  transporta- 
tion available  for  the  movement,  and  by  following  the  various 
letters  and  telegrams  contained  in  my  report  you  will  see  that 
the  transports  furnished  were  not  adequate  to  so  prompt  a 
movement  as  they  thought  practicable.  Although  I  was 
always  most  strongly  opposed  to  the  withdrawal,  and  to  the 
last  moment  did  my  best  to  have  the  order  countermanded,  I 
can  conscientiously  say  that  I  did  not  lose  a  moment  in  carry- 
ing it  into  effect,  and  the  movement  was  effected  without  an 
hour's  unnecessary  delay.  You  will  see,  from  these  despatches, 
that  the  means  of  transportation  for  horses,  guns,  and  wagons, 
were  especially  deficient,  and  that  the  infantry,  as  a  rule, 
reached  Alexandria  without  artillery  or  wagons,  and  entirely 
out  of  condition  to  undertake  a  campaign  and  go  into  battle  at 
any  distance  from  thek  supplies.  Bear  in  mind,  also,  the  en- 
tu'e  ignorance,  on  Halleck's  part  (as  shown  in  his  despatches 
to  me) ,  of  Pope's  position  and  condition  ;  the  fact  that  the 
enemy  was  known  to  be  between  him  and  Washington  (though 
in  what  force  we  did  not  know) ,  —  and  I  am  very  sure  you  will 
see  that  Franklin  could  not  move  more  readily  or  otherwise 
than  he  did.  The  same  with  regard  to  Sumner.  So  far  as  the 
statement  is  concerned  that  before  my  arrival  at  Alexandria 
the  troops  moved  forward  with  no  delays,  etc.,  —  it  is  a  suf- 
ficient answer  that  these  first  troops  exhausted  the  means  of 
transportation,  and  that  nothing  was  left  for  the  others.  You 
will  see,  from  my  report,  that  I  held  back  nothing,  but  gave  the 
last  man,  horse  and  wagon  under  my  control.  All  this  is  most 
hurriedly  written,  and  probably  incoherent.    After  you  have 


298 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


carefully  read  that  part  of  my  report,  if  there  are  any  points  in 
regard  to  which  you  are  in  doubt,  or  need  further  explanation, 
I  shall  be  very  happy  to  give  it  you,  and  when  I  reach  our 
summer  destination,  in  Canada,  I  will  look  over  the  subject 
more  carefully  and  write  you  again.  In  the  meantime  I 
would  be  glad  to  hear  from  you,  and  to  receive  any  suggestions 
that  may  occur  to  you.  I  know  so  well  that  I  honestly  did  all 
in  my  power  to  insure  the  good  of  the  service  that  it  may  well 

be  that  important  points  might  escape  me.    ■  mentioned 

to  me  incidentally  a  day  or  two  ago  that  he  intended  writing  to 
Weld  or  yourself  on  the  subject,  as  Porter  had  written  him 
about  it.  My  address  for  the  next  two  or  three  months  (after 
the  close  of  this  month)  will  be  Coburg,  Canada.  Again 
expressing  the  satisfaction  with  which  I  received  your  letter, 
I  am,  my  dear  Whittier,  always  your  friend, 
Geo.  B.  McClellan. 

Gen.  Chas.  A.  Whittier. 

Extract  from  Letter. 

McClellan's  first  action  towards  the  support  of  Pope  was 
in  sending  off  the  troops  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from 
Fortress  Monroe  and  vicinity.  He  had  them  embarked  with 
the  greatest  energy  and  speed,  giving  them  such  destinations 
(Acquia  Creek  some,  others  Alexandria)  as  would  tend  to 
reenforce  Pope  at  the  earliest  moment.  At  this  time  no  one 
supposed  Pope  to  be  in  danger;  but  it  was  the  wish  of  the 
War  Department  to  make  him  strong  beyond  peradventure. 
It  is  my  impression  that  Burnside's  and  Porter's  corps  were 
landed  at  Acquia  Creek ;  Heintzelman's,  Franklin's,  and  Sum- 
ner's at  Alexandria.  On  account  of  the  enormous  call  for 
transports  it  was  not  possible  to  keep  the  men  and  material 
together  in  some  of  the  corps.    It  was  so  with  Porter  the 


GElSr.  McCLELlAX  at  ALEXANDRIA. 


299 


first  to  leave  Fort  Monroe  and  having  every  facility  at  his 
disposal,  and  in  the  case  of  Franklin  the  artillery  horses  and 
harnesses  did  not  get  to  Alexandria  for  a  considerable  time 
after  the  arrival  of  the  infantry  and  guns.  Heintzelman's 
corps,  I  think,  arrived  at  Alexandria  first,  and  was  imme- 
diately sent  out  to  join  Pope.  Then  arrived  Franklin's, 
which  was  ordered  to  encamp  near  Alexandria  by  Gen. 
Halleck.  Then  arrived  the  head-quarters  (Gen.  McClellan), 
and  then  Gen.  Sumner's  corps. 

Gen.  McClellan  had,  therefore,  detached  from  his  .own 
command  the  whole  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  except 
these  two  corps.  Pope  had  an  army  of  enormous  size,  and 
the  impression  was  in  Washington  that  he  was  safe,  and  I 
do  not  think  that  any  one  in  high  position  considered  him 
in  danger  of  defeat.  There  did  not,  therefore,  appear  to  be 
any  necessity  for  sending  out  either  Sumner  or  Franklin. 

However,  by  Gen.  Halleck' s  order,  Franklin's  corps  was 
sent  out,  29th,  with  such  horses  and  harnesses  as  could  be  ob- 
tained, without  caissons  for  the  artillery  and  without  cavalry, 
with  orders  to  guard  the  line  of  communication  between  Gen. 
Pope  and  Alexandria.  It  marched  as  far  as  Annandale,  nine 
miles,  when  Gen.  W.  F.  Smith,  commanding  the  leading 
division,  reported  that  he  had  learned  from  stragglers  (one 
of  whom  was  a  colonel  of  a  regiment),  that  the  enemy  was 
advancing  in  force  from  beyond  Fairfax  Court-House.  Gen. 
Smith  halted  at  Annandale,  reported  these  facts  to  Gen. 
Franklin,  who  in  turn  reported  them  to  Gen.  McClellan,  who 
directed  that  the  corps  should  remain  that  night  at  Annan- 
dale. 

Gen.  Smith  also  reported  that  his  artillery  was  short  of 
ammunition,  having  only  what  was  in  the  limbers  of  the  pieces. 
During  the  night  Gen.  Franklin  received  orders  to  await  the 


300 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


arrival  of  a  train  of  provisions  which  was  to  leave  Alexandria 
that  morning.  The  train  arrived  about  8  A.M.,  30th,  when  the 
march  was  immediately  resumed,  and  continued  until  1  P.M., 
when  the  corps  arrived  at  a  point  some  distance  in  front  of 
Fairfax  Court-House,  towards  Manassas. 

Gen.  Franklin  detached  a  brigade  at  Fairfax  Court-House, 
under  command  of  Brig.-Gen.  Torbert,  to  take  post  at  Ger- 
mantown,  to  prevent  any  approach  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  from 
the  rear,  carrying  out  the  instructions  that  he  had  received  to 
guard  the  line  of  communication  of  Gen.  Pope.  While  the 
remainder  of  the  corps  was  resting,  about  1  P.M.,  Gen.  Frank- 
lin received  an  order  from  Gen.  McClellan  directing  him  to 
go  forward  and  join  Gen.  Pope  with  his  command.  The  march 
was  immediately  resumed,  and  continued  without  halt  until 
the  troops  of  Gen.  Pope  were  met  retreating  from  the  battle- 
field, about  dusk.  The  direction  of  the  wind  or  the  state  of 
the  atmosphere  was  such  that  no  indication  that  a  fight  was  in 
progress  was  apparent  to  any  one  in  Gen.  Franklin's  command 
until  the  retreating  troops  were  met. 

Gen.  Franklin  took  the  responsibility  of  leaving  Gen.  Tor- 
bert's  brigade  at  Germantown,  notwithstanding  the  order  to 
join  Gen.  Pope  with  bis  command.  This  brigade  was  attacked 
by  the  enemy  on  the  next  day,  and  the  attack  was  repulsed. 
But,  had  it  not  been  there,  it  is  not  assuming  too  much  to 
say  that  Gen.  Pope's  trains,  which  were  then  filling  the  roads 
between  Fairfax  Court-House  and  Centre ville  and  Washington, 
would  have  been  utterly  destroyed,  —  a  result  prevented  by  Gen. 
McClellan's  order  t; )  Franklin  to  protect  Gen.  Pope's  rear;  an 
order  given  and  executed  when  it  was  not  supposed  that  Gen. 
Pope  was  in  danger  of  defeat.  This  fact  does  not  appear  in  any 
official  reports,  but  Gen.  Franklin  has  Gen.  Torbert's  official 
report  to  him.^  The  effect  of  Gen.  McClellan's  foresight  was, 
1  16  W.R.,  537. 


GEN.  McCLELLAN  AT  ALEXANDRIA. 


301 


in  this  instance,  to  save  the  demoralized  forces  of  Pope  from 
enormous  disaster ;  for,  had  the  enemy's  cavalry  found  the 
trains  unguarded,  the  confusion  caused  by  their  destruction 
would  have  induced  the  belief  that  the  bulk  of  Lee's  forces 
had  got  between  Centreville  and  Washington.  It  is  hard  to  say 
now  what  would  have  been  the  result  of  that  belief. 

In  discussing  this  question  (Did  Gen.  McClellan  give  to 
Gen.  Pope  proper  support,  etc.  ?)  it  must  be  remembered  that 
Gen.  McClellan  was  acting  as  General  Halleck's  subordinate ; 
that  he  had  reason  to  believe  that  Gen.  Pope  had  as  large  an 
army  as  the  best  General  could  handle  in  a  pitched  battle ; 
that  he  had  no  information  to  induce  the  belief  that  Pope  was 
in  danger ;  that,  supposing  Pope  to  be  in  danger,  it  was  neces- 
sary to  have  a  heavy  force  of  fresh  men  in  his  line  of  retreat ; 
that,  if  Pope  were  routed,  an  energetic  enemy  would  at  once 
pursue ;  and  that  Franklin's  or  Sumner's  corps  would  have 
been  the  only  troops  immediately  available  to  man  the  lines  in 
front  of  Washington. 

General  McClellan  has  often  been  blamed  for  the  expres- 
sion in  his  despatch  to  Gen.  Halleck  as  to  leaving  Pope  to  his 
fate,  or  words  to  that  effect  (they  are,  I  know,  not  quoted  cor- 
rectly) .  These  expressions  were  used  in  answer  to  a  military 
question,  and  should  not  be  considered  as  having  any  personal 
bearing.  Gen.  McClellan  was  asked  what  ought  to  be  done  in 
certain  contingencies,  and  he  ought  to  have  given  his  honest 
opinion  from  the  best  lights  in  his  possession.  As  has  been 
stated  before,  there  never  was  reason  to  believe  from  Pope's 
despatches,  or  from  any  other  source,  that  Pope  was  in  great 
danger  until  he  was  defeated. 

The  best  information  on  all  these  subjects  can  be  obtained 
from  Gen.  McClellan's  report,  which  gives  the  facts  in 
detail. 


302 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


In  answer  to  an  inquiry  why  McClellan  did  not  send 
one  of  liis  own  staff  to  learn  about  Pope's  situation 
Gen.  Weld  read  the  following  letter  from  an  intimate 
friend  of  Gen.  McClellan  (which  had  received  the  ap- 
proval of  McClellan  himself),  showing  that  he  had  not 
only  sent  Col.  Hammerstein,  but  had  begged  Gen.  Halleck 
to  send  one  of  his  own  staff,  for  that  very  purpose :  — 

Kelton's  mission  resulted  directly  from  a  report  to  McClellan 
by  Col.  Hammerstein,  whom  McClellan  had  sent  to  the  front. 
This  report  accorded  with  Porter's  and  other  information,  and 
was  directly  contrary  to  the  tenor  of  Pope's  reports  to  Halleck. 
McClellan  went  to  Halleck  with  it,  and  urged  him  to  go  out 
in  person  and  obtain  the  state  of  affairs.  He  said  that  he  had 
so  much  office-work  that  he  could  not  go.  McClellan  told  him 
the  fate  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  vastly  more  impor- 
tant just  then  than  any  office-work ;  that  his  post  as  General- 
in-Chief  was  with  the  army  ;  and  urged  him  to  go.  He  positively 
declined.  Just  then  Gen.  Cullum  came  in ;  and  McClellan 
asked  him  if  he  would  go.  He  also  had  too  much  office- work 
of  great  importance.  McClellan  saw  Kelton  writing  in  the 
next  room,  and  beckoned  him  in.  McClellan  asked  him  if  he 
could  go.  He  promptly  assented,  and  said  he  could  start  on 
the  instant. 

Before  leaving  McClellan  lent  him  an  aide,  and  cautioned  him 
not  to  content  himself  with  seeing  Pope,  but  to  see  also  as 
many  of  the  corps  and  division  commanders  as  possible,  in 
private^  and  to  say  to  them  that  he,  McClellan,  wished  him 
(Kelton)  to  have  the  exact  state  of  affairs  as  far  as  they  could 
give  it. 


XI. 

REVIEW  OF  THE  REPORTS  OF  COLONEL  HAVEN 
AND  GENERAL  WELD  ON  THE  CONDUCT  OF 
GENERAL  McCLELLAN  AT  ALEXANDRIA  IN 
AUGUST,  1862;  AND  ON  THE  CASE  OF  FITZ- 
JOHN  PORTER. 

By  Col.  THEODOEE  LYMAN,  U.S.V. 


COMMITTEE. 
Col.  Theodore  Lyman,  U.S.V. 
Col.  Thomas  L.  Livermore,  U.S.V. 
Bvt.  Brig. -Gen.  Alfred  P.  Rockwell,  U.S.V- 


Read  before  the  Society  on  Monday  evening,  June  11  f  1877, 


EEYIEW  OF  REPORTS  OF  COL.  HAYEN  AND 
GEN.  WELD. 


1.  A  United  States  army,  commanded  in  chief  by 
tkree  persons,  de  facto  or  de  jure,  viz. :  the  President, 
the  Secretary  of  War,  and  General  Halleck.  Of  these, 
two  were  without  military  education  and  singularly  want- 
ing in  a  soldier's  instinct ;  the  third,  a  man  of  strong  in- 
tellect and  the  best  military  training,  had  slender  ability 
as  a  strategist,  and  none  at  all  as  a  field-fighter. 

2.  Two  beaten  armies,  —  one  of  which  was  moving  in 
all  haste  by  water  from  the  peninsula  to  Alexandria  to  re- 
enforce  the  other. 

3.  Two  commanders  in  the  field,  —  Pope  and  Mc- 
Clellan;  the  former  an  officer  of  courage  and  energy, 
and  not  devoid  of  capacity,  but  so  bombastic  and  so  desti- 
tute of  savoir  faire  as  to  alienate  his  subordinates ;  the 
latter  conspicuous  for  the  three  talents  of  organization, 
strategy,  and  personal  influence,  yet  lacking  the  qualities 
of  a  field-fighter.  He  had  not  the  quick  action  of  eye  and 
will  together  that  seizes  the  supreme  moment  of  battle. 

There  were,  then,  three  incompetent  commanders-in- 

305 


elements  of  the  problem  are  these :  — 


306 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


chief  at  Washington,  dealing  out  office  strategy  by  tele- 
graph; two  commanders  in  the  field,  distrustful  each  of 
the  other ;  and  two  beaten  armies,  not  yet  come  together  ; 
the  whole  in  presence  of  an  enemy  active  and  united,  and 
full  of  revolutionary  ardor. 

This  is  one  of  those  rare  historical  cases  where  it  might 
be  stated  a  priori  that  nothing  but  confusion,  mismanage- 
ment, recrimination,  and  final  disaster  could  result. 

And  we  can  go  farther,  and  aver  that  it  was  then,  and 
has  been  since,  impossible  to  determine  accurately  who 
are  the  officers  responsible  for  such  disaster.  The  best 
the  historian  can  do  is  diligently  to  sift  the  evidence,  dis- 
torted though  it  may  be  by  prejudice,  excitement,  and 
faults  of  memory,  and,  taking  into  account  the  known 
natures  of  the  chief  witnesses,  to  make  an  approximation 
to  the  truth. 

In  the  present  discussion  Generals  McClellan  and 
Porter  are  really  under  trial,  although  the  latter  only  was 
court-martialled.  It  is  therefore  needful  to  define  what 
may  be  an  officer's  guilt.  A  soldier  may  commit  two 
faults :  — 

1.  He  may  err  through  want  of  capacity. 

2.  He  may  err  through  wilful  disobedience  of  orders. 
The  first  is  not  punishable ;  but  the  officer  is  removed 

from  his  command,  and  assigned  to  inferior  duty  fitted  to 
his  ability.  The  second  renders  him  liable  to  such  punish- 
ment as  a  court-martial  may  inflict.  Your  committee  is 
of  opinion  that  want  of  capacity  should  not  be  considered 
in  this  discussion,  except  as  illustrating  the  real  topic,  to 
wit,  wiliul  disobedience  of  orders.    These  last  ten  days  of 


REVIEW  OF  REPORTS. 


SOT 


August,  1862,  are  so  fraught  with  confusion,  passion,  and 
suspicion  that  tlie  historian  can  hope  barely  to  determine 
who  obeyed  orders. 

A,    Ca8e  of  Gren.  Porter, 

This  officer  was  tried  and  dismissed  the  service  under 
substantially  the  following  charges  :  — 

1.  Failure  to  obey  the  so-called  "joint  order"  to  Mc- 
Dowell and  himself.  ^ 

2.  Failure  to  attack  under  order  from  Pope,  dated  4.30 
P.M.,  August  29.2 

3.  Shameful  retreat  on  August  29. 

4.  Feeble  attack,  August  30. 

After  the  able  papers  to  which  the  Society  has  listened, 
an  outline  sketch  of  the  military  movements  will  suffice  to 
make  the  deductions  clear. 

On  August  21  Lee  presented  himself  on  the  south  side 
of  the  Rappahannock,  and  made  as  if  to  force  the  fords. 
He  had  two  corps  :  Jackson's,  with  the  three  divisions  of 
Starke,  Ewell,  and  A.  P.  Hill,  in  all  say  35,000  men  ;  and 
Longstreet's,  with  the  three  divisions  of  Anderson, 
Walker,  and  McLaws,  which  composed  it,  and  the  added 
division  of  Hood,  say  about  35,000  men  together.  In- 
cluding cavalry  and  artillery  Lee's  army  numbered  from 
70,000  to  75,000  men.  On  the  north  side  Pope  stood  on 
the  defensive,  up  and  down  the  stream,  from  Rappahan- 
nock Station. 

He  had  about  50,000  men,  including  the  commands  of 
Sigel,  Banks,  McDowell,  Sturgis,  and  Reno,  and  the 
cavalry. 

^  16  W.R.,  76.  2Xb.,  18. 


308 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  campaign: 


The  next  four  days  were  occupied  by  Pope  in  making 
and  trying  to  execute  as  many  plans  of  defensive  attack. 
He  kept  his  troops  marcliing,  countermarching,  and  cross- 
marching,  often  in  mud  and  storm,  until  the  officers  lost 
all  reckoning,  and  the  men  were  exhausted  by  want  of 
rest  and  rations.  ^ 

On  the  25th  Jackson  made  a  forced  march  north-east 
to  Salem,  then  south-east  through  Thoroughfare  Gap ;  and 
on  the  night  of  the  26th  he,  with  Stuart's  cavalry,  seized 
Manassas  Junction,  burned  the  enormous  supplies  there, 
and  at  one  blow  cut  off  Pope's  communication  and  food. 
The  latter  hastened  to  reestablish  his  line  by  converging 
on  Manassas  Junction. 

On  the  night  of  the  27th  one  part  of  his  army  was  near 
Gainesville,  the  other  along  the  Alexandria  Kailroad. 
Thus,  Jackson  was  cut  off  from  Longstreet,  who  was  near 
Salem,  following  in  the  steps  of  his  predecessor.  The 
good  work  of  this  day  Pope  undid  on  the  next.  He  or- 
dered a  further  closing  in  from  the  north-west  and  south- 
west on  Manassas  Junction,  which  Jackson,  of  course, 
evacuated  on  the  28th,  and,  marching  without  opposition 
to  the  north,  settled  down  in  line-of-battle  with  his  left 
near  Sudley  Springs,  and  his  right  on  the  Gainesville  pike, 
along  which  he  stretched  a  friendly  hand  towards  Long- 
street  in  Thoroughfare  Gap. 

Before  this  Pope  had  received  heavy  reenforcements 
in  the  corps  of  Porter  and  Heintzelman,  and  the  di- 
vision of  Reynolds,  so  that  on  the  eve  of  the  28th 
of  August  his  force  was  about  equal  to  that  of  Lee. 
But  his  troops  were  scattered  and  out  of  position,  and 


REVIEW  OF  REPORTS. 


309 


he  had  opened  the  door  wide  to  the  right  wing  of  the 
enemy. 

There  is,  perhaps,  no  instance  in  the  war  where  a  com- 
mander showed  greater  ignorance  of  the  positions,  not 
only  of  the  enemy's  troops,  but  of  his  own. 

On  the  29th  Gen.  Pope,  still  confident  that  he  would 
have  only  Jackson  to  deal  with,  made  a  series  of  yain 
attacks,  chiefly  with  his  right  wing. 

Longstreet,  coming  along  the  Warrenton  pike,  joined 
Jackson  before  noon,  and  extended  the  line  to  the  south, 
across  the  Manassas  Railroad.  Opposite  him  was  Porter, 
forming  the  Union  left ;  and  next,  on  Porter's  right,  but 
not  connecting,  came  McDowell. 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  30th  Pope,  having  drawn  in  his 
left,  and  strengthened  his  centre  and  right,  attacked 
Jackson's  right  with  Porter's  corps,  which  was  driven 
back  with  heavy  loss. 

Lee  saw  the  moment  had  come,  and  immediately 
charged,  pivoting  on  Jackson  and  swinging  to  his  own 
left.  Pope's  left  wing  was  overwhelmed  and  forced  back 
with  the  loss  of  18  cannon  and  many  prisoners  ;  and  only 
the  heroic  resistance  of  the  regulars  and  other  choice 
troops,  seconded  by  the  falling  night,  saved  the  army  from 
destruction,  and  enabled  it  to  retreat  on  Centreville. 

It  may  be  well  to  complete  the  sketch  by  adding  that 
McClellan  had  arrived  at  Alexandria  on  the  27th  under 
orders  to  command  all  the  forces  there  and  in  the  defences 
of  Washington,  —  a  command  he  administered  for  four  or 
five  days.  There  he  found  the  corps  of  Sumner  and 
Franklin,  of  which  he  sent  the  latter  on  the  29th  as  far  as 


310 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CA3IPAIGN. 


Annandale,  and  on  the  30th  to  Centreville,  where  it  reen- 
forced  the  retreating  army. 

To  come  now  to  the  case  of  Porter.  Pope  charges  that 
Porter  failed  to  attack,  as  ordered,  on  the  29th,  and  thus 
flank  Jaclison  (as  he  then  supposed),  or  else  paralyze 
Longstreet  (as  he  subsequently  maintained).  It  is  no 
part  of  your  committee's  duty  to  determine  the  degree  of 
vigor  or  intelligence  exhibited  by  Porter.  The  only  ques- 
tion is,  whether  Porter's  dismissal  for  disobedience  of  orders 
was  a  justifiable  sentence  ? 

First  to  be  considered  is  the  "  joint  order."  The  points 
therein  that  touch  this  discussion  are  :  — 

(a.)  That  Porter  and  McDowell  should  push  their 
joint  commands  towards  Gainesville,  join  Sigel,  who  was 
marching  west  on  the  Warrenton  pike,  and  halt. 

(5.)  That  they  should  be  prepared  to  fall  back  for 
rations  to  Centreville. 

((?.)  That  the  order  could  be  departed  from,  if  any 
great  advantage  were  apparent. 

There  is  no  word  here  of  a  general  action  or  of  a  specific 
attack ;  and  the  only  idea  twice  repeated  is  the  warning  to 
be  ready  to  fall  back  on  Centreville. 

The  clause  (c'),  permitting  a  modification  of  the  order, 
is  simply  negative,  and  gives  discretion  without  command. 
Nevertheless,  if,  under  this  clause,  McDowell,  as  ranking 
ofQcer,  had  ordered  Porter  to  attack,  the  latter  would 
have  been  clearly  liable  under  this  "joint  order."  Mc- 
Dowell says  he  did  so  order ;  Porter  declares  he  did  not. 

These  assertions  of  honorable  men  neutralize  each  other, 
and  we  must  look  for  outside  evidence.   It  is  admitted 


REVIEW  OF  REPORTS. 


311 


that  there  was,  at  any  rate,  no  written  order  for  attack. 
Gen.  S.  M.  Weld  and  Gen.  Y\"arren  testify  tliat  McDowell 
exclaimed,  Porter,  tliis  is  no  place  for  a  battle.  Yon  are 
too  far  forward ;  *'  or  words  to  that  effect,  and  that  his  con- 
versation in  general  did  not  favor  attack.  Finally,  an 
order  to  fight  is  so  positive  a  thing  for  the  recipient,  that 
it  is  hardly  possible  Porter  could  have  misunderstood,  if 
he  had  received  such  a  one.  We  can  only  guess  that 
during  their  prolonged  interview  McDowell  said  that, 
under  certain  conditions,  an  attack  would  be  advisable. 
Turn  it  as  we  may  the  charge  is  not  proved. 

Second.  There  is  the  specific  order  to  attack  from 
Pope  to  Porter,  dated  4.30  P.M.,  August  29.  The  testi- 
mony here  seems  conclusive  (and  especially  the  circum- 
stantial evidence  of  Gen,  Weld)  that  this  order  was  not 
delivered  to  Porter  until  6.30  P.M.  The  sun  on  August 
29  sets  about  6.40  P.M. ;  of  course  no  such  advance 
could  then  be  made,  and  this  charge  of  disobedience 
faUs. 

Third.  The  charge  that  Porter  shamefully  retreated 
seems  based  on  his  note  to  McDowell,  which  stated  his 
intention  to  retreat  for  certain  reasons  which  he  soon 
discovered  had  no  foundation.  It  seems  now  to  be 
admitted  that  he  remained  in  the  place  where  early  in 
the  day  he  deployed  his  leading  division,  and  essentially 
made  no  movement. 

The  charge,  therefore,  has  no  basis. 

Fourth.  The  charge  that  Porter  made  a  criminally 
weak  attack  on  the  30th  of  August  is  controverted  by 
the  printed  reports  of  Jackson,  and  other  rebel  officers, 


312 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


and  by  the  returns  whicli  showed  a  loss  of  2,200  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing,  out  of  7,000  engaged. 

In  thus  summing  up  your  committee  have  purposely 
avoided  details,  and  questions  of  motive  or  judgment, 
and  have  carefully  adhered  to  the  single  question  of 
the  strict  justice  of  Porter's  sentence.  They  are  of 
the  opinion  that  the  charges  were  not  proved,  and 
that  the  sentence  should  be  reversed. 

B,    Case  of  MeClellan. 

It  is  plain,  from  the  papers  of  Col.  Haven  and  Gen. 
Weld,  that  MeClellan  regarded  the  movements  of  Pope 
with  profound  distrust,  and  it  is  not  improbable  that  he 
deemed  it  wise  to  hold  a  strong  reserve  near  the  capi- 
tal, in  case  of  the  defeat  that  seemed  impending;  but 
here,  as  in  Porter's  case,  the  question  of  his  dislikes, 
his  slowness,  or  his  apathy,  is  not  one  that  we  can 
profitably  discuss,  since  it  would  lead  only  to  a  series 
of  barren  hypotheses.  What  we  can  ask  is :  Did  he 
obey  his  orders?  Here  the  only  doubt  seems  to  con- 
cern Franklin's  corps,  because  it  does  not  appear  that 
the  movements  of  Sumner's  troops  were  called  in  ques- 
tion. 

The  orders  sent  by  Halle  ck  for  the  movement  towards 
Manassas  of  Franklin's  corps  were  of  two  sorts.  Those 
of  August  26  and  27  were  such  as  might  allow  dis- 
cretion to  MeClellan ;  but  the  order  of  the  28th  was 
peremptory,  yet  it  was  not  obeyed  till  the  next  day, 
when  it  had  been  seconded  by  a  still  more  pressing 
telegram. 


REVIEW  OF  REPORTS. 


313 


Your  committee  is,  therefore,  of  the  opinion  that 
McClellan  disobeyed  the  orders  of  Halleck  in  retarding 
the  advance  of  Franklin's  corps  from  August  28  to 
August  29. 


Porter's  Case.  —  Pope's  letters  to  Comte  de  Paris  :  — 

1.  (Dated  May  29,  1876)  and  published  in  Army  and 
Navy  Journal. 

2.  Published  in  Army  and  Navy  Journal,  January  6, 
1877,  p.  346. 

3.  Published  in  Army  and  Navy  Journal,  May  5, 
1877,  p.  626. 

Comte  de  Paris  to  Pope :  — 

1.  Army  and  Nayy  Journal,  Noyember  4,  1876. 

2.  Army  and  Xayy  Journal,  April  14,  1877,  p.  578. 


XII. 


THE  CONDUCT  OF  GENERALS  McCLELLAX  AND 
HALLECK  IX  AUGUST.  1S62  :  AXD  THE  CA-^E  OF 
FITZ-JOHX  PORTER. 

By  Col.  THQAIAS  L.  LIVEEMORE,  U.S.Y. 


CO^nilTTEE. 
Col.  Theodoee  Ltman.  U.S.V. 
Col.  Thomas  L.  LrvEEMOEE.  E.S.Y. 
Bvi.  Brig. -Gen.  Alfeed  P.  Eockwell,  U.S.Y. 


Read  hefore  the  Society  on  Mondo.y  evening,  June  11,  1877. 


THE  CONDUCT  OF  McCLELLAN  AND  HAL- 
LECK  IN  AUGUST,  1862;  AND  THE  CASE 
OF  FITZ-JOHN  PORTER. 

TULY  8,  1862,  Gen.  Pope,  testifying  before  the  Com- 


mittee on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  at  Washington, 
said  that  he  was  assembling  his  army  of  43,000  men  on 
the  east  side  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  at  the  outlets  of  the 
passes  into  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  so  that,  if  the  enemy 
penetrated  into  that  valley,  he,  by  reason  of  being  nearer 
Gordonsville  than  they,  could  cut  off  their  retreat,  and 
could  defend  Washington  ' '  by  laying  off  on  his  [the 
enemy's]  flanks  and  attacking  him  night  and  day,  from 
the  moment  he  crosses  the  Rappahannock,  until  his  forces 
are  destroyed,  or  mine,"  ^ 

He  also  expressed  himself  as  confident  of  preventing 
80,000  of  the  enemy  from  reaching  Washington,^  but 
said  that  he  was  apprehensive  that  he  could  not  stop 


He  recognized  the  possibility  that  the  enemy  might 
detach  a  large  force  from  Richmond;  and  that  if  they 
did  he  should  be  flanked  and  forced  back  if  he  stood 
on  the  defensive. 


100,000.= 


n  C.W.,  277. 


3  lb.,  278. 


317 


318 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


It  was  the  wish  of  the  government  that  he  should  draw 
a  considerable  force  of  the  enemy  from  Richmond  in  order 
to  facilitate  McClellan's  operations  against  that  city ;  ^  and 
this  he  did,  for  Lee  says,  in  his  report,  that  Jackson  with 
his  own  and  Ewell's  divisions  was  sent  north  to  meet 
Pope,  July  13th.  ^  McClellan  did  not  avail  himself  of  this 
diversion,  and  probably  was  ignorant  of  it,  and  Halleck 
(as  appears  by  his  memorandum  for  the  Secretary  of  War, 
dated  July  27,  1862  3)  yisited  McClellan  July  25th  to 
enforce  upon  him  the  necessity  of  either  attacking  Rich- 
mond, or  withdrawing  from  the  peninsula  and  joining 
Pope.  McClellan  asked  for  30,000  more  men  before 
attacking ;  but  Halleck  told  him  he  could  have  only  20,- 
000,  and,  after  consultation  with  his  officers,  McClellan 
agreed  to  attack  if  the  latter  number  were  sent  to  him. 
On  the  next  day  McClellan  sent  a  despatch  to  Halleck 
stating  that  the  enemy  in  front  of  him  was  being  largely 
reenforced,  and  beseeching  the  loan  of  an  additional  15,000 
or  20,000  men  from  the  West.^  This  was  the  last  straw;  — 
and  Halleck  testified  that,  as  these  troops  could  not  be 
given  him  measures  were  then  taken  to  withdraw  his 
army  from  the  peninsula.^  Blame  has  been  thrown  upon 
Halleck  for  not  informing  McClellan  at  once  of  the  in- 
tended withdrawal  of  his  army  from  the  peninsula;  but 
McClellan  had  persistently  represented  that  a  retreat 
would  have  an  effect  on  the  moral  of  his  men  which  was 
to  be  dreaded,  and  which  would  be  disastrous  to  his  army.^ 
For  this  reason  alone  it  would  have  been  wise  for  Halleck 
to  conceal  his  purpose  from  McClellan  and  his  army  until 
the  moment  it  became  necessary  to  order  the  march,  if 

^  16  W.R.,  21.  nb.,  552.  ^  14  y^,^,^  337. 

4  lb.,  334.  5 1  C.W.,  452.        ^  12  W.R.,  75,  81,  83. 


CONDUCT  OF  McCLELLAN  AND  RALLECK.  319 

McClellan  had,  in  fact,  had  such  an  army  as  he  feared; 
and  of  this  Halleck  could  not  be  supposed  to  judge  as 
well  as  McClellan. 

It  was  only  after  this  despatch  of  July  26th  from 
McClellan^ that  Pope  went  to  the  front  with  the  under- 
standing that  McClellan  was  to  be  withdrawn  from  the 
peninsula;  and  yet  it  has  been  charged  that  McClellan's 
withdrawal  had  been  determined  on  with  Pope  while  the 
former  was  yet  being  urged  to  take  the  offensive. 

July  30th  and  31st  Halleck  informed  McClellan  that 
Pope  reported  movements  of  the  enemy  from  Richmond 
to  the  south  of  the  J ames  River  and  towards  DamT.lle  and 
Lynchburg,  and  that  the  force  in  Richmond  was  very 
small,  and  requested  him  to  press  the  enemy  and  ascertain 
the  facts. 

It  was  not  until  August  5th  that  McClellan  reported 
any  advance  on  his  part,  and  then  he  had  found  out  noth- 
ing.' 

These  movements  of  the  enemy,  which  were  reported  by 
Pope,  were  in  fact  the  movement  of  A.  P.  Hill's  division 
to  join  Jackson,  July  27th,  and  the  movement  of  D.  H. 
Hill  to  Coggin's  Point  for  a  ruse  to  conceal  the  movement 
of  Jackson  to  the  Rapidan ;  and  the  very  troops  of  A.  P. 
Hill  whose  movements  were  reported,  were  a  part  of  those 
with  whom  Jackson  fought  Pope  at  Cedar  Mountain ;  and 
had  McClellan  pressed  the  enemy  fronting  him  in  earnest, 
it  would  not  have  been  left  to  Pope  to  find  out  by  the 
weight  of  Jackson's  column  that  three  divisions  were  in 
his  front. 

July  30th  McClellan  was  instructed  to  send  away  his 

^  U  W.R.,  334.  2 12  W.R.,  76,  77.  3  ib.,  78. 


320 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


sick.  ^  August  3d  lie  was  informed  that  his  army  was  to 
be  withdrawn  and  directed  to  take  immediate  measures  to 
effect  it.2  August  9th  Halleck  telegraphed  to  McClellan 
that,  in  his  opinion,  the  enemy  was  massing  in  front  of 
Pope  and  Burnside  expecting  to  crush  them  and  then 
move  forward  to  the  Potomac,  and  that  he  (McClellan) 
"  must  send  re  enforcements  instantly  to  Acquia  Creek."  ^ 
August  10th  Halleck  informed  him  of  the  fighting  then 
going  on  at  Cedar  Mountain,  and  of  the  crossing  of  the 
Rapidan  by  large  forces  of  the  enemy,  and  told  him  there 
must  be  no  further  delay  in  his  movements.* 

August  12th  Halleck  again  told  him  that  not  a  moment 
was  to  be  lost  in  getting  additional  troops  in  front  of 
Washington.^  On  the  same  day  McClellan  replied  that  it 
was  probably  too  late  for  his  army  to  arrive  in  time  to 
save  Washington,  and  that  it  was  in  "  much  better  posi- 
tion to  do  so  from  here  than  from  Acquia."^ 

August  13th  Lee  ordered  the  rest  of  his  army  to  reen- 
force  Jackson,  having  delayed  until  then  to  meet  any 
movement  McClellan  might  make  against  Richmond.^ 

August  14th  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  began  to  move 
southward.^ 

Had  McClellan  been  a  commander  of  even  ordinary 
energy  and  boldness,  he  would  have  so  effectually  stirred 
up  the  enemy,  while  waiting  from  August  3d  to  the  15th 
to  get  his  sick  away,  that  Lee  could  not  have  ventured  to 
march  northward  at  the  time  he  did,  and  so  the  campaign 
against  Pope  might  have  been  very  different. 

It  was  the  purpose  of  Lee  to  engage  Pope  in  front  on 
the  Rapidan,  while  Jackson  gained  his  rear.    Pope  dis- 

» 12  W.K.,  76-77.       nb.,  80.        ^b.,  85.  ^Ib.,  86. 

5  lb.,  87.  ^  lb.,  88.        7 16  W.E.,  552.      ^  12  W.R.,  89. 


CONDUCT  OF  McCLELLAN  AND  HALLECK.  321 


covered  tliis  August  15th,  but  delayed  on  tlie  Rapidan 
until  the  18th,  to  give  time  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
to  arrive,^ and  then  skilfully  withdrew  to  the  left  bank  of 
the  Rappahannock,  reaching  it  on  the  19th,  —  two  days  be- 
fore Lee  was  ready  to  begin  his  movement.  Urged  and 
commanded  by  Halle ck  to  stand  on  the  Rappahannock 
until  reenforced,  Pope  held  his  position  on  this  river 
until  the  24th,  repeatedly  encountering  the  enemy. ^ 

Whether  Lee  really  intended  to  cross  the  Rappahan- 
nock in  the  vicinity  of  Waterloo,  or  whether  he  from  the 
first  intended  to  cross  above  and  go  through  Thorough- 
fare Gap,  as  he  finally  did,  has  been  doubted ;  but  it  seems 
reasonable  to  suppose  that,  had  not  Pope  extended  his 
right  to  meet  Lee  as  he  appeared  at  each  ford,  the  latter 
would  have  seized  the  first  chance  to  cross  and  flank  him ; 
and  the  reports  of  Lee,^  Jackson,*  and  Capt.  Boswell 
(chief  engineer  of  Jackson)^ all  seem  to  leave  no  other 
conclusion.  Considering  the  success  of  the  same  opera- 
tion by  Lee  in  the  fall  of  1863,  when  Gen.  Meade  was 
obliged  to  retreat  with  all  haste  behind  Bull  Run,  en- 
countering the  enemy  in  his  way  twice  in  the  retreat. 
Pope  seemingly  deserves  great  credit  for  his  strategy  and 
boldness  down  to  the  beginning  of  Jackson's  movement  to 
his  right. 

On  the  night  of  the  2 2d,  Stuart's  raid  on  Catlett's  sta- 
tion took  place, ^  and  although  Pope's  indifi'erence  to  it  was 
creditable  to  his  nerve,  he  perhaps  was  to  blame  in  not 
recognizing  it  as  the  precursor  of  Jackson's  coming.  On 
the  morning  of  the  25th  Pope  was  informed  of  Jackson's 
movement  towards  Thoroughfare  Gap  which  began  that 

^16W.E.,  29.  2  lb.,  29,  30.  ^  jb.,  552-554. 

*  lb.,  642-643.  &  i^.,  649-650.         ^  i^,^  730-731, 


322 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


morning ;  and  here,  according  to  appearances,  lie  began  to 
be  greatly  at  fault,  for,  although  the  direction  of  this 
movement  was  apparent,  it  seems  certain  that  Pope,  not- 
withstanding what  he  says  in  his  report,  entertained  the 
delusion  that  the  enemy  were  bound  for  the  Shenandoah 
Valley,  until  some  time  on  the  26th.  He  so  writes  to 
McDowell  on  the  evening  of  the  25th.  ^  McDowell,  in  his 
despatch  of  the  26th,  stating  the  possible  movements  of 
the  enemy,  does  not  foretell  the  movement  through 
Thoroughfare  Gap.^  Halleck  at  11  A.M.  on  the  26th 
telegraphs  McClellan  (presumably  on  information  from 
Pope)  that  there  is  reason  to  believe  the  enemy  are  mov- 
ing into  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  that  a  reconnoissance 
will  soon  determine  the  fact.^  Pope  complains  that  the 
cavalry  he  sent  to  Thoroughfare  Gap  on  the  morning  of 
the  26th  made  no  report;^ and  the  first  order  of  Pope's 
looking  to  receiving  the  enemy  on  the  Warrenton  turn- 
pike was  that  to  McDowell  at  8  P.M.  on  the  26th, ^  and  as 
late  as  8.20  P.M.  he  directed  Heintzelman  to  send  a  regi- 
ment to  Manassas  to  see  what  had  occurred,  to  repair  the 
wires,  and  protect  the  railroad  till  further  orders  ;^  and  at 
midnight  of  the  26th  he  sent  word  to  McDowell  that  it 
was  the  enemy's  cavalry  that  had  cut  his  communication 
at  Manassas,  and  that  up  to  one  hour  before  he  had  sup- 
posed it  was  only  a  column  of  ten  or  fifteen  thousand  that 
had  come  through  the  Gap,  and  that  it  must  be  ascertained 
whether  his  whole  force  had  come. 7 

Pope  has  been  criticised  because  his  movements  had  not 
been  up  to  this  time  according  to  the  plan  laid  out  by  him 
before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War ;  but  this 

67.       Mb.,  67-68.       ^  12  W.R.,  94.       n6  W.R.,  34. 
5  lb.,  69.  6  113.^70.  7ii3^ 


CONDUCT  OF  McCLELLAN  AND  HALLECK. 


323 


is  unjust,  for  he  had  been  commanded  to  keep  up  com- 
munication with  Fredericksburg,  and  re  enforcements  were 
coming  from  there  and  from  Alexandria,  so  that  he  could 
not  cut  loose  from  that  flank,  and  bj  staying  where  he 
was,  he  had  received  Eeno,  Eejnolds,  Porter,  and 
Heintzelman. 

But  the  error  of  not  ascertaining  Jackson's  movements 
was  a  serious  one,  for  at  the  moment  when  he  was  writing 
to  McDowell,  on  the  evening  of  the  26th,  that  he  had 
requested  Halleck  to  send  Franklin  up  the  Manassas  Gap 
railroad  to  protect  his  right  flank, ^Jackson's  advance  had 
stolen  by  that  flank  some  hours  and  was  then  on  Pope's 
railroad  at  Kettle  Run.  This  was  an  enormous  error. 
It  will  scarcely  be  contended  that  any  General  could  be 
blamed  for  not  predicting  a  movement  so  eccentric  and  so 
contrary  to  the  recognized  principles  of  strategy  as  Jack- 
son's was ;  but  certainly  Pope  was  to  blame  for  not  dis- 
covering that  during  the  whole  of  the  26th  of  August 
25,000  men  or  more  were  marching  from  Salem  to  Bristoe 
so  close  to  his  position. 

Jackson  began  his  march  from  Salem  in  the  morning 
and  arrived  at  Bristoe  Station  at  sunset.  Had  Pope 
known  of  this  march  in  season  he  might  have  fallen  upon 
Jackson  as  he  passed,  brought  him  to  a  stand,  and  de- 
stroyed him,  for  he  had  with  him  then  Eeno  and  Reynolds  : 
and  Porter  was  at  Bealeton  Station,  and  Heintzelman's 
corps  was  at  Warrenton  Junction,  numbering  in  all,  ac- 
cording to  Pope's  own  estimate,  54,500  men. 

Gen.  Pope  says  in  his  report  that  he  expected  Franklin 
to  be  at  or  near  Gainesville  by  the  afternoon  of  the  26th,^ 

^  16  W.R.,  69.  2  xb.,  33. 


324 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


but  we  cannot  discover  that  lie  had  any  good  ground  for 
expecting  this. 

At  this  period,  when  we  find  Pope  cut  off  from  Wash- 
ington by  Jackson,  it  is  due  to  him  to  say  that  Halle ck's 
repeated  commands  and  entreaties  to  hold  the  Rappahan- 
nock until  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  arrived,  had  warranted 
him  in  so  doing,  even  if  he  suspected,  or  ought  to  have 
suspected,  that  Halleck  might  fail  him,  and  that,  while  it 
seems  inexcusable  for  him  to  have  remained  ignorant  of 
Jackson's  movement,  yet  he  had  conducted  the  campaign 
with  boldness,  faithfulness,  and  strategic  skill  up  to  this 
time. 

It  is  true  that  he  had  made  numerous  marches  and 
countermarches,  and  had  provoked  several  days  of  fight- 
ing, and  there  seems  to  be  no  doubt  that  his  men  were 
weary  and  hungry,  but  these  are  the  legitimate  incidents 
of  a  defensive  campaign  against  a  larger  force ;  and  when 
we  consider  that  it  was  not  over  a  day's  march  between 
the  extremes  of  his  field  of  operations,  and  remember  the 
marches  and  hardships  of  the  enemy  opposed  to  him, 
and  those  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  other  cam- 
paigns, we  cannot  find  good  ground  to  greatly  blame  Pope 
for  working  his  men  hard  up  to  August  25th. 

To  return  to  Pope's  situation  on  the  night  of  the 
26th.  As  appears  from  his  message  at  midnight  to  Mc- 
Dowell, above  referred  to,  he  had  only  within  an  hour 
or  so  suspected  that  the  force  which  had  come  through 
Thoroughfare  Gap  was  a  formidable  one,  and  that, 
without  information  as  to  its  destination  or  progress, 
he  had  not,  at  midnight,  conjectured  that  it  was  this 
force  which  for  some  hours  had  possessed  his  railroad 


CONDUCT  OF  MgCLELLAN  AND  HALLECK.  325 

in  his  rear,  within  ten  miles  of  his  headquarters  at 
Warrenton  Junction.^  TTe  are  left  in  ignorance  of  what 
Pope  actually  learned  of  the  position  of  the  enemy  be- 
tween that  time  and  the  hour  of  issuing  his  order  of  the 
27th  for  the  movements  of  his  command.^  This  order 
directed  McDowell,  Sigel,  and  Reynolds  to  march  down 
the  Warrenton  turnpike  to  Gainesville,  and  Heintzelman 
and  Porter  to  march  to  Greenwich.  It  does  not  seem 
that  these  dispositions  were  designed  to  cut  off  Jackson, 
nor  does  it  seem  that  they  were  designed  mainly  to  bring 
on  a  pitched  battle  with  a  force  that  Pope  supposed  was 
marching  down  from  Thoroughfare  Gap,  but  that  they 
were  designed  to  secure  Pope's  retreat  behind  Bull  Run. 
The  evidence  of  this  is  not  negative  merely.  Porter,  who 
met  Pope  on  the  morning  of  the  27th,  and  then,  as  we 
cannot  doubt,  was  fully  informed  as  to  the  latter's  plans, 
in  his  despatch  to  Burnside  of  4  P.M.  of  that  day  said  that 
Pope  was  manoeuvring  to  get  beliind  Bull  Run ;  and  Pope 
himself  in  his  report  says  that  it  was  his  design  on  this 
day  to  place  his  army  between  Zee^s  army  and  BuU  Run^ 
and  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  argue  that,  having  taken 
this  resolution,  he  must  have  determined  to  reach  the  left 
bank  of  Bull  Run  as  soon  as  possible.  The  order  to  Banks 
to  push  the  trains  along  the  road  to  the  south  of  Manassas, 
facing  towards  the  Rappahannock  for  defence,  the  mention 
of  Porter  as  being  on  his  (Banks's)  riglit^  and  the  terming 
of  the  force  at  Gainesville  as  the  "  right  wing,"^ —  all  in- 
dicate that  Pope  regarded  his  army  as  still  fronting  the 
Rappahannock,  and  not  as  an  army  fronting  an  enemy  be- 
tween it  and  Bull  Run,  and  it  seems  as  though  the  con- 
centration of  his  main  force  near  Gainesville  was  to  stop 

1 16  W.E.,  70.     2  lb.,  70-71.     3  18  W.R.,  699-700.     ^  16  W.R.,  71. 


326 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CA3IPAIGN. 


the  way  until  his  retreat  by  Manassas  Junction  was 
assured.  He  says  in  his  report  that  these  movements  were 
also  to  crush  that  part  of  the  enemy  who  had  got  through 
the  Gap/ and  doubtless  he  had  determined  to  crush  what- 
ever stood  in  the  way  of  his  retreat ;  but  it  is  not  at  all 
certain  that,  when  he  issued  the  order  above  referred  to, 
he  expected  to  meet  any  considerable  force  south  of 
Gainesville,  and  it  does  seem  certain  that  the  whole 
movement  was  planned  on  the  defensive,  and  not  on  the 
offensive.  Perhaps  future  publications  of  the  reports  of 
all  his  subordinates,  showing  exactly  what  his  information 
was  on  the  morning  of  the  27th,  will  afford  ground  for 
different  conclusions,  which  must  rest  on  conjecture,  if 
anything,  now. 

What  induced  Pope  to  send  Hooker  down  the  railroad^ 
instead  of  towards  Gainesville,  is  not  plain,  but  it  was  for- 
tunate he  did  so,  as  it  led  to  the  discovery  of  Ewell  four 
miles  west  of  Bristoe,  who  was  thereupon  driven  back 
in  an  engagement  lasting  until  sunset. 

Pope  says  he  then  became  convinced  that  Jackson  was 
south  of  the  turnpike  near  Manassas  Junction,  and  he 
became  apprehensive  that  the  latter  would  try  to  turn  his 
right  at  Bristoe.^  He  has  been  much  criticised  for  this, 
but  as  McDowell  shared  in  the  same  apprehension,  the 
grounds  for  it  are  worthy  of  examination. 

Pope's  line  of  columns  facing  to  the  rear,  ran  substan- 
tially north  and  south,  with  its  left  at  Gainesville  and  its 
right  at  Bristoe  Station,  and  this  line  was  substantially 
parallel  to  the  east  side  of  a  triangle,  one  corner  of  which 

1  16  w.R.,  34. 

2  He  was  going  to  reestablish  his  communication  and  get  rations.  — 
T.  Lyman.  ^      ^.j..^  35. 


CONDUCT  OF  McCLELLAN  AND  HALLECK.  327 

was  at  White  Plains,  another  at  Manassas  Junction,  and 
another  on  the  west  side  of  the  Rappahannock.  On  the 
night  of  the  27th  Jackson  was  at  the  south-east  corner 
and  Lee  at  the  north  corner ;  from  these  corners  a 
forced  march  of  a  day  would  bring  them  together  at  the 
south-west  corner.  To  meet  on  the  east  side  of  the 
triangle  would  require  nearly  a  day,  if  they  were  unop- 
posed ;  but,  in  fact,  McDowell,  Sigel,  and  Reynolds  were 
on  the  road  between  them.  Under  these  circumstances  it 
does  not  seem  to  have  been  fatuous  in  Pope  to  suppose 
that,  if  his  right  flank  remained  weak,  Jackson  would  take 
the  road  thus  left  open  to  liim,  especially  when  the  wagon- 
trains  of  Pope's  army  were  a  possible  prize  in  such  a 
movement;  and  even  if  this  would  not  have  been  good 
strategy,  was  it  unreasonable  to  suppose  that  this  erratic 
commander  contemplated  it,  when  Pope  had  already  found 
his  advance  four  miles  west  of  Bristoe  Station,  as  if  it  were 
the  very  vanguard  of  the  movement  ? 

For  the  purpose  of  closing  on  Jackson  and  repelling  his 
expected  attack  on  the  right  flank,  Pope  ordered  Porter, 
who  was  yet  at  Warrenton  Junction,^  and  Kearny  (at 
Greenwich)  to  be  at  Bristoe  by  daybreak ;  ^  also  Reno 
(at  Greenwich)  to  march  at  daylight  on  ]\Ianassas 
Junction,^  and  ]\IcDowell  (at  Gainesville)  to  march  at 
daylight  on  Manassas  Junction,  resting  his  right  on  the 
Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  and  throwing  his  left  "  well  to 
the  east;"^  and  Pope,  in  his  despatches  to  Kearny  and 
McDowell,  expressed  the  hope  that  he  should  capture 
Jackson  by  these  movements. 

It  was  disobedience  of  this  order  to  Porter  of  which  he 

.  ^  16  W.E.,  71-72.       2  xb.,  72.       ^  ig  70I.       "  16  W.R.,  72. 


328 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN 


was  convicted  on  the  first  charge.  Close  study  of  it  sus- 
tains the  criticism  of  Mr.  Charles  O'Conor  that  it  contains 
no  intimation  to  Porter  that  Pope  expected  to  be  attacked 
at  Bristoe. 

If  Jackson  had  attempted  to  go  round  Pope's  right, 
the  dispositions  of  the  latter  would  have  brought  their 
armies  into  pitched  battle,  with  the  odds  greatly  in  Pope's 
favor ;  or  if  Jackson  had  retreated  to  the  north  through 
Centreville,  which  Pope  supposed  was  his  only  alternative, 
the  latter  would  have  been  in  favorable  order  for  pursuit ; 
and  even  if  McDowell  and  Jackson  both  had  started  at 
daybreak,  and  the  former  had  moved  down  in  line  of  battle 
(as  his  orders  seemed  to  contemplate,  and  as  in  fact  his 
orders  to  Sigel  and  Reynolds,  intercepted  by  B.  T.  John- 
son, directed  ^) ,  his  24,000  men  would  have  stretched  clear 
to  the  Sudley  road,  and  Taliaferro's  division,  moving  up 
on  that  road,  would  probably  have  been  intercepted, 
which  would  have  brought  the  other  divisions  to  its 
rescue,  and  thus  have  precipitated  a  battle.  But  Sigel, 
who  had  the  advance  of  McDowell's  column,  was  several 
hours  late  in  starting,  and  Jackson,  moving  through  the 
night  and  early  on  the  28th  in  three  columns,  two  east  of 
Bull  Pun,  and  one  by  the  Sudley  Spring  road,  west  of 
Bull  Pun,  evaded  a  battle  with  Pope,  and  united  his  col- 
umns north  of  the  Warrenton  turnpike  and  west  of  Bull 
Run  ;  although,  as  appears  by  the  report  of  Col.  Johnson, 
commanding  a  brigade  of  Taliaferro's  division,  McDowell's 
column  actually  struck  him  on  the  Warrenton  pike  at 
Groveton.2 

But  the  conclusion  forces  itself  on  us,  that  Pope  over- 
looked the  possibility  of  Jackson's  moving  early  enough 

U6W.E.,  664.  2ib.^665. 


CONDUCT  OF  McCLELLAN  AND  HALLECR. 


329 


and  hugging  Bull  Run,  and  stealing  round  Ms  left  flank, 
as  lie  did. 

In  passing  we  may  say  tliat  we  do  not  find  reason  to 
believe  tliat  Jackson  moved  A.  P.  Hill  tkrougn  Centre- 
ville  as  a  ruse  to  deceive  Pope.  Jackson  makes  no  men- 
tion of  the  movement  of  either  diAusion  except  Tali- 
aferro's, which  moved  by  the  Sudley  Springs  road,  across 
the  Warrenton  turnpike.^  A.  P.  Hill  says  he  moved  his 
division  to  Centreville  at  1  A.M.  of  the  2Sth,  and  at 
10  A.M.  moved  on  the  Warrenton  pike  towards  the  Stone 
Bridge,  where  he  received  a  despatch  from  Jackson  stating 
that  the  enemy  were  in  full  retreat,  and  to  move  down  to 
the  fords  and  intercept  him ;  but,  having  intercepted 
orders  from  Pope  to  McDowell,  ordering  the  formation  of 
his  Kne  of  battle,  he  deemed  it  best  to  push  on  and  join 
Jackson.-  Early  says  that  Ewelhs  division  moved  towards 
Centreville  on  the  night  of  the  27th,  camped  separately 
by  brigades  between  Manassas  and  Bull  Pun,  and  at 
dawn  of  the  2Sth  crossed  Bull  Run  at  Blackburn's  Ford; 
that  Early's  brigade  moved  up  its  left  bank  through  the 
fields  to  Stone  Brido;e.  followed  bv  Trimble's  brio^ade  :  re- 
crossed  at  Stone  Bridge,  and  waited  with  the  other 
brigades  on  the  old  battle-field  for  Lawton's  and  Hayes's 
brigades,  which,  missing  their  way,  had  gone  towards 
Centre^dlle,  and  which  then  came  tip  by  the  "Warrenton 
pike  and  joined  the  others.^ 

At  noon  of  the  28th,  Pope,  arriving  at  Manassas  Junc- 
tion, was  led  to  believe  that  Jackson  had  retreated  to  Cen- 
treville on  his  way  to  the  nortli.  and  he  at  once  ordered 
McDowell  to  march  to  Gum  Springs  to  intercept  him  :  ^  l)ut 
immediately  afterwards  received  a  note  from  McDowell  in 
which  he  suggested  pushing  a  large  force  across  the  AVar- 

'16W.K.,  644.       2i|3_^g-Q^       3  113.^710.       nsW.R.,  717. 


330 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


reiiton  turnpike  west  of  Bull  Run ;  and  Pope  replied,  at 
1.20  P.M.,  telling  him  not  to  go  to  Gum  Springs  if  he 
thought  it  too  hazardous,  and  directing  him  to  call  back 
his  force  to  Gainesville,  and  promising  to  push  Reno  and 
Heintzelman  to  Gainesville  that  evening,  unless  he  found 
a  large  force  at  Centreville,  which  he  did  not  expect^  and 
agreeing  to  support  McDowell  in  any  way  he  suggested 
by  pushing  forward  from  Manassas  Junction  across  the 
turnpike.!  Pope  says  further,  in  his  report,  that  he  ordered 
McDowell  to  advance  on  Centreville.^ 

Why  Pope  did  not  at  that  moment,  as  suggested  by 
McDowell,  push  Heintzelman  and  Reno,  or  Porter,  or  all 
of  them,  to  Gainesville  is  not  clearly  explicable.  He 
certainly  was  not  then  apprehensive  that  Jackson  intended 
to  go  round  his  right  flank.  It  is  apjDarent  that  he 
feared  Jackson  would  retreat  to  Aldie;  but  unless  Mc- 
Dowell, in  his  note  above  referred  to  (which  would  be 
very  interesting  to  read),  had  given  him  to  understand 
that  a  movement  towards  Gum  Springs  was  impracticable, 
it  is  difficult  to  comprehend  why  he  did  not  see  that  the 
best  route  for  him  to  take  to  intercept  such  a  retreat  by 
Jackson  was  through  Gainesville  towards  Gum  Springs. 
The  key  to  all  tliis  seems  to  be  that  Pope,  short  of  sup- 
plies, with  his  depot  at  Manassas  destroyed,  and  depend- 
ent on  Washington  for  further  supplies,  feared  to  incur 

^  16  W.n.,  74,  337;  C.W.  2  Sup.  149.  There  are  two  versions  of  this 
note  as  indicated:  one  printed  in  the  War  Eecords,  16  W.R.,  74;  the 
other  in  C.W.  2  Sup.  149.  The  former  appears  as  having  been  written  at 
2  P.M.,  giving  McDowell  the  privilege  to  disregard  the  order  to  proceed 
to  Green  Springs;  the  latter,  as  written  at  1.20  P.M.,  and  the  name  of  the 
place  as  Gum  Springs.  The  latter  would  seem  to  be  the  true  version  re- 
ceived by  McDowell,  being  in  agreement  with  the  references  to  it  in  his 
report,  16  W.R.,  337.  2  ib.,  37. 


CONDUCT  OF  XcCLELLAN  AXD  EALLECK.  331 


the  risk  of  being  cut  olF  from  them  by  the  adventurous 
Jackson,  and  chose  to  insure  hhnself  against  this  by 
throwing  a  heavy  force  between  Jackson  and  Washing- 
ton ;  and  his  message  to  McDowell,  that  Jackson's  train 
ougiit  to  be  captured  at  any  rate,  seems  to  indicate 
that  he  feared  Jackson  had  escaped  northwards  even  then. 

At  night  he  was  informed  that  McDowell  had  met  and 
stopped  the  enemy  at  Gainesville.^  He  then  relied  upon 
tlrrowing  his  right  wing,  under  McDowell,  across  the  road 
wliich  Jackson  would  take  to  the  north,  and  so,  having: 
him  hemmed  in  between  McDowell,  Sio^el.  and  Revnolds, 
with  25.000  men,  on  one  side,  and  Kearny,  Eeno,  and 
Hooker,  with  25,000  men.  on  the  other  side,  to  crush  or 
capture  liim.  This  seems  to  be  the  true  explanation  of 
his  failure  to  send  Heintzelman  and  Reno  to  Gainesville 
from  Manassas  Jtinction  that  night,  as  he  promised  ]\Ic- 
Dowell.^  But  Pope  lost  tliis  great  opportunity,  Avhich 
McDowell  had  indicated  to  him  by  his  note  of  the  28th, 
and  his  own  plan  failed  becatise  he  had  miscalculated 
Lee's  pace.  Longstreet  arrived  at  "Wlhte  Plains  on  the 
evening  of  the  27th,  having,  as  he  says,  been  delayed 
an  hour  by  a  dash  of  several  squadrons  of  Buford's 
cavalry  ^  into  Salem  in  front  of  him."  (We  should  be 
glad  to  know  whether  Pope  received  a  report  of  this 
reconnoissance  on  the  27th.)  On  the  28th,  at  3  P.M., 
Longsti'eet  arrived  in  fi'ont  of  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and 
here  was  delayed  imtil  after  dark  by  Ricketts's  division, 
which  McDowell,  with  great  foresight,  had  sent  to  hold 
the  Gap  on  the  28th.  Pope  complains  of  this  act  of 
McDowell's  as  diverting  a  part  of  the  force  for  operating 
against  Jackson;^  but,  if  McDowell  had  not  sent  Rick- 

^  16  W.R.,  7i-7o.     =  lb.,  74.     3 gg^       971,  277,  333.  335. 
lb.,  564.  =Ib.,  37,  38, 


332 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


etts  up  to  the  Gap,  Longstreet  would,  in  all  probability, 
liave  reached  the  field  of  battle  on  the  night  of  the  28th. 
In  that  case  McDowell  would  have  been  in  a  serious 
position,  and  what  the  result  would  have  been  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  determine.  That  it  was  a  position  that  Mc- 
Dowell's subordinates  were  not  willing  to  occupy  was 
made  certain  on  that  very  night  of  the  28th,  for  Ricketts, 
retreating  from  Thoroughfare  Gap,  stayed  not  until  he  got 
safely  beyond  it,  and  King  followed  him.  This  destroyed 
Pope's  combination  against  Jackson. 

Pope,  by  ordering  McDowell  to  move  down  the  Warren- 
ton  pike  towards  Centreville,  had  in  fact  cut  off  Jackson 
from  Lee.  He  undoubtedly  was  inexcusable  for  not 
knowing  that  Lee  would  not  spare  man  or  horse  to  aid 
Jackson,  and  for  not  foreseeing  or  discovering  the  near 
approach  of  Lee ;  and  the  question  occurs,  whether, 
regardless  of  Lee's  approach,  he  was  warranted  as  a 
strategist  in  trusting  to  McDowell  to  stop  the  way  be- 
tween Jackson  and  Lee.  If  an  unhappy  accident  had  not 
separated  McDowell  from  his  command  that  night  it 
probably  would  have  stayed  at  Gainesville  until  Lee  came 
at  least ;  what  would  have  followed,  with  the  two  armies 
sandwiched  together  in  four  parts,  can  scarcely  be  con- 
jectured. 

Towards  daylight  of  the  29tli  Pope  learned  that  King 
had  retreated  to  Manassas  Junction  and  opened  the  way 
between  Longstreet  and  Jackson.^ 

At  this  time  a  new  phase  came  upon  the  campaign  east 
of  the  Rappahannock.  Up  to  the  night  of  the  28th  Jack- 
son, by  the  bold  separation  of  his  corps  from  Longstreet's, 

» 16  W.R.,  38. 


CONDUCT  OF  McCLELLAN  AND  HALLECK.  333 

had  put  himself  within  Pope's  power,  and  the  latter,  with 
superior  numbers  and  superior  strategic  position,  had,  as 
it  seemed,  only  to  bring  on  a  pitched  battle  with  all  his 
force  to  realize  a  tremendous  victory;  but  now,  on  the 
evening  of  the  28th,  he  had  lost  the  advantage  of  position, 
and,  although  he  did  not  know  it,  before  he  could  recover 
it  the  enemy  in  liis  front  were  to  exceed  him  in  force. 

This  was  the  time  when  the  whole  Army  of  the  Potomac 
and  Cox's  force  were  needed  by  him  to  secure  victory,  and 
in  twenty-four  hours  more  they  were  needed  to  avert  dis- 
aster, and  yet  Franklin,  Sumner,  and  Cox  did  not  reach 
him;  and  the  question  comes.  Who  was  to  blame  for  it? 

The  conclusion  of  a  preceding  committee,  that  McClellan 
was  to  blame  for  the  detention  of  Franklin  and  Cox,  can- 
not be  avoided,  although  Halleck  should  share  in  the  re- 
sponsibility for  the  detention  of  Cox  from  the  evening  of 
the  29th,  when  he  assented  to  it. 

We  think  Halleck  and  McClellan  were  both  to  blame 
for  the  detention  of  Sumner.  His  corps  was  partially 
landed  at  Acquia  Creek  on  the  26th.  If  he  had  continued 
he  could  have  reached  Pope  on  the  27th  or  28th  by  land. 
At  noon  of  the  27th  McClellan  suggested  to  Halleck  to 
call  Sumner  to  Alexandria  by  water,  to  move  out  to 
Centreville  with  Franklin.  Halleck  expressing  his  ap- 
prehension that  the  enemy  were  trying  to  turn  Pope's 
right  (which  Jackson  had  done  twenty-four  hours  before), 
assented  to  calling  Sumner  up  by  water.  Sumner  arrived 
at  Alexandria  on  the  28th,  and  was  detained  in  camp  near 
Alexandria  twenty-four  hours,  and  that  veteran,  testifying 
before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  said : 


334 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


"  I  can  say  this,  —  had  I,  upon  landing  at  Alexandria,  been 
ordered  forward  immediately,  I  should  have  been  in  the 
second  Bull  Run  battle  with  my  corps''^ — a  corps  of 
about  10,000  men.  At  8  A.M.  on  the  27th  McClellan 
reported  his  arrival  to  Halleck.^  At  3.30  P.M.  on  the  28th 
Halleck  ordered  McClellan  to  push  as  large  a  force  as  pos- 
sible forward  to  communicate  with  Pope,  "  before  the  enemy 
is  reenforcedy  ^  It  would  seem  that  this  was  upon  informa- 
tion from  the  front  that  Jackson  was  isolated  by  Pope. 
At  4.45  P.M.  McClellan  tells  Halleck  that  neither  Sumner 
nor  Franklin  is  ready  to  move  and  fight  a  battle;^ at  10.30 
A.M.  of  29th  he  sends  word  to  Halleck  that,  if  Sumner 
follows  Franklin,  it  will  leave  Washington  too  much 
alone  ;  and  at  noon,  again,  suggests  the  posting  of  Sumner 
in  front  of  Washington ;  ^  and  in  the  afternoon  Halleck 
assents  to  this.^ 

This  resulted  from  a  panic  which  had  apparently  over- 
taken Halleck  and,  perhaps,  McClellan,  resulting  from 
their  not  hearing  from  Pope,  which  was  most  singular, 
because  the  enemy  had  retreated  from  the  railroad  early 
on  the  28th,  and  left  the  way  between  Halleck  and  Pope 
open,  although  Gen.  Fitzhugh  Lee,  with  some  cavalry, 
raided  towards  Alexandria  on  that  day. 

It  is  difficult  to  find  any  justification  for  the  belief  of 
Halleck  and  McClellan,  that  Pope,  with  over  50,000  men, 
could  give  so  little  account  of  himself  as  to  allow  the 
enemy  to  march  on  Washington  with  such  a  force  as  to 
require  Sumner,  Cox,  and  Tyler  to  remain,  with  all  the 
other  troops  that  Pope  had  left  behind,  for  the  defence  of 
Washington. 

» 1  C.W.,  367.       2 12  W.R.,  94 ;  18  W.R.,  688-689.       ^  709. 
^  lb.  5  12  W.R.,  97-98.  ^  lb.,  98  ;  18  W.R.,  722. 


COXDUCT  OF  McCLELLAN  AXD  EALLECK. 


835 


Sumner  did  not  marcli  for  Pope  until  the  oOtli,  too  late 
to  take  part  in  the  battle. 

To  return  to  Pope's  moyements :  Tve  find  that,  upon  learn- 
ing of  King's  retreat,  he  ordered  Sigel,  who  was  near  Grove- 
ton  supported  by  Reynolds,  to  attack  the  enemy  as  soon  as 
it  was  light  enough  to  see  on  the  29th,  and  to  bring  them 
to  a  stand  ;^  he  ordered  Heintzelman  and  Reno  at  earliest 
dawn  to  follow  and  attack  the  enemy,-  and  he  ordered  Fitz- 
John  Porter  to  march  with  King's  division  directly  from 
Manassas  Junction  to  Gaines^dlle  with  all  speed,  to  turn 
the  enemy's  flank  there. ^  Soon  after  this,  on  receiving  a 
request  from  McDowell  not  to  take  King's  division  from 
him.  he  sent  the  joint  order  "  to  him  and  Porter.^  It  has 
been  contended  that  this  order  superseded  all  others, 
and  that  it  was  not  made  clear  to  Porter  by  it  that  Pope 
intended  to  fight  a  battle  on  this  day ;  that  the  command 
to  assiu^e  a  retreat  behind  Bull  Run  that  night  was  incon- 
sistent with  such  an  intention ;  and  that  Porter  was  so 
ignorant  of  the  sitttation  of  affairs  that,  when  he  fotmd 
himself  opposed  by  an  itnexpected  force,  he  cotild  net 
divine  that  it  was  necessary  for  him  to  attack:  and  force 
has  been  lent  to  this  last  assertion  by  the  statement  that 
such  had  been  the  conftision  of  Pope's  movements  that  he 
himself  did  not  know  the  sitttation  of  his  troops,  and  his 
commanders  had  no  confidence  in  his  knowledge  of  it. 

It  is  difficult  to  find  sttpport  for  these  propositions.  It 
is  true,  as  has  been  stated  in  this  article,  that  Pope  was 
cttlpably  ignorant  of  the  enemy's  movements,  bttt  his  own 
were  exact,  and  they  were  commttnicated  clearly  and  fully 
to  his  commanders  by  his  despatches  to  them,  which  are 

1 16  W.K.,  38.       2  3  lb..       513.       4  j^.,  33,  "6,  508,  520. 


836 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


in  print.  And  it  does  seem  that  lie  and  his  commanders 
all  knew  on  the  night  of  the  26th  that  the  enemy  were 
in  force  behind  him;  on  the  morning  of  the  27th  that 
the  line  of  battle,  facing  the  rear,  was  to  be  formed  from 
Gainesville  southward ;  on  the  morning  of  the  28th  that 
the  different  corps  were  to  converge  on  the  enemy  at 
Manassas  Junction ;  in  the  afternoon  that  they  were  to 
pursue  the  enemy  towards  Centreville,  and,  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  29th,  that  Jackson,  retreating  towards  Thor- 
oughfare Gap,  was  to  be  pursued  by  Heintzelman,  Sigel, 
and  Reno,  and  intercepted  by  Porter  at  Gainesville,  if 
possible,  and  to  be  attacked,  if  he  could  be  reached,  and 
struck  as  hard  a  blow  as  possible  before  Lee  reached  him. 
The  joint  order  seems  in  terms  to  confirm  the  previous 
order,  which  clearly  contemplated  an  attack,  and  not  to 
supersede  it. 

It  seems  incredible  that  Porter  could  have  supposed 
that  the  march  to  Gainesville  of  50,000  men  was  intended 
to  be  merely  an  exercise  in  tactics,  or  to  pick  up  strag- 
glers from  Jackson's  force ;  or  that  he  supposed  he  was 
to  turn  the  enemy's  flank  only  to  get  a  convenient  posi 
tion  from  which  to  retreat ;  or  that  Sigel  was  to  bring  the 
enemy  to  a  stand  merely  to  afford  them  the  spectacle  of 
the  Union  army  effecting  a  junction  in  their  front,  and 
then  retiring  over  Bull  Run. 

Porter  reported  to  Pope  in  person  on  the  morning  of 
the  27th,  and  without  doubt  then  learned  the  existing 
situation.  At  4  o'clock  on  the  same  day  he  telegraphed 
to  Burnside  that  Pope  was  working  to  get  behind  Bull 
Run  ;^  again,  at  2  P.M.  on  the  28th,  that  the  talk  about 

U8  W.R.,  699-700. 


CASE  OF  FIT Z- JOHN  PORTER. 


337 


bagging  Jackson  was  bosh,  that  Manassas  was  left  open, 
and  the  enemy  jumped  through  ;^  and  agam,  at  6  A.M.  of 
29th,  that  Heintzelman  and  Reno  were  at  Centreville, 
where  they  marched  yesterday;  that  Pope  went  to 
Centreville  with  the  last  two  as  a  body-guard,  at  the  time 
not  knowing  where  the  enemy  was,  and  when  Sigel  was 
fighting  within  eight  miles  of  him  and  in  sight.  ^  These 
despatches  show  a  knowledge  of  the  general  situation. 
The  only  theory  consistent  with  Porter's  intelligence  is, 
that,  both  before  and  after  reading  the  "  joint  order  "  of  the 
29th  he  knew  that  Pope  intended  both  wings  to  fight  the 
enemy  he  was  pursuing  as  soon  as  they  overtook  them. 

Pope  supposed  that  Longstreet  would  not  reach  J ackson 
that  day,  but  McDowell  informed  Porter  of  Buford's  re- 
port that  seventeen  regiments  had  passed  through  Gaines- 
ville that  morning,^  and  Porter,  upon  arriving  at  his  most 
advanced  position,  doubtless  found  evidence  that  a 
considerable  force  was  arriving  in  his  front.  McDowell 
and  he  rode  to  the  front  together  and  reconnoitred, 
and  then  McDowell  determined  to  take  his  command 
round  on  the  Sudley  Springs  road  to  the  rear.  There 
has  been  much  question  made  as  to  whether,  on  the 
one  hand  McDowell  advised  Porter  to  attack  there,  or, 
on  the  other  hand,  ordered  him  not  to.  A  civil  court 
would  be  very  likely  to  refuse  to  reopen  an  adjudicated 
question  of  a  civil  nature  fifteen  years  after  the  event, 
where  its  solution  depended  on  the  recollection  of 
witnesses  of  words  spoken  in  a  peaceful  negotiation,  and 
there  is  no  greater  safety  in  tliis  case,  where  the  words 
were  uttered  under  the   excitement   aroused  by  the 

^  18  W.E.,  732-733.  2  lb.,  733.  '  16  W.R.,  338. 


338 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


presence  of  the  enemy.  The  record  of  the  Porter  court- 
martial  shows  that  Porter,  marching  on  the  road  from 
Manassas  Junction  to  Gainesville,  had  arrived  near  where 
this  road  crossed  the  railroad  at  about  noon. 

According  to  the  testimony  of  Capt.  Martin,  when 
McDowell  was  with  Porter  at  the  front,  the  latter's  troops 
were  closing  in  mass  preparatory  to  forming  line  of 
battle,  and  skirmishers  were  out,^  and  a  section  of  the 
enemy's  artillery  fired  perhaps  twenty  minutes  very 
slowly,  and,  perhaps  an  hour  later,  a  battery  further  to 
the  right  opened,  and  was  engaged  by  Hazlett's  battery 
of  Morell's  division.^ 

Gen,  Morell  testified  that  when  the  enemy's  skirmishers 
were  reported.  Porter  ordered  the  column  to  be  halted 
and  position  to  be  taken ;  that,  after  McDowell  left, 
Porter  ordered  him  (Morell)  to  move  over  the  rail- 
road to  the  right ;  that  he  got  a  brigade  and  a  battery 
over,  and  then  received  orders  to  return,  and  in  so  doing 
received  a  shot  from  the  enemy's  artillery  directly  in 
front ;  that  the  only  enemy  he  supposed  to  be  in  reach 
were  directly  in  front ;  and  that  the  enemy  in  Pope's 
front  were  a  considerable  distance  away,  with  woods 
between ;  that  he  had  out  the  Sixty-Second  Penn- 
sylvania, and  afterwards  the  Thirteenth  New  York,  as 
skirmishers;  that  just  before  sunset  he  got  an  order 
from  Porter  to  make  dispositions  to  attack,  which  was 
then  countermanded,  and  that  soon  after  Porter  came 

Gen.  Griffin,  commanding  Morell's  leading  brigade, 
testified    that    his   brigade   moved   over  the  railroad 

^  17  W,K.,  963.  2       935^  3  j^,^  9(33, 


CASE  OF  FITZ-JOHX  PORTER. 


and  was  tlien  ordered  back  :  and  that  lie  then  started  back 
towards  Manas.-as.  and  had  gone  from  one  and  a  half  to 
two  miles  when  an  order  reached  him  at  about  sunset  to 
return  to  the  front. ^ 

Col.  B.  F.  Smith  testified  to  the  Second  Division  falling 
back.^^ 

Col.  Marshall,  of  the  Thirteenth  Xew  York,  testified 
that  he  deployed  skirmishers  at  about  1  o'clock,  and 
was  immediately  tired  on  by  dragoons,  and  soon  after 
by  a  section  of  artillery,  and  that  at  abont  2  P.]\L  the 
head  of  a  large  column  came  to  his  front  and  deployed 
skirmishers  and  drove  his  men  in.  and  deployed  in  line  of 
battle.-^  Major  Hyland.  of  this  regiment,  testified  that  he 
was  on  the  skirmish  line,  that  the  enemy  opened  fire 
between  2  and  3  o'clock,  and  that  there  was  no  enemy  to 
the  left  that  he  conld  see.* 

Col.  Shepard  and  Capt.  Bowers,  of  the  Thirty-second 
Massachtisetts  Voltinteers.  who  were  in  Griffin's  command, 
have  recently  told  one  of  yonr  committee  that  they 
remember  retreating  a  mile  or  two.  and  then  coimter- 
marching  to  the  front  so  late  as  to  arrive  at  their  previotis 
advanced  position  at  dark. 

It  is  difficult  to  avoid  the  belief  that  this  rearward 
movement  of  Morelhs  was  made  late  in  the  day.  and  in 
pursuance  of  the  order  of  Porter  to  him  to  push  over  to 
the  Sudley  Springs  road,  on  which  King  was  moving  to 
reach  Sigel's  rear  and  aid  him,'^and  the  tone  of  the  order 
is  as  if  Porter  himself  were  about  cutting  loose  fi^om 
Morell  to  retreat  with  the  Second  Division,  and  one  is 
led  to  connect  tliis  order  with  Porter's  messao-e  to  Kino^ 

U7  9S3-9S4.  ^Ib..  932.  'lb..  1011-1012. 

■'lb-  996.  =16W.R..523. 


340 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CA3IPAIGN. 


and  McDowell,  that,  having  learned  that  Pope  was  being 
driven  back,  he  was  about  to  retreat. 

The  explanation  that  this  retrograde  movement  was  sim- 
ply to  conceal  Morell's  troops  does  not  appeal  strongly  to 
an  unsympathetic  critic ;  and  as  all  the  other  despatches 
between  Morell  and  Porter,  published  and  unpublished 
(so  far  as  disclosed),  are  consistent  with  the  theory 
that  Porter  actually  did  retreat,  unless  the  hours  of  send- 
ing them  (which  have  not  been  disclosed)  make  this  con- 
clusion inconsistent  with  them,  there  is  no  overwhelming 
reason  apparent  for  disturbing  the  finding  of  the  court  on 
this  point.  It  seems  probable  that  it  was  Pope's  order  of 
4.30  P.M.  which  arrested  this  movement,  and  the  time  that 
was  occupied  in  countermarching  to  the  front  might  go  far 
towards  explaining  why  there  was  not  time  to  attack  after 
the  receipt  of  this  order. 

For  reasons  before  stated  as  to  the  other  question,  it 
seems  utterly  unwise  to  reopen  the  question  of  whether 
Porter  received  Pope's  order  of  4.30  at  one  time  or  an- 
other ;  and  Porter's  claim  for  a  rehearing  does  not  neces- 
sarily depend  on  this,  for  this  order  was  founded  on  Pope's 
belief  that  only  Jackson  was  in  his  front,  and  that  Porter 
could  strike  his  flank ;  and  Porter  was  quite  as  much  in 
the  right  to  disregard  this  upon  the  ground  that  a  differ- 
ent force  than  what  Pope  supposed  was  in  his  front,  as  he 
was  to  refrain  from  attacking  on  the  order  of  the  morning. 
He  was  tried  for  both  these  offences,  and  convicted  of  the 
charge  of  misbehavior  in  the  face  of  the  enemy  against  the 
52d  Article  of  War,  on  two  specifications.  Now,  if  this 
new  force  was  in  his  front,  it  is  folly  to  waste  time  in  the 


CASE  OF  FITZ-JOHX  PORTER. 


341 


discussion  of  the  question  whether  he  could  have  marched 
over  the  country,  between  liim  and  Jackson's  right  llanh, 
for  he  would  hare  had  to  march  over  a  more  serious  ob- 
stacle,—  a  new  enemy. 

And  what  conclusion  must  we  arrive  at  as  to  the  pres- 
ence of  this  new  force,  and  whether  Porter  conducted 
himself  well  in  its  presence  ?  To  begin  with,  we  have  now 
the  published  reports  of  the  enemy  which  Porter's  court 
did  not  have,  and  if  thev  afford  us  unambioaious  evidence 
of  the  right  kind,  that  should  be  enough  to  giA'e  Porter  a 
rehearing,  because  it  is  contemporaneous,  disinterested, 
and  preserved  in  print,  -the  memory  of  which,"  as  a 
learned  counsellor  has  said,  is  not  impaired  by  the  lapse 
of  time.'' 

Porter  encountered  the  enemy's  skirmishers  at  about 
noon,  perhaps  an  hour  or  so  before  noon,  and  we  can 
gather  from  the  testimony  of  the  witnesses  before  the 
coiu't,  that,  at  first,  he  encountered  only  skirmishers ; 
that  after  a  while  a  section  of  artillery  opened  on  him: 
and  that  during  the  afternoon  infantry  began  to  form  in 
front  of  him,  and  a  full  battery  opened  on  him. 

From  the  reports  of  Jackson  and  his  subordinates 
it  is  made  clear  that  all  of  his  line  of  battle  was 
north  of  the  TTarrenton  turnpike  on  this  day,  and 
therefore  not  in  front  of  Porter.  Reynolds  testified 
before  the  Porter  court  :  that  up  to  12  or  1  the  enemy's 
right  was  not  across  the  pike ;  that  he  had  made 
an  attack  on  their  right,  and  was  obliged  to  change 
front  to  the  rear  to  meet  the  enemy  coming  down 
the  pike:  that  he  thought  they  extended  their  right 


342 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CA3IPAIGN. 


till  dark/  and  outflanked  him  by  sunset  too  far  to  be 
engaged.^ 

Stuart  says  that  at  about  10  A.M.  he  was  in  Jackson's 
rear,  and  then  went  out  towards  Haymarket  to  open  com- 
munication with  Longstreet  and  Lee  ;  met  them,  with  the 
head  of  the  column,  between  Gainesville  and  Haymarket ; 
then  passed  through  the  column  and  went  directly  towards 
Manassas;  selected  a  fine  position  for  a  battery  which  was 
sent  to  him,  and  fired  a  few  shots  at  the  enemy's  supposed 
position,  which  induced  the  enemy  to  shift  position.^ 

Major  Frobel,  chief  of  artillery,  says  that  at  11  A.M.  he 
reported  with  Bachman's  battery  to  Stuart  by  order  of 
Hood,  and  from  a  position  selected  by  Stuart,  near  the 
Orange  &  Alexandria  Railroad,  opened  on  a  column  mov- 
ing to  the  right,  which  at  once  changed  direction  and 
moved  to  the  left,  —  fired  fifteen  rounds  and  then  ceased 
because  the  distance  was  so  much  increased,  and  then 
took  the  battery  to  the  left  of  the  turnpike  at  1  P.M.^ 

Stuart  says  further,  that  Robertson,  who  had  gone  fur- 
ther towards  Manassas,  reported  the  enemy  in  his  front, 
and  that,  repairing  to  that  front,  he  (Stuart)  found  Rosser 
engaged  with  the  enemy  on  the  left  of  the  road;  that 
Robertson's  videttes  had  found  the  enemy  approaching 
from  the  direction  of  Bristoe  towards  Sudley,  and  that  the 
prolongation  of  the  line  of  march  of  the  enemy  would 
have  passed  through  his  (Stuart's)  position  "  and  struck 
Longstreet  in  flank ; "  that  he  found  this  was  at  least  an 
army  corps;  that  he  then  dragged  brush  up  and  down 
the  road,  and  so  deceived  Porter,  and  notified  Longstreet 
that   his  flank  was  seriously  menaced ;  that  J enkins's, 

U7  W.R.,  993.         2ib.^  994.  ^  i6  W.R..,  735-736.  *  lb.,  607. 


CASE  OF  F IT Z- JO  EN  PORTER. 


343 


Kemper's,  and  D.  R.  Jones's  brigades  and  several  pieces  of 
artillery  were  ordered  to  Mni  by  Longstreet,  and  were 
placed  fronting  Bristoe ;  and  tliat,  after  exchanging  a 
few  shots,  this  corps  of  the  enemy  "withdrew  toward 
llanassas,  leaving  artillery  and  supports  to  hold  the  posi- 
tion till  night."  1 

Hood  had  the  advance  of  Longstreet's  column,  and 
kept  on  the  Warrenton  turnpike.  The  Orange  & 
Alexandria  Railroad,  spoken  of  by  jiajor  Frobel,  is  the 
unfinished  road  which  crosses  or  arrives  at  the  turnpike 
between  Gainesville  and  Groveton,  and  it  is  apparent 
that  it  was  Reynolds  or  Sigel,  manoeuvring  near  the 
turnpike,  whom  Stuart  first  encountered,  and  that  this 
was  at  about  noon,  and  before  Longstreet  had  got  into 
position. 

There  also  cannot  be  any  doubt  that  the  army  corps 
discovered  by  Robertson  was  Porter's. 

If  Stuart's  account  be  correct,  then  Porter's  demon- 
strations did  not  have  much  effect,  and  he  diverted 
but  three  of  Longstreet's  brigades  of  infantry  from  their 
previous  position,  and  those  for  a  short  time  only.  It 
is  contended  by  Porter's  friends  that  Stuart  was  accus- 
tomed to  enlarge  his  exploits  in  the  narration  of  them, 
and  that  in  fact  he  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  force  sent 
to  meet  Porter,  and,  moreover,  that,  in  this  instance, 
instead  of  three  brigades  sent  over  to  him  to  meet 
Porter,  there  were  three  divisions  posted  by  Lee  him- 
self for  that  purpose.  Longstreet  in  liis  report  says 
that  after  passing  Gainesville  Hood's  division  was  placed 
on  right  and  left  of  the  turnpike  at  right  angles  with 

116  W.R.,  736. 


844  .    POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 

it,  and  supported  by  Evans's  brigade,  and  then  goes  on  .to 
say :  ' '  Before  these  [Hood's]  batteries  could  open  the 
enemy  .  ,  .  withdrew  his  left.  Another  battery 
(Captain  Stribling's)  was  placed  upon  a  commanding 
position  to  my  right,  which  played  upon  the  rear  of  the 
enemy's  left  and  drove  him  entirely  from  that  part  of 
the  field.  He  changed  his  front  rapidly,  so  as  to  meet 
the  advance  of  Hood  and  Evans.  Three  brigades,  under 
General  Wilcox,  were  thrown  forward  to  the  support  of 
the  left,  and  three  others,  under  General  Kemper,  to  the 
support  of  the  right,  of  these  commands.  General  D.  E. 
Jones'  division  was  placed  upon  the  Manassas  Gap  Eail- 
road  to  the  right  and  en  Echelon  with  regard  to  the  last 
three  brigades.  ,  ,  ,  At  a  late  hour  in  the  day  Major- 
General  Stuart  reported  the  approach  of  the  enemy  in 
heavy  columns  against  my  extreme  right.  I  withdrew 
General  Wilcox,  with  his  three  brigades,  from  the  left 
and  placed  his  command  in  position  to  support  Jones  in 
case  of  an  attack  against  my  right.  After  some  few  shots 
the  enemy  ivithdi^eiv  his  forces,  moving  them  around 
toward  his  front,  and  about  4  o'clock  in  the  afternoon 
began  to  press  forward  against  General  Jackson's  position. 
Wilcox's  brigades  were  moved  back  to  their  former  posi- 
tion, and  Hood's  two  brigades,  supported  by  Evans, 
were  quickly  pressed  forward  to  the  attack.  At  the  same 
time  Wilcox's  three  brigades  made  a  like  advance,  as 
also  Hunton's  brigade,  of  Kemper's  command."  ^ 

Lonfifstreet's  field  minutes  also  state  that  Lee  was 
very  anxious  to  attack  the  enemy  in  front  when  he 
arrived  that  afternoon,  but  that  his  subordinates  per- 
suaded him  to  wait  until  the  next  day,  and  that  after 

U6W.E.,  565« 


CASE  OF  FITZ-JOHN  PORTER. 


345 


tliis  the  approach  of  the  enemy  on  the  right  Tvas  re- 
ported, and  Wilcox  yas  sent  over  to  meet  them. 

Jackson,  too,  in  liis  report  says  that  '-it  Tras  not  desira- 
ble to  bring  on  a  general  engagement on  the  evenmg 
of  the  29th.i 

Wilcox  says  in  his  report  that  at  9.30  A.^^vl.  on  the 
morning  of  the  29th  he  joined  the  rest  of  the  division 
at  the  junction  of  the  roads  from  Thoroughfare  and 
Hopewell  Gaps,  then  marched  past  Gainesville  three 
miles,  formed  line  of  battle  on  right  and  left  of  turn- 
pike, and  at  right  angles  with  it.  and  then  advanced 
thi'ee-Cjuaiters  of  a  mile  and  halted,  and  then  at  4.30  or 
5  P.M.  .  .  .  moved  across  to  the  right  of  the  turn- 
pike a  mile  or  more  to  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,"'  and 
at  sundown  was  ordered  back  to  the  turnpike  and  forward 
to  the  support  of  Hood.- 

Lee  in  his  report  says  :  D.  R.  Jones'  division  formed 
the  exti'eme  right  of  the  line,  resting  on  the  Manassas 
Gap  Railroad.  The  cavalry  guarded  our  right  and 
left  flanks,  that  on  the  right  being  under  General 
Stuaii;  in  person.  After  the  arrival  of  Longstreet  the 
enemy  changed  his  position  and  l3egan  to  concentrate 
opposite  Jackson's  left,  opening  a  brisk  artillery  lire, 
which  was  responded  to  with  etiect  by  some  of  Gen- 
eral A.  P.  Hilhs  batteries.  Colonel  "Walton  placed  a 
part  of  his  artillery  upon  a  commanding  position 
between  the  lines  of  Generals  Jackson  and  Long- 
sti'eet  by  order  of  the  latter  and  engaged  the  enemy 
vigorously  for  several  hours.  Soon  afterward  General 
Stuart  reported  the  approach  of  a  large  force  from 
the   direction    of  Bristoe    Station,    threatening  Long- 

U6W.R.,6i6.  2  lb.,  598. 


346 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


street's  right.  Tlie  brigades  under  General  Wilcox  were 
sent  to  reenforce  General  Jones,  but  no  serious  attack  was 
made,  and  after  firing  a  few  shots  the  enemi/  withdrew.''^ 

D.  R.  Jones  says  in  his  report  that  he  arrived  at  about 
noon,  and  was  placed  on  the  extreme  right,  and  "  during 
the  balance  of  the  day  was  subjected  to  shelling,  resulting 
in  but  few  casualties."^ 

It  seems  that  Stuart  was  mistaken  as  to  what  brigades 
were  sent  to  the  right,  for  Wilcox  had  Pryor's,  Feather- 
ston's,  and  his  own  brigades,  and  probably  Stuart  arro- 
gates too  much  to  himself  when  he  intimates  that  these 
brigades  were  put  under  his  command,  but  in  all  other 
material  particulars  above  mentioned  Stuart,  Longstreet, 
Wilcox,  and  Lee  agree ;  and  the  conclusion  cannot 
be  escaped  that,  while  it  is  true  that  Longstreet, 
with  all  his  corps,  except  R.  H.  Anderson's  division,  was 
arriving  in  front  of  Pope's  army  at  aboi"'t  noon  of  the 
29th ;  yet  Lee  on  that  day  regarded  Porter's  demonstration 
as  insignificant.  Of  all  his  army  only  the  three  brigades 
under  Wilcox  were  diverted  for  the  express  purpose  of 
meeting  Porter,  and  Lee  made  all  his  dispositions  except- 
ing this,  and  determined  not  to  give  battle  on  that  day 
before  Porter's  demonstrations  attracted  his  attention ; 
and,  therefore,  the  claim  that  Porter,  by  his  presence,  re- 
lieved Pope  in  any  material  degree  is  not  well  founded. 
Further,  the  testimony  of  Stuart,  Longstreet,  and  Lee  is, 
that  Porter's  main  force  withdrew^  and  this  movement 
cannot  be  connected  with  anything  but  the  march  to  the 
rear  testified  to  by  Griffin  and  Smith ;  and  as  now  related 
by  Col.  Shepard  and  Capt.  Bowers. 

neW.R.,  556.  Mb.,  579. 


CASE  OF  FIT Z- JO  EN  PORTER. 


347 


It  is  said  by  Porter's  friends  that  Longstreet's  troops  to 
double  liis  number  were  in  his  front ;  but  this  assertion  is 
not  warranted.  Longstreet  had  with  him  twelve  brigades, 
numbering  from  25,000  to  30,000  men.  Hood's  two 
brigades,  Evans's  brigade,  and  Kemper's  three  brigades,  six 
in  all,  are  not  suggested  by  any  Confederate  General  as 
being  in  Porter's  front,  and  four  of  them  took  part  in  the 
advance  on  Pope  that  afternoon.  Col.  Marshall,  of  Lee's 
staff,  writing  to  Fitz-John  Porter,  in  1869,  says :  D.  K. 
Jones  was  not  in  line  when  Porter's  approach  was  reported, 
and  was  then  disposed  so  as  to  meet  it,  and  Porter's  ap- 
proach caused  nearly  the  whole  of  Longstreet's  line  to 
face  from  the  north  to  the  east ;  ^  but  this  seems  to  be 
directly  contrary  to  the  reports  above  cited,  made  soon 
after  the  battle.  It  seems  that  Kemper,  Hood,  and  Evans 
were  not  opposed  to  Porter.  "Was  D.  R.  Jones  ?  It  is  said, 
that,  being  formed  on  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  he 
must  have  been ;  but  if  liis  right  touched  that  railroad  at 
first,  yet,  in  advancing  in  line  of  battle  three-quarters  of  a 
mile,  as  Wilcox  did,  his  right  would  bear  away  from  the 
railroad  a  long  distance. 

Moreover,  the  witnesses  on  Porter's  trial  testified  that 
the  force  in  front  of  him  was  separate  from  that  in  Pope's 
front,  while  D.  R.  Jones's  division  was  the  prolongation  in 
6chelon  of  the  force  in  front  of  Pope.  It  would  be  inter- 
esting to  learn  whose  artillery  fire  it  was  that  D.  R.  Jones 
was  subjected  to  during  the  day. 

On  the  whole,  it  seems  probable  that  D.  R.  Jones,  even 
if  not  under  Porter's  fire,  was  in  such  position  that  he 
could  have  joined  in  repelling  any  attack  of  Porter's. 

*  1  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  37,  P;irt  1,  474. 


348 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CA31PAIGN. 


This  would  make  six  brigades,  numbering  from  12,000 
to  15,000  men,  in  front  of  Porter.  The  cavalry  can 
hardly  be  counted  as  an  effective  force  against  Porter's 
infantry.  It  is  not  easy  to  understand  why  it  has  been 
supposed  that  Porter  would  have  been  destroyed  if  he 
had  attacked  this  force  with  his  11,®00  veteran  soldiers. 

The  question  now  comes,  whether  Porter,  with  his 
knowledge  of  Pope's  plans  for  the  29th,  finding  himself 
opposed  by  an  unexpected  force  a  little  stronger  than 
his  own,  was  justified  in  refusing  to  attack  ? 

It  may  be  that  he  believed  that  no  attack  was  being 
made  by  Pope ;  but,  if  it  comes  to  relying  upon  this,  it 
must  be  admitted  by  Porter  that  he  heard  continued  and 
severe  artillery  firing  on  his  right,  and  that  at  one  time  he 
supposed  Pope  was  being  driven  back  in  an  infantry  battle. 
Col.  Marshall,  of  Griffin's  brigade,  testified  on  Porter's  trial 
to  seeing  from  Porter's  front  the  encounter  of  infantry  in 
Pope's  front,  ^  and  Longstreet  reported  that  his  jaded  men, 
approaching  Gainesville,  hurried  forward  at  the  sound  of 
battle  in  their  front,2and  it  is  true  beyond  doubt  that  sev- 
eral hours  before  dark,  and  perhaps  at  the  time  Porter  was 
withdrawing,  Pope  did  attack  the  enemy  in  his  front. 

However,  upon  newly  discovered  evidence  of  an  unim- 
peachable character,  it  is  now  apparent  that  both  Pope  and 
Porter  were  confronted  by  a  force  which  Pope  had  not 
expected.  Whether  the  fact  justified  Porter's  conduct  is 
a  question  deserving  the  consideration  of  a  tribunal  of 
military  experts  of  high  rank,  which  we  cannot  begrudge 
Porter. 

» 17  W.R.,  1012.  H6  W.R.I  564. 


XIII. 

THE    HEAKING    IN    THE    CASE    OF  FITZ-JOHN 

PORTER. 

By  JOHN  C.  EOPES,  Esq. 


Read  before  the  Society  on  Monday  evening,  Jan.  12,  1880. 


THE  HEAEmG  IN  THE  CASE  OF  FITZ- 
JOH^  POETER. 


Y  an  order  of  Gen.  Sherman,  dated  March  9,  1878,  a 


Board  of  Officers,  consisting  of  Gens.  Schofield  and 
Terry  and  Col.  Getty,  with  Major  Asa  Bird  Gardner  as 
Judge- Advocate,  was  convened  "  to  examine  in  connec- 
tion with  the  record  of  the  trial  hy  couit-martial  of  Major- 
General  Fitz-John  Porter,  such  new  evidence  relating  to 
the  merits  of  said  case  as  is  now  on  file  in  the  War  De- 
partment, together  with  such  other  evidence  as  may  be 
presented  to  said  Board,  and  to  report,  with  the  reasons 
for  their  conclusion,  what  action,  if  any,  in  their  opinion, 
justice  requires  should  be  taken  "  ^  by  the  President  on 
the  application  of  Gen.  Porter  for  a  review  of  his  case. 

It  is  probable  that  it  was  Gen.  Sherman's  intention  to 
limit  the  Board  in  receiving  testimony  to  newly  dis- 
covered evidence,  whether  from  the  files  of  the  War 
Department  or  from  other  sources.  His  language,  how- 
ever, was  so  broad  as  to  justify  the  Board  in  admitting 
any  evidence  that  might  be  presented,  whether  it  had 
been  presented  to  the  coui-t-martial  or  not. 

The  result  of  this  latitudinarian  construction  was  that 


*2  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  37,  63. 

351 


352 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


fifteen  of  the  principal  witnesses  in  the  court-martial 
testified  before  the  Board,  and,  though  the  effort  was 
made  in  their  examination  in  chief  to  confine  them  to 
matters  to  which  they  had  not  testified  before,  yet  there 
was,  of  course,  and  unavoidably  on  the  cross-examination, 
a  good  deal  of  ground  gone  over  which  had  been  occupied 
by  them  in  their  testimony  before  the  court-martial. 

There  were,  as  will  be  remembered,  two  charges  pre- 
ferred against  Gen.  Porter  at  the  court-martial ;  the  first 
being  disobedience  of  orders,  and  the  second,  misbe- 
havior before  the  enemy. 

Under  the  first  charge  there  were  tliree  specifications,^  as 
they  are  termed  (for  the  4th  and  5th  were  dropped);  that 
is,  Porter  was  accused  of  disobeying  orders  on  three  occa- 
sions. He  was  accused  of  disobeying  the  order  to  start  from 
Manassas  Junction  for  Bristoe  at  1  o'clock  in  the  morn- 
ing of  the  28th  of  August,  the  disobedience  consisting  in 
his  starting  at  3  instead  of  at  1  in  the  morning ;  secondly, 
he  was  accused  of  disobeying  the  now  celebrated  "  Joint 
Order  to  him  and  McDowell,  received  at  noon  of  the 
29th,  the  disobedience  to  which  certainly  did  not  consist 
in  any  plain  act  or  omission  to  act ;  and,  thirdly,  he  was 
accused  of  disobeying  the  order  ^  dated  half-past  4  that 
afternoon,  which  undoubtedly  was  not  obeyed.  Gen. 
Porter  alleging,  in  the  first  place,  that  it  came  too  late  to 
be  obeyed ;  and,  secondly,  that  his  situation  was  such  that 
a  literal  compliance  with  it  was  impossible. 

I  shall  not  take  up  the  time  of  the  society  with  dwell- 

'  1  17  W.R.,  824-826.  ^  Appendix  C,  supra,  384. 

^  Appendix  D,  supra^  385. 


HEARING  IN  FIT Z- JOHN  PORTER  CASE. 


353 


ing  oPx  tliis  cliarge  of  disobedience  of  orders.  No  person 
familiar  with  the  case,  it  is  safe  to  say,  has  had  any  great 
difficulty  in  disposing  of  this  accusation.  That  a  corps- 
commander  cannot  lawfully  use  discretion  whether  to 
start  at  1  or  at  3  o'clock  in  the  morning  on  a  road 
blocked  by  wagons  is  hardly  to  be  maintained.  In  post- 
poning his  march  two  hours,  he  exercised,"  to  use  the 
language  of  Gen.  Schofield,  "  only  the  very  ordinary  dis- 
cretion of  a  corps-commander,  which  it  w^as  his  plain  duty 
to  exercise."  This  is  quite  enough  to  dispose  of  this 
specification;  but  the  Board  go  farther,  and  say  that,  in 
their  opinion,  this  discretion  w^as  wisely  used.^  Then  as 
to  disobeying  the  "  Joint  Order."  That  was  an  order 
directing  Gens.  McDowell  and  Porter  to  move  forw^ard 
with  their  joint  command  towards  Gainesville ;  and  it  con- 
tained this  sentence :  "  If  any  considerable  advantages  are 
to  be  gained  by  departing  from  this  order,  it  will  not  be 
strictl}^  carried  out."  It  is  not  easy  to  see  how  this  order 
could  have  been  disobeyed.  At  any  rate,  the  fact  was 
that  Gen.  McDowell,  who  ranked  Gen.  Porter,  thought 
that  considerable  advantages  could  be  gained  by  depart- 
ing from  the  order,  and,  instead  of  moving  towards 
Gainesville  with  the  joint  command,  he  marched  up  the 
Sudley  Springs  road  towards  Groveton  with  his  own 
corps,  leaving  Porter  alone.  After  this,  it  seems  impos- 
sible to  fasten  on  Porter  the  charge  of  disobedience  to 
an  order  which  had  been  departed  from  so  essentially 
by  his  superior  officer.    It  is  plain  that  it  was  no  longer 

^Sopes,  Army  under  Pope,  178-180;  3  Senate  Ex.  Doc,  1699. 
2  Appendix  C,  supra.,  384. 


354 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


possible  to  obey  it  as  it  was  written.  Finally,  as  to  tbe 
order'  of  4.30  P.M.  That  order  reads,  "Your  line  of 
marcli  brings  you  in  on  the  enemy's  right  flank.  I 
desire  you  to  push  forward  into  action  at  once  on 
the  enemy's  flank,  and,  if  possible,  on  his  rear,"  etc. 
Gen.  Porter  maintained  at  the  trial  that  this  order 
was  not  received  till  nearly  or  quite  half-past  6,  and 
that  then  it  was  too  late  to  obey  it.  The  evidence 
he  adduced  in  support  of  this  was  so  strong  that  no 
student  of  the  case  probably  has  been  surprised  at  its 
confirmation  by  a  recently  discovered  despatch  from 
Porter  to  McDowell,  dated  6  P.M.  And  in  regard  to  his 
main  defence  to  this  charge,  namely,  that  his  line  of 
march  did  not  bring  him  in  on  the  "  enemy's  right  flank," 
as  the  order  said  it  did,  but  that,  on  the  contrary,  the 
enemy  were  confronting  him  in  strong  force,  —  while  the 
evidence  he  brought  forward  of  this  state  of  facts  w*as  not 
so  strong  as  could  have  been  desired,  still  it  was  enough 
to  show  the  extreme  probability  of  the  fact  being  as  he 
maintained.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  if  the  enemy  were 
in  the  position  in  which  Porter  claimed  that  they  were,  a 
compliance  with  the  order  was  impossible.  To  attack  a 
force  some  miles  off  in  flank  is  one  thing,  to  attack 
another  force  directly  in  front  is  quite  another ;  and  Gen. 
Porter's  claim,  that  a  large  force  of  the  enemy  was  in  his 
front,  while  it  lacked,  at  the  court-martial,  the  evidence  of 
the  Confederate  officers  by  which  it  was  substantiated  at 
the  late  hearing  before  the  Board,  was,  nevertheless,  sup- 
ported by  so  many  facts  that  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the 

^  Appendix  D,  supra^  385. 


HEARING  m  FIT Z- JOHN  PORTER  CASE. 


355 


court  managed  to  find  that  there  was  no  opposing  force 
of  any  magnitude  in  liis  front.  Not  one  of  tlie  tliree 
specifications  under  the  charge  of  disobedience  of  orders 
ever  had  a  sufiicient  probability  in  its  favor  to  justify 
making  it  the  foundation  of  a  charge  of  violating  one  of 
the  fundamental  articles  of  war. 

The  real  difficulty  in  the  case  of  Gen.  Porter  has 
always  been  connected  with  the  second  charge,  that  of 
misbehavior  in  face  of  the  enemy ;  and  impartial  students 
of  the  case  have  generally  felt,  not  only  that  the  other 
accusations  were  weak  and  unfounded,  but  that  they 
showed  an  animus  on  the  part  of  the  Government  quite 
inconsistent  with  the  serious  temper  with  which  such  a 
grave  matter  as  trying  a  veteran  officer  of  high  rank 
should  be  undertaken. 

It  has,  however,  as  has  just  been  said,  not  been  found 
so  easy  to  dispose  of  the  second  charge,  that  of  misbe- 
havior in  face  of  the  enemy.  The  facts,  as  they  were 
stated  in  evidence  to  the  court-martial,  were,  on  the 
whole,  a  good  deal  against  Porter.  Here  was  a  battle 
going  on  a  very  few  miles  away,  and  Porter's  corps  lying 
idle  all  the  afternoon.  It  is  true  that  he  claimed  that  he 
had  a  large  body  of  the  enemy  in  his  front;  but  the 
evidence  of  this  was  weak.  He  was  not  attacked.  He 
deployed  only  one  brigade.  His  troops  saw  almost 
nothing  of  their  opponents.  His  own  instructions  to 
his  officers  seemed  hardly  such  as  would  have  been  given 
had  he  supposed  himself  seriously  in  danger.  He  liimself 
was,  most  of  the  afternoon,  nearly  three  miles  from  the 
skirmish  line.    Above  all,  there  was  the  parting  word  of 


356 


POPE'S   VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


Gen.  McDowell,  to  wMcli  that  officer  testified,  telling 
him  "  to  put  his  force  in  here."  ^  Then  there  were  the 
letters  to  Burnside,  which  seemed  to  supply  the  motive 
of  this  apparently  unaccountable  inactivity.  Finally, 
there  was  no  one  on  the  court-martial,  probably,  who  did 
not  believe  that  the  position  of  the  two  armies  was  such 
that  Porter  might  have  attacked  Jackson  in  flank,  and 
that  thereby  Pope  would  have  gained  a  decisive  victory. 
With  such  evidence  as  this  before  it,  pressed  home  by 
arguments  of  a  kind  most  calculated  to  affect  soldiers  in 
time  of  war,  it  was  not,  perhaps,  greatly  to  be  wondered 
at  that  the  court  condemned  Fitz-John  Porter. 

Since  that  decision  much  has  been  written  upon  the 
subject.  Porter  himself  has  made  several  appeals  to  the 
Government,  and  has  adduced  a  great  deal  of  evidence 
from  the  statements,  and  especially  the  official  reports  of 
Confederate  officers.  There  have  been  rejoinders  written 
or  circulated  by  Gen.  Pope  and  by  Gen.  McDowell. 
There  have  been  pamphlets  printed  about  the  matter. 
The  Comte  de  Paris  was  obliged  to  treat  the  subject  in 
his  History,  and  thereby  became,  naturally  enough, 
perhaps,  involved  in  a  controversy  with  Pope,  and  in  a 
correspondence  with  Porter. 

At  last  the  Government  took  the  matter  up  and  ap- 
pointed this  Board  of  Officers,  as  we  have  seen,  to  ex- 
amine the  newly  discovered  evidence  in  connection  with 
the  record  of  the  court-martial,  and  to  report  their 
opinion  to  the  President.  The  hearing  was,  as  we  all 
know,  very  long  and  very  full,  and  the  evidence  and 
arguments,  contained  in  two  bulky  volumes  of  printed 
m  W.R.,  904. 


EEARIXG  AY  FIT Z- JO  EX  PORTER  CASE. 


357 


matter,  and  a  third  of  maps,  vrill  tell  tlie  future  liistorian 
all  tliat  can  be  known  abotit  this  celebrated  case.^  Tliis 
hearing  resulted  in  an  almost  unc[ualified  approval  by  the 
"Boarcl  of  the  conduct  of  Gen.  Porter.  He  Tvas.  it  is  true- 
criticised  for  the  insubordinate  language  in  which,  in 
his  letters  to  Burnside,  he  spoke  of  Gen.  Pope  :  btit  of 
his  acts,  and  omissions  to  act.  in  the  held,  the  Board  had 
no  words  too  emphatic  in  which  to  express  their  approval. 

I  pui^pose  this  evening  to  examine,  as  briefly  as  may  be, 
the  evidence  and  arouiments  at  this  hearino\  and  the  re- 
port  of  the  Board  of  Officers,  with  reference  to  the  second 
of  the  two  charo;es  against  Gen.  Porter,  namelv.  that  of 
misbehavior  in  the  face  of  the  enemy.  The  first  charge, 
that  of  disQbedience  of  orders,  I  have  never  considered 
worthy  of  much  attention. 

There  were  three  specifications  to  sttpport  this  second 
charge.  (The  fottrth.  relating  to  the  battle  of  the  30th, 
was  abandoned.)  The  first  adds  to  the  accusation  of  dis- 
obeying the  order  to  attack,  of  4.30  P.M. by  alleging  that 
he  shametuUy  disobeyed  it,  and  not  only  disobeyed  it,  but 
actually  retreated  from  the  enemy.  This  last,  however, 
the  court-martial  found  not  to  have  been  the  fact. 

We  need  not  particularly  concern  ourselves  with  this 
specification,  for  the  gist  of  it  lies  in  two  mistaken  sup- 
positions, namely,  that  the  4.30  P.M.  order  was  received 
soon  after  5  o'clock,  and  that  it  was  possible  for  Porter 
to  strike  the  flank  of  the  force  in  front  of  Pope.  T\'e 
shall  recur  to  this  later  on. 

The  second  specification  alleged  that  Porter,  being  in 

^  Eeprinted  in  Senate  ExeentiTe  Document,  Xo.  37.  4:6th  Congress.  1st 
Session.    See  Porter,  in  List  of  Books  cited,  ante, 
^Appendix  D.  siqrra.  385. 


358 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


the  face  of  the  enemy,  and  within  sound  of  the  guns  of  a 
severe  action,  failed  to  bring  his  corps  on  to  the  field,  and 
shamefully  retreated  from  the  enemy.  On  this  he  was 
found  guilty. 

The  tliird  specification  is  an  aggravation  of  the  second, 
in  this,  that  it  accuses  Pcrter  of  having  shamefully  re- 
treated to  Manassas,  when  he  was  in  the  belief  that  Pope's 
army  was  being  beaten.  Of  this  he  was  found  guilty; 
though  the  court  said  that  he  did  not  retreat  so  far  as 
Manassas. 

These  last  two  specifications  are  substantially  the  same. 
They  are  sufficiently  precise  for  their  purpose,  and  need 
not  detain  us  farther,  save  to  note  that  in  them  there  is 
no  allusion  to  the  alleged  verbal  order  of  Gen.  McDowell, 
of  which  so  much  was  said  in  the  course  of  the  trial. 

The  court-martial,  in  fine,  found  that  Gen.  Porter,  being 
within  hearing  of  a  battle  going  on  a  few  miles  from 
where  he  was,  and  being,  as  they  supposed  he  well  knew, 
in  a  position  where  he  could,  by  an  aggressive  movement 
on  the  enemy's  flank,  have  decided  the  fate  of  the  action, 
refused,  from  dishonorable  motives,  to  fight  his  corps,  and 
actually  fell  back  a  certain  distance ;  and  it,  therefore, 
found  him  guilty  of  this  second  charge,  that  of  misbe- 
havior in  presence  of  the  enemy. 

This  conclusion,  that  Porter's  inaction  was  due  to  dis- 
honorable motives,  was,  however,  not  entirely  based  on 
the  two  supposed  facts  just  recited,  namely,  that  he  was 
within  hearing  of  a  battle,  and  that  he  could  have  turned 
the  flank  of  the  enemy,  had  he  chosen  to  do  so. 

There  was  another  supposed  fact,  and  a  very  material 


HEARING  IN  FIT Z- JO  UN  PORTER  CASE.  359 

one  in  the  opinion  of  the  court,  namely,  that  Gen. 
McDowell  had,  on  leaving  Gen.  Porter,  told  him  to  put 
his  force  in  at  the  place  where  he  was  then ;  and,  though 
the  Judge  Advocate  did  not  probably  consider  this  remark 
as  sufficiently  explicit  for  him  to  use  it  as  the  foundation 
of  a  specification  under  the  charge  of  disobedience  of 
orders,  yet  he  did  consider  it  as  showing  that  the  line  of 
Porter's  duty  had  been  clearly  pointed  out  to  him,  so  that 
he  was  without  excuse  in  his  subsequent  inactivity. 

In  connection  with  this  it  must  be  remembered  that  the 
court-martial  undoubtedly  took  the  view  of  the  situation 
of  the  two  armies  which  Gens.  Pope  and  McDowell 
believed  at  the  time  to  be  true,  namely,  that  J ackson  had 
not,  during  the  29th,  been  reenforced  to  any  considerable 
extent,  and  that  there  was  no  large  force  of  the  enemy  in 
front  of  Porter.  Hence  they  held  Porter  to  be  bound  to 
carry  out  Pope's  expressed  design  of  falling  upon  Jack- 
son before  he  should  be  joined  by  the  rest  of  Lee's  army, 
and  that  it  was  his  plain  duty  to  make  his  way  through 
the  country,  whether  rough  or  otherwise,  which  separated 
him  from  the  Warrenton  pike,  while  McDowell  was 
marching  up  the  Sudley  Springs  road,  Porter  thus  strik- 
ing Jackson's  right  flank,  while  McDowell  joined  the  main 
army  under  Pope. 

Now,  the  new  evidence  which  Porter  had  to  offer  to  the 
Board  was  almost  entirely,  so  far  as  it  was  material  and 
important,  confined  to  one  point ;  but  that  was  the  key- 
point  of  the  case. 

He  was  able  to  offer  to  the  Board  conclusive  evidence 
from  Confederate  officers  that  nearly  the  whole  of  Lee's 


360 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


army  was  confronting  the  Federal  forces  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  29th,  and,  especially,  that  he  (Porter)  was  con- 
fronted by  a  large  part  of  Longstreet's  corps,  as  he  had 
maintained  at  his  trial  was  the  fact. 

He  might,  therefore,  as  it  seems  to  me,  have  introduced 
this  evidence,  and  then  rested  his  case.  He  might  have 
said  substantially  this :  ^'  Suppose  that  Gen.  McDowell 
did  at  noon  tell  me  to  put  my  troops  in  where  I  was,  and 
without  reference  to  any  cooperation  with  him.  If  he 
did,  which  I  do  not  admit,  it  was  under  the  supposition 
that  I  could  go  from  where  I  was  to  the  neighborhood  of 
the  turnpike  without  fighting  a  battle.  The  very  fact  of 
his  marching  away  from  me  with  both  the  divisions  of  his 
corps,  shows  that  he  did  not  expect  that  I  should  be  con- 
fronted with  the  enemy  just  there.  Had  he  known  that 
the  enemy  were  in  front  of  me  in  large  force  he  would, 
of  course,  have  brought  up  his  corps,  so  that  we  could 
have  fought  our  battle  together ;  that  is,  he  would,  had  it 
been  his  intention  to  fight  there  at  all.  At  any  rate  it  was 
clearly  not  my  duty  to  undertake  to  carry  out  any  order, 
based  on  what  I  very  soon  found  was  an  entire  miscon- 
ception of  the  true  state  of  the  case.  I  was  convicted, 
not  because  the  court  thought  I  was  to  blame  in  not 
attacking  Longstreet's  corps  in  front  of  me,  but  because 
the  court  did  not  believe  that  Longstreet's  corps  was  in 
front  of  me,  and  did  believe  that  I  could  have  attacked 
Jackson's  force  in  flank,  but  deliberately  refrained 
from  so  doing.  Now,  I  show  that  Longstreet  was  in  my 
front,  as  I  maintained  at  the  time,  and  that  I  could  not 
possibly  have  attacked  Jackson  in  flank.    What  is  there 


f 


HEARING  IN  FITZ-JOHN  PORTER  CASE.  361 

for  the  Board  to  do  but  to  reverse  the  finding  of  the 
court  ?  Not  because  the  finding  of  the  court  was  unjust, 
but  because  it  proceeded  from  an  essentially  mistaken 
view  of  the  facts.  I  have  no  accusation  to  bring  against 
any  one.  I  do  not  care  to  inquire  now  how  far  passion 
and  prejudice  had  to  do  with  the  formation  of  the  mis- 
taken view  of  the  facts  in  the  minds  of  the  witnesses  who 
testified,  or  in  the  minds  of  the  members  of  the  court 
who  decided,  against  me.  I  assume  that  they  were  all 
honorable,  disinterested  men ;  and  that,  if  I  can  convince 
them  that  they  were  mistaken,  and  that  I  was  correct,  in 
respect  to  the  position  of  the  enemy  that  afternoon,  they, 
or  those  of  them  who  are  still  living,  will  cheerfully  join 
in  a  demand  for  my  rehabilitation  by  this  Board.  In  this 
temper  and  with  this  belief  I  submit  my  evidence  and 
make  my  plea." 

Unfortunately,  as  I  think,  for  the  credit  of  the  ser\dce, 
and  for  his  own  position  in  the  controversy.  Gen.  Porter, 
or  rather,  perhaps,  his  counsel,  did  not  take  tliis  ground. 
They  took  up  from  the  first  an  attitude  of  hostility  to  every 
one  who  had  testified  before  the  court-martial  against 
Porter.  They  tried  their  case  exactly  as  if  it  had  been  an 
ordinary  criminal  case  before  the  ordinary  tribunals,  tried 
for  the  first  time.  While  they  tried  their  case  with  great 
ability,  they,  however,  dwelt  upon  every  point  of  it  with- 
out much  discrimination,  and  with  very  little  sense  of  per- 
spective. They  had  a  case  in  which  it  was  in  their  power 
absolutely  to  prove  certain  facts,  a  belief  in  which  would 
overthrow,  necessarily,  the  verdict  of  the  court-martial. 
They  proved  these  facts,  indeed,  but  they  proved  a  lot  of 


362 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


other  things  besides,  of  no  earthly  importance  in  any  view 
of  the  subject.  They  proved,  indeed,  the  presence  of  a 
large  force  in  front  of  Porter,  observing  him  all  the 
afternoon;  but  they  also  proved  that  President  Lincoln 
told  Governor  Newell,  of  New  Jersey,  "  that  he  had  not 
been  able  to  give  that  personal  attention  to  the  case  which 
its  merits  required ;  .  .  .  that  he  had  had  a  high  regard 
for  General  Porter  personally  and  as  a  soldier."^  This 
piece  of  folly,  however,  brought  its  own  punishment  in 
the  introduction  by  the  Recorder  of  the  evidence  of  Presi- 
dent Lincoln's  son,  who  testified  that  his  father  said  to 
him  "  that  the  case  would  have  justified,  in  his  opinion, 
a  sentence  of  death."  ^  As  the  real  opinion  of  this 
eminent  military  expert  was  thus  left  in  doubt,  the  Board, 
it  is  to  be  presumed,  were  obliged  to  fall  back  on  their 
own  unaided  reason. 

This  determination  to  go  over  every  point  of  the  case, 
and  every  bit  of  testimony  minutely  and  slowly,  was 
especially  noticeable  in  their  cross-examination  of  the 
Government  witnesses.  For  instance,  there  was  a  man 
who  testified  that  he  heard  Porter  say,  I  warn't  {sic) 
loyal  to  Pope;  I  was  loyal  to  McClellan."^  It  takes 
more  than  eight  pages  ^  to  print  his  cross-examination ; 
and  he  stuck  to  it  after  all.  A  dozen  instances  might  be 
cited  as  striking  as  this. 

So,  also,  their  suspicion  of,  and  hostility  to,  the  Gov- 
ernment witnesses  was  a  most  marked  and  disagreeable 
feature  in  their  method  of  trying  the  case.    The  great 

1  2  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  37,  320.  ^  i^.,  855.  ^  ib.,  638. 

'*  lb.,  639-645 ;  cf.  Proceedings  and  Report  of  the  Board  of  Army  Offi- 
cers, in  the  case  of  Fitz-John  Porter,  652-660. 


HEARIXG  IX  FITZ-JOHX  PORTER  CASE. 


363 


instance  of  this  is  their  treatment  of  Gen.  McDowell, 
who  was  called  by  the  Recorder.  After  some  unim- 
portant questions,  the  Recorder  asked  him  whether  the 
asserrion  made  by  the  petitioner  in  his  opening  statement, 
that  he  had  been  told  by  McDowell  that  there  was  a 
plan  to  form  behind  Bull  Run,  and  so  forth,  was  true. 
Mr.  Choate  strenuously  objected,  and  very  unnecessarily 
said  that  Gen.  McDowell  was  not  there  to  argue  the 
case.''  ^  And  when  the  Board  overruled  the  objection,  and 
the  Judge  Advocate  showed  the  General  the  passage  in 
Porter's  statement  to  vrliich  he  referred,  the  offensive 
suggestion  was  repeated.  The  Board,  overruling  the  ob- 
jection again.  Gen.  McDowell  said  that  he  did  not  admit, 
in  substance  or  in  terms.  haAuno;  used  the  lanmiao^e  at- 
tributed  to  liim.  At  once  ]\Ir.  Choate  sprang  upon  him, 
savinor  that  he  was  not  there  to  make  admissions,''  and 
so  forth.  Under  tins  treatment  a  witness  naturally  be- 
comes suspicious,  afraid  of  being  taken  up  short,''  and  of 
committing  himself.  And  in  this  frame  of  mind  he  natu- 
rally does  not  do  hunself  justice.  In  fact,  no  lawyer 
begins  by  treating  a  witness  in  this  way,  unless  with  the 
deliberate  intention  of  discreditino;  him  thi^ouodiout.- 

As  the  testimony  of  Gen.  McDowell  is,  dotdotless,  the 
most  important  testimony  in  the  whole  case  on  the  gov- 
ernment side,  I  purpose  to  consider  it  with  some  care. 

I  am  somewhat  at  a  loss  to  discover  the  object  the 
Government  had  in  callino-  liim.  unless  it  was  to  obtain 
from  him  the  denial,  to  which  I  have  just  called  attention, 
that  he  told  Porter  anything  about  there  being  a  plan  to 
form  behind  Bull  Run,  to  get  re  enforcements  from  the 

^2  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  37,  716.  ^Ih.,  717-718. 


364 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  then  fight  the  main  battle. 
The  cross-examination  was  conducted  by  Mr.  Choate.  It 
began  by  calling  the  General's  attention  to  the  publica- 
tions he  had  made,  or  circulated,  respecting  the  case,  and 
especially  to  a  misquotation  in  one  of  these  publications 
from  the  report  of  Gen.  Jackson  as  to  the  battle  of  the 
29th  of  August. 

There  could  be  but  one  purpose  in  this  line  of  exami- 
nation, namely,  to  convict  Gen.  McDowell  of  such  hos- 
tility to  Gen.  Porter  that  he  was  capable  of  falsifying  the 
report  of  Gen.  Jackson  in  order  to  sustain  his  accusa- 
tions. It  is  needless  to  say  that  his  purpose  was  instantly 
perceived  by  the  witness,  and  that  the  two  men  were 
thenceforth  and  throughout  the  examination  in  an  atti- 
tude of  mutual  hostility.  Nothing  else  could  be  expected, 
of  course.  Having  exhausted  this  topic,  to  which  I  shall 
advert  later  on,  and  still  anxious  to  pursue  this  plan  of 
attempting  to  break  down  McDowell's  character,  chance 
threw  another  opportunity  in  his  way. 

When  this  hearing  before  the  Board  was  ordered.  Gen. 
McDowell  caused  a  new  search  to  be  made  among  his  old 
papers,  to  see  if  anything  could  be  found  in  any  way  bear- 
ing on  the  case.  Such  a  search  had  been  made  at  the 
time  of  the  court-martial,  and  he  expected  nothing  to 
result  from  his  present  inquiry. 

But  it  so  happened  that  there  were  found  among  some 
old  papers  three  little  pieces  of  paper  containing  each  a 
few  lines  written  to  him  by  Porter  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
29th. 

These  he  sent  on  at  once  to  the  Judge  Advocate,  as  the 


HEARING  IN  FIT Z- JO  EN  PORTER  CASE. 


365 


proper  custodian  of  them.  Of  course,  as  it  is  liardly  nec- 
essary to  say,  he  might  hare  thrown  them  in  the  fire;  but, 
as  I  have  said,  he  did  not,  but  furnished  them  without  a 
second  thought  to  the  Revising  Board. 

Now,  it  will  hardly  be  believed,  but  it  is,  nevertheless, 
true,  that  Mr.  Choate  subjected  the  General  to  as  severe  a 
cross-examination  about  these  despatches  as  if,  for  in- 
stance, they  had  been  unearthed  from  the  General's  desk 
by  a  detective,  after  the  General  had  told  the  Board  that 
there  was  nothing  in  his  desk. 

The  grossest  insinuations  of  intentional  concealment 
were  made,  despite  the  fact,  which  stared  everybody  in 
the  face,  that  it  was  McDowell  himself,  and  none  other, 
who  had  found  and  produced  the  despatches.  If  such 
treatment  awaits  a  witness  who  puts  all  his  evidence  at 
the  disposal  of  the  proper  officers,  it  is  really  not  easy  to 
see  what  worse  fate  would  be  liis  who  should  in  like  cir- 
cumstances destroy  newly  discovered  evidence.  It  is 
worth  remarking,  too,  as  a  curious  fact,  that  one  of  these 
despatches  afforded  Porter  the  means  of  showing  that  the 
order  ^  of  Pope,  dated  4.30  P.M.,  had  not  reached  him  at 
6  o'clock, — a  fact  very  material  to  him  on  one  branch  of 
the  case. 

The  natural  effect  of  this  course  of  treatment  upon 
Gen.  McDowell  was  to  render  Mm  extremely  cautious, 
very  careful  in  his  answers  to  stick  to  the  very  terms  of 
the  question,  and  never  to  say  a  word  more  than  he  could 
help.  Those  of  us  who  are  familiar  with  courts,  and  who 
know  with  what  readiness  a  clever  lawyer  will  pass  from 

^Appendix  D,  supra,  385. 


366 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


checking  and  snubbing  a  witness  who  may  say  a  word  too 
much,  to  the  contemptuous  insinuation,  thrown  out  if  a 
witness  is  precise,  that  the  witness  knew  perfectly  well 
what  the  question  meant,  and  might  answer  at  once  if  he 
were  not  disposed  to  prevaricate, — those  of  us,  I  say,  who 
have  seen  this,  can  easily  imagine  the  sort  of  time  Gen. 
McDowell  had  with  Mr.  Choate. 

It  is  superfluous  to  say  that  the  General's  testimony  is 
not  agreeable  reading ;  that  it  does  not  give  such  a  view  of 
the  facts  of  that  day,  and  of  that  campaign,  as  lay  in  his 
mind.  But  then  it  was  no  part  of  Mr.  Choate's  intention 
that  it  should  give  such  a  view.  On  the  contrary,  he  was 
determined  to  prevent  anything  of  the  kind  being  given 
in  evidence  ;  and  with  the  power  he  had  as  cross-examin- 
ing counsel,  which  he  wielded  most  unhesitatingly,  he 
naturally  succeeded. 

To  return  to  the  misquotation  from  Jackson's  report. 
It  seems  that  McDowell  found  the  Reports  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  "  in  Gen.  Halleck's  library  at  San 
Francisco,  and  copied  from  them  certain  brief  extracts 
from  the  reports  of  Stuart,  Longstreet,  and  Jackson,  and 
sent  them  to  Pope,  who  prepared  a  paper,  which  was 
printed,  though  not  published,  and  was  entitled  "  Brief 
Statement  of  the  Case  of  Fitz-John  Porter,"  ^  in  which 
these  extracts  appear  with  explanations  and  comments  by 
Gen.  Pope.  Now,  although  these  extracts  show  that 
Longstreet's  corps  was  up  on  the  afternoon  of  the  29th, 
which  was  denied  by  the  Government  in  the  court-mar- 
tial, still  there  are  passages  in  them  that  look  as  if  the 
irresolute  attitude  of  Porter's  corps  on  our  extreme  left 

^  See  List  of  Books  cited,  ante., 


HEARING  m  FITZ-JOHN  PORTER  CASE.  367 


had  enabled  Lee  to  use  the  bulk  of  his  force  against 
Gen.  Pope's  immediate  command.  To  this  point  the 
extracts  from  Stuart's  and  Longstreet's  reports,  in  which 
there  was  no  mistake  whatever,  are  most  appropriate. 
The  extract  from  Jackson's  report,  which  is  to  the  same 
general  purport,  although  very  much  fuller,  was,  however, 
taken  from  his  report  of  the  operations  of  the  30th.  The 
mistake  of  citing  it  as  applying  to  the  29th  evidently 
arose,  as  any  one  will  see  from  inspection  of  the  book,^ 
from  the  writer  not  having  commenced  his  account  of  the 
battle  of  the  30th  by  a  new  paragraph.  There  seems  to  a 
casual  reader  no  break  between  the  narrative  of  the  opera- 
tions of  the  29th  and  the  narrative  of  the  operations  of 
the  30th.  When  Gen.  Pope  heard  that  some  people  had 
doubted  whether  the  extract  from  Jackson's  report  re- 
ferred to  the  29th,  he  sent  it  to  the  Adjutant-General's 
ofBce  in  Washington,  and  it  was  returned  with  only  a  few 
verbal  corrections.  As  for  McDowell,  he  never  saw  the 
book  of  Reports  but  once  before  it  was  shown  to  him  at 
this  hearing,  and  that  was  the  time  when  he  made  the  ex- 
tract from  it.  It  was  not  difficult,  in  fact  it  was  the 
easiest  tiling  in  the  world,  for  Mr.  Choate  to  show  Gen. 
McDowell  his  mistake,  and  to  get  him  to  acknowledge 
it.  But  Mr.  Choate  was  not  satisfied  till  this  acknowl- 
edgment had  been  made  seven  or  eight  times,  so  as  to 
give  him  the  opportunity  of  charging  the  General  with  a 
wilful  and  fraudulent  misquotation. 

Those  of  us  who  know  Gen.  McDowell  need  no 
defence  of  him  from  me  against  such  an  accusation  as 
this.    Carelessness  there  certainly  was ;  for  the  same  ex- 

^  2  A.  N.  v.,  96 ;  the  arrangement  of  paragraphs  of  Jackson's  report  as 
reprinted  in  16  W.R.,  646,  probably  corresponds  with  the  original. 


368 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


amination  wliicli  convinced  him  of  liis  error  when  the 
book  was  shown  him  on  the  witness-stand,  ought,  of 
conrse,  to  have  been  used  by  him  in  Gen.  Halleck's 
library  years  before.  But,  besides  the  somewhat  confus- 
ing way  in  which  the  operations  of  the  two  days  are 
printed  so  as  to  make  a  continuous  narrative,  to  which  I 
have  already  referred,  there  was  also  this,  which  certainly 
assisted  to  mislead  him,  namely,  that  the  extract  from 
Jackson's  report  might  have  been  written  of  the  battle  of 
the  29th  almost  as  well  as  of  the  battle  of  the  30th.  On 
the  29th,  as  on  the  30th,  the  Federal  infantry  advanced  in 
the  latter  part  of  the  afternoon  and  pressed  Jackson  hard, 
and  on  both  days  he  was  saved  from  defeat  by  the  assist- 
ance of  Longstreet's  corps.  On  the  29th  he  was  aided 
by  Hood  and  Evans,  supported  by  Wilcox,  and  on  the 
30th  the  entire  corps  of  Longstreet  was  put  in  on  his 
right.  And  it  cannot  be  said  that  this  misquotation,  of 
which  so  much  has  been  made,  added  much,  if  it  added 
anything,  to  the  force  of  the  citations  from  the  reports  of 
Stuart  and  Longstreet,  in  which  there  was  no  mistake  at 
all. 

It  did  not,  of  course,  escape  the  vigilant  eye  of  Mr. 
Choate  that  this  paper  of  Gen.  Pope's,  with  the  extracts 
made  by  Gen.  McDowell  from  the  rebel  reports,  admitted 
what  neither  Pope  nor  McDowell  admitted  at  the  court- 
martial  having  known  at  the  time,  namely,  the  presence 
on  the  field  of  the  corps  of  Longstreet  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  29th.  Of  course  there  was  nothing  inconsistent  in 
McDowell's  having  found  out  afterwards  that  Long- 
street's  corps  was  up ;  and,  therefore,  there  was  no  reason 


HEAR IX G  ly  FIT Z- JOHN  T OUTER  CASE.  369 


TvliY  ^IcDoTvell  should  not  have  frankly  stated  that  he 
had,  subseqnently  to  the  court-martial,  ascertained  this 
to  be  the  fact.  But,  treated  as  McDoTvell  had  been,  it 
Tras  impossible  to  get  from  him  any  statement  of  this 
character  in  reply  to  any  question  of  Mr.  Choate.  The 
same  fate  met  Mr.  Choate's  queries  based  on  ]Mc- 
DoTvell's  order  to  Sigel,  dated  Buckland  Mills,  August  27, 
11.30  P.M.,^  in  which  he  tells  that  officer  that  a  large 
division  of  the  enemy,  under  Longstreet^  left  Salem  at 
4  P3L  for  Manassas  through  Thoroughfare  Gap.  What 
with  the  reluctance  of  the  witness  to  go  into  any  exam- 
ination of  matters  prior  to  the  29th,  and  the  objections 
raised  by  the  Judge  Advocate,  there  was  a  skirmishing  of 
questions  and  answers  running  tln-ough  eight  printed 
pages  before  this  order  was  brought  out.  Had  Mr. 
Choate's  treatment  of  his  witness  been  respectful  and 
conciliatorv.  had  he  not  beg^un  bv  accusmo'  him  of  fraud 
and  deceit,  he  would  doubtless  have  got  on  faster.  And  I 
am  compelled  to  say  that  had  Gen.  McDowell  answered 
each  c|uestion  as  frankly  and  promptly  as  was  in  his 
newer,  without  retortino-  on  the  counsel  bv  wishino-  to 

J-  O  V  o 

know  what  was  the  object  of  this  or  of  that  question,  and 
every  now  and  then  making  a  sort  of  stand  in  regard  to 
certain  questions  which  seemed  to  him  directed  by  a 
hostile  intent,  his  ^dews  of  the  campaign  would  have 
appeared,  so  far  as  they  were  given  in  liis  examination,  to 
vastly  better  advantage.  But  the  fact  is,  the  witness, 
made  thorouo-hlv  hostile  to  Gen.  Porter's  counsel  while  he 
was  yet  in  the  hands  of  the  Judge  Advocate,  gave  his 
evidence  in  a  piecemeal  sort  of  way  and  with  evident 

^2  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  37.  753. 


370 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


reluctance.  But  let  it  not  be  forgotten  that  for  this 
state  of  feeling  no  one  but  Mr.  Choate  was  to  blame. 

Among  other  things  which  were  out  of  the  proper  line 
of  examination,  and  which  tended  greatly  to  intensify  this 
unfortunate  state  of  feeling,  must  be  mentioned  the 
questions  put  to  Gen.  McDowell,  asking  him  why  he  did 
not  do  something  else  instead  of  the  thing  that  he  did  do. 

Thus,  he  was  asked  whether  there  was  anything 
to  prevent  his  coming  up  on  Porter's  left,  on  the 
left  of  the  Manassas  and  Gainesville  road,  instead  of 
going  up  the  Sudley  Springs  road.^  To  all  this  sort  of 
thing  McDowell  very  properly  objected,  that  what  he 
did  was  plain  enough,  and  that  the  question  was  open- 
ing a  totally  foreign  subject  of  inquiry,  namely,  whether 
he  might  not  have  done  something  wiser  than  what  he 
actually  did.  This  annoyance  was,  by  the  way,  repeated 
more  than  once  in  the  course  of  the  investigation. 

Leaving,  now,  further  criticism  on  the  conduct  of  the 
cross-examination  of  Gen.  McDowell,  I  remark  that  his 
testimony  shows  very  clearly  that  it  was  his  intention  to 
bring  his  troops  round  by  the  Sudley  Springs  road,  and 
connect  with  Keynolds  on  the  right  and  with  Porter  on 
the  left.  I  do  not  know,"  he  says,  "  that  I  had  [the 
idea  of  a  continuous  line] ,  but,  in  general  terms,  the  idea 
was  to  get  the  army  together ;  they  were  separated  and  in 
a  critical  position."  ^ 

It  also  appears  that  Porter  himself  concurred  in  this 
proposed  action,  if  he  did  not  himself  suggest  it,^  as  he 
himself  thinks  was  the  fact.* 

It  is  also  very  clear  that  McDowell,  and,  presumably, 

1  2  Senate  Ex.  Doc,  759.  ^  lb.,  761. 

3  lb.,  779.  "  1  Senate  Ex.  Doc,  330. 


HEARING  m  FIT Z- JOHN  PORTER  CASE. 


871 


Porter  too,  had  no  notion,  when  they  separated  at  noon, 
that  they  were  to  be  separated  for  the  rest  of  that  day. 
It  is  true  that  McDowell,  on  being  asked  if  he  had  any 
idea  how  long  the  movement  would  take  him,  says  he  had 
not,  but  that,  long  or  short,  it  was  the  movement  he 
wanted  to  make  ;  that  he  does  not  recollect  of  his  mind 
taking  up  the  question  of  time,  and  so  on.^  Yet  he  says 
later  that  he  hoped  at  the  end  of  an  hour  to  get  his  force 
well  around  and  connect  with  Eeynolds.^  And  no  doubt 
this  was  his  expectation. 

It  is  true  that  Gen.  McDowell  will  not  admit  that  his 
intention  was  that  the  connection  between  his  troops  and 
those  of  Porter  was  to  be  made  before  Porter  was  to 
attack.  He  says,  indeed,  he  expected  that  Porter  would 
get  engaged  with  the  enemy  at  the  end  of  an  hour ;  ^ 
and  that  by  this  time  he  hoped  to  have  his  force  ' '  well 
around."  But  when  asked  whether,  when  he  left 
Porter,  his  plan  was  one  of  cooperation,  he  makes  the 
somewhat  unsatisfactory  answer,  ^'We  were  all  coop- 
erating to  the  same  point."  *  And  when  asked  whether 
it  was  his  expectation  that  Porter  would  be  in  a  general 
engagement  with  the  enemy  before  he  got  around  on 
the  left  of  Eeynolds,  he  says,  "You  want  to  make  me 
say  what  he  would  be  doing  at  a  certain  time,  and  where 
I  should  be.  I  say  no  such  calculation  entered  into  my 
mind."^  "As  to  saying  that  I  did  not  want  him  to  do 
any  fighting  till  I  got  around  to  a  certain  place,  I  made 
no  such  calculations."  And  there  is  much  more  to  the 
same  effect.^ 

But  it  is  quite  plain  that  Gen.  Porter's  understanding 

1 2  Senate  Ex.  Doc,  37,  758-759.  ^  lb.,  778-779.  ^  i^.,^  779^ 
*Ib.  6Xb.  6  lb.,  780. 


872 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


of  the  matter  was  tliat  he  should  establish  some  connec- 
tion with  McDowell's  corps  before  taking  the  offensive. 
And  his  three  despatches  to  McDowell  indicate  nnmis- 
takably  that  his  inability  to  effect  this  was  unexpected, 
and  a  cause  of  great  anxiety  to  him.  It  is  plain  that  he 
felt  his  position  to  be  critical,  having  the  enemy  in  his 
front,  and  not  being  able,  as  he  evidently  expected  he 
would  in  an  hour  or  two  be  able,  to  connect  Morell's 
division  with  King's.  He  says  in  his  notes  to  Mc- 
Dowell that  he  cannot  advance ;  that  he  has  failed  to 
get  messengers  over  to  McDowell,  save  by  the  route  taken 
by  King,  i.e.^  the  Sudley  Springs  road ;  that  he  has  been 
wandering  over  the  woods,  and  has  failed  to  get  a  commu- 
nication to  McDowell  and  King;  that  the  enemy  is  in 
strong  force  in  his  front,  getting  towards  his  left ;  that  he 
wishes  to  know  McDowell's  designs  for  the  night ;  and 
more  to  the  same  effect,  i  These  despatches  show  that 
Porter  had  one  thing  in  his  mind  very  clearly  that  after- 
noon, and  that  thing  was  connecting  his  right,  or,  at  least, 
establishing  some  communication,  with  McDowell's  corps. 
There  is  notliing  in  them  of  an  apologetic  character; 
nothing  like  an  excuse  for  inaction ;  on  the  contrary,  they 
are  simply  the  language  of  an  officer  unexpectedly  left 
alone  in  presence  of  a  large  force  of  the  enemy,  and  in  a 
somewhat  critical  position,  who  has  endeavored  to  carry 
out  the  understanding  that  he  should  connect,  in  some 
way,  with  the  supporting  corps,  and  who  has  not  suc- 
ceeded in  doing  so,  and  who  evidently  does  not  imagine 
that  anything  of  an  aggressive  character  is  expected  of 
him  until  this  connection  shall  be  effected.    The  theory 

^2  Senate  Ex.  Doc,  776;  16  W.R.,  624,  525. 


BEARING  IN  FITZ-JOHN  PORTER  CASE.  373 

of  the  Judge  Advocate,  that  these  despatches  show 
that  Porter  felt  himself  to  be  bound  by  an  order  of 
McDowell's  to  attack  the  enemy  from  where  he  was/ 
seems  to  me  wholly  imsupported  by  their  contents. 
Porter,  in  these  despatches,  says  that  he  is  trying  to  com- 
municate with  McDowell,  not  to  attack  the  enemy  in  his 
front ;  and,  with  the  exception  of  a  statement  in  the  first 
despatch,  that  he  has  attempted  to  send  messengers  to 
Sigel,  there  is  no  hint  of  any  other  intention  in  his  mind 
than  that  of  establishing  communication  with  the  corps  of 
McDowell  somewhere  to  the  north  of  his  own  position. 

The  only  despatches  of  Gen.  Porter's  which  look  at 
all  as  if  he  intended  at  any  time  that  afternoon  to  attack 
the  enemy  before  ha^dng  established  some  communica- 
tion with  McDowell,  are  those  sent  to  Gen.  Morell,  who 
commanded  his  advance  division.  The  first  order  reads 
as  follows :  — 


General  Morell,  —  Push  over  to  the  aid  of  Sigel  and  strike 
in  his  rear.  If  you  reach  a  road  up  which  King  is  moving 
[i.e.,  the  Sudley  Springs  road],  and  he  has  got  ahead  of 
you,  let  him  pass;  but  see  if  you  cannot  give  help  to  Sigel. 
If  you  find  him  rething,  move  back  towards  Manassas,  and, 
should  necessity  requh-e  it,  and  you  do  not  hear  from  me, 
push  to  Centreville.  If  you  find  the  direct  road  filled,  take 
the  one  via  Union  Mills,  which  is  to  the  right  as  you  return. 

F.  J.  Porter, 
Major- General, 
Look  to  the  points  of  the  compass  for  Manassas.^ 

1 2  Senate  Ex,  Doc,  37,  492.        ^  xb.,  432  ;  16  W.R.,  523. 


374 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


Gen.  Porter  says  this  was  sent  early  in  the  after- 
noon ;  ^  but  Gen.  Morell,  with  more  probability,  fixes  the 
time  from  the  reference  to  King  moving  up  the  Sudley 
Springs  road,  as  the  middle  or  latter  part  of  the  after- 
noon ;  ^  and  in  this  opinion  the  Board  of  Officers  con- 
curred.^ This  efi'ort  was  never  made,  however,  owing,  as 
Gen.  Porter  says,  to  the  diflficulty  of  penetrating  the  in- 
tervening country  even  with  iniantry,  and  the  impossi- 
bility of  carrying  artillery  through  it,  and  owing  to,  also, 
as  he  wisely  adds,  the  necessity  of  holding  the  enemy 
in  our  immediate  front."  ^  In  fact,  the  order,  which 
would  seem  to  imply  that  Morell's  division  should  cross 
from  where  it  w^as  posted  over  to  the  Sudley  Springs 
road,  up  which  King's  division  was  marching,  was,  as 
Morell  says,  rescinded  almost  immediately,  and  before  he 
had  made  any  efforts  to  carry  it  out.^ 

Then,  later  in  the  afternoon,  at  6  o'clock,  favorable 
reports  having,  as  Porter  says,  come  in  from  the  right 
wing.  Porter  ordered  a  reconnoissance  in  force  with 
four  regiments  to  be  made  by  Morell ;  but,  on  the 
urgent  remonstrance  of  this  officer,  withdrew  the  order. ^ 
Both  these  orders  were  unquestionably  given  late  in 
the  afternoon,  the  one,  five  (as  the  Board  of  Officers 
fijid  is  probably  the  fact),''^  and  the  other  six,  hours 
after  McDowell  had  left  Porter.  It  is,  therefore,  impos- 
sible to  find  in  them  any  admission  on  Porter's  part  of 
his  feeling  himself  bound  by  an  order  of  McDowell's  to 
attack  the  enemy.  Moreover,  the  first  order  is  not  an 
order  to  attack  at  all,  but  to  communicate  with  Sigel  by 

»  1  Senate  Ex.  Doc,  37,  333.  2  2  ib.,  443.  ^  3  lb.,  1705. 

4  1  lb.,  333.  ^  2  lb.,  443.  «  i  i^.,  335.  7  3  i^.^  1705. 


HEARING  m  FIT Z- JOHN  PORTER  CASE. 


375 


some  road,  wliicli  the  order  indicates  will  probably  be 
tlie  Sudley  Springs  road. 

No  one,  it  seems  to  me,  can  blame  Porter  for  delaying 
his  attack  till  he  should  have  established  his  communica- 
tions mth  McDowell.  A  battle  is  a  serious  thing  under 
any  circumstances,  and  for  a  corps-commander  to  under-  / 
take,  with  both  flanks  in  the  air,  an  offensive  operation 
against  an  enemy  of  unknown  strength,  when  a  large 
corps,  to  which  he  could  look  for  help,  but  with  which  • 
he  has  as  yet  established  no  connection,  was  passing  up 
a  road  a  few  miles  in  his  rear,  would  have  been  about 
as  unmihtary  a  thing  as  he  could  well  have  done.  If 
met  by  superior  numbers  his  defeat  might  have  entailed 
that  of  McDowell.  It  is  no  sufficient  answer  to  this  to 
say,  as  McDowell  does,  that  Porter  might  have  made 
it  a  light  or  heavy  attack,  as  circumstances  dictated.^ 
Unless  McDowell  was  actually  prepared  to  support  him, 
it  would  have  been  unwise  for  him  to  attack  at  all,  at 
such  a  distance  as  he  was  from  the  main  army.  Por- 
ter and  McDowell  unquestionably  expected  that  their 
two  corps  would  be  in  communication  in  the  middle  of 
the  afternoon,  but  they  were  disappointed,  owing  to 
McDowell's  corps  taking  a  longer  time  than  he  expected 
to  make  the  march,  and  owing,  doubtless,  also  to  McDow- 
ell's being  obliged  to  obey  new  orders  from  Pope  wliich 
carried  him  away  from  Porter  towards  the  main  army. 
And  this  left  Porter  waiting  for  orders,  and  waiting  also 
for  the  establishment  of  some  sort  of  communication 
with  McDowell,  all  the  afternoon ;  observing  the  enemy 
with  one  division;  keeping  the  other  in  column  to  be 

'2  Senate  Ex.  Doc,  37,  781. 


376 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


ready  to  move  at  a  moment's  notice ;  and,  judging  from 
the  tone  of  Ms  despatches,  as  well  as  from  the  facts  of 
the  case,  not  having  the  least  foreboding  of  the  cruel 
interpretation  so  soon  to  be  put  upon  his  inactivity. 

Still,  while  we  may  admit  that  Porter  was  under  no 
obligation  either  to  attempt  to  force  his  way  through  the 
broken  country  to  Groveton  with  a  powerful  enemy  on 
his  flank,  or  to  fall  furiously  on  that  enemy  in  his  front 
before  having  established  some  sort  of  communication 
with  McDowell's  corps,  we  need  not,  as  it  seems  to  me, 
rush  to  the  conclusion  that  the  dispositions  made  of  his 
troops  that  afternoon  were  the  wisest  in  the  world.  In 
two  points,  perhaps,  they  may  be  open  to  criticism. 

Firsts  as  to  the  ascertainment  by  Porter  of  the  strength 
and  composition  of  the  enemy's  forces  in  his  front.  This 
was  called  for,  not  only  from  a  regard  for  his  own  safety, 
but  to  insure  an  intelligent  and  successful  cooperative 
movement,  in  case  an  attack  should  be  ordered  after 
communication  with  McDowell  had  been  established. 
But  his  dispositions  to  this  end  seem  to  me  to  have  been 
quite  inadequate.  How  he  managed,  with  the  very  slight 
reconnoissance  that  he  ordered,  or  rather  that  he  could 
prevail  upon  Morell  to  undertake,  —  how  he  managed, 
I  say,  to  find  out  as  much  as  he  did,  is  rather  a  mystery  t( 
me.  He  deployed  but  one  brigade.  It  would  be  tedious 
to  recapitulate  the  evidence  of  his  officers ;  but,  though  it 
is  now  established  by  the  Confederate  testimony  that  a 
large  force  was  directly  in  front  of  him,  say  ten  thousand 
men,  during  the  whole  of  the  afternoon,  and  more  than 
that  number  at  one  period,  yet  it  is  not  easy  to  see  how 


HEARING  IN  FIT Z- JO  EN  PORTER  CASE. 


37T 


the  reports  of  his  subordinates  to  him  in  regard  to  the 
strength  and  dispositions  of  tliis  force  could  have  enabled 
him  to  cooperate  very  intelligently  or  very  efficiently 
with  McDowell,  had  that  officer's  corps  managed  to  get 
around  and  connect  with  Porter's  troops  in  the  middle, 
or  toward  the  close,  of  the  afternoon,  and  had  a  forward 
movement  been  then  ordered.  For  how  much  of  this 
ignorance  of  the  enemy's  position  and  strength  Gen. 
Morell  was  responsible  we  can  hardly  tell.  Morell 
says  of  himself  that  he  was  very  ill,  and  scarcely  fit  for 
duty.i 

Secondly^  while  Porter  ought,  under  the  circumstances, 
to  have  ascertained  all  about  the  enemy,  he  might  also 
have  made  such  demonstrations  with  his  corps  as  would 
have  drawn  to  that  portion  of  the  field  a  considerable 
part  of  the  enemy's  force.  But  he  did,  as  has  been  said, 
notliing  of  the  kind.  He  concealed  his  forces  from  the 
enemy's  observation,  and  abstained  from  all  demonstra- 
tions whatever.  It  is  clear  to  my  mind  that,  had  his 
attitude  been  more  pronounced,  General  Lee  would  have 
sent  a  much  larger  force  to  observe  his  corps.  I  am  not 
speaking  now  of  making  attacks,  or  of  anything  except 
such  menacing  demonstrations  as  can  always  be  made  by 
as  large  a  force  as  that  which  Porter  commanded,  and  can 
always  be  made  by  experienced  officers  with  entire  safety 
to  their  commands.  I  think  such  demonstrations  as  these 
were  plainly  demanded  by  the  circumstances  of  the  case. 
I  think  the  orders  to  Morell,  to  which  I  have  referred, 
show  that  Porter  himself  recognized  tliis.  But,  whether 
it  was  due  to  Mor ell's  sickness,  or  to  Porter's  belief  that 

^2  Senate  Ex.  Doc,  37,  446. 


378 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


he  might  at  any  moment  be  called  upon  to  fall  back  to 
Bull  Run,  as  indicated  in  the  "  J oint  Order,"  *  or  to  what- 
ever cause,  certain  it  is  that  no  demonstrations  of  any 
serious  kind  were  made.  I  believe  myself  entirely  in 
Porter's  good  faith  and  generally  sound  military  judg- 
ment ;  but  he  certainly  did  not,  in  my  opinion,  make  so 
much  of  an  impression  on  the  enemy  that  afternoon  as 
might  have  been  made. 

It  seems  probable  to  me  that  Porter  was  under  the 
impression  all  the  afternoon  that  his  stay  in  this  exposed 
position  was  merely  temporary,^  and  that  he  therefore  dis- 
posed his  corps  so  as  to  fall  back  to  Bull  Run  with  the 
greatest  possible  convenience  and  celerity,  having  been 
convinced  by  the  terms  of  the  "  Joint  Order  "  and  by  the 
appearance  on  the"  field  of  Longstreet's  corps,  that  this 
would  be  Gen.  Pope's  plan.  And  for  this  belief  he  had, 
as  I  have  before  said,  very  strong  reasons.  Still,  I  think 
that  the  dispositions  he  made  of  his  force  while  he  was 
waiting  for  the  orders  he  expected,  are  open  to  the 
above  criticisms. 

If,  now,  we  ask  the  not  unnatural  question,  how  it 
happened  that  two  such  able  and  zealous  officers  as 
McDowell  and  Porter,  being  apparently  in  perfect  accord 
at  noon,  so  far  as  either  of  them  knew  or  believed,  could, 
during  the  afternoon,  have  become  the  subjects  of  this 
most  unhappy  misunderstanding,  —  for  such  it  appears  to 
me  to  have  been,  —  I  must  reply  that,  like  most  misunder- 
standings, this  one  arose  from  a  want  of  explicitness. 

*  Appendix  C,  supra,  384.  ^  j^^f^^  85-89. 


EEARIXG  m  FIT Z- JO  EN  PORTER  CASE.  379 


Had  tliev  perfectly  understood  each  other  during  the 
half  hour  they  were  together,  this  unfortunate  and 
deplorable  affair  could  not  have  happened.  If  Gen. 
McDowell,  instead  of  giving  Porter  what  he  admits 
was  a  very  vague  "  ^  order,  "  put  your  troops  in  here  " 
or  "there,"  accompanied  by  a  motion  of  the  hand 
in  some  direction  not  remembered,-  and  without  indi- 
cating when  the  order  was  to  be  executed,  had  given 
him,  mstead,  an  explicit  order,  not,  of  course,  precise  as 
to  tactical  details,  but  such  an  order  as  would  be  given  to 
a  corps-commander  who  was  to  make  a  serious  attack 
without  any  support  that  could  be  counted  upon  (which 
was  the  case  here),  the  whole  trouble  would  probably 
have  been  avoided.  Had  he  remained  till  he  was  certain 
that  Porter  clearly  understood  him,  it  would  have  saved 
a  world  of  trouble.  Had  they  discussed,  even  in  the  most 
general  way,  the  route  by  wliich,  and  the  time  in  which 
the  communication  between  their  respective  corps  was  to 
be  estabhshecl,  after  McDowelhs  moA^ement  up  the  Sudley 
Springs  road  should  have  placed  his  corps  on  the  left  of 
Reynolds's  division,  they  could  not  have  failed  to  arrive 
at  some  sort  of  a  mutual  understanding.  But,  vague  as 
were  Gen.  McDowell's  orders,  his  calculations  were  no 
less  vague.  What  he  intended  to  do  himself  was  clear, 
and  was  supported  by  cogent  military  reasons  ;  but  truth 
compels  me  to  say  that  he  does  not  seem  to  have  devoted 
sufficient  consideration  to  the  situation  of  his  associate 
after  he  should  have  separated  from  him,  to  justify  him  in 
giving  that  associate  an  order,  even  a  very  vague  one.  It 
does  not,  in  fact,  seem  as  if  McDowell  assumed  any  such 

^  2  Senate  Ex.  Doc,  37,  769.  ^  lb.,  777. 


880 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CA3IPAIGm 


responsibility  for  the  success  of  tlie  movement  lie  pre- 
scribed to  Porter  as  an  officer  who  gives  an  important 
order  must  assume. 

For,  it  must  be  remembered,  this  order,  on  McDowell's 
own  showing,  was  not  a  common  order  to  attack,  given  by 
a  general-in-chief  to  a  corps-commander  in  the  course  of  a 
battle.  It  was  not,  for  example,  like  the  order  given  to 
Porter  the  next  day  by  Pope,  that  he  should  assault  the 
enemy's  position  in  a  particular  part  of  the  field.  It  was 
an  order  to  make  an  independent  movement  with  his 
corps,  so  as  to  get  engaged  with  an  enemy  with  whom 
they  were  not  then,  as  McDowell  supposed,  in  immediate 
contact,  and  in  regard  to  whose  strength  they  had  very 
general  information.  Such  an  order,  though  necessarily 
vague  as  to  some  points,  such  as  tactical  details,  should 
have  been,  one  would  suppose,  tolerably  explicit  as  to 
other  points,  such  as  communications,  connections,  Hnes 
of  advance  and  retreat.  Such  an  independent  operation 
as  that  which  McDowell  says  he  prescribed  to  Porter  was 
inevitably  hazardous,  and  contingencies  and  emergencies 
should  have  been  foreseen  and  provided  for,  so  far  as  pos- 
sible, in  his  instructions.  It  is  perfectly  plain  that  Porter 
never  understood  that  he  had  received  an  order  of  this 
nature.  McDowell,  indeed,  admitted  that  any  kind, 
almost,  of  an  attack  would  have  been  a  compliance  with 
his  order ;  ^  but  this  only  shows  that  he  was  far  from 
being  clear  in  his  own  mind  as  to  what  the  situation 
demanded,  except,  as  has  been  said,  as  to  his  own  course. 
As  to  that,  McDowell  was  perfectly  clear ;  but  as  to 
Porter,  whether  he  should  attack  in  force  or  merely  with 

^2  Senate  Ex.  Doc,  37,  781-782. 


HEARINO  m  FIT Z- JOHN  PORTER  CASE. 


381 


a  skirmish-line,^  whether  he  was  or  was  not  to  get  en- 
gaged before  McDowell's  corps  could  support  him ;  ^ 
when,  if  at  all,  he  could  calculate  on  the  head  of  Mc- 
Dowell's column  reaching  some  available  point, ^  —  on 
none  of  these  points,  all  of  which,  it  is  needless  to  say, 
were  of  vital  importance  to  Gen.  Porter,  in  view  of  the 
supposed  movement,  does  Gen.  McDowell  seem  to  have 
thouo-ht  at  all.  It  was  not  to  be  wondered  at,  that  a 
combined  operation,  so  loosely  conceived  and  defined, 
should  have  failed.  It  is  greatly  to  be  deplored  that  the 
failure,  so  very  natural  in  itself,  should  have  led  to  such 
distressing  results. 

I  have  hardly  thought  it  necessary  to  express  my 
opinion  of  the  ability  with  which  Gen.  Porter's  case  was 
conducted.  I  have,  in  the  former  part  of  tliis  paper,  criti- 
cised certain  features  in  the  management  of  the  case  by 
the  able  counsel  he  employed,  w^hich  seemed  to  me  de- 
serving of  reprehension.  But  I  desire  to  bear  my  testi- 
mony to  the  great  acumen  and  marvellous  industry  with 
which  every  point  of  the  case  was  cleared  up.  Not  a 
stone  was  left  unturned. 

Nor  must  I  omit  to  mention  the  gallant  and  able  de- 
fence of  Major  Gardner.  With  an  unpopular  cause  to 
maintain,  with  three  experienced  and  able  practising 
lawyers  all  exercising  their  combined  wit  upon  his  posi- 
tions and  arguments,  he  held  his  own,  like  a  good  soldier, 
and  like  a  good  lawyer.  And  a  pretty  strong  case  he 
made  of  it  too.  Whenever  the  other  side  overshot  the 
mark,  they  had  to  pay  for  it.  Whenever  the  facts,  seemed 

1 2  Senate  Ex.  Doc,  37,  769,  781-782.        ^  j^.,  779.         3  j^^^  758-759. 


382 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


to  bear  out  the  Government  theory,  they  were  ably  mar- 
shalled for  that  end. 

The  report  is  characteristic  of  Gen.  Schofield,  who  un- 
doubtedly drew  it  up.  It  is  very  clear  and  very  strong 
in  what  is  called  "  power  of  statement."  In  general,  it  is, 
to  my  mind,  convincing,  so  far  certainly  as  its  conclusions 
are  concerned ;  but  there  are  several  passages  in  it  where 
the  views  of  the  petitioner  are,  perhaps,  adopted  rather 
too  fully. 

Believing,  as  we  certainly  may,  and  as  I  certainly  do, 
that  Gen.  Porter  was  entirely  innocent  of  any  intentional 
disregard  of  duty,  that  none  of  his  acts  or  omissions  to  act 
that  afternoon  sprang  from  any  unwillingness  to  render  to 
Gen.  Pope  all  the  service  in  his  power,  we  are  yet,  I  sup- 
pose, quite  free  to  regard  him  as  a  fallible  man  like  other 
men.  In  the  vindication  of  his  character  by  the  Board,  I 
entirely  concur.  Still,  in  reviewing  the  whole  case,  I  may 
frankly  say  that  I  think  he  might  have  done  more  than  he 
did  during  that  afternoon  to  ascertain  the  strength  of  the 
enemy,  and  also  to  attract  their  attention,  and  thus  relieve 
the  main  army.  But  I  cordially  concur,  as  I  have  said 
more  than  once,  in  the  verdict  of  the  Revising  Board,  and 
I  trust  that  such  action  will  speedily  be  taken  by  Govern- 
ment as  will  at  last  remove  the  stain  of  dishonor  from  a 
faithful  and  gallant  soldier. 


HEARING  IN  FIT Z- JO  EN  PORTER  CASE. 


383 


APPEXDIX. 
A. 

Headquarters  of  the  Army  of  Yirgixia, 

Near  Bull  Eun,  August  29,  1862,  3  A.M. 

G-EXERAL :  —  McDowell  has  intercepted  the  retreat  of 
Jackson.  Sigel  is  immediately  on  the  right  of  McDowell. 
Kearny  and  Hooker  march  to  attack  the  enemy's  rear  at  early 
dawn.  Major-General  Pope  directs  you  to  move  upon  Centre- 
ville  at  the  first  dawn  of  day  with  your  whole  command,  leaving 
your  trains  to  follow.  It  is  very  important  that  you  should  be 
here  at  a  very  early  houi'  in  the  morning.  A  severe  engage- 
ment is  likely  to  take  place,  and  your  presence  is  necessary. 

I  am,  General,  very  respectfully, 

your  obedient  servant, 

G-EO.   D.  EUGGLES, 

Colonel  and  Chief  of  Staff.' 

Major-General  Porter. 

Bristoe.  —  Received  August  29,  1862,  5.30  A.M. 


B. 

Headquarters  Army  of  Yirgls-ia, 

Cextretille,  August  28,  1862. 

Push  forward  with  your  corps  and  King's  division,  which 
you  will  take  with  you,  upon  Gainesville.  I  am  following  the 
enemy  down  the  Wan'enton  tuimpike.  Be  expeditious  or  we 
will  lose  much. 

Jyo.  Pope, 
Ma jor-  General,  Commanding.^ 
Major-Gex.  Fitz-John  Porter. 

1 16  75,  518 ;  17  TV.R..  846,  923,  1061,  1070 :  18  W.R.,  733. 

2  15  W.R.,  245 ;  16  W.R.,  518 ;  17  TT.R.,  846,  1061 ;  18  TV.R.,  729. 


384 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


C. 

Headquarters  Army  of  Virginia, 

Centreville,  August  29,  1862. 

Generals  McDowell  and  Porter  :  —  You  will  please  move 
forward  with  your  joint  commands  toward  Gainesville.  I  sent 
General  Porter  written  orders  to  that  effect  an  hour  and  a  half 
ago.  Heintzelman,  Sigel,  and  Reno  are  moving  on  the  War- 
renton  turnpike,  and  must  now  be  not  far  from  Gainesville. 
I  desu'e  that  as  soon  as  communication  is  established  between 
this  force  and  your  own  the  whole  command  shall  halt.  It  may 
be  necessary  to  fall  back  behind  Bull  Run  at  Centreville  to- 
night. I  presume  it  will  be  so,  on  account  of  our  supplies. 
I  have  sent  no  orders  of  any  description  to  Ricketts,  and  none 
to  interfere  in  any  way  with  the  movements  of  McDowell's 
troops,  except  what  I  sent  by  his  aide-de-camp  last  night, 
which  were  to  hold  his  position  on  the  Warrenton  pike  until  the 
troops  from  here  should  fall  on  the  enemy's  flank  and  rear.  I 
do  not  even  know  Ricketts'  position,  as  I  have  not  been  able  to 
find  out  where  General  McDowell  was  until  a  late  hour  this 
morning.  General  McDowell  will  take  immediate  steps  to  com- 
municate with  General  Ricketts,  and  instruct  him  to  join  the 
other  divisions  of  his  corps  as  soon  as  practicable.  If  any 
considerable  advantages  are  to  be  gained  by  departing  from 
this  order  it  will  not  be  strictly  carried  out.  One  thing  must  be 
had  in  view,  that  the  troops  must  occupy  a  position  from  which 
they  can  reach  Bull  Run  to-night  or  by  morning.  The  indica- 
tions are  that  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy  is  moving  in  this 
dkection  at  a  pace  that  will  bring  them  here  by  to-morrow  night 
or  the  next  day.  My  own  headquarters  will  be  for  the  present 
with  Heintzelman's  corps  or  at  this  place. 

John  Pope, 
Major-General^  Commanding.^ 

» 15  W.E,.,  196;  16  W.R.,  76,  508,  520;  17  W.R.,  825,  903,  1121. 


HEARING  IN  FIT Z- JO  EN  PORTER  CASE. 


385 


Headquarters  Army  of  Virginia, 
In  the  Eield,  August  29,  1862,  4.30  P.M. 

Major-General  Porter  :  —  Your  line  of  inarch  brings  you 
in  on  the  enemy's  right  flank.  I  desu-e  you  to  push  forward 
into  action  at  once  on  the  enemy's  flank  and,  if  possible,  on  his 
rear,  keeping  your  right  in  communication  with  General  Rey- 
nolds. The  enemy  is  massed  in  the  woods  in  front  of  us,  but 
can  be  shelled  out  as  soon  as  [you]  engage  then-  flank.  Keep 
heavy  reserves  and  use  your  batteries,  keeping  well  closed  to 
your  right  all  the  time.  In  case  you  are  obliged  to  fall  back, 
do  so  to  your  right  and  rear,  so  as  to  keep  you  in  close  com- 
munication with  the  right  wing. 

Jno.  Pope, 
Major-General ^  Commanding ^ 

» 16  W.E.,  18,  509,  510,  525 ;  17  W.R.,  826,  1085. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN, 
August  9,  1862. 

By 

GEOEGE  LEOXARD  ANDREWS, 
Brevet  Major- General,  U.S.V. 


Read  hefore  the  Society  on  Tuesday  Evening,  March  26,  1895. 


CEDAE  MOU^^TAm. 


undertaking  to  give  an  account  of  the  battle  of 
Cedar  Mountain,  I  am  well  aware  that  even  with 
the  best  intentions  and  much  painstaking  I  cannot 
reasonably  expect  to  state  accurately  the  trath,  the  whole 
truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  concerning  anything  so 
complicated.  An  eye-witness  sees  at  most  only  a  part 
of  the  action,  and,  in  regard  to  what  he  does  see,  his 
memory,  especially  after  the  lapse  of  many  years,  is 
somewhat  defective.  Like  other  writers  on  events  of  the 
War  of  the  Eebellion,  I  have  had  to  depend  largely  upon 
the  statements  of  others,  found  in  official  reports  and 
correspondence,  or  in  accounts  written  for  the  most  part 
long  after  the  events ;  and,  as  was  to  be  expected,  these 
statements  are  more  or  less  conflicting.  Besides  official 
reports  and  letters  contained  in  the  Record  of  the  War 
of  the  Rebellion,  I  have  consulted  the  published  works 
of  General  Gordon,  Mr,  John  C.  Ropes,  Major  Gould  of 
the  10th  Maine,  Adjutant  Bryant  of  the  3d  Wisconsin, 
Chaplain  Quint  of  the  2d  Massachusetts,  and  Esten 
Cooke  of  the  Confederate  Army.^  I  have  also  had  oral 
or  written  statements  from  several  of  the  officers  and  men 
who  took  part  in  the  battle,  of  whom  I  ought  to  mention 

^  See  List  of  Books  cited,  ante. 
389 


390 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


Major  Gould,  and  Mr.  H.  A.  Tripp  of  the  10th  Maine. 
From  these  sources  of  information,  and  from  my  recol- 
lection of  what  I  saw,  I  have  endeavored  to  make  a  plain, 
straightforward,  unpretending  statement  of  the  pertinent 
facts,  avoiding  in  the  narrative  expressions  of  opinion 
which  might  interfere  with  a  clear  and  distinct  presenta- 
tion of  the  facts. 

For  the  better  understanding  and  appreciation  of  the 
battle,  its  causes  and  results,  I  have  thought  it  best  to 
begin  with  some  account  of  the  organization  of  the  Army 
of  Virginia,  and  of  the  movements  that  preceded  and  led 
to  the  first  serious  action  in  which  any  considerable  part 
of  that  army  was  engaged. 

On  the  26th  of  June,  1862,  the  President  issued  an 
order  by  which  the  forces  under  Fremont,  Banks  and 
McDowell,  and  the  troops  at  Washington,  were  consoli- 
dated to  form  one  army  to  be  called  the  Army  of 
Virginia,  to  the  command  of  which  was  specially  assigned 
Major-General  John  Pope.  The  troops  of  the  Mountain 
Department  under  Fremont  were  to  constitute  the  First 
Army  Corps ;  the  troops  of  the  Department  of  the 
Shenandoah  under  Banks,  the  Second  Army  Corps ;  the 
troops  of  the  Department  of  the  Eappahannock,  except 
those  within  the  city  of  Washington,  the  Third  Army 
Corps ;  and  the  three  corps  were  to  be  commanded  re- 
spectively by  Fremont,  Banks  and  McDowell.^ 

Pope  was  junior  in  rank  to  every  one  of  these  three 
generals,  of  whom  Fremont,  unwilling  to  serve  under  his 

1  15  W.  R.,  169 ;  18  W.  R.,  435. 


TEE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN. 


391 


junior,  was,  at  his  own  request,^  relieved  from  the  com- 
mand :  ^  he  was  replaced  by  Sigel.^ 

The  order  of  the  President  was  in  the  direction  of  a 
reversal  of  the  policy  previously  pursued  by  the  Govern- 
ment, of  constituting  commands  independent  of  one 
another,  which  received  orders  only  from  the  President 
or  the  War  Department.  Under  that  policy,  McClellan 
had  been  relieved  of  all  command  except  that  of  the 
Army  and  Department  of  the  Potomac,  and  several 
departments  entirely  independent  of  his  department,  and 
of  one  another,  had  been  constituted  and  had  been  placed 
under  the  command  of  several  generals,  who  naturally 
were  not  always  in  harmony. 

The  disadvantages  of  many  separate  commands,  and 
the  inability  of  the  War  Department  to  combine  and 
direct  their  movements  so  as  to  secure  united  and  effi- 
cient action,  had  been  plainly  shown  by  the  events  in 
the  Shenandoah  Valley  in  the  latter  part  of  May,  1862. 
Here  Jackson  had  inflicted  on  Banks's  small  army  heavy 
losses  in  men  and  materiel^  had  caused  great  alarm  at  the 
North  and  to  the  authorities  at  Washing-ton,  and  had 
prevented  the  co-operation  of  McDowell  with  McClellan ; 
afterward,  he  had  with  little  scathe  escaped  the  forces 
of  Fremont,  Banks  and  McDowell,  sent  to  intercept 
him,  and  had  returned  to  the  ^dcinity  of  Eichmond  in 
time  to  take  part  in  the  battle  of  Gaines's  Mill. 

Pope  assumed  command  of  the  Army  of  Virginia  on 
the  27th  of  June.''    He  announced  his  headquarters  as 

U8W.  E.,  437.  nb.,  444. 

2 lb.,  438.  4 lb.,  436. 


392 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


at  "Washington,  where  he  remained  and  whence  he  issued 
orders  until  the  29th  of  July. 

He  was,  he  says  in  his  report,  to  cover  the  city  of 
Washington  from  any  attacks  from  the  direction  of  Rich- 
mond, to  make  dispositions  necessary  for  the  safety  of 
the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
operate  upon  the  enemy's  lines  of  communication  in  the 
direction  of  Gordonsville  and  Charlottesville  so  as  to 
draw  off,  if  possible,  a  considerable  force  of  the  enemy 
from  Eichmond,  and  thus  relieve  the  operations  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  against  that  city.^ 

The  assignment  of  Pope  to  his  command  was  just  at 
the  beginning  of  the  Seven  Days'  battles  on  the  peninsula, 
which  ended  in  the  transfer  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
from  the  Chickahominy  to  the  James.  This  movement 
Pope  had  strongly  opposed ;  and  he  had  urged  upon  the 
President  that  McClellan  should  be  ordered  not  to  move 
with  his  army  farther  south  than  the  White  House  or 
York  River. ^  However,  soon  after  the  movement  was 
completed.  Pope  wrote  to  McClellan  proposing  to  co- 
operate with  him,  but  plainly  indicated  that  his  move- 
ments must  be  governed  by  the  necessity  of  protecting 
Washington.^  Of  this  kind  of  co-operation  McClellan 
had  had  experience,  and  his  reply,*  though  courteous, 
was  not  satisfactory  to  Pope.  According  to  the  latter,  it 
became  apparent  that,  to  secure  harmonious  and  prompt 
co-operation  between  the  two  armies,  some  military  supe- 
rior of  both  McClellan  and  himself  should  be  placed  in 


1  16  W.  E.,  23. 

2  lb.,  21-22. 


3  14  W.  R.,  295. 

4  lb.,  306. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUXTAIX. 


893 


command  of  all  the  operations  in  Virginia.^  In  accord- 
ance with  these  views,  Major-General  Halleck  was  placed 
in  general  command.  He  was  appointed  General-in-Chief 
on  the  11th  of  July: -but,  having  been  detained  by 
affairs  at  the  West,  did  not  assume  command  until  the 
23d.3 

Here  something  seems  to  have  made  Pope  dissatisfied : 
for  he  says  that  many  circumstances  induced  him  to  ex- 
press to  the  President,  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  to 
General  Halleck,  his  desire  to  be  relieved  from  the  com- 
mand of  the  Army  of  Virginia,  and  to  be  returned  to  the 
TTestern  country.^  His  wishes  were  not  complied  with, 
and  he  says  he  took  the  field  in  Virginia  with  grave  fore- 
bodings of  the  result,  but  with  a  determination  to  carry 
out  the  plans  of  the  Government  with  all  the  energy  and 
with  all  the  ability  of  which  he  was  master.^ 

Pope  found  his  army  disposed  as  follows  :  Fremont's 
corps  was  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  on  Cedar  Creek,  to 
the  right  of  Banks"s  corps,  with  detachments  at  other 
points :  Banks's  corps  was  guarding  the  Shenandoah 
from  Strasburg  Turnpike  eastward  to  Front  Royal : 
Eicketts's  division  of  ]\IcDo well's  corps  was  near  Manas- 
sas, and  King's  division  was  at  Falmouth  opposite 
Fredericksburg :  Cox's  command  was  in  the  District  of 
the  Kanawha,  the  main  body  being  at  Flat-top  Mountain  ; 
Sturgis  was  at  or  near  AVashington. 

According  to  Pope's  ofiicial  report,  the  strength  of 
these  component  parts  of  his  army  was  as  follows : 

^  16  TT.  R.,  22.  3      ^T.  R..  ^-b  '  lb..  22-23,  46. 

n^TV.  R.,  371.  ^Ib.,22. 


394 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


Sigel's  (formerly  Fremont's)  corps,  11,500;  Banks's 
corps  reported  14,500,  but  in  reality  only  about  8,000; 
McDowell's  corpa,  18,500;  making  of  the  three  corps  a 
total  of  38,000.  The  cavalry  numbered  about  5,000 
men  for  duty,  "  most  of  it  badly  mounted  and  armed, 
and  in  poor  condition  for  service."^  The  force  under 
Sturgis  at  Washington  numbered  about  17,000  men, 
says  Pope  in  his  letter  to  McClellan,  "mostly  raw 
recruits  and  fragments  of  broken  regiments,  in  no  con- 
dition for  ser^dce."^  The  force  in  the  District  of  the 
Kanawha  was  about  12,000  men.  In  the  same  letter 
Pope  says  that  the  troops  of  the  First  and  Second  Corps 
"  are  much  demoralized  and  broken  down,  and  unfit  for 
active  service  for  the  present."^  He  also  says  that 
McDowell's  corps  is  the  best,  and  in  fact  the  only 
reliable  portion  of  his  command.^  Sigel,  on  assuming 
command  of  the  First  Corps,  made  a  very  unfavorable 
report  of  its  condition.^ 

Having  ascertained  the  strength,  condition  and  posi- 
tion of  the  several  parts  of  his  command,  and  having  at- 
tended to  the  re-organization  of  the  divisions  and  of 
some  of  the  brigades  of  the  First  Corps,  and  to  furnishing 
his  whole  force  with  needed  supplies.  Pope  began  to 
concentrate  his  movable  forces,  and  to  establish  them  in 
the  positions  which  he  judged  best  for  the  purpose  of 
effecting  the  objects  set  forth  in  his  instructions.  In  the 
first  week  in  July,  Eicketts's  division  was  ordered  to 
Warrenton  ;  ^  Sigel's  corps  (temporarily  under  Schenck) 

1  16  W.  K.,  20.  3  ib.^  295.  *  lb.,  20,  54. 

2  14  W.  R.,  296.  "  lb.,  296.  «  18  W.  R.,  451. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUXTAIX. 


395 


was  directed  to  proceed  along  the  west  side  of  the  Blue 
Eida'e  through  Luray  Valley  to  Sperryville  ;  ^  Banks's 
corps  moved  to  a  point  near  ^Varrenton.-  All  these 
movements  were  effected  hy  the  11th.  But  Banks 
having  moved  as  he  did  under  a  mistake  due  to  an  error 
in  a  telegraphic  despatch  received  by  him  on  the  9th, 
again  moved  on  the  16th,  and  on  the  17th  arrived  at 
Little  AVashington,  a  few  miles  from  Sperryville.  These 
movements  brought  the  active  army  upon  a  line  extend- 
ing from  Luray  Gap  eastward  through  Spenyville  and 
Little  TTashinglon  to  Warrenton.  King's  division  of 
McDowell's  corps  was  left  at  Falmouth,  "  to  cover  the 
crossing  of  the  Eappahannock  at  that  point  and  to  pro- 
tect the  railroad  thence  to  Acquia  Creek  and  the  public 
buildings  that  had  been  erected  at  the  latter  place."  ^ 
Pope  says  that  this  wide  separation  of  one  di^-ision  from 
the  rest  of  the  army  was  in  compliance  with  the  wish 
of  the  War  Department,  and  gave  him  very  serious 
uneasiness.^ 

The  cavalry  of  Banks's  corps  under  Hatch  covered  the 
front :  the  cavalry  under  Bayard  was  with  ^McDowell. 
On  the  12th  Hatch  was  directed  to  take  up  his  head- 
quarters at  Culpeper,  throwing  out  strong  cavalry 
pickets  for  at  least  twenty  miles  in  the  direction  of 
Gordonsville  and  Eichmond.^  On  the  llrtli  he  was 
ordered  to  seize  Gordonsville,  and  if  possible  Charlottes- 
ville; he  was  promised  promotion  in  case  of  success. 
He  was  to  destroy  the  railroad  east  and  west  from  Gor- 

^  18  TV.  R..  453.     ni3       R..  21.  ns  TT.  R.,  467. 

«  lb.,  450.  ^Ib, 


396 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


donsville  ;  and,  if  he  met  no  considerable  resistance,  was 
to  push  a  force  to  the  James  and  destroy  the  canal. ^ 
On  the  15th  Bayard  with  his  cavalry  was  ordered  from 
Warrenton  Junction  to  Culpeper  to  join  Hatch. ^  On 
the  17th,  Pope  learned  that  instead  of  moving  with 
cavalry  only.  Hatch  had  taken  with  him  infantry,  artil- 
lery and  wagons ;  and  that  in  consequence  of  bad  roads 
he  had  at  that  date  advanced  only  as  far  as  Madison 
Court-House.^  Meantime,  on  the  16th  (the  Confeder- 
ate accounts  say  the  19th),  Ewell  had  reached  Gordons- 
ville,  and  the  proposed  movement  had  become  impracti- 
cable.* Hatch  was  then  ordered  to  make  another 
movement,  one  against  the  railroad  west  of  Gordons- 
ville,  by  proceeding  with  a  cavalry  force  from  Madison 
Court-House  round  the  west  side  of  the  Blue  Eidge. 
In  this  also  he  failed,  and  after  the  two  failures,  was  re- 
lieved from  his  command  and  replaced  by  Buford.^ 
About  this  time  a  cavalry  expedition  which  King  had 
been  ordered  to  send  afirainst  the  Yiro^inia  Central  Kail- 
road  was  reported  successful.^ 

On  the  21st  Ricketts's  division  was  ordered  from  War- 
renton to  Waterloo  Bridge,  at  the  crossing  of  Hedge- 
man's  River,  on  the  road  to  Sperryville ; this  brought 
him  nearer  to  Banks.  Crawford's  brigade  of  Banks's 
corps  was  sent  forward  to  Culpeper,  where  it  arrived  on 
the  24th.    Kins^'s  division  was  still  at  Falmouth. 

On  the  29th,  Pope  left  Washington  and  joined  his 
army.    He  was  not  enthusiastically  received.    He  had, 

1  18  W.  R.,  473.      16  W.  R.,  24.    ^  lb.,  24,  514.  Ub.,  496. 

2  lb.,  474.  "lb.  nSW.  R  .,484,  485,  487,  490,  499. 


TEE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN. 


397 


on  the  14th  of  July,  sent  to  his  conmiancl  the  following 
communication  : 

To  the  Officers  and  Soldiers  of  the  Army  of  Virginia : 

By  special  assignment  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  I 
have  assumed  the  command  of  this  army.  I  have  spent  two  weeks  in 
learning  yom-  whereabouts,  your  condition,  and  yom'  wants,  in  pre- 
jDaring  you  for  active  operations,  and  in  placing  you  in  jDositions 
from  which  you  can  act  promptly  and  to  the  purpose.  These 
labors  are  nearly  completed,  and  I  am  about  to  join  you  in  the 
field. 

Let  us  understand  each  other.  I  have  come  to  you  from  the 
West,  where  we  have  always  seen  the  backs  of  our  enemies ;  from 
an  army  whose  business  it  has  been  to  seek  the  adversary  and  to 
beat  him  when  he  was  found ;  whose  policy  has  been  attack  and 
not  defence.  In  but  one  instance  has  the  enemy  been  able  to  p)lace 
our  AVestern  armies  in  defensive  attitude.  I  presume  I  have  been 
called  here  to  pursue  the  same  system  and  to  lead  you  against  the 
enemy.  It  is  my  purpose  to  do  so,  and  that  speedily.  I  am  sure 
you  long  for  an  opportunity  to  win  the  distinction  you  are  capable 
of  achieving.  That  opportunity  I  shall  endeavor  to  give  you. 
Meantime  I  desire  you  to  dismiss  from  your  minds  certain  phrases, 
which  I  am  sorry  to  find  so  much  in  vogue  amongst  you.  I  hear 
constantly  of  "taking  strong  positions  and  holding  them,"  of 
"  lines  of  retreat,"  and  of  "  bases  of  supplies."  Let  us  discard  such 
ideas.  The  sti'ongest  position  a  soldier  should  desire  to  occupy  is 
one  from  which  he  can  most  easily  advance  against  the  enemy. 
Let  us  study  the  probable  lines  of  reti'eat  of  our  opponents,  and 
leave  our  own  to  take  care  of  themselves.  Let  us  look  before  us, 
and  not  behind.  Success  and  gloiy  are  in  the  advance,  disaster 
and  shame  lurk  in  the  rear.  Let  us  act  on  tliis  understanding,  and 
it  is  safe  to  predict  that  your  banners  shall  be  inscribed  with  many 
a  glorious  deed  and  that  your  names  will  be  dear  to  your  country- 
men forever.^ 


1  18       K.,  i73-i74. 


398 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


This  communication  gave  great  offence  to  his  army, 
and  was  regarded  as  indicating  on  his  part  a  lack  of 
judgment  and  good  sense.  It  was  felt  that  neither  in 
his  career  nor  in  the  events  of  the  war  up  to  that  time 
had  there  been  anything  to  justify  his  taking  such  a 
tone.  His  insinuations  against  the  courage  of  the 
Eastern  armies  doubtless  had  an  effect  on  Banks  at  Cedar 
Mountain.  Pope  also  spoke  in  conversation  openly  and 
freely  in  bitter  censure  of  McClellan ;  and  this,  while 
very  pleasing  to  certain  persons  at  Washington,  was 
equally  displeasing  to  many  of  Pope's  command.  More- 
over, a  habit  of  open  censure  was  thereby  fostered, 
from  which  Pope  himself  suffered.  His  pretensions 
were  greatly  ridiculed  in  his  army  and  elsewhere ;  the 
newspapers  especially  made  him  an  object  of  attack. 

The  unfavorable  impression  upon  his  command  made 
by  General  Pope  at  the  beginning,  only  grew  worse; 
so  that,  after  the  disasters  of  the  last  of  August,  when, 
according  to  an  eye-witness,  his  wounded  "laid  upon 
the  ground  waiting  for  transportation  to  come,  covered 
acres,"  the  same  witness  adds,  "How  they  cursed  one 
man  !  " 

Yet,  notwithstanding  ill-feeling  and  lack  of  confidence 
in  Pope,  there  was  on  the  part  of  his  oflScers  and  men 
no  want  of  determination  to  do  their  duty  manfully, 
as  their  heavy  losses  in  killed  and  wounded  attest,  and 
as  the  behavior  of  Banks's  corps  was  so  soon  to  demon- 
strate. 

Pope's  orders  holding  citizens  responsible  for  injuries 
done  to  tracks,  lines  or  roads,  and  for  attacks  upon 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN. 


399 


trains  or  stragglers,  by  guerillas  in  their  neighborhood; 
directing  that  disloyal  male  citizens  should  be  arrested, 
and,  in  case  of  refusal  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to 
the  United  States,  be  conducted  southward  beyond  our 
lines,  and  be  treated  as  spies  if  they  returned ;  and 
prescribing  other  acts  of  severity  greatly  exasperated 
the  Confederates,  and  rendered  the  contest  more  bitter, 
with  little  utility  to  the  Union  cause. ^ 

"  It  was  determined  before  I  left  Washington  to  take 
the  field  in  Virginia,"  says  Pope,  "that  the  union  of 
the  Armies  of  Virginia  and  of  the  Potomac  was  al:)so- 
lutely  essential  both  to  the  safety  of  the  national  capital 
and  to  the  further  successful  prosecution  of  the  opera- 
tions against  Eichmond.""^  This  modified  Pope's  plans, 
in  that  his  operations  against  the  enemy's  lines  of  com- 
munication to  the  west  and  north-west,  thereby  forcing 
him  to  make  heavy  detachments  from  his  main  force  at 
Richmond,  were  thereafter  to  be  with  the  object  of 
enabling  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  withdraw  from 
Harrison's  Landing  on  the  James  and  take  shipping  for 
Acquia  Creek  or  for  Alexandria ;  and  further,  in  that  if 
the  enemy  should,  as  was  feared,  throw  his  whole  force 
in  the  direction  of  Washington,  his  advance  was  to  be 
resisted  at  all  hazards,  his  movements  were  to  be 
embarrassed  and  delayed,  so  as  to  give  all  the  time  pos- 
sible for  the  arrival  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  behind 
the  Eappahannock.^ 

The  order  to  withdraw  from  the  James  and  transfer 
his  troops  to  Acquia  Creek  ^  was  received  by  McClellan 


1  16  W.  R.,  51,  52. 

2  lb.,  23. 


3  16  W.  R.,  23. 
*  12  W.  R.,  80-81. 


400 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


only  on  the  4th  of  August.^  Lee's  letters  to  Jackson 
show  that,  so  long  as  McClellan  remained  on  the  James, 
Lee  did  not  think  it  prudent  to  re-enforce  Jackson 
heavily;^  however,  on  the  27th  of  July  he  sent  him 
A.  P.  Hill's  division.^ 

By  the  plan  determined  upon  at  Washington,  the  two 
Union  armies  were  left  widely  separated,  and  were  for  a 
time  to  be  even  farther  apart ;  the  enemy  had  the  inte- 
rior line,  and  it  was  to  be  expected  that  Lee,  as  soon 
as  he  was  satisfied  of  the  withdrawal  of  McClellan,  would 
not  confine  himself  to  making  heavy  detachments  from 
his  force  at  Richmond,  as  Pope  seems  to  have  imagined, 
but  would  throw  nearly  the  whole  of  it  upon  Pope. 
However,  Lee  did  not  learn,  for  some  days  after  the 
order  was  given,  that  the  withdrawal  of  McClellan  had 
begun ;  and  he  did  not  commence  his  own  movement 
against  Pope  until  the  13th  of  August,^  but  left  to  deal 
with  the  latter,  Jackson  re-enforced  by  Hill. 

Soon  after  Pope  joined  his  army.  Banks  moved  from 
Little  Washington  to  Hazel  River  where  it  crosses  the 
turnpike  from  Sperryville  to  Culpeper ;  Ricketts  moved 
to  Culpeper.  Thus,  on  the  7th  of  August  the  infantry 
and  artillery,  except  King's  division,  were  at  points 
on  the  turnpike  from  Sperryville  to  Culpeper,  a  dis- 
tance of  about  twenty-two  miles.  They  numbered 
according  to  Pope's  report  about  28,500  men ;  ^  but 
the  return  of  his  army  of  July  31  shows  a  larger 
number.^    The   cavalry  on   the   7th  of  August  was 

112W.  E.,  81.  3  lb.,  919.  5  16W.  R.,24. 

8  18  W.  R.,  916-917.       *  lb.,  928-929.  ^  lb.,  53. 


TEE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN. 


401 


disposed  as  follows  :  Buford  with  five  regiments  was 
posted  at  Madison  Court-House,  having  his  pickets  along 
the  Eapidan  from  Barnett's  Ford  as  far  west  as  the  Blue 
Eidge ;  Bayard  with  four  regiments  was  posted  near 
Eapidan  Station,  ha\dng  his  pickets  extending  from 
Barnett's  Ford  eastward  to  Eaccoon  Ford.  As  a  support 
to  Buford's  cavalry,  Sigel  had  been  directed  to  send  a 
brigade  and  a  battery  to  Eobertson's  Eiver,  where  it 
crosses  the  road  from  Sperryville  to  Madison  Court- 
House  ;  as  a  support  for  Bayard's  cavalry,  Crawford's 
brigade  with  artillery  was  posted  at  Culpeper.^ 

The  weather  at  this  time  was  intensely  hot ;  owing  to 
this,  to  imprudence  in  eating  unripe  fruit,  and  to  neglect 
of  sanitary  precautions,  many  of  the  men  were  ill,  and 
many  died. 

I  now  turn  to  the  movements  of  the  enemy.  Jack- 
son, after  having  escaped  the  forces  sent  to  intercept 
him,  encamped  on  the  12th  of  June  near  Weyer's  Cave. 
Aided  by  a  false  movement  of  a  part  of  Lee's  forces,  he 
sought,  apparently  with  success,  to  give  the  Union  com- 
manders the  impression  that  a  strong  advance  was  to  be 
made  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  But,  instead  of  mov- 
ing down  the  valley,  he  proceeded  to  Eichmond  to  take 
part  in  the  attack  on  McClellan  begun  on  the  26th  of 
June.  As  I  have  stated,  it  was  regarded  by  the  Con- 
federate authorities,  even  after  McClellan's  withdrawal 
to  the  James,  as  necessary  to  retain  at  Eichmond  a  force 
sufficient  to  repulse  any  advance  of  his  army.  How- 
ever, it  was  known  or  believed  that  Pope  was  threaten- 
ing Gordonsville,  and  it  was  deemed  important  that  he 

U6  W.  R.,  24. 


402 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


should  be  checked.  Therefore,  on  the  13th  of  July 
Jackson  with  his  own  division  and  that  of  Ewell  was 
ordered  to  "proceed  to  Louisa  Court-House,  and  if  prac- 
ticable to  Gordonsville,  there  to  oppose  the  reported  ad- 
vance of  the  enemy  from  the  direction  of  Orange  Court- 
House."  ^  The  two  divisions  moved  as  ordered,  and  on 
the  19th  Ewell  reached  Gordonsville.  Jackson,  having 
received  information  that  the  Union  forces  greatly  out- 
numbered his  own,  repeatedly  asked  Lee  for  re-enforce- 
ments ;  Lee  hesitated,  but  as  above  stated,  sent  him  on 
the  27th,  A.  P.  Hill's  division.^ 

Early  in  August,  Lee  was  informed  by  Colonel 
Mosby  that  Burnside  was  embarking  troops  at  Fort 
Monroe,  and  that  they  were  intended  for  the  Kappahan- 
nock.  This  was  promptly  communicated  to  Jackson, 
who,  learning  that  only  a  part  of  Pope's  army  was  at 
Culpeper,  determined  to  attack  it  before  it  should  be 
re-enforced.  Accordingly,  the  three  divisions,  Ewell's, 
Hill's  and  Jackson's  moved  on  the  7th  of  August  from 
their  camps  near  Gordonsville,  in  the  direction  of  Cul- 
peper.^ The  divisions  were  to  move  in  the  order  above 
given  ;  but  Hill,  mistaking  Jackson's  division  for  that  of 
Ewell,  which  he  was  to  follow,  fell  in  rear  of  the  former, 
and  thus  caused  delay.'* 

On  the  morning  of  the  8th,  the  Confederate  cavalry 
under  Kobertson  attacked  and  drove  back  the  Union 
cavalry  under  Bayard,  and  Jackson  continued  his 
advance.^    The  day  was  spent  in  skirmishing  with  the 

U8  W.  R.,  915.  new.  R.,  182.  ^  i^.^  i82. 

2  lb.,  919.  4  lb.,  214-215. 


TEE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN, 


403 


Union  cavalry,  which  displayed  such  activity  and  enter- 
prise that  Jackson,  to  guard  the  trains  of  his  division, 
sent  back  Lawton's  brigade,  which  was  thus  prevented 
from  taking  part  in  the  battle  of  the  next  day.^  Jack- 
son had  intended  to  arrive  at  Culpeper  in  the  forenoon 
of  the  ninth,  but  his  troops  like  those  of  Pope  had 
greatly  suffered  from  the  oppressively  hot  weather,  and 
his  progress  had  been  much  slower  than  he  had 
expected. 

I  now  return  to  the  movements  of  Pope's  army,  which 
was  left  extending  along  the  turnpike  from  Sperryville 
to  Culpeper.  On  the  7th  Pope  was  at  Sperr}wille, 
where  he  inspected  Sigel's  corps,  and  remained  until  four 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  During  the  day  he  received 
reports  that  the  enemy  was  crossing  the  Rapidan  at  sev- 
eral points  between  the  railroad  crossing  and  Liberty 
Mills.  Pope  returned  to  Culpeper,  where  he  arrived  on 
the  mornins:  of  the  8th.  Here  were  Crawford's  brio;- 
ade  of  Banks's  corps  and  Ricketts's  division  of  McDow- 
ell's corps.  During  the  morning,  reports  were  received 
from  Bayard,  who  was  slowly  falling  back  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Culpeper,  and  from  Buford,  who  reported  the 
enemy  advancing  in  force  in  the  direction  of  Madison 
Court-House.^  From  these  reports  it  was  uncertain  in 
which  direction  the  real  movement  of  the  enemy  was 
being  made ;  yet  Pope,  in  view  of  his  instructions  to 
keep  interposed  between  the  enemy  and  the  lower  Rap- 
pahannock, decided  to  concentrate  at  or  near  Culpeper. 
Shortly  after  noon  on  the  8th,  he  sent  forward  toward 

UGW.  R.,  182.  2 lb.,  25. 


404 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CA3IPAIGN. 


Cedar  Mountain,  Crawford's  brigade  with  artillery  to 
support  Bayard  and  assist  him  in  determining  the  move- 
ments and  the  forces  of  the  enemy.  Orders  were  sent 
to  Banks  to  move  promptly  to  Culpeper,  and  to  Sigel  to 
march  at  once  to  the  same  place.  Banks  arrived  at 
Culpeper  at  eleven  o'clock  that  night ;  but  Sigel,  at  half- 
past  six  o'clock  that  afternoon,  sent  to  ask  Pope  by 
what  road  he  should  march,  although  the  only  direct 
road  was  the  turnpike.^  Consequently,  he  arrived  at 
Culpeper  only  in  the  afternoon  of  the  9th.  His  troops 
were  much  fatigued,  and,  in  spite  of  express  orders  to 
the  contrary,  had  come  unprovided  with  rations. ^  They 
required  time  to  repose  and  to  obtain  rations.  On  the 
8th  also,  Ricketts's  division  was  sent  to  the  junction 
of  the  road  from  Madison  Court-House  with  the  road 
from  Cedar  Mountain  to  Culpeper ;  ^  Buford  was  di- 
rected to  try  to  make  a  dash  upon  the  flank  and  rear  of 
the  enemy  and  King's  division  was  ordered  to  join 
Pope.^  King  arrived  only  on  the  11th  ;^  he  had  left 
at  Falmouth,  Burnside  with  about  12,000  men."'' 

On  the  morning  of  the  9th,  Banks  was  directed  to 
move  forward  with  his  corps  toward  Cedar  Mountain 
and  join  Crawford's  brigade.^  The  corps  began  its 
march  at  about  ten  o'clock,  under  a  burning  sun,  over  a 
road  without  shade  or  water,  soon  passed  Ricketts's 
division  reposing  near  the  road,  and  at  about  noon,  or 
soon  after,  arrived  at  the  ground  held  by  Crawford  near 
Cedar  Run. 

1  16  AV.  R.,  25.    3  lb.,  170.  ^  lb.  '  18  W.  R.,  554. 

2  lb.,  26.  18  W.  R.,  548.    « 16  W.  R.,  27.    ^  iq       R.,  25. 


TEE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUXTAIX. 


405 


There  has  been  a  controversy  as  to  what  Banks  was 
ordered  to  do :  he  asserting  that  he  was  ordered  to 
attack,^  and  Pope  denying  that  he  gave  an  order  to  that 
effect.2 

An  order  orally  given  to  Banks,  brought  Ijy  Colonel 
Lewis  Marshall,"  of  Pope's  staff,  was  by  Banks's  direc- 
tion put  in  writing  by  Major  L.  H.  Pelouze,  of  Banks's 
stalf,  and  according  to  Pelouze's  retained  copy  was 
worded  as  follows  : 

CuLPEPER,  9.45  A.M.,  Aug.  9,  *62. 

From  Col.  Leicis  2Iarsho.ll  : 

Genl.  Banks  to  move  to  the  front  immediately,  assume  com- 
mand of  all  forces  in  the  front,  deplov  his  skirmishers  if  the  enemy 
approaches,  and  attack  him  immediately  as  soon  as  he  approaches, 
and  be  re- enforced  from  her  e.^ 

I  find  no  reason  to  doubt  that  the  order  sriven  to 
Banks  was  so  worded  :  in  fact,  Pope  in  one  of  his  state- 
ments admits  that  he  gave  Banks  substantially  the  same 
directions/  It  is  plain  that  Banks  did  his  part  to  have 
the  order  coiTectly  expressed  in  writing :  and  that,  for 
any  mi  sunder  standins"  due  to  an  error  in  the  wording  of 
the  order,  he  was  not  responsiljle. 

The  answer  to  the  question  whether  Banks  was 
ordered  to  do  as  he  did,  seems  to  turn  upon  the  proper 
interpretation  of  the  order  as  above  expressed,  and  upon 

1  3  C.  TV..  1665,  •■  Zvliscellaneous,"  46. 

2  16  W.  R..  26;  3  C  W..  1865.  ••  ^liscellaneous,"  47. 
^  Louis  H.  ^rarshall. 

*  cf.  3  C.  TT..  1S65,  •■^liscellaneous,"  45. 

*  16  W.  R.,  26. 


406 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  campaign: 


whether  such  oral  instructions  as  Pope  says  he  gave 
Banks  were  really  given. 

The  order,  while  giving  directions  concerning  the 
employment  of  skirmishers,  —  a  matter  that  might  well 
be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  commander  of  the  corps, 
—  is  silent  upon  really  important  matters.  If  it  was 
intended,  as  Pope  alleges,  that  Banks  should  merely 
check  the  advance  of  the  enemy  so  as  to  give  time  for 
the  concentration  of  Pope's  forces,  nothing  to  that  effect 
is  found  in  the  order ;  moreover,  the  point  where  the 
concentration  was  to  be  made  is  not  distinctly  indicated. 

Pope's  statements  vary  considerably,  but  he  has 
asserted  that  he  gave,  in  an  interview  at  his  head- 
quarters in  Culpeper,  oral  instructions  to  Banks, ^  and 
that  he  sent  him  his  chief  of  cavalry.  General  Robei-ts, 
with  full  and  precise  orders  that  Banks  should  take  up  a 
position  near  that  held  by  Crawford's  brigade,  and  if  the 
enemy  advanced  upon  him  (Banks)  he  should  push  his 
skirmishers  well  to  the  front  and  attack  the  enemy  with 
them.^  Roberts  says  that  he  understood  Pope's  object 
was  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check  at  Cedar  Mountain,  and 
not  to  attack  until  the  other  troops  should  arrive  and 
join  Banks  ;  ^  that  at  about  three  o'clock  he  expressed  to 
Banks  the  opinion  that  Jackson  had  arrived  and  his 
forces  were  very  large ;  that  Banks  expressed  a  different 
opinion,  saying  he  thought  he  should  attack  the  batteries 
before  night ;  that  he  gave  Banks  his  reasons  for  believ- 

^  15  W.  E.,  201 ;  16  W.  R.,  26 ;  cf.  3  C.  W.,  1865,  "  Miscellaneous,"  45. 

2  16  W.  R.,  26 ;  3  C.  W.,  1865,  "  Miscellaneous,"  46. 

3  15  W.  R.,  184. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN.  407 

ing  such  an  attack  would  be  dangerous,  and  stated  his 
conviction  that  the  batteries  were  supported  by  heayy 
masses  of  infantry  massed  in  the  wood,  that  Banks  was 
of  a  different  opinion,  and  thought  he  could  carry  the 
field ;  that  he  (Eoberts)  then  (he  thinks  the  despatch 
was  dated  at.  about  half-past  four)  sent  word  to  Pope 
that  a  general  battle  would  be  fought  before  night,  and 
urged  that  Eicketts's  di^dsion  should  be  at  once  sent  to 
the  field. 

In  regard  to  all  this,  it  is  to  be  said  that  Pope's 
statements^  are  unreliable,  and  that  Roberts  is  not  an 
unbiassed  or  an  accurate  witness ;  moreover,  there  is 
incongruity  between  the  statements  made  by  the  two, 
and  the  course  taken  by  Eoberts.  Pope  says  he  sent 
Eoberts  with  full  and  precise  orders  as  to  what  Banks 
was  to  do,  and  Eoberts  says  he  understood  Pope's  object 
was  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check  at  Cedar  Mountain,  and 
not  to  attack  until  other  troops  should  arrive  and  join 
Banks ;  yet,  according  to  Eoberts's  first  statement,  the 
objections  to  the  proposed  attack  which  he  made  to  Banks 
were  based  only  on  his  belief  that  the  enemy  was  in 
great  force,  not  upon  the  ground  that  such  an  attack 
would  be  inconsistent  with  Pope's  orders  or  with  his 
object.  However,  in  his  testimony  on  the  next  day, 
Eoberts  said  :  "  I  .  .  .  showed  General  Banks  the  posi- 
tions where  his  own  corps  could  take  position  to  advan- 
tage and  hold  those  positions,  as  I  thought,  if  attacked. 
I  then  told  him  that  General  Pope  wanted  him  to  hold 
the  enemy  in  check  there  until  Sigel's  forces  could  be 

^  15  TV.  R.,  185. 


408 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


brought  Up,  which  were  expected  that  day,  and  all  his 
other  forces  united  to  fight  Jackson's  forces."  ^  Why  was 
a  matter  so  important  omitted  in  Roberts's  first  statement  ? 
Was  Banks  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check  until  even  King's 
division  should  arrive  ?  Roberts  adds  in  the  same  para- 
graph, "I  mean  to  be  understood  to  say  that  it  is  my 
impression  that  General  Banks  fought  that  battle  entirely 
upon  his  own  responsibility  and  against  the  expectations 
of  General  Pope,  and  those  expectations  had  been 
expressed  to  General  Banks,  as  I  have  already  stated,  per- 
haps more  strongly."  ^  If  Roberts  distinctly  recollected 
having  said  to  Banks  what  he  asserts  that  he  said,  why 
does  he  weaken  the  force  of  his  statement  by  explaining 
it  as  his  "impression"?  Again,  Roberts  says  that  Pope 
authorized  him  to  give  any  orders  in  Pope's  name  to  any 
of  the  officers  that  might  be  in  the  field  senior  to  him 
(Roberts).^  That  Pope  was  empowered  so  to  authorize 
Roberts,  and  thus  virtually  to  place  him  in  command  over 
Banks,  is,  at  least,  very  doubtful ;  for  it  seems  to  have 
required  a  special  law  to  empower  even  the  President  to 
place  a  junior  in  command  over  his  senior.  However, 
Roberts  appears  not  to  have  doubted  the  validity  of  the 
authority  given  him,  yet  it  was  not  used  to  prevent  Banks 
from  doing  what  Roberts  understood  to  be  not  what  Pope 
intended. 

U5  W.  E.,  186.  "^Ih. 
3  lb.,  184 ;  cf.,  3  C  W.,  1865,  "  Miscellaneous,"  48.  This  statement 
was  modified  the  next  day  to  :  "I  was  authorized  to  give  any  orders,  so 
far  as  to  carry  out  General  Pope's  views  as  they  had  been  expressed  to 
me  (General  Roberts),  in  relation  to  holding  the  enemy  there  until  his 
forces  (General  Pope's  forces)  could  come  up."    15  W.  R.,  185. 


TEE  BATTLE  OE  CEDAR  MOUyTAIX. 


409 


It  is  true  that  the  order  does  not  in  terms  direct  sitck 
an  attack  as  Banks  made  :  and  in  anv  case,  some  dis- 
cretion must  be  aUowed  to  tke  comm.ander  of  an  army 
corps  acting  at  a  distance  from  kis  superior. 

Banks  said  to  tke  Committee  on  tke  Conduct  of  tke 
^Var.  "'I  ^as  a  little  desperate,  because  I  supposed 
General  Pope  tkougkt  we  did  not  want  to  figkt.'"'  ^ 
Banks  doubtless  remembered  tke  language  of  Pope's 
address  to  kis  army  on  tke  14tk  of  July.  Besides,  on 
tkat  same  date.  Pope  wi-ote  to  Banks,  "I  again  beg 
of  you  to  dismiss  any  idea  tkat  tkere  is  any  purpose 
whatever  to  reti^eat  from  the  positions  which  you  are  in- 
stinct ed  to  take  up.  or  tkat  tkere  is  any  design  wkatever 
to  await  any  attack  of  tke  enemy.'"  -  And  Banks 
states  tkat  Eob^erts  said  to  kim  repeatedly  on  tke  day  of 
tke  b>aule,  "Tkere  must  be  no  backing  out  to-day."  ^ 
In  view  of  all  tkis.  it  is  ceitain  tkat  "taking  a  strong 
position  and  kolding  it."  "not  "to  seek  tke  adversary 
and  beat  kim  wken  foimd,"^  or  "to  await  any  attack  of 
tke  enemy."  was  not  in  accordance  witk  tke  expressed 
views  of  General  Pope  ;  and  to  kave  any  "  backing  out 
was  regarded  as  especially  objectionable. 

Union  commanders  kad  often  been  accused  of  over- 
estimatino"  tke  numbers  of  tke  enemy,  and  at  Cedar 
]\Iountain  kis  infantry  force,  mostly  concealed  in  tke 
wood  or  by  tke  nature  of  tke  groimd,  could  only  be  con- 

^  3  C.         1S65.  "mscenaneoii5."46. 
-  IS  VT.  E..  472. 

3.3  C.  W..  1S65.  "  AlisceEaneoiLS.'"  i6. 
'  IS  TV.  E..  i7i. 
=  lb. 


410 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


jectured.  Besides,  Banks  had  received  at  about  nine 
o'clock  on  tlie  morning  of  tlie  9tli  a  despatcli  from 
Buford  stating  that  all  his  (Buford's)  force  was  in  re- 
treat toward  Sperryville,  that  the  enemy  was  in  force  on 
his  right,  left  and  rear,  and  that  he  might  be  cut  off.^ 
The  force  of  the  enemy  thus  referred  to,  appears  to  have 
been  cavalry.  This  despatch  tended  to  mislead  Banks 
as  to  the  force  in  his  front ;  and,  having  been  forwarded 
to  Pope,  was  probably  the  cause  of  the  retention  of 
Ricketts's  division  at  the  junction  of  the  road  from  Madi- 
son Court-House  with  the  road  from  Culpeper  to  Cedar 
Mountain.  As  late  as  twenty-five  minutes  past  two 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  Banks  reported  the  enemy  as 
showing  ostentatiously  a  strong  force  of  cavalry,  no  in- 
fantry seen  and  not  much  artillery.^ 

Going  back  to  the  movements  on  the  8th,  Crawford 
marched  soon  after  noon,  with  four  regiments  of  infantry, 
Roemer's  battery  (L,  2d  New  York)  of  six  three-inch 
rifled  guns  and  two  sections  of  Knap's  battery  (E,  Penn- 
sylvania) of  ten-pounder  Parrotts.  By  four  o'clock  he 
came  up  with  Bayard's  cavalry  near  Cedar  Run.  Passing 
to  the  front,  he  saw  the  enemy's  pickets,  and  beyond 
them  on  the  road  a  portion  of  his  cavalry.  Crawford 
selected  a  position,  drew  up  his  infantry  in  the  low 
ground  of  the  run,  concealed  from  the  view  of  the  enemy, 
and  within  close  supporting  distance  from  his  artillery, 
which  he  posted  on  his  right  and  left.  The  cavalry 
moved  to  the  front,  strong  pickets  were  thrown  out,  and 
the  command  bivouacked  for  the  night. ^ 

1  16  W.  R.,  55.  2  nh.,  U9-150. 


TEE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUXTAm. 


411 


In  the  morning  of  the  9th,  the  enemy  established  near 
the  foot  of  Cedar  Momitain,  and  to  Crawford's  left,  a 
battery  of  three  pieces,  from  T^'hich  at  eleven  o'clock  he 
opened  fire,  and  soon  afterward  opened  from  another 
battery  a  short  distance  in  the  rear.  This  fire  was 
sharply  replied  to  by  Knap's  battery,  and  soon  ceased. 
A  little  later  Battery  F,  4th  U.S.  Artillery,  arrived  and 
was  placed  on  the  right  and  left.  There  was  for  some 
time  an  occasional  fire  of  artillery  at  long  range.  At 
about  twelve  o'clock,  Gordon's  brigade  of  ^Villiams's 
division  came  up ;  and  between  one  and  two  o'clock, 
Banks  arrived  with  Augur's  division,  which  took  posi- 
tion on  Crawford's  left.    Gordon  moved  to  the  right. ^ 

My  remembrance  of  the  topography  of  the  l^attlefield 
is  imperfect.  I  have  not  seen  it  since  the  time  of  the 
battle,  and  the  maps  which  I  have  been  able  to  consult  are 
incomplete  and  do  not  agree  :  hence,  my  description  must 
be  defective. 

About  six  miles  from  Culpeper  on  the  road  to  Orange 
Court-House  there  is  for  half  a  mile  a  gentle  descent  to 
the  ground  through  which  winds,  with  several  branches,  a 
small  stream  called  Cedar  Eun.  For  about  four  hundred 
yards  from  the  beginning  of  the  descent,  the  road  is 
skirted  on  both  sides  by  a  wood,  then  passes  through 
open  ground,  for  about  nine  hundred  yards,  to  a  short 
distance  beyond  the  junction  of  the  road  to  ^Mitchell's 
Station.  Here,  on  the  right  of  the  road,  and  on  a  ridge 
crossing  it,  a  strip  of  wood  of  varying  width,  narrow  on 
the  road,  soon  becomes  some  three  or  four  hundred  yards 

1  16  W.  R.,  150. 


412 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


wide.  On  the  hither  side  of  this  strip  of  wood  is  the 
low  ground  of  the  run  (the  latter  being  then  nearly  or 
quite  dry)  ;  thence,  northward,  the  ground  rises  consider- 
ably to  a  wood  nearly  parallel  to  the  other,  near  the  edge 
of  which,  and  about  twelve  hundred  yards  to  the  right 
of  the  road  from  Culpeper,  is  a  house  (Mrs.  Brown's). 
On  the  farther  side  of  the  strip  of  wood  was  a  stubble 
field,  of  which  the  wheat  had  been  reaped  and  left  in 
stacks.  This  field,  of  irregular,  four-sided  outline,  ex- 
tended about  eight  hundred  yards  to  the  right  of  the 
Culpeper  road,  was  some  six  hundred  yards  across  along 
the  road,  and  about  three  hundred  yards  at  the  opposite 
end.  Here  it  adjoined  an  old,  worn-out  field,  nearly 
trapezoidal  in  shape,  overgrown  with  bushes  and  briars ; 
alonof  the  line  between  the  two  fields  ran  a  low  ridj^e 
fringed  with  bushes.  On  the  side  next  the  Culpeper 
road,  the  wheatfield  was  open ;  on  both  the  hither  and 
the  farther  side  of  the  two  fields,  and  along  the  end  of 
the  bushy  field  farthest  from  the  road,  extended  a  thick 
wood. 

On  the  left  of  the  road,  opposite  the  wheatfield,  were 
cornfields  with  the  corn  still  standing.  The  road,  from 
a  point  not  far  from  the  crossing  of  the  run,  curves  to 
the  right,  and  leaves  Cedar  (Slaughter's,  or  Cedar  Run) 
Mountain  a  considerable  distance  to  the  left,  nearly  due 
south  from  the  crossing.  From  several  hundred  yards 
on  the  hither  side  of  the  run,  the  ground  on  our  left  of 
the  road  was  open,  undulating,  dotted  here  and  there 
with  clumps  of  brushwood,  crossed  by  several  fences, 
and  gradually  rose  for  a  mile  or  more  from  the  run  to 


TSE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN. 


413 


the  base  of  the  mountain,  of  which  the  sides  were  par- 
tially wooded.  A  little  beyond  the  crossing,  a  road  to 
the  left  leads  to  Mitchell's  Station  on  the  Orange  and 
Alexandria  Eailroad.  About  a  mile  and  a  half  farther  on 
the  road  from  Culpeper  to  Orange  Court-House,  a  road 
branches  to  the  right  and  leads  to  Madison  Court-House. 
There  were  also,  running  in  various  directions,  several 
farm  roads  and  dirt  roads. 

Soon  after  his  arrival  on  the  field,  Gordon  suggested 
to  Eoberts  that  the  crest  of  the  hill  near  Brown's  house 
should  be  held,  and  said,  Shall  I  take  it?  "  —  "Do  so," 
replied  Roberts,  and  the  brigade  moved  at  once  to  the 
designated  place  and  took  position  -}  the  27th  Indiana 
on  the  right,  having  two  companies  out  beyond  and  to 
the  front  of  its  right  flank,  both  with  skirmishers  de- 
ployed; near  these  companies  the  16th  Indiana  battery; 
the  2d  Massachusetts  and  the  Collis  company  of  Zouaves 
(temporarily  attached)  a  little  in  rear  of  Brown's  house, 
with  two  companies  at  the  house ;  the  3d  AVisconsin  on 
the  left ;  Cothran's  battery  (M,  1st  Xew  York)  in  front 
and  to  the  left  of  the  house.  Six  companies  of  the  3d 
Wisconsin  deployed  as  skirmishers  were  soon  sent  for- 
ward into  the  strip  of  wood  in  front. 

The  line  held  by  Gordon  on  the  crest  of  the  hill, 
extending  to  and  across  the  road,  appears  to  have  been 
the  line  indicated  by  Eoberts  to  Banks  as  the  strongest 
position  for  the  whole  command,^  from  which,  however, 
Banks  moved  forward.    It  seems  that  Banks  did  not 

1  Gordon,  Brook  Earm,  282. 

2  15       R.,  186 ;  3  C.  W.,  1865,  "  Miscellaneous,"  45. 


414 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


know  the  position  assigned  to  Gordon,  but  supposed  him 
to  be  just  this  side  of  the  strip  of  wood  and  to  the  right 
of  Crawford,^  after  the  latter  had  moved  forward  into 
the  wood,  as  will  now  be  related. 

Soon  after  the  arrival  of  Augur's  division,  Crawford's 
brigade,  then  posted  across  the  road,  was  moved  wholly, 
to  the  right  of  it.  Some  time  afterward,  the  5th  Con- 
necticut, 28th  New  York  and  46th  Pennsylvania  of  this 
brigade  were  ordered  into  the  strip  of  wood  in  front; 
they  moved  off  with  alacrity,  and  soon  disappeared  from 
view.  Immediately  after  this,  the  10th  Maine  of  the 
same  brigade  was  ordered  forward  to  the  hither  side  of 
the  same  strip  of 'wood,  its  left  resting  near  the  road. 
The  three  other  reo'iments  had  inclined  to  the  risfht  so 
that  they  were  in  front  of  Gordon's  position,  distant 
therefrom  full  1,200  yards,  and  were  also  widely  sepa- 
rated from  the  10th  Mame.^ 

Augur's  division,  which  had  taken  position  on  the  left 
of  Crawford's  brigade,  was,  after  this  brigade  had  gone 
to  the  right  of  the  road,  moved  forward  and  formed  in 
two  lines,  the  right  resting  near  the  Culpeper  road,  the 
lines  extending  therefrom  in  a  direction  a  little  to  the 
east  of  the  mountain.^  Williams's  line  beino'  in  a  direc- 
tion  nearly  east  and  west,  the  lines  of  the  two  divisions 
formed  an  obtuse  angle,  with  the  re-entering  toward  the 
enemy.  Augur's  brigades  were  in  the  following  order 
from  right  to   left :  Geary's,  Prince's,  Greene's.  Of 

^  Gordon,  Brook  Farm,  286,  note. 

2  16  W.  R.,  150-151. 

3  lb.,  157-158. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUXTAIX. 


415 


Geary's  brigade,  the  Ttli  Ohio  on  the  right  and  the  66th 
Ohio  on  the  left  formed  the  first  line  :  the  29th  Ohio  on 
the  right  and  the  5th  Ohio  on  the  left  formed  the  second 
line.  Of  Prince's  brigade,  the  11th  Pennsylvania  on  the 
right  and  the  3d  ^Maryland  on  the  left,  formed  the  first 
line ;  the  109th  Pennsylvania  on  the  right  and  the  102d 
Xe^v  York  on  the  left,  the  second  line  ;  while  the  bat- 
talion of  the  8th  and  the  12th  U.S.  Infantry  mider  Cap- 
tain Pitcher  was  detached,  and  l^y  General  Augar's 
order  was  deployed  as  skiiTnishers  "  to  cover  the  front  of 
the  whole  division,  to  advance  continuously,  discover 
the  enemy's  position,  and  annoy  him  as  much  as  possi- 
ble."'" This  was  so  well  done  as  to  excite  the  admiration 
of  the  enemy,  some  of  whom  asked  a  captured  officer 
whether  these  skirmishers  were  not  regulars,  as  they  had 
never  seen  such  skirmishing.  These  regulars  were  out 
during  the  whole  liattle,  penetrated  to  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion, and  annoyed  him  so  much  as  to  cause  him  to  turn 
artillery  and  waste  canister  upon  them.  Greene's  small 
brigade  was  on  the  left  of  the  whole  line,  somewhat  re- 
fused, and  supported  ]\IcGilvery's  battery.^ 

The  artillery  was  in  front,  placed  from  right  to  left 
nearly  as  follows  :  The  16th  Indiana  battery  on  the  right, 
near  the  two  companies  of  the  27th  Indiana  :  Cotliran's 
battery  (M,  1st  Xew  York)  near  Brown's  house  ;  Muh- 
lenberg with  four  guns  of  Best's  battery  (F,  4th  U.S.) 
on  our  right  of,  and  near,  the  Culpeper  road  :  next,  on 
our  left  of  that  road,  four  gims  of  Koemer's  battery  (L, 
2d  Xew  York)  ;  then,  on  higher  ground,  four  guns  of 


1  16  W^  E..  157-158. 


416 


POPWS  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


Knap's  battery  (E,  Pennsylvania)  ;  next,  two  guns  of 
Roemer's  battery  under  Lieutenant  Howard ;  next,  two 
guns  of  Best's  battery  under  Lieutenant  Harry  Cushing ; 
next,  two  guns  of  Knap's  battery  under  Lieutenant 
Geary ;  next,  six  guns  of  Robinson's  battery  (4th 
Maine)  ;  next,  on  our  extreme  left,  six  guns  of  McGil- 
very's  battery  (Gth  Maine)  ;  forty-two  guns  in  all.  The 
discrepancies  in  the  different  accounts  of  the  position  of 
the  artillery  are  probably  due  to  changes  made  in  the 
position  of  portions  of  it  during  the  action. 

According  to  Augur's  official  report,  his  total  number 
of  men  in  action  was  3,013  :  Geary's  brigade  and  Knap's 
battery,  1,121 ;  Prince's  brigade  and  Robinson's  battery, 
1,435;  Greene's  brigade  and  McGilvery's  battery,  457. 
There  were  absent  detached,  from  Geary's  brigade,  the 
28th  Pennsylvania  at  Thoroughfare  Mountain  to  protect 
the  signal  station ;  from  Greene's  brigade,  the  3d  Dela- 
ware at  Front  Royal,  the  Purnell  Legion  Maryland 
Volunteers  at  Warrenton  and  Warrenton  Junction,  the 
60th  New  York  at  Warrenton  Springs,  leaving  in  this 
brigade  only  the  78th  New  York  and  a  battalion  of  the 
1st  district  besides  the  battery.^  Estimating  the  number 
of  officers  of  infantry  and  artillery  at  235,  the  total  of 
officers  and  men  in  the  division  was  3,248. 

Williams's  division  had,  in  Crawford's  brigade,  1,767  ^ 
officers  and  men;  in  Gordon's  brigade,  about  1,500;^ 
in  the  artillery,  including  batteries  serving  on  the  9th  in 
front  of  Augur's  division,  about  300  (estimated)  ;  total 
3,567.    Of  Gordon's  brigade,  the  29th  Pennsylvania 

^  16  W.  R.,  157.  2  lb.,  153.  3  ib.^  808. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN. 


41T 


was,  and  had  been  for  weeks,  on  detached  semce.  Some 
shigie  companies  were  also  detached. 

The  cavahy  was  estimated  at  not  more  than  1,200. 
The  grand  total  of  Banks's  forces  present  in  action  was 
about  8,000^  or,  exclusive  of  cavalry,  which  took  little 
part  in  the  action,  about  6,800. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  detachments  were  numer- 
ous and  heavy ;  and  these,  together  with  losses  by  sick- 
ness and  straggling,  both  aggravated  by  the  oppressive 
weather,  will  go  far  to  account  for  the  discrepancy  be- 
tween the  reported  strength  of  the  corps  and  its  effective 
strenglh  in  action. 

Turning  attention  now  to  the  Confederates,  who  were 
left  just  arriving  at  Cedar  Mountain,  Jackson's  intention 
had  been,  as  he  states  in  a  despatch  dated  the  9th,  at 
Locust  Dale,  twelve  miles  from  Culpeper,  to  be  in  Cul- 
peper  before  noon  on  that  day.  But  Ewell's  division 
marched  only  eight  miles  on  the  8th,  the  weather  being 
oppressively  hot  and  several  men  having  suffered  from 
sunstroke.  Hill's  division  made  that  day  only  two 
miles,  and  at  night  was  only  one  mile  north  of  Orange 
Court-House.  ^Mien  writing  the  despatch,  Jackson 
did  not  expect  a  battle  that  day,  and  feared  that  in  con- 
sequence of  his  tardy  movements  his  expedition  would 
be  productive  of  little  good.^ 

The  cavalry  of  the  Confederates  had  made  their  appear- 
ance on  the  8th :  but  Jackson's  leadins:  division  under 
Ewell  arrived  near  the  battlefield  only  at  about  one 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  9th,  and  began  to  move 

^16W.  R.,2o.  2  ^181. 


418  •     POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 

into  position  at  about  two  o'clock.^  Early  with  his 
brigade  of  this  division  moved  by  the  Culpeper  road,  and 
formed  his  line  on  his  right  of  the  road,  just  behind  the 
crest  of  a  hill  some  distance  to  the  left  of  Mrs.  Critten- 
den's house  ;  ^  while  Ewell  with  the  brigades  of  Hays  and 
Trimble,  on  reaching  the  point  where  a  road  to  Rapi- 
dan  Station  leaves  the  Culpeper  road,  turned  off  to  his 
right,  proceeded  to  the  mountain  and  along  its  side,  and 
at  about  three  o'clock  reached  a  position  on  the  north- 
east slope,  about  two  hundred  feet  above  the  valley  below, 
where  his  forces  were  concealed  from  view.  Hays's  bri- 
gade (under  Colonel  Forno)  was  held  in  reserve  ;  neither 
of  the  two  brigades  was  actively  engaged,  although  both 
were  under  fire.^ 

Jackson's  division  (commanded  by  Winder)  came 
near  the  battlefield  at  about  three  o'clock,  and  was  an 
hour  or  more  in  getting  into  position.^  Campbell's 
brigade  (under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Garnett)  was  placed 
with  the  21st  and  the  48th  Virginia  facing  Augur's 
front  ;^  the  42d  Virginia  and  the  1st  Virginia  (Irish) 
battalion  at  an  angle  with  the  two  other  regiments  and 
facins:  the  wheatfield.  The  left  of  this  bris^ade  was  soon 
strengthened  by  the  10th  Virginia  from  Taliaferro's 
brigade,  Jackson  having  directed  Garnett  to  look  well 
to  his  left  flank  and  to  call  upon  Taliaferro's  brigade  for 
re-enforcements.^  Taliaferro's  brigade  was  placed  be- 
tween that  of  Early  on  its  right  and  that  of  Garnett  on 


•  Swell's  Report.   16  W.  R.,  226-228. 

Early's  Report.   lb.,  228-233. 
3  16  W.  R.,  237. 


4  lb.,  182,  188,  192. 
s  lb.,  182,  200. 
«  lb.,  200. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN. 


419 


its  left.i  The  Stonewall  brii?acle  under  Colonel  Ronald 
was  placed  in  reserve,  considerably  in  rear  of  Garnett, 
and  formed  in  column  of  regiments.  These  resfiments 
were  all  from  Virginia,  and  when  later  they  moved  for- 
ward in  line  of  battle  were  in  order  from  rioiit  to  left  as 
follows :  27th,  33d,  5th,  2d,  4th.2  Lawton's  brigade 
was  far  in  the  rear  guarding  trains  and  was  not  in 
action.'"^ 

The  brigades  of  Hill's  division  marched  in  the  follow- 
ing order  from  front  to  rear :  Thomas's,  Branch's, 
Archer's,  Pender's,  Stalford's,  Field's.^  Thomas's  bri- 
gade, as  it  came  up,  w^as  ordered  to  support  Early,  and 
took  position  on  the  right  of  the  latter.^  The  brigades 
of  Branch,  Archer  and  Pender,  arrived  in  time  to  take 
part  in  the  struggle  with  Williams's  division  ;  ^  those  of 
Stafford  and  Field  did  not  arrive  until  after  the  battle 
was  ended."' 

The  Confederate  artillery  was  placed  opposite  to 
Augur's  front,  on  a  line  concave  toward  the  Union 
artillery,  and  on  higher  ground.  The  batteries  of 
Poague,  Carpenter  and  Caskie  were  in  front  of  Talia- 
ferro and  Garnett ;  ^  those  of  Brown,  Dement  and 
D'Aquin,  in  front  of  Early ;  ^  to  them  were  added  as 
they  came  up,  Pegram's  and  Fleet's  batteries  from  Hill's 
division ;     Latimer's  battery  and  a  section  of  Johnson's 


'  16  W.  R.,  182-183,  188. 

2  lb.,  183,  188,  191. 

3  lb.,  178,  182. 
*Ib.,  215. 

»  lb.,  183,  215,  219,  231. 


6  lb.,  178,  183,  215,  218,  225. 
'  lb.,  216,  217,  224. 

8  lb.,  183,  190,  192,  213. 

9  lb.,  182,  227. 

10  lb.,  184,  226. 


420 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  0A3IPAIGN. 


were  on  tlie  Confederate  right  with  the  brigades  of 
Trimble  and  Hays.^  The  total  number  of  pieces  I  do 
not  know ;  the  number  reported  as  belonging  to  Ewell's 
division  was  sixteen.  The  batteries  seem  to  have  been 
incomplete  in  number  of  pieces. 

I  find  no  mention  of  any  important  part  taken  by  the 
Confederate  cavalry  in  the  action,  nor  did  I  see  anything 
of  the  kind. 

The  positions  of  the  two  armies  at  about  five  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon,  when  infantry  began  to  be  seriously 
engaged,  may  be  briefly  summed  up  as  follows  : 

BANKS'S  ARMY. 

Williams's  division,  on  our  right  of  Culpeper  road; 
three  regiments  of  Crawford's  brigade  and  six  companies 
of  the  3d  Wisconsin  in  the  strip  of  wood  on  the  hither 
side  of  the  wheatfield,  and  not  in  sight  of  the  enemy ; 
the  10th  Maine  near  the  Culpeper  road,  on  this  side  of 
the  strip  of  wood,  and  considerably  separated  from  the 
rest  of  the  brigade.  Gordon's  brigade  (except  the  six 
companies  of  the  3d  Wisconsin)  on  the  crest  of  the  hill 
near  Brown's  house,  full  twelve  hundred  yards  in  rear  of 
Crawford.^ 

Augur's  division,  on  our  left  of  Culpeper  road,  the 
line  forming  an  obtuse  angle  with  Williams's  line,  the 
re-entering  toward  the  enemy ;  Geary's  brigade  on  the 
right.  Prince's  next ;  Greene's  small  brigade  on  the  left 
somewhat  refused,  supporting  McGilvery's  battery. 
The  division  was  in  two  lines,  and  extended  from  a  point 


1 16  W.  R.,  227. 


2  lb.,  146,  807-808. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN. 


421 


near  the  Culpeper  road  in  a  direction  somewhat  to  the 
eastward  of  the  mountain.^ 

The  artillery,  one  battery  on  our  right  near  the  27th 
Indiana,  one  near  Brown's  house,  one  near  the  10th 
Maine,  four  along  the  front  of  Augur's  division,  mostly 
on  a  low  ridge. 

The  cavalry,  the  1st  Maine,  Colonel  Allen,  on  our 
extreme  left :  ^  the  remainder  mostly  at  the  centre  near 
the  Culpeper  road. 

JACKSOX'S  AROT. 

E well's  division,  the  brigades  of  Hays  and  Trimble 
on  the  extreme  Confederate  right ;  next,  at  a  consider- 
able distance  to  the  left,  leaving  a  gap  soon  partly  filled 
by  Thomas's  brigade  of  Hill's  division,  Early's  brigade.^ 

Jackson's  di^dsion,  Taliaferro's  brigade  on  the  left  of 
Early;  next,  on  Taliaferro's  left,  Campbell's  brigade 
with  two  regiments  in  line  with  Taliaferro,  and  two 
regiments  facing  the  wheatfield  strengthened  by  an 
additional  regiment  from  Taliaferro's  brigade ;  Eonald's 
Stonewall  brigade  in  resen^e  in  the  rear  of  Campbell's 
left.  Thomas's,  Taliaferro's,  and  part  of  Campbell's 
brigades,  facing  Prince  and  Greary.^ 

Hill's  division,  except  Thomas's  brigade  already  in 
line  or  about  to  enter,  coming  up  on  the  Confederate 
left  by  the  road  from  Orange  Court-House  to  Cul- 
peper.^ 

The  artillery,  in  line  along  the  front,  opposite  to  the 

1 16  W.  R.,  157.  ^  lb.,  182-183,  188,  191,  200,  215,  219,  231. 

2 lb.,  UO.  ^Ib.,  215. 

3  lb.,  182. 


422 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


Union  artillery  in  front  of  Augur's  division  and  the  10th 
Maine. 

Winder  commanded  Jackson's  division,  but  was 
mortally  wounded  early  in  the  action,  as  he  was  directing 
the  movements  of  batteries  in  front  of  his  command,  and 
was  succeeded  in  command  by  General  Taliaferro.^ 

At  about  three  o'clock,  the  fire  of  artillery  began  in 
earnest.  From  Brown's  house,  looking  toward  the  left 
of  the  mountain,  I  could  see  some  of  our  batteries,  all 
actively  engaged,  changing  position  occasionally  as  the 
enemy  appeared  to  get  their  range.  I  could  also  see  a 
part  of  our  infantry  in  two  lines  a  short  distance  apart 
lying  down  on  the  lower  ground  in  rear  of  our  artillery. 
From  where  I  stood,  none  of  the  enemy's  infantry  was 
then  in  sight,  and  of  his  batteries  only  the  one  on  his 
extreme  right  was  visible,  from  which  some  shots  struck 
near  Cothran's  battery.  I  thought  we  had  the  greater 
number  of  pieces  and  the  better  service ;  but  the  enemy 
replied  vigorously,  and  some  of  his  pieces  had  a  heavier 
sound  as  if  of  larger  calibre. 

The  fire  of  artillery  continued  two  hours  or  more.  I 
cannot  recall  having  heard  in  all  that  time  any  fire  of 
musketry;  there  may  have  been,  as  the  reports  state, 
some  skirmishing,^  but  I  certainly  heard  nothing  to 
indicate  that  infantry  was  seriously  engaged.  Near  me 
and  in  Gordon's  front,  all  was  quiet  except  Cothran's 
battery. 

About  five  o'clock  Banks  ordered  our  artillery  to 
cease  firing,  in  order  that  the  infantry  might  advance ; 

'  16  W.  R.,  178,  183,  206.  '  lb.,  158. 


TEE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN. 


423 


but  it  was  soon  found  that  the  enemy's  infantry  also  was 
advancing,  that  the  ground  was  such  as  to  permit  firing 
over  the  heads  of  our  men  without  endangering  them, 
and  the  cannonade  was  renewed  and  continued  until  the 
close  of  the  action.  I  recollect  that  the  fire  of  artillery 
ceased  or  at  least  slackened  at  about  five  o'clock. 
Evening  was  approaching,  and  I  began  to  think  the  rest 
of  the  battle  would  be  deferred  until  the  next  day. 
Nothing  was  yet  heard  from  Crawford ;  there  was  no 
movement  on  the  part  of  Gordon. 

It  seems  that  Banks  was  still  quite  unaware  of  the 
strength  of  the  enemy.  In  a  despatch  to  Pope  dated  at 
fifty  minutes  past  four  o'clock,  he  reported  that  one  regi- 
ment of  rebel  infantry  deployed  as  skirmishers  was  ad- 
vancing, and  that  he  had  ordered  "  a  regiment  from  the 
right,  Williams's  division,  and  one  from  the  left  [Augur's]  ; 
Augur  to  advance  on  the  left  and  in  front."  He  added, 
"  5  P.M.  They  are  now  approaching  each  other."  ^  To 
what  movement  this  despatch  referred,  I  am  unable  to 
say.  However,  shortly  after  five  o'clock,  Geary's 
brigade  was  ordered  forward  to  support  the  skirmishers 
of  the  U.S.  Infantry,  who  were  falling  back  before  the 
advancing  enemy,  and  was  soon  hotly  engaged.^  Prince's 
brigade  also  advanced  and  took  part  in  the  combat.^ 

Suddenly,  at  about  forty  minutes  after  five  o'clock, 
there  burst  forth  in  the  direction  of  the  w^heatfield  the 
heaviest  and  most  continuous  sound  of  musketry  that  I 
ever  heard.    It  was  not  preceded  by  scattering  shots, 

»  16  W.  E.,  55.  2xb.,  160.  ^  n^,^  iq^^ 


424 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


but  at  once  became  a  steady  roar.  What  was  there 
takmg  place  was  out  of  sight  from  Grordon's  po- 
sition. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Crawford  with  three  reo-i- 
ments  of  his  brigade  had  some  time  before  been  ordered 
into  the  strip  of  wood  on  our  side  of  the  wheatfield. 
Colonel  Euger  with  his  six  companies  of  the  3d  Wis- 
consin deployed  as  skirmishers  had  been  sent  into  the 
same  wood,  had  swept  through  it  on  Crawford's  right ; 
but,  not  having  crossed  the  field  beyond  the  wood,  had 
not  encountered  the  enemy.  Some  time  after  five 
o'clock  Crawford  was  ordered  to  advance  against  the  left 
flank  of  the  enemy,  and  was  informed  that  the  move- 
ment would  be  supported  by  Gordon's  brigade.^  He 
ordered  Euger  with  his  six  companies  to  join  him,  but 
Euger  objecting  to  obey  without  an  order  from  his  own 
superior,  such  an  order  was  obtained  from  Banks. ^  The 
advance  was  hastened  in  consequence  of  urgent  directions 
from  Banks ;  and  without  waiting  to  see  that  Euger's 
command  was  properly  joined  to  his  own,  or  to  see 
whether  Gordon's  brigade  was  in  a  position  promptly  to 
support  him,  Crawford  formed  his  regiments  in  line  (the 
order  from  right  to  left  being,  46th  Pennsylvania,  28th 
New  York,  5th  Connecticut) ,  gave  the  order  to  advance 
to  the  edge  of  the  wood,  to  fix  bayonets,  and  to  charge 
upon  the  enemy's  position.^  This  was  at  about  forty 
minutes  after  five  o'clock.  I  do  not  find  that  Crawford 
himself  advanced  into  the  wheatfield,  or  that  he  gave 
any  directions  to  his  command  after  the  order  to  ad- 

^  16  W.  E.,  151.  2  s  lb.  4  lb. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN. 


425 


vance ;  the  leader  in  the  combat  was  Colonel  Donnelly 
of  the  28th  New  York. 

The  three  regiments,  numbering  1,306  officers  and 
men,  moved  to  the  edge  of  the  wood,  passed  over  a  fence 
near  it,  with  a  cheer  rushed  across  the  field,  passed  over 
another  fence  on  the  farther  side  of  it,  and  fell  upon  the 
Confederates,  who,  being  engaged  with  Geary,  seem  to 
have  been  surprised  by  this  sudden  attack  from  an  unex- 
pected direction.  I  have  not  space  to  give  in  detail  all 
that  was  so  gallantly  done  by  the  three  regiments. 
Under  a  heavy  fire  from  the  moment  they  entered  the 
wheatfield,  they  unshrinkingly  pressed  forward,  crossed 
the  field,  drove  back  in  great  disorder  Campbell's  brigade 
under  Grarnett,^  of  which  the  1st  Virginia  (Irish)  bat- 
talion could  not  be  rallied,  and  of  which  the  21st  Vir- 
ginia engaged  in  front  with  Geary  suddenly  received  a 
fire  in  the  rear  and  fell  back  in  disorder,^  as  did  also  the 
48th  Virginia  taken  in  rear  and  almost  surrounded,^ 
By  this  time  all  regular  order  in  the  three  regiments  was 
lost ;  but  they  pushed  on  and  poured  a  fire  into  the  rear 
of  Taliaferro's  brigade,  causing  it,  as  well  as  the  left  of 
Early's  brigade,  to  fall  back.^  The  artillery  of  Jackson's 
division  became  exposed  in  the  rear  and  was  withdrawn.^ 
While  the  men  were  still  firing  upon  the  disordered  brig- 
ade of  Taliaferro,  the  Stonewall  brigade  under  Konald 
was  seen  advancing  in  line  of  battle.  Leaving  Taliafer- 
ro's men,  the  now  scattered  groups  turned  upon  these 
fresh  enemies,  threw  the  right  regiment  into  disorder, 

1 16  W.  R.,  183,  200-201.  ^  i^.,  £01,  204.  ^  i^. 

2 lb.,  202.  4  ^183. 


426  ■      POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 

and  checked  the  next  regiment.  The  Confederate  Gen- 
eral Branch  says  in  his  journal,  "I  had  not  gone  one 
hundred  yards  through  the  woods  before  we  met  the 
celebrated  Stonewall  brigade,  utterly  routed  and  fleeing 
as  fast  as  they  could  run."  ^  This  seems  to  be  an  ex- 
aggeration ;  for  according  to  other  accounts  only  a 
part  of  the  Stonewall  brigade  was  thrown  into  dis- 
order. 

Turning  our  attention  for  a  moment  to  the  six  com- 
panies of  the  3d  Wisconsin,  Ruger  obeyed  the  order 
given  him,  assembled  his  skirmishers,  formed  the  bat- 
talion in  the  edge  of  the  wood  on  Crawford's  right,  and 
found  himself  opposite  to  the  old  bushy  field,  with  a 
considerable  gap  between  his  battalion  and  the  right  of 
the  three  regiments.  Owing  to  the  ridge  between  the 
two  fields,  to  the  bushes  and  the  stacks  of  wheat,  the 
right  of  the  three  regiments  was  not  in  sight  of  the  bat- 
talion. Climbing  over  the  fence  near  the  edge  of  the 
wood,  it  advanced  into  the  bushy  field.  Its  movement, 
on  account  of  the  rough  and  broken  ground  over  which 
it  had  advanced,  had  been  slower  than  that  of  the  three 
regiments,  and  it  came  into  action  somewhat  later.  As 
it  entered  the  field,  the  battalion  became  fully  exposed 
and  speedily  found  itself  confronted  by  the  Stonewall 
brigade,  which  had  been  thrown  forward  as  soon  as  the 
three  regiments  struck  Campbell's  brigade.  Imme- 
diately the  battalion  was  receiving  the  fire  of  the  three 
regiments  of  the  left  of  the  Stonewall  brigade ;  the  2d 

new.  E.,  223. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN. 


427 


Virginia  in  front,  the  4th  Virginia  on  its  left,  and  the  5th 
Virginia  on  its  right ;  the  line  of  the  three  regiments 
being  somewhat  concave  toward  the  battalion.  To  re- 
main under  such  a  fire  was  annihilation,  and  the  com- 
mand fell  back  to  the  wood  in  some  disorder,  having 
lost  in  about  two  minutes  80  out  of  267  in  action.  The 
lieutenant-colonel  was  killed,  the  major  badly  wounded, 
two  captains  were  wounded.  Accounts  differ  as  to 
whether  Euger  ordered  his  command  to  fall  back ;  how- 
ever, in  any  case  the  intimations  from  the  enemy  were 
not  such  as  to  be  disregarded. 

The  5th  Virginia,  after  having  fired  upon  Kuger's 
command,  wheeled  to  its  right  and  helped  to  close  round 
Crawford's  broken  regiments ;  but  there  is  significance 
in  the  fact  that  Ronald  found  it  prudent  to  recall  the  5th 
Virginia  back  into  the  wood. 

Crawford's  three  regiments  had  sustained  great  losses, 
had  become  exhausted  by  their  extraordinary  efforts, 
were  assailed  by  parts  of  broken  regiments  rallied  by 
the  personal  exertions  of  Jackson  himself,  by  the  un- 
broken regiments  of  the  Stonewall  brigade,  and  by  the 
fresh  brigade  of  Branch  which  had  just  come  up.  The 
remnants  of  the  three  regiments  fell  back  under  a  hot 
fire  to  the  wood  whence  they  had  started.  Their  loss 
had  been  29  officers  and  296  men  killed  and  wounded, 
19  officers  and  350  men  captured ;  a  total  of  694  out  of 
1,306  in  action.  Their  brave  leader.  Colonel  Donnelly, 
was  mortally  wounded;  in  fact,  nearly  all  their  field 
officers  were  killed  or  wounded.^ 

U6  W.  R.,  137,  151,  152-153. 


428 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN, 


The  10th  Maine  of  Crawford's  brigade  we  left  in  rear 
of  the  strip  of  wood  and  near  the  Culpeper  road,  sup- 
porting Muhlenberg's  battery.  There  was  no  occasion 
for  active  support  from  infantry ;  but  the  battery  received 
from  Latimer's  battery,  aided  by  guns  in  front  of  Early, 
more  compliments  than  it  could  well  return.  On  a  hill 
near  the  battery  General  Banks  was  seen  calmly  watch- 
ing the  combat,  undisturbed  by  the  shots  that  fell  about 
him.  Some  time  after  Crawford's  advance,  the  10th 
Maine  was  ordered  to  move  forward  through  the  wood 
and  attack  the  enemy.  The  order  was  promptly  obeyed, 
and  at  the  farther  edge  of  the  wood  the  regiment  got  its 
first  view  of  the  scene  of  actual  combat.  In  front  was 
the  wheatfield,  there  about  six  hundred  yards  across. 
For  about  five  hundred  yards  the  ground  descended  with 
some  undulation  to  a  marshy  run;  thence  rose  to  the 
opposite  wood  at  the  edge  of  which  was  a  rail  fence. 
Some  two  hundred  and  fifty  yards  to  the  left  'was  the 
Culpeper  road,  and  on  the  left  of  it  Greary's  troops  were 
seen  hotly  engaged.  The  edge  of  the  opposite  wood 
was  alive  with  men.  From  it  were  coming  out  remnants 
of  the  three  regiments,  which  passed  diagonally  across 
the  field  toward  the  right.  As  the  10th  Maine  appeared 
in  the  wheatfield,  it  came  under  a  heavy  fire  which 
became  murderous  when  the  regiment  reached  the 
summit  of  a  low  ridge.  Colonel  Beal,  seeing  that  his 
men  having  no  shelter  were  suffering  severely  and  use- 
lessly, began  to  move  the  regiment  back  to  the  shelter  of 
the  wood  he  had  left,  when  Major  Pelouze  of  Banks's 
staff  came  up,  forbade  the  movement,  and  gave  Banks's 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN. 


429 


order  to  advance.  An  altercation  between  the  major 
and  Colonel  Beal  ensued,  which  ended  in  the  colonel's 
halting  the  regiment  behind  a  low  ridge,  ordering 
the  men  to  Ke  down  and  fire.  It  was  a  little  after  six 
o'clock  when  this  fire  was  opened,  the  men  taking  advan- 
tage of  such  slight  shelter  as  was  at  hand.  A]30ut  this 
time  the  skirmishers  of  the  2d  Massachusetts  were  seen 
entering  the  wheatfield  at  some  distance  to  the  right :  the 
rest  of  Grordon's  brigade  was  not  in  sight.  Under  the 
fire  of  a  greatly  superior  force,  the  regiment  suffered  so 
much  that  the  colonel  ordered  a  retreat.^  The  loss  was 
173  out  of  461  present. 

At  about  this  time  a  charge  across  the  wheatfield  was 
made  by  two  squadrons  (less  than  200  strong)  of  the  1st 
Pennsylvania  reserve  cavalry  under  IMajor  Falls,  with 
the  object  of  favoring  the  withdrawal  of  a  battery  left 
without  support.  The  charge  was  gallantly  made,  but 
was  speedily  repulsed  by  the  fire  of  the  enemy. 

It  is  time  to  relate  what  took  place  in  front  of  Augnir's 
division.  That  Jackson  did  not  attack  seems  to  have 
encouraged  Banks  in  attacking.  Some  time  after  five 
o'clock,  Geary's  brigade  was  ordered  forward  to  support 
the  skirmishers,  who  were  fallino'  back  under  a  o-allino- 
fire.  They  had  been  near  capturing  in  front  of  Early's 
left  several  pieces  of  artillery,  which  had,  without  see- 
ing  the  skirmishers,  dashed  forward  to  within  short 
range  of  the  cornfield  in  which  they  were.  The  pieces 
were  saved  only  by  a  prompt  and  rapid  advance  of 
Early's  brigade.    Geary's  first  line  (7th  and  66th  Ohio) 

1  Gould.  173-178. 


430 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN-. 


advanced,  and  under  a  destructive  fire  did  not  give  way. 
However,  Geary,  seeing  the  need  of  aid,  ordered  for- 
ward the  second  line,  the  29th  Ohio,  to  the  support  of 
the  7th,  the  5th  to  the  left  of  the  66th.  But  after  a 
most  brave  and  determined  but  ineffectual  stmo:£:le  with 
the  superior  force  of  the  enemy  (Taliaferro^s  brigade  and 
parts  of  Early's  and  Campbell's),  the  brigade  retreated.^ 
Its  loss  was  464  (mostly  killed  or  wounded)  out  of  about 
1,160  engaged,  including  officers.  The  5th  Ohio  lost 
122  out  of  about  275,  and  the  7th  lost  182  out  of  307.^ 

Prince,  seeing  Geary's  forward  movement,  began  a 
cautious  advance  of  his  first  line  (111th  Pennsylvania 
and  3d  Maryland) .  He  soon  received  an  order  to  go 
forward,  and  advanced  across  a  ridge,  a  ditch,  several 
fences,  and  a  road,  into  a  field  of  very  high  corn.  In 
this  movement,  the  obstacles  being  more  in  the  way  of 
the  3d  Maryland,  it  fell  somewhat  in  the  rear  of  the 
lllth*Pennsylvania ;  and  in  the  cornfield  where  the  two 
regiments  could  not  see  each  other,  the  111th  Pennsyl- 
vania came  to  lap  over  the  3d  Maryland.  When  the 
line  reached  the  outer  edge  of  the  cornfield,  the  fire  of 
the  enemy  converged  from  full  thirty  degrees  to  Prince's 
left.  While  the  first  line  was  movins:  throuorh  the  corn- 
field.  Prince  received  an  order  to  move  forward  his 
whole  force.  He  brought  up  the  second  line  (109th 
Pennsylvania  and  102d  New  York),  and  formed  it  en 
Echelon  about  100  paces  to  the  left  and  rear  of  the  first 
line.  The  direction  of  the  fire  of  the  second  line  was 
carefully  indicated  so  as  to  avoid  firing  into  the  3d 

1 16  W.  R.,  160-165-  2  lb.,  137, 


TEE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  JIOUXTAIX. 


^Maryland.  But  at  the  first  volley  this  regiment  thought 
it  Tvas  receiving  a  fii'e  from  the  rear,  and  fell  back  in  dis- 
order, folloved  by  the  111th  Pennsylvania.  Both  regi- 
ments, however,  were  rallied  in  the  road  that  had  been 
crossed  in  the  advance,  and  later  did  good  seiwice.  The 
second  line  steadily  held  its  ground.  The  ti'oops  op- 
posed to  this  brigade  were  Thomas's  brigade  and  part  of 
Earlrs.i 

Prince,  on  going  toward  his  right,  perceived  that  the 
firing  in  Geary's  brigade  on  his  right  had  ceased.  Xo 
staff  officer  or  mounted  person  was  near  him,  and  he  pro- 
ceeded toward  division  headquarters  to  ascertain  the 
state  of  affairs  on  his  right.  At  this  time  Augur  and 
Geary  had  both  been  wounded,  and  Prince  was,  without 
knowing  the  fact,  left  in  command  of  the  division. 
AThile  walking  his  horse  in  the  cornfield,  his  bridle  was 
seized  and  he  found  himself  a  prisoner.  His  second 
line  had  been  turned  by  troops  that  were  noiselessly 
occupying  the  cornfield,  where,  however,  they  were  for 
a  time  held  in  check  by  the  fii'st  line  rallied  in  the  road. 
But  soon,  the  first  line  having  withdrawn  to  cover 
aitillery  also  withdrawn,  the  second  line  found  itself 
turned  on  its  right,  and  retired  along  our  left  of  the 
field.-  The  loss  in  the  brigade  was  152  out  of  about 
1,500  officers  and  men  engaged.^ 

I  have  seen  no  report  of  the  part  taken  by  Greene's 
fragment  of  a  brigade.  It  seems  to  have  supported  a 
battery  near  it,  and  to  have  assisted  in  holding  in  check 
the  right  of  the  enemy.    It  retired  when  the  troops  on 

U6  W.  E.,  16S-169.  "lb.  ^  ji^^,  137^ 


432 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


its  right  fell  back.  The  loss  was  26  out  of  about  475 
officers  and  men.^ 

Allen's  cavalry  (1st  Maine)  was  employed  in  watching 
the  enemy  on  our  extreme  left.  The  fire  of  the  Con- 
federate artillery  obliged  him  more  than  once  to  change 
position.  In  the  evening,  having  had  a  slight  afiair 
with  the  Confederate  cavalry,  and  a  battery  at  point- 
blank  range  having  opened  fire  upon  him,  he  withdrew 
to  the  cover  of  the  woods  in  the  rear.^ 

Ewell's  two  brigades  opposite  to  our  left  seem  to  have 
remained  inactive  until  the  close  of  the  action.  A  mill- 
pond  in  front  was  in  the  way  of  their  movements,  and 
the  only  other  ground  over  which  they  could  advance 
was  swept  by  the  fire  of  Latimer's  battery.^ 

The  only  movement  remaining  to  be  described  is  that 
of  Grordon's  brigade,  which,  it  will  be  remembered,  had 
been  posted  near  Brown's  house.  Attempts  have  been 
made  to  throw  upon  Gordon  the  blame  of  Crawford's 
not  having  received  timely  support :  a  few  words  on  this 
point. 

When  Crawford's  three  regiments  moved  forward  to 
attack,  Gordon's  brigade  was  at  least  twelve  hundred 
yards  in  rear  of  them,  and  Gordon  did  not  receive  the 
order  to  advance  until  after  the  three  regiments  had 
been  for  some  time  engaged;  they  were  not  engaged 
more  than  thirty  minutes.  Under  these  circumstances 
timely  support  was  impossible.  Williams  says  in  his 
report,  "  General  Gordon  put  his  brigade  in  movement 
at  double-quick  as  soon  as  the  order  was  communis 

1  16  W.  R.,  138.  2  ib,^  140.  3  lb.,  227. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  3I0rXTAIX. 


433 


cated.'"'  ^  In  vain  :  his  brigade  could  not  have  arrived  in 
time  if  it  could  have  flown.  To  have  given  timely  and 
efficient  suppoii:.  Gordon's  brigade  should  have  been 
placed  not  more  than  one  himdred  and  fifty  yards  in  rear 
or  to  the  right  of  Crawford's  command,  and  should  have 
advanced  at  the  same  time.  The  relative  positions  to  be 
occupied  by  the  brigades  of  a  division  are  determined, 
not  by  the  commander  of  a  brigade,  but  by  the  com- 
mander of  the  division,  or  by  higher  authority.  If,  then, 
G-ordon's  brigade  was  not  in  proper  position  with  respect 
to  Crawford's  command,  the  fault  was  not  Gordon's. 
According  to  T\^illiams's  report,  Gordon's  brigade  (ex- 
cept the  six  companies)  "was  held  in  the  oiiginal 
position  to  observe  the  right  flank,  and  especially  some 
woods  half  a  mile  or  so  on  the  right  (which^  it  was 
thought  was  a  cover  for  rebel  cavalry),  as  well  as  to  be 
in  readiness  to  re-enforce  Crawford's  brigade  in  case  of 
necessity."-  AVhether  Gordon's  small  brigade  could 
have  changed  the  fortune  of  the  day  is  very  doubtful : 
but  if  it  was  intended  that  Gordon  should  support  Craw- 
ford's attack,  he  certainly  ought  to  have  been  ordered 
forward  much  earlier.  That  there  might  be  no  delay,  a 
signal  to  advance  had  been  arranged  ^vith  Gordon  by 
TTilliams,  the  two  being  in  plain  sight  of  each  other  : 
but  it  was  not  used,  nor  could  its  use  have  remedied 
what  was  amiss. 

At  last,  about  six  o'clock,  a  messenger  brought  an 
order  from  Banks  to  send  the  2d  Massachusetts  "  down 
the  pike  *'  to  him.    The  regiment  immediately  moved 

1  16  ^.  Pv..  U7.  2  Ri..  U6. 


434 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


forward,  but  had  gone  only  a  short  distance,  when  an 
aide  of  General  Williams  brought  an  order  to  Grordon  to 
move  his  whole  command  to  the  support  of  Crawford. 
The  direction  of  the  2d  Massachusetts  was  changed 
toward  the  right,  and  the  command  moved  forward  at 
double-quick,  the  27th  Indiana  on  the  right,  the  remain- 
ing companies  of  the  3d  Wisconsin  next,  the  2d  Massa- 
chusetts considerably  to  the  left,  owing  to  its  first 
direction.  As  we  approached  the  wood,  the  scattered 
men  of  Crawford's  regiments  were  coming  out  of  it 
without  any  order,  mostly  opposite  to  the  two  regiments, 
whose  movements  were  thereby  somewhat  hindered. 
Some  of  the  men  of  the  six  companies  of  the  3d  Wiscon- 
sin were  here  rallied,  joined  the  fresh  companies  of  the 
regiment,  and  went  into  action  the  second  time  that  after- 
noon. Just  as  I  was  entering  the  wood,  I  met  Major 
Perkins,  chief  of  Banks's  staff,  coming  out  of  it,  and 
asked  him  for  some  information  as  to  what  was  in  the 
wood,  and  where.  "  Oh !  the  enemy  is  there ;  go  in 
and  you  will  find  him,"  was  the  reply.  Thinking  I 
might  find  him  too  suddenly,  I  caused  Company  A  to  be 
deployed  as  skirmishers,  and  precede  the  rest  of  the 
regiment.  However,  the  enemy  was  not  in  that  wood, 
if  he  had  been  there  at  all. 

It  was  after  sunset,  and  the  obscurity  of  evening  was 
gathering  in  the  wheatfield,  when  the  regiment  reached 
the  edge  of  the  wood  on  this  side  of  the  field.  Of 
Crawford's  three  regiments,  nothing  whatever  was  to  be 
seen.  The  enemy  was  concealed  by  the  opposite  wood, 
and  his  presence  was  shown  only  by  the  incessant  flashes 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN. 


435 


of  his  fire  of  musketry.  There  was  nothing  left  to  sup- 
port. Xo  attack  on  my  part  seemed  practicable ;  I 
thought  firing  at  a  concealed  enemy  at  a  distance  of  four 
or  five  hundred  yards  worse  than  useless,  and  I  ordered 
the  men  to  lie  down  behind  the  low  wall  crowned  by  a 
fence  which  ran  along  the  edge  of  the  wood.  The 
skirmishers,  however,  had  advanced  quite  far  into  the 
field,  and  were  firing  lying  down.  They  had  run  into 
Confederate  skirmishers,  with  whom  they  had  some 
close  encounters. 

Soon  afcer  the  regiment  came  into  this  position.  Major 
Perkins  rode  up  and  gave  me  an  order  from  General 
Banks  to  charge  across  the  field.  In  utter  astonishment 
I  exclaimed,  Why,  it  will  be  the  destruction  of  the 
regiment  and  will  do  no  good."  The  major  shrugged 
his  shoulders  with  a  deprecating  look  and  made  no  reply. 
To  charge  with  a  single  unsuppoi'ted  regiment  across  an 
open  field  in  face  of  the  long  line  of  the  enemy  extending 
far  to  right  and  left !  A  very  similar  blundering  order' 
was,  on  the  field  of  Gettysburg,  carried  to  the  gallant 
Mudge  then  in  command  of  the  regiment,  and  under  the 
circumstances  he  obeyed ;  we  know  with  what  result.  If 
I  had  obeyed  the  order  given  to  me  at  Cedar  Mountain, 
nothing  useful  would  have  been  accomplished,  and  I 
doubt  whether  the  regiment  as  such  would  have  appeared 
at  Gettysburg.  Determined  to  avoid  such  wanton 
destruction  if  I  could,  I  sought  and  found  Gordon,  and 
informed  him  that  I  had  received  such  an  order.  "  I 
know  you  have,"  he  replied,  "  what  do  you  think  of  it?  " 
I  told  him  what  I  thought  of  it ;  he  agreed  with  me  and 


436 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


said,  "You  need  not  do  it."  Gordon  is  mistaken  in 
saying  that  I  could  not  have  made  the  movement  with- 
out his  order ;  ^  but  his  taking  the  responsibility  of 
directing  the  order  given  to  be  disobeyed,  was,  under 
the  circumstances,  wise  and  commendable.  He  himself, 
while  having  enough  to  do  to  hold  his  position,  had 
brought  to  him  by  an  officer  the  message,  "  General 
Banks  wishes  you  to  charge  across  the  field."  —  "What 
field  ?  "  —  "I  do  not  know  ;  I  suppose  this  field."  Gordon 
sent  the  messenger  back  for  explicit  instructions ;  but 
before  the  latter  had  had  time  to  return,  the  enemy  had 
effectually  countermanded  the  order.  It  was  afterward 
stated  to  me  by  Major  Perkins,  that  the  order  given  me 
was  given  by  mistake,  under  the  impression  that  I  had 
gone,  as  at  first  directed,  "  down  the  pike  "  to  General 
Banks.  It  was  denied  that  the  order  brought  to  Gordon 
was  sent  him.^ 

Soon  after  I  received  the  order  brought  by  Major 
Perkins,  Gordon  rode  up  to  me  and  asked  why  I  was  not 
firing,  I  replied,  "  I  don't  see  anything  to  fire  at."  He 
then  directed  me  to  move  to  the  right  and  join  the  rest 
of  the  brigade ;  this  was  immediately  done.^ 

The  two  other  regiments,  which  we  left  just  entering 
the  wood,  had  advanced  to  the  edge  of  it  next  the  wheat- 
field.  Owing  to  the  nature  of  the  ground,  the  27th 
Indiana  had  had  some  difficulty  in  getting  into  position, 
so  that  its  right  wing  came  into  action  before  the  left 
wing  got  into  line.  As  soon  as  they  appeared  in  sight 
of  the  enemy,  both  regiments  were  under  a  heavy  fire, 

'  Gordon,  Brook  Farm,  317.       ^  ^^.^  3  ^f.  ib.,  305-306. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUXTAIX.  437 

the  27tli  Indiana  being  so  placed  as  to  receive  both  a 
direct  and  a  slant  fire.  A  report  that  we  were  filing  on 
our  own  men  caused  the  fii'e  of  a  portion  of  the  27th 
temporarily  to  cease ;  but  Gordon  riding  forward  in  the 
direction  of  the  supposed  friends,  drew  such  a  fire  as 
removed  all  doubt  as  to  their  real  character.  The  fire  of 
the  enemy  became  heavier,  the  crash  of  musketry  was 
continuous.  Soon,  in  spite  of  ail  that  Colonel  Colgrove 
could  do,  the  regiment  gave  way  and  fell  back  to  the 
rear  of  the  wood.  Here  it  was  rallied  and  ao'ain  moved 
foi'ward  to  the  field.  But  it  had  fired  only  one  or  two 
rounds  when  the  enemy  was  discovered  advancing  against 
its  right ;  Pender's  brigade  was  on  its  flank.  Colonel 
ColgTOve  attempted  to  change  front  to  meet  this  new 
attack ;  but  it  was  too  late,  no  skirmishers  were  out  on 
the  right,  and  the  advancing  enemy  had  not  been  dis- 
covered in  time.^  This,  however,  considering  the  over- 
whelming force  of  the  enemy,  doubtless  made  no 
difference  in  the  result.  The  regiment  again  fell  back  to 
the  rear  of  the  wood,  whence  it  retreated  to  its  original 
position.  TTith  it  fell  back  the  3d  Wisconsin,  which, 
however,  rallied  in  the  wood  and  attempted  to  make  a 
stand,  but  was  soon  forced  to  continue  its  retreat.  Owing 
to  the  thick  wood  and  underbrash,  all  this  had  been  out 
of  sight  from  the  2d  Massachusetts,  and  no  notice 
reached  me  that  the  two  regiments  had  fallen  back  and 
that  mv  rio-ht  flank  was  left  uncovered.  The  loss  of  the 
27th  Indiana  was  officially  reported  as  50 ;  that  of  the 
od  TVisconsin,  including  the  loss  in  the  bushy  field,  as 

1  16  W.  R.,  156. 


438 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


108.^  However,  I  think  these  losses  are  somewhat 
understated. 

Of  Williams's  division,  and  perhaps  of  Banks's  whole 
corps,  the  2d  Massachusetts  was  now  the  only  regiment 
left  holding  its  ground.  Soon  after  the  regiment  moved 
to  the  right  and  joined  the  rest  of  the  brigade,  the 
enemy's  line  appeared  coming  up  from  a  hollow  and 
advancing  obliquely,  his  left  inclined  toward  my  right. 
The  fire  of  the  regiment  was  immediately  opened,  and 
was  so  effectual  as  to  stop  for  a  time  the  advance  in  front. 
The  force  opposed  was  Archer's  brigade,  and  it  was  here 
that  he  was,  as  he  says  in  his  report,  "  exposed  to  a  heavy 
fire,"^  losing  in  killed  and  wounded  135.  The  contest 
with  the  enemy  in  front  had  continued  but  a  few  minutes 
when  suddenly  there  came  from  my  right  and  right  front 
a  withering  fire,  before  which  Captain  Goodwin  of  the 
right  company  and  (it  seemed  to  me)  half  his  men  went 
down.  Some  men  on  the  right  fell  back.  I  was  then  a 
few  paces  directly  in  rear  of  the  company,  and  impulsively 
started  forward  to  restore  the  line,  when  my  horse  re- 
ceived two  bullet  wounds,  which  sent  him  plunging  about 
amidst  the  trees  and  underbrush.  I  soon  quieted  him, 
and  turning  again  toward  the  regiment,  saw  at  once  that 
the  enemy  was  on  its  right  flank,  and  the  sooner  we 
departed  from  that  place  the  better.  I  accordingly 
ordered  the  companies  to  fall  back.  The  order  was 
immediately  obeyed  by  the  companies  on  the  right  that 
could  hear  it  in  the  uproar ;  but  riding  toward  the  left, 
I  found  companies  steadily  holding  their  positions,  wait- 

1  16  W.  R.,  137.  2  lb.,  219. 


TEE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN. 


439 


ing  to  be  sure  that  the  order  to  retreat  had  been  given. 
I  particularly  remember  Captain  Charles  F.  Morse  com- 
ing back  to  me  from  where  his  company  still  stood  in 
line,  and  asking  whether  I  had  ordered  a  retreat.  The 
order  finally  reached  the  left,  and  the  companies  fell 
back  to  the  original  position,  where  the  regiment  was 
re-formed.  The  loss  was  173  out  of  497  engaged;  out  of 
twenty-two  officers,  only  eight  came  back  unhurt.  The 
major  was  mortally  wounded,  four  captains  were  killed, 
another  captain  was  wounded  and  taken  prisoner,  still 
another  captain,  H.  S.  Eussell  (now  General),  was 
taken  prisoner  while  binding  up  the  wounds  of  Major 
Savage.^ 

The  Collis  Company  of  Zouaves  on  the  left  of  the 
regiment  did  its  duty  honorably  and  creditably.  Its 
loss  was  thirteen  including  its  commander.  Lieutenant 
Heimack,  taken  prisoner.^ 

The  pursuit  by  the  enemy  was  very  feeble.  Gordon's 
position  near  Brown's  house  was  not  attacked  or  even  ap- 
proached. On  our  left  of  the  Culpeper  road,  the  brigades 
of  Stafford  and  Field  of  Hill's  division  advanced  as  far 
as  through  the  wood  opposite  to  Brown's  house.  Here 
Pegram's  battery  was  placed  and  opened  fire  on  Eick- 
etts's  division  then  coming  up,  but  was  soon  silenced 
with  heavy  loss  by  Hall's  (2d  Maine)  and  Thompson's 
(2d  Maryland)  batteries.  Eicketts's  division  arrived  at 
about  seven  o'clock,  and  took  position  on  our  right  of 
the  road,  one  brigade  relieving  at  Brown's  house  Gor- 
don's brigade,  which  was  sent  to  the  rear.    There  was 

1  cf.  Gordon  Brook  Earm,  312.  ^  ^37^ 


440 


POPE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN. 


some  exchange  of  musketry  with  the  enemy  in  the  wood 
on  our  left  of  the  road,  and  it  was  nearly  midnight  be- 
fore all  was  quiet. 

General  Pope  arrived  at'  about  the  same  time  as 
Kicketts's  division.  Sigel's  corps  came  up  considerably 
later. 

The  battle  was  over.  The  next  morning  the  enemy 
withdrew  from  his  advanced  position  on  our  left  (his 
right)  to  nearly  his  original  position  of  five  o'clock  P.M. 
on  the  9th.  The  two  armies  remained  in  presence  of 
each  other  —  both  leaders  ready  to  receive  but  not  to 
make  an  attack  —  until  the  night  of  the  11th,  when 
Jackson,  who  had  learned  that  Pope  had  received  or  was 
to  receive  re-enforcements,  retreated  to  the  vicinity  of 
Gordonsville.  A  few  days  afterward,  Pope  retired 
across  the  Eappahannock. 

Though  General  Pope  did  not  approve  of  Banks's 
attack,  he  spoke  in  the  highest  terms  of  Banks's  intrepid- 
ity and  coolness  during  the  engagement,  and  expressed 
himself  as  "  delighted  and  astonished  at  the  gallant  and 
intrepid  conduct "  of  his  corps. 

A  Southern  writer  asserts  that  the  action  was  brought 
on  by  General  EaHy  in  obedience  to  an  order  from 
General  Jackson.  But  whatever  may  be  said,  or  may 
seem  to  be,  in  favor  of  this  view,  the  fact  is  that  at  Cedar 
Mountain  he  who  was  aggressive,  who  persistently 
attacked,  who  "  forced  the  fighting,"  was  no  other  than 
General  Banks. 


OFFICIAL  DOCUMENTARY  SOUECES  OF  DATA  FOR  THE  HIS- 
TORY  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN. 


The  Reports  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  officers  engaged  in  this  battle  are 
to  be  found  ia  the  Official  Records  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion,  Series  1,  Vol- 
ume XH.,  Part  n.,  i.  e.,  16  W.  R. ;  and  their  Correspondence  in  the  same,  Part 
m.,  {.  e.,  18  W.  R. 

Banks.  —  General  Banks  appears  never  to  have  made  a  report  of  this  battle. 
His  only  official  statement  concerning'  the  event  was  volunteered  on  the  con- 
clusion of  his  testimony  on  the  Red  River  Expedition  of  1863,  to  the  Joint 
Committee  of  Congress  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  December  14, 1864.  This 
statement  was  not  printed  with  the  papers  of  the  Red  River  investigation, 
but  with  a  series  of  "  Miscellaneous  "  papers  of  the  Reports  of  that  Commit- 
tee, in  Volume  3  of  the  Second  Series  of  Reports,  see  List  of  Books  cited, 
ante,  xx.  References  to  this  statement  are  made  in  this  volume  to  3  C.  W., 
1865,  "MisceUaneous,"  44-46. 

His  correspondence  with  Pope  and  other  officers,  of  that  period,  will  be 
found  in  16  and  IS  W.  R. 

Makshali.,  Louis  H.  ,  Colonel,  U.  S.  V.  The  order  from  Pope  of  August  9 
1862,  alleged  by  Banks  to  have  been  communicated  verbally  by  Colonel  Lewis 
[sic]  Marshall,  and  to  have  been  taken  down  by  Colonel  Pelouze  in  his  pre- 
sence and  approved  as  correct  by  him,  is  printed  with  Banks's  testimony  on, 
page  45  of  3  C.  W.,  1865,  "  LliseeUaneous." 

Marshall's  letter  containing  a  statement  from  memory  of  the  order  sent  by 
him  from  Pope  to  Banks,  AugTist  9, 1862,  and  his  understanding  of  its  inten- 
tion, is  printed  with  Pope's  Letter  to  Wade  of  January  12,  1865,  in  the  same 
volume,  i.  e.,  3  C.  W.,  1865,  "  Miscellaneous,"  page  54. 

Pope. — Major-General  John  Pope,  U.  S.  V.,  was  appointed  to  command  the 
Army  of  Virginia,  June  26, 1862,  [15  W.  R.,  169 ;  18  W.  R.,  435  ;]  and  assumed 
command,  June  27,  [18  W.  R.,  436.]  He  appeared  before  the  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War,  Jidy  8, 1862,  and  stated  his  plans  of  campaign,  [1  C. 
W.,  276-282.] 

His  Report  concerning  the  Virginia  Campaign,  accompanied  by  his  official 
Correspondence,  forms  Part  III.  of  his  general  report  addressed  to  B.  F.  Wade, 
Chairman  of  the  Joint  Committee  of  Congress  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  and 
was  first  piiblished  in  1866,  in  the  second  volume  of  a  document  of  the  1st 
Session,  39th  Congress. 

"  Supplemental  Report  of  the  Joint  Committee  on  the  War,  in  two  volumes. 
Supplemental  to  Senate  Report,  No.  142,  38th  Congress,  2d  Session. 

The  general  report  is  comprised  in  pages  3-217,  covering  a  period  of  May 
17,  1861,  to  November  15, 1865.    The  part  relative  to  the  Virginia  Campaign 


442 


BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  MOUNTAIN 


of  1862,  is  comprised  in  pages  104-190,  (cited  as  C.  W.,  2  Supp't).  This  spe- 
cial part  has  been  largely  reprinted  in  16  W.  R.,  20-87 ;  some  preliminary  and 
concluding  statements  have  been  omitted  and  the  correspondence  printed  dis- 
tinctively. 

Other  correspondence  of  the  period  between  him  and  the  Government,  and 
the  officers  of  the  Army  of  Virginia,  is  printed  in  16^and  18  W.  R. 

General  Pope's  testimony  before  the  McDowell  Court  of  Inquiry,  held  at 
Washington,  Nov.  17,  1862-Feb.  23,  1863,  is  printed  in  15  W.  R.,  200-207. 
The  statements  particularly  relative  to  Cedar  Mountain  on  pages  200-202. 

His  testimony  before  the  Military  Commission  convened  as  a  general  Court- 
martial  for  the  trial  of  Fitz-John  Porter  is  printed  with  the  Record  of  that 
trial,  in  17  W.  R.,  829-860,  1045-1046.  This  testimony  does  not  relate  to 
Cedar  Mountain  or  to  a  period  prior  to  August  27,  1862. 

His  Letter  of  January  12,  1865,  to  B.  F.  Wade,  Chairman  of  the  Joint  Com- 
mittee on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  with  accompanying  papers  and  testimony 
concerning  the  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain,  August  9,  1862,  is  printed  in  Part 
3  of  the  Report  of  the  Joint  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  submit- 
ted at  the  Second  Session  Thirty-eighth  Congress,  Senate  Report,  No.  142, 
1865,  in  section  "  Miscellaneous,"  pages  47-53,  (cited  as  3  C.  W.,  1865,  "Mis- 
cellaneous." This  letter  was  intended  as  a  rebuttal  of  the  statements  made 
by  General  Banks  in  his  volunteered  testimony  before  that  Committee,  on  his 
action  at  Cedar  Mountain. 
RoBEKTS.  —  Brigadier-General  Benjamin  S.  Roberts,  M.  S.  V.,  gave  his  testi- 
mony concerning  Cedar  Mountain  at  the  McDowell  Court  of  Inquiry.  This 
is  printed  in  15  W.  R.,  184-190 ;  also,  with  Pope's  Letter  to  Wade  of  Jan° 
uary  12, 1865,  in  3  C.  W.,  1865,  "  MisceUaneous,"  51-53. 


INDEX. 


Abbott,  E.  G.,  Capt.,  2d  Mass.,  at  bat- 
tle of  Cedar  MountaiB,  17. 

Acqnia  Creek,  Ya..  tlie  railroad  from 
Fredericksburg  to,  g-narded  by  King-, 
Jtdy,  1862,  41,  895;  tbis  provision 
criticized,  41 ;  tbe  transfer  to,  of 
the  Army  of  tbe  Potomac  from  tbe 
Peninsula,  ordered  Aug.  4,  1862,  7, 
399 ;  unnecessary  delay  of  transfer, 
27;  expectation  of  Government  as 
to  time  required  for  tbe  transfer, 
57;  McClellan  urged  to  basten  re- 
enforcements  to,  Aug.  9,  320  ;  bis 
opinion  tbat  troops  at  Harrison's 
Landing  would  be  more  useful  tban 
at,  ib.  ;  bis  belief  tbat  communica- 
tion to  tbe  Eappabannock  from, 
sborter  tban  from  Alexandria,  112 
note ;  Kearny's  strengtb  at,  Aug.  21, 
204 ;  Porter's  transfer  from  Harri- 
son's Landing  to,  223  ;  McClellan  ar- 
rived at,  Aug.  24,  272,  289  ;  ordered 
to  Alexandria  from,  111,  272,  283 ; 
engaged,  Aug.  26,  in  superintending 
debarkation  of  army  at,  111 ;  bis  posi- 
tion at,  270  et  seq. ;  Burnside  in  cbarge 
of  forwarding  troops  from,  after  Aug. 
26,  271,  272  ;  McClellan's  proposi- 
tion, Aug.  27,  to  send  gunboats  to, 
117 ;  also  that  Burnside  sbould  evac- 
uate, 118;  part  of  Sumner's  corps 
landed  at,  Aug.  26,  112,  289,  299, 
333 ;  bis  movement  to  Alexandria 
from,  276 ;  mentioned,  274,  298. 

Alabama  Yolimteers,  C.  S.  A.,  5tb  bat- 
talion in  Arcber's  brigade.  A.  P. 
Hill's  division,  Jackson's  corps,  at 
battle  of  CbantiUy,  Sept.  I,"'l862,  • 
155  ;  47tb  and  48tb  reg-ts.  in  TaH-  j 
aferro's  brigade,  "Winder's  division, 
Jackson's  corps,  206.  I 

Aldie,  Ya.,  Pope  believed  tbat  Jack-  ! 
son's  retreat  would  be  made  by  way  | 
of,  Aug.  28.  68. 76, 330 ;  Lee's  move- 
ment by.  in  attempt  to  turn  Union 
rigbt,  Aug.  31,  95.  I 

Aldie  Turnpike.  See  Little  River 
Tiirnpike. 


Jexandria,  Ya.,  Confederate  spies  at, 
104 ;  Army  of  tbe  Potomac  ordered 
to  withdraw  from  tbe  Peninsula  to, 
399-400 ;  unnecessary  delay  in  trans- 
fer, 27  ;  expectation  of  Government 
as  to  time  required  for  transfer,  57  ; 
McClellan  summoned  to  correct  ir- 
regularities at.  111 ;  tbe  irregulari- 
ties, 111,  272,  283.  290;  McCleUan 
arrived  at,  Aug.  26,  112,  265,  268, 
269,  271,  273,  277,  290,  309;  be 
found  notbing  to  criticize  at,  112  ; 
its  works  of  defence  inspected,  117  ; 
proposition  to  garrison  forts  at,  119  ; 
McCiellan's  conduct  at,  examined, 
269  et .  seq. ;  McClellan  reported  as 
idle  at,  123  ;  communication  between 
Pope  and,  interrupted  by  Jackson, 
Aug.  28,  268,  277  ;  Pope's  efforts  to 
secure  bis  communications  witb,  at 
Gainesville,  59-60 ;  Pope  knew  of 
Confederate  advance  on  bis  commu- 
nications witb,  124 ;  peril  of  Con- 
federates at  Manassas  from  Union 
troops  at,  101 ;  tbe  return  of  tbe  re- 
mains of  Taylor's  brigade  from  Man- 
assas to,  118-119  ;  Union  forces  pur- 
sued by  Confederate  cavalry  rear  to, 
Aug.  27,  109  ;  Pope's  confidence  in 
tbe  coming  of  re-enforcements  from, 
73  ;  re-enforcements  sent  by  Haupt 
from,  Aug.  24,  25,  269 ;  tbe  commu- 
nication free.  Aug.  29,  between  Pope 
•and,  279  ;  Pope  informed  tbat  be 
could  get  supplies  for  bis  army,  Aug. 
29,  by  sending  to,  281 ;  tbe  condition 
of  tbe  Army  of  tbe  Potomac  on 
reacbing,  297  ;  McClellan's  strengtb 
at,  2S4 ;  tbe  cavalry  force  at,  Aug. 
29,  279 ;  McClellan  given  cbarge, 
Aug.  27,  of  forwarding  troops  to 
Pope  from,  113  ;  Couch's  division 
ordered  to  Fairfax  C.  H.,  from.  149  ; 
Franklin  disembarked  at.  Aug.  26, 
291,  298,  299  ;  Franklin's  corps  en- 
camped near,  Aug.  26.  299  ;  the  lack 
of  transportation  at,  for  Franklin 
discussed,  291  et  seq.  ;  an  abundant 


444 


INDEX 


means  of  transportation  at,  Aug-.  26- 
30,  282,  283,  284;  Kearny's  state- 
ment, Aug.  21,  of  his  strength  at, 
204  ;  Kearny  and  Hooker  moved  to 
join  Pope  from,  203  ;  also  Piatt,  ih. ; 
proposition  that  Sumner  should  be 
brought  to,  117  ;  Sumner  ordered  to, 
Aug.  27,  120 ;  his  movement  to,  and 
detention  at,  333-334 ;  in  his  move- 
ment to  Georgetown,  276,  277  ; 
Pope's  provision  for  protecting  road 
for  retreat  to,  148  ;  the  retreat  of 
Union  forces  to,  Sept.  2,  160  ;  men- 
tioned, 132,  178,  213  note,  274,  298, 
299,  305. 

Alexandria  and  Orange  Railroad.  See 
Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad. 

Alexandria  and  Winchester  Turnpike. 
See  Little  River  Turnpike. 

Allan,  W.,  Lt.-Col.,  C.  S.  A.,  his  esti- 
mates of  numbers  of  Union  and  Con- 
federate Armies,  Aug.,  1862,  197- 
217  ;  Ropes'  reply  to,  217-219. 

AUen,  S.  H.,  Col.,  _U.  S.  V.,  in  com- 
mand of  1st  Maine  Cavalry  regt., 
2d  division  (Ricketts),  3d  Corps, 
A.  of  v.,  421  ;  his  position.  Cedar 
Mountain,  ih. ;  his  service  in  the 
battle,  432 ;  his  strength,  Aug.  16, 
2]  5. 

Ames,  the  deserter  from  New  England 
regiment,  and  betrayer  of  General 
Stoughton  to  capture  by  Mosby, 
185. 

Anderson,  G.  T.,  CoL,  C.  S.  A.,  in  com- 
mand of  brigade,  D.  R.  Jones'  di- 
vision, Longstreet's  corps,  at  Chan- 
tilly,  171. 

Anderson,  R.  H.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 

his  strength,  July  20,  207 ;  under 
Longstreet,  Aug.  21,  307 ;  time  of 
his  arrival,  second  battle  of  Bull 
Rim,  91,  92-93,  256,  258  note,  346 ; 
his  failure  at  Manassas  to  obey  an 
order  of  Lee's,  254. 

Andrews,  G.  L.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(March  26, 1865),  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(Nov.  10,  1862),  Col.  2d  Massachu- 
setts (June  13, 1862),  at  Cedar  Moun- 
tain, his  advance  in  support  of  Craw- 
ford, 434  ;  ordered  into  the  wood  by 
Perkins,  ih. ;  his  position  on  the  edge 
of  the  wheat-field,  434-435 ;  ordered 
by  Perkins  to  charge  across  the 
wheat-field,  435  ;  the  order  counter- 
manded by  Gordon,  436 ;  the  order 
was  given  by  mistake,  ih. 

Annandale,  Va.,  282  ;  Franklin's  move- 
ment to,  Aug.  29,  309-310 ;  detained 
at,  by  McCleUan,  Aug.  29,  275,  277, 


293 ;  reasons  for  detention  cited,  294, 
299;  Halleek's  displeasure,  296;  the 
incorrect  information  sent  by  Frank- 
lin from,  280. 
Antietam  Creek,  Maryland,  Pope 
would  probably  have  been  successful 
in  battle  of,  96 ;  a  contrast  to  bat- 
tle of  ChantiUy,  97;  McClellan's 
anxiety  for  command  of  campaign, 
285. 

Aqueduct  Bridge,  Georgetown,  D.  C, 
Sumner  ordered  to  position  at,  Aug. 
30,  276 ;  ordered  to  Centreville 
from,  ih. 

Archer,  J.  J.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  his 
brigade  in  A.  P.  Hill's  division  at 
Cedar  Mountain,  419 ;  his  loss  at 
close  of  day  from  fire  of  2d  Mass., 
438 ;  in  engagement,  Aug.  27,  at 
Manassas  Junction,  104 ;  his  report 
of  Union  prisoners  taken,  105  note ; 
his  share  in  battle  of  Aug.  30,  261 ; 
at  battle  of  ChantiUy,  Sept.  1,  155. 

Arlington,  Va.,  National  cemetery  at, 
174. 

Army  and  Navy  Journal,  the  corre- 
spondence between  Pope  and  the 
Comte  de  Paris  published  in,  313. 

Army  Corps.  See  United  States  Army 
Corps. 

Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  Confed- 
erate. See  Confederate  States,  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia. 

Army  of  the  Potomac,  Union.  See 
United  States,  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac. 

Army  of  Virginia,  Union.  See  United 
States,  Army  of  Virginia. 

"Army  under  Pope,"  by  J.  C.  Ropes, 
cited,  136,  217  et  seq. 

Army,  United  States,  Regular.  See 
United  States,  Army,  Regular. 

Artillery,  United  States  Army.  See 
United  States,  Army,  Regular,  Ar- 
tillery. 

Ashland,  Va.,  Jackson's  advance  to, 
June  26, 1862,  33. 

Augur,  C.  C,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 
(March  13,  1865)  ;  Major,  U.  S.  A. 
(May  14,  1861) ;  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(Aug.  9,  1862)  ;  as  Brig.-Gen.,  U. 
S.  v.,  in  command  of  2d  division, 
5th  Corps,  38  ;  Greene  in  his  division, 
39;  his  position  at  battle  of  Cedar 
Mountain,  414,  420-421 ;  the  dispo- 
sition of  his  forces,  414-416 ;  his 
estimate  of  Union  strength,  416 ; 
position  of  Confederate  artillery  in 
front  of,  419 ;  one  of  his  regiments 
ordered  to  advance,  4.50  P.  M.,  423 ; 


INDEX 


445 


his  part  in  tlie  battle,  429-432 ;  his  [ 
brigade  uuder  Geary  repulsed,  429- 
430 ;   wounded  severely,  50,  431  ; 
return  of  his  division  for  AugTist, 
216. 

Baehman,  W.  K.,  Capt.,  C._  S.  A.,  de- 
monstration made  by  his  battery, 
Aug-.  29,  342. 

Ballard,  J.  N.,  Lieut.,  C.  S.  A.,  pro- 
prietor of  the  Reid  House,  on  Chan- 
tiUy  battlefield,  ISO;  Walcott  and 
Stevens  in  1SS3,  entertained  by,  181 
ei  seq. ;  his  reminiscences  of  the  var, 
183  et  seq. ;  fired  the  first  shot  at  first 
Bull  Run,  ib. ;  mentioned,  189,  190, 
191,  192,  193.  194. 

Banks,  N.  P.,  ]\Iaj.-Gen.,  U._  S.  Y.  (May 
16,  1861),  little  injury  inflicted  on 
Jackson  by.  May,  1862,  391 ;  his  i 
engagement  "vrith  Jackson  at  Win- 
chester, Jime,  1862,  33  ;  driven  from 
the  Shenandoah  Valley,  33  ;  his  po- 
sition in  the  Shenandoah  Valley, 
June  30,  393  ;  his  forces  included 
in  Army  of  Virginia,  June  26,  1862, 
4,  35,  390  ;  given  command  of  the  2d 
Corps,  June  26,  1862,  37,  390  ; 

the  strength  of  his  command,  July- 
September,  1862  :  Pope's  report, 
July  8, 199  ;  his  ovra  report  for  July 
31,  38,  198  ;  his  estimate  sustained, 
39,  200;  Pope's  statement  of  his 
strength,  after  Cedar  Mountain,  201 ; 
Pope's  statement  of,  Aug.  20,  ib. ; 
the  statement  discussed,  201-202 ; 
strength  understated,  ib. ;  as  stated 
in  return  for  August.  202,  210,  216  ; 
Pope's  statement  of  September  2, 
213  ;  Pope's  statement  in  his  report, 
209,  210  ;  the  question  discussed.  39, 
394 ;  conjecture  as  to  cause  of  dis- 
crepancy between  the  several  re- 
ports, 199,  202 ;  desertions  from  his 
corps,  52 ;  his  cavalry  under  com- 
mand of  Hatch,  44,  395  ;  afterwards 
of  Buford,  44  ;  Crawford's  brigade 
of  his  corps,  15 ;  Crawford  ordered 
to  Culpeper,  42.  45  ;  Eieketts'  prox-  j 
imity  to,  after  July  21,  396  ; 

his    movements    under    Pope's  i 
orders :  ordered  to  position  at  Sperry- 
ville,  July  5, 41,  395  ;  at  Hazel  River,  | 
Aug.  7,  45  ;  ordered  to  Culpeper. 
Aug.  8,  15,  45,  400,  404;  at  Cul-  1 
peper,  Aug.  8,  16,  46.  403,  404; 
ordered  to  Cedar  Mountain,  Aug.  9, 
404 ;  his  prompt  movement,  47  ;  suf-  j 
fering  of  his  troops  on  the  march. 
ib.,  207;  his  interview  with  Pope 


early  morning.  Aug.  9.  at  CulpeiDer. 
22,  48,  406 ; 

Cedar  Mountain :  controversy  as 
to  Pope's  orders  to,  405  et  seq.  ; 
Pope's  order  of  10  A.  m.,  sent  by 
Marshall,  cited,  21-22,  47,  405; 
transcribed  by  Pelouze,  21,  47,  405  ; 
credibility  of  Pelouze's  version,  405  ; 
the  purport  of  it  admitted  by  Pope, 
ib. ;  question  as  to  the  interpretation 
of  the  order,  405-406  ;  Pope's  error 
in  sending  verbal  order,  51 ;  directed 
by  Pope  to  take  strong  position,  47, 
48 ;  Roberts  given  authoiity  to  as- 
sign the  forces  of,  to  position,  406 
et  seq. ;  Roberts'  imputations  as  to 
his  unwillingness  to  fight.  23,  48, 
409 ;  his  restiveness  under  Roberts, 
23  ;  his  claim  that  Roberts  urged 
fighting,  48  ;  Roberts'  testimony  con- 
tradicted, ib. ;  attack  made  by,  con- 
trary to  the  wishes  of  Roberts.  406 
et  seq. ;  Roberts'  statement  that  he 
was  authorized  to  give  orders  to,  in 
Pope's  name,  408  ;  the  statement 
qualified,  408  note  ;  Pope  not  pos- 
sessed of  authority  to  place  any  one 
in  command  over,  408 ;  his  belief 
that  Pope  thought  him  unwilling  to 
fight.  409 ;  his  strength  at  Cedar 
Mountain,  19,  38,  50,  416-417  ;  the 
strength  of  his  cavalry,  417;  his 
position,  47,  420-421 ;  its  strength, 
48 :  probable  result  had  he  held  it, 
ib. ;  position  on  Brown  House  bill 
indicated  to  him  by  Roberts,  413  ; 
the  disposition  of  his  forces,  414- 
416  ;  his  ignorance  of  Gordon's  posi- 
tion, 52,  414 ;  his  ignorance  of  the 
strength  of  the  enemy,  48,  51.  423  ; 
his  position  for  survey  of  battlefield, 
428 ;  informed  by  Buford  of  the 
enemy's  advance,  Aug.  9,  410  ;  mis- 
led by  Buford's  despatch,  ib.  ;  his 
despatch  to  Pope  at  4.50  p.  in.,  ib., 
423  ;  his  statement  incorrect  that  the 
battle  began  by  attack  of  Confed- 
erates. 22  ;  the  failure  of  attack  by 
Jackson  encouragement  for  an  at- 
tack by,  429  ;  attack  begun  by, 
about  4.50  p.  m.,  48,  423 ;  his  force 
"panting  for  a  fight,"  18,  20;  the 
cause  of  his  attack,  23,  48 ;  in  con- 
sonance with  Pope's  general  orders, 
28,  49,  398,  409  ;  affected  by  the 
terms  of  Pope's  letter  of  July  14  to, 
409 ;  his  desire  to  retaliate  for  re- 
verses inflicted  by  Jackson  in  the 
Shenandoah,  48,  49 ;  foolhardiness 
of  his  attack,  28,  49 ;  its  impetu- 


446 


INDEX 


osity,  49  ;  repetition  of  bad  taeties 
of  battle  of  Winebester,  ib. ;  the  ar- 
tillery silenced  by  command  of,  5 
p.  M.,  422 ;  tlie  fire  renewed,  423  ; 
his  order  for  Ruger's  advance,  con- 
firming' Crawford's,  424 ;  his  order 
to  3d  brigade  to  charge,  criticized, 
18,  19 ;  the  question  discussed,  20 ; 
his  incorrect  accusation  of  delay  of 
3d  brigade,  19  ;  his  order  for  charge 
by  the  10th  Maine,  428;  his  order 
to  the  2d  Mass.  to  join  him,  433 ; 
immediately  obeyed,  ih. ;  order  given 
by  his  chief  of  staff  to  2d  Mass.,  to  ad- 
vance into  the  wood,  434 ;  order  given 
by  the  same  to  the  same  to  make  a 
hopeless  charge  across  the  wheat- 
field,  435  ;  the  order  not  obeyed,  435- 
436 ;  the  order  a  mistake,  436 ;  2d 
Mass.  the  only  part  of  his  forces 
which  held  their  ground  at  night-fall, 
Aug.  9, 438  ;  their  retreat,  ih. ;  feebly 
pursued  by  the  enemy,  439 ;  the 
bravery  and  sacrifice  of  his  corps 
at  Cedar  Mountain,  49,  398;  their 
retreat,  49  ;  his  loss,  50  ;  compli- 
mented by  Pope,  21,  440 ;  his  intre- 
pidity praised  by  Pope,  440  ;  his 
attack  not  approved  by  Pope,  ih. ; 
Pope's  statement  that  he  had  not 
ordered  the  battle,  in  his  presence, 
not  denied  by  him,  21 ;  Pope's  state- 
ment in  his  report,  as  to  orders  given 
to,  not  denied  by,  until  1864,  21 ; 
his  statement  to  Conduct  of  War 
Committee,  Dec,  1864,  18,  21,  22, 
23 ;  his  testimony  answered  by  Pope, 
23  ;  his  responsibility  for  tlie  dis- 
aster, 51,  440 ;  his  attempt  to  jus- 
tify himself,  23,  48 ;  no  official  re- 
port of  the  battle  made  by,  22 ; 
Pope's  statement  of  the  strength  of, 
Aug,  10,  201. 

Period  subsequent  to  Aug.  9  :  with 
Pope  on  the  Rappahannock,  Aug.  21, 
307  ;  Jackson's  movement,  Aug.  25, 
reported  to,  59 ;  at  Fayetteville,  Aug. 
26,  62,  113  ;  Pope's  communications 
with  McDowell  concerning  his  move- 
ment|from  Warrenton,  Aug.  27,  126  ; 
given  charge  of  trains,  in  movement 
to  Manassas,  Aug.  27,  63,  126,  128, 
325 ;  Pope's  conjecture  of  Jackson's 
project  against  the  trains,  64,  67,  74, 
126  ;  question  as  to  the  result  of  an 
attack  on,  65  ;  ordered  to  Catlett's 
Station,  Aug.  27,  126-127  ;  precision 
of  orders  given  to,  128  ;  at  Bealeton 
Station,  evening  of  Aug.  27,  63, 128  ; 
marching  from  Catlett's  to  Manassas, 


Aug.  28,  67 :  the  position  to  which 
he  should  have  been  assigned,  Aug. 
28,  69,  76 ;  conjecture  as  to  the  ad- 
vantage which  might  have  resulted 
had  his  forces  been  united  with  Por- 
ter's and  McDoweU's,  Aug.  29,  88  ; 
not  employed  by  Pope  in  operations, 
Aug.  29,  78  ;  his  supply  wagons  em- 
ployed for  Franklin's  transportation, 
282,  294,  295 ;  rejoined  Pope,  Aug. 
31,  140  ;  his  position,  ih. ;  his  slight 
loss  in  Pope's  campaign,  97. 

His  characteristics  :  his  ignorance 
of  the  soldier,  20  ;  his  inexperience  in 
war,  35,  37 ;  his  political  career,  37 ; 
his  appointment  as  Maj.-Gen.,  May 
16,  1861,  ih.;  his  martial  predilec- 
tions, ih. ;  his  ambition,  ih. ;  pos- 
sessed good  military  capacity  for 
subordinate  service,  38 ;  his  bravery, 
23,  38  ;  mentioned,  132,  219. 

Barnard,  J.  G.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 
(March  13,  1865) ;  Colonel  of  Engi- 
neers, U.  S.  A.  (Dec.  28,  1865) ; 
Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (Sept.  23, 1861) ; 
12th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry  ordered 
to  report  to,  Aug.  29, 279 ;  MeClellan 
possessed  no  authority  to  give  orders 
to,  untU  Aug.  30,  290. 

Barnett's  Ford,  Rapidan  River,  one 
limit  of  Bayard's  picket  line,  401 ; 
Buford's  pickets  at,  ih. 

Bartow,  F.  S.,  Col.,  C.  S.  A.,  place 
where  he  was  killed  on  Henry  House 
hill,  marked  by  a  monument,  174- 
175. 

Bates,  S.  P.,  History  of  Pennsylvania 
Volunteers,  by,  mentioned,  161. 

Bayard,  G.  D.,  Capt.,  4th  Cavalry, 
U.  S.  A.  (Aug.  20,  1861),  Brig.- 
Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (April  28,  1862),  in 
command  of  cavalry  brigade,  3d 
Corps,  A.  of  v.,  215 ;  his  strength, 
with  Buford's,  Aug.  1,  202 ;  his  po- 
sition at  Rapidan  Station,  Aug.  7, 
401 ;  his  picket  line,  ih. ;  supported 
by  Crawford,  ih. ;  repulsed  by 
Robertson,  Aug.  8,  46,  402;  Con- 
federate advance  retarded  by,  402- 
403  ;  his  reports  to  Pope  of  Confed- 
erate advance,  403 ;  his  retreat  to 
Culpeper,  ih.  ;  his  position  at  4  p.  M. 
Aug.  8,  on  Cedar  Run,  410 ;  Craw- 
ford ordered  to  his  support,  at  Ce- 
dar Mountain,  Aug.  8,  403-404 ;  his 
skirmishes  with  Jackson,  morning  of 
Aug.  9,  47  ;  his  movement,  Aug.  9, 
15  ;  with  McDowell's  command,  395 ; 
ordered,  Aug,  15,  to  join  Hatch  at 
Culpeper,  396;  strength,  Aug.  16, 


INDEX 


447 


215 ;  attached  to  Sigel's  commaiid, 
Aug.  27,  129. 

Beal,  G.  L.,  Col.,  U.  S.  V.,  in  com- 
mand of  10th  Maine,  428 ;  his  at- 
tempt to  shelter  his  troops  under  a 
murderous  fire,  Cedar  Moimtain,  ib. ; 
censured  by  Pelouze,  ib. ;  the  position 
taken  by,  429. 

Bealeton  Station,  Va.,  Porter  in  posi- 
tion at,  Aug-.  26,  1882,  62,  73^323 ; 
Banks  at,  evening  of  Aug.  27,  68  ; 
McCleUan's  telegram  for  information 
to,  Aug.  27,  114. 

Beauregard,  G.  T.,  Capt.  of  Engineers, 
U.  S.  A.  (March  3,  1853  -  Feb.  20, 
1861) ;  General,  C.  S.  A. ;  Cormth 
evacuated  by.  May  30,  1862,  34; 
HaUeck's  despatch  discredited  by, 
ib. ;  his  refutation  not  believed  at  the 
North,  ib. 

Bee,  B.  E.,  Capt.,  10th  Infy.,  U.  S.  A. 
(March  3,  1855  — March  3,  1861); 
Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  killed  on  Henry 
House  hill,  first  battle  of  Bull  Run, 
174 ;  monument  to  mark  the  place, 
175. 

Belcher,  Capt.,  A.  D.  C,  U.  S.  V.,  sent 
by  Stevens  from  Chantilly  to  Pope 
for  re-enforcements,  154. 

Benjamin,  S.  N.,  Bvt.  Lt.-CoL,  U.  S.  A. 
(March  13,  1865) ;  Capt.,  U.  S.  A. 
(June  13,  1864) ;  as  1st  Lieut., 
U.  S.  A.,  in  command  of  battery  E, 
2d  U.  S.  Artillery  at  Chantilly,  135, 
152 ;  his  position,  153  ;  his  service, 
156. 

Best,  C.  L.,  Major,  U.  S.  A.  (Feb.  5, 
1867) ;  Capt.,  U.  S.  A.  (April  29, 
1861) ;  Chief  of  ArtiUery,  1st  divi- 
sion, 2d  Corps,  A.  of  V.,  his  battery 
F,  under  Miihlenberg,  its  position  at 
Cedar  Mountain,  415  ;  in  returns  for 
August,  216. 

Bethlehem  Church,  Va.,  interview  of 
Locke  and  McDowell  at,  232 ;  Por- 
ter's headquarters  at,  233. 

Bhney,  D.  D.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(Feb.  3,  1861),  his  report  of  battle  of 
ChantiUy,  138 ;  cited,  160  ;  his  divi- 
sion hotly  engaged,  157-158 ;  his 
position,  ib. ;  his  opponents,  157 ; 
Kearny  killed  in  seeking  to  cover 
right  flank  of,  158-159 ;  in  contact 
with  Thomas'  command,  159 ;  the 
enemy  diverted  from  attack  on,  160  ; 
his  forces  in  the  action,  160-161, 163- 
164 ;  assumed  command  of  division, 
in  Kearny's  absence,  161 ;  held  posi- 
tion at  ChantiUy,  tiU  3  A.  M.,  Sept.  2, 
161 ;  his  retreat,  ib. 


Blackburn's  Ford,  Bull  Run,  in  the 
route  of  Hill's  division,  night  of 
Aug.  27,  108 ;  crossed  by  Ewell, 
Aug.  28,  65  ;  Pope's  headquarters 
near,  night  of  Aug.  28,  78  ;  Banks' 
retreat  from  Bristoe,  Aug.  31,  by 
way  of,  140. 

Blenker,  L.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (Aug. 
9,  1861),  his  division  the  nucleus  of 
Sigel's  corps,  36. 

Blue  Ridge  Mts.,  Va.,  Sigel  ordered  by 
Pope  to  cross,  41,  395  ;  failure  of 
Hatch's  expedition  by  way  of,  44, 
396 ;  Buford's  line  of  pickets  ex- 
tended to,  Aug.  7,  401 ;  317. 

Boswell,  J.  K.,  Capt.,  C.  S.  A.,  Chief 
Engineer,  A.  N.  V.,  his  report  cited 
in  evidence  of  Lee's  j)lan  against 
Pope,  321. 

Bowers,  Capt.,  32d  Mass.,  his  state- 
ment as  to  movement,  Aug.  29,  339, 
346. 

Branch,  L.  O'B.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  in 
command  of  brigade,  A.  P.  Hill's 
division,  Jackson's  corps,  at  Cedar 
Mountain,  419 ;  his  report  of  the 
rout  of  the  Stonewall  brigade  ex- 
aggerated, 426 ;  brigade  sent  by,  to 
re-enforce  the  Stonewall  brigade, 
427  ;  hurried  by  Jackson  to  oppose 
Stevens  at  Chantilly,  Sept.  1,  152 ; 
his  brigade  in  the  engagement,  154, 
167 ;  his  position,  166 ;  broken  in 
Stevens'  charge,  155, 166 ;  position  of 
remnants  of  his  brigade,  157 ;  his 
ammunition  exhausted,  he  held  posi- 
tion by  bayonet,  168 ;  his  loss,  169 ; 
support  given  by  Pender  to,  170  ; 
report  for  his  division  at  Chantilly 
made  by  Lane,  168 ;  killed  at 
Antietam,  ib. 

Bristoe  Station,  Va.,  on  Orange  and 
Alexandria  RaOxoad,  Jackson's 
march  to,  Aug.  26,  328 ;  Jackson 
arrived  at,  6  p.  m.,  Aug.  26,  62  ;  rail- 
road at,  cut  by  Jackson,  ib.  ;  Pope 
informed,  Aug.  27,  62,  74 ;  no  evi- 
dence that  Jackson  cut  Pope's  com- 
munications at,  110  ;  encounter^  be- 
tween Hooker  and  Ewell  at  Kettle 
Run,  Aug.  27,  near,  108, 326 ;  Ewell 
repulsed,  63,  210,  211,  268;  his 
losses,  212  ;  Jackson's  position  at, 
night  of  Aug.  27,  108 ;  Pope  in- 
formed of  Jackson's  advance  beyond, 
327 ;  Kearny  ordered  to,  Aug.  28, 
327  ;  Porter  ordered  to,  Aug.  28,  65, 
327  ;  disobedience  of  order,  a  charge 
against  Porter  at  court-martial,  352 ; 
Ricketts'  withdrawal  towards,  from 


448 


INDEX 


ThoroTigMare  Gap,  Aug.  28,  226; 
the  movement  of  Union  troops  from, 
seen  by  Confederates,  morning'  of 
Aug.  29,  342,  345;  Pope's  order, 
Aug-.  29,  3  A.  M.,  received  Tby  Porter 
at,  224,  383  ;  no  intimation  made  by 
Pope  to  Porter  of  expected  attack 
at,  328 ;  conjecture  that  Stuart 
dragged  bushes  from  Gainesville  to, 
250 ;  Banks'  retreat  from,  Aug.  31, 
140. 

Broad  Run,  Va.,  seizure  by  Union 
force  of  bridge  at  Buckland  Mills 
on,  ordered,  129 ;  saved  from  burn- 
ing, 130  ;  guarded  by  Steinwehr,  131 ; 
place  of  Eeynolds'  encampment, 
night  of  Aug.  27,  132. 

Brockenbrough,  J.  M.,  Col.,  C.  S.  A., 
his  share  in  battle  of  Aug.  30,  261 ; 
in  command  of  Field's  Virginia 
brigade,  A.  P.  Hill's  division,  Jack- 
son's corps,  Sept.  1,  166  ;  brought  up 
to  oppose  Stevens  at  Chantilly,  Sept. 
1,  152 ;  engaged,  154  ;  his  position, 
166,  170;  forced  back  by  Stevens' 
charge,  155  ;  Pender  ordered  to  his 
support,  170;  no  report  of  his 
brigade  for  Chantilly,  171. 

Brown,  Mrs.,  position  of  her  house  in 
Cedar  Mountain  battle,  412 ;  Gor- 
don's position  by,  Aug.  9,  413,  420 ; 
the  strongest  position  for  the  Union 
forces,  413  ;  indicated  by  Roberts  to 
Banks  for  his  position,  ih. ;  Banks' 
ignorance  of  Gordon's  position  on, 
413-414 ;  position  of  Union  artillery 
before,  421 ;  aspect  of  the  battle 
from,  422 ;  Gordon's  first  position 
on,  not  approached  by  the  enemy, 
439 ;  the  advance  of  the  enemy  to- 
wards, ih. 

Brown,  W.  D.,  Capt.,  C.  S.  A.,  in  com- 
mand of  Chesapeake  (Maryland) 
battery,  position  of  his  gun.  Cedar 
Mountain,  419. 

Bryant,  E.  E.,  his  history  of  the  3d 
Wisconsin,  389. 

Buchanan,  R.  C,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen., 
U.  S.  A.  (March  13,  1865) ;  Brig- 
Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (Nov.  29,  1862)  ;  Col., 
U.  S.  A.  (Feb.  8,  1864) ;  Lt.-Col., 
U.  S.  A.  (Sept.  9,  1861) ;  his  ser- 
vices in  battle  of  Aug.  30,  94. 

Buckland  Mills,  Va.,  Union  forces 
at,  Aug.  27,  63;  Sigel  ordered  to 
Gainesville,  Aug.  27,  by  way  of, 
129,  369 ;  the  bridge  at,  seized  by 
Union  forces,  130  ;  saved  from  burn- 
ing, ih. 

Buford,  J.,  Maj.,  U.  S.  A.  (Nov.  12, 


1861) ;  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (Dec.  16, 
1863) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (July 
27,  1862) ;  superseded  Hatch  in 
command  of  cavalry,  2d  Corps,  A.  of 
v.,  44,  396  ;  his  probable  strength, 
Aug.  1,  202  ;  in  return  for  Aug., 
216  ;  his  position  and  strength,  Aug: 
7,  at  Madison  Court  House,  401 ; 
position  of  his  pickets,  ih.  ;  sup- 
ported by  Sigel,  ih. ;  ordered  to  op- 
erate upon  the  flank  and  rear  of 
enemy,  Aug.  8,  404  ;  his  movement, 
Aug.  9,  1862,  15;  his  reports  of 
Jackson's  advance,  16,  403,  410  ;  his 
retreat  towards  Sperryville,  46,  410 ; 
Banks  misled  by  his  despatch,  410 ; 
his  report  to  McDowell  of  9  a.  m., 
Aug.  29,  of  Confederate  advance,  85, 
90,  124,  231,  242,  337  ;  read  to  Por- 
ter, 85,  231  ;  not  communicated  to 
Pope,  242 ;  Sigel's  cavalry  attached 
to  his  command,  Aug.  27,  129;  oc- 
cupied va.  reconnaissance  to  White 
Plains,  Aug.  27,  looking  for  Jack- 
son, 109,  129  ;  Longstreet's  advance 
to  Thoroughfare  Gap  delayed  by, 
331 ;  his  skirmishing  operations, 
Sept.  1,  in  the  retreat  from  Centre- 
ville,  137 ;  with  Patrick  and  Riek- 
etts,  repulsed  Stuart  on  Little  River 
Turnpike,  Sept.  1, 149-150 ;  his  testi- 
mony for  Porter  at  court-martial, 
245. 

Bull  Run,  Va.,  railway  bridge  over, 
burned,  Aug.  27,  by  Jackson,  112, 
273  ;  Lee  free  from  apprehension  on 
account  of  Jackson  at,  256  ;  McClel- 
lan's  apprehensions  from  Confederate 
cavalry  at,  Aug.  26,  115 ;  his  appre- 
hension that  the  bridges  over, 
would  not  afford  Pope  sufficient 
means  for  retreat,  117  ;  Haupt's  re- 
connaissance towards,  Aug.  27, 278 ; 
fight  between  Taylor  and  Jackson  at 
the  bridge  over,  105, 292  ;  crossed  by 
Ewell,  night  of  Aug.  27,  108 ;  Pope's 
dispositions,  Aug.  27,  intended  to 
secure  his  retreat  beyond,  325;  in 
Jackson's  movement  from  Manassas, 
Aug.  28,  328,  329;  Porter's  move- 
ment to,  early  Aug.  29, 225  ;  ordered 
by  Pope  to  post  guard  at,  ih. ;  pro- 
vision in  Pope's  joint  order  to  Porter 
and  McDowell  to  return  to,  night  of 
Aug.  29,  81,  82,  226,  229 ;  Porter's 
misconstruction  of  that  order,  231, 
335  ;  his  disposition  of  forces  in  eon- 
sequence,  234 ;  the  effect  upon  his 
action,  377-378;  McDowell's  state- 
ment at  Porter  investigation  board 


INDEX 


449 


concerning-  the  plan  to  reform  be-  j 
liind,  363;    tlie   delay   caused  to  ! 
Hooker  and  Reno  in  crossing-,  Aug. 
29,  85  ;  Pope  should  have  withdrawn 
behind,  Aug.   30,  93;   his  retreat 
across,  94;   crossed  by  Banks  in  j 
retreat  from  Bristoe,  Aug.  31,  140 ;  \ 
defence  of  bridge  over,  by  Cox,  199 ;  \ 
advance  by  Lee  across,  Aug.  31, 144 ; 
crossed  by  Jackson,  Aug.  31,  144- 
145,  165 ;  by  Longstreet,  145,  171, 
173;  Meade's  retreat  behind,  1863, 
321. 

BuU  Eun,  battle  of  1861,  the  field 
agaia  occupied  by  Jackson's  forces 
Aug.  28,  1862,  65-66;  his  strong 
position   there,   69;    souvenirs  of, 
found  by  Confederates,  Aug.  27, 103 ; 
Jackson's  movement  to,  107,  108 ;  j 
Henry  House  Hill  on,  visited  by  j 
Walcott,  173  et  seq. ;  reminiscences  j 
of,  related  by  Ballard,  183  et  seq.  j 

BuU  Run,  second  battle,  Aug.  29-30,  ! 
1862,  73-97,  169,  265,  268 ;  no  re-en-  \ 
f orcements  sent  to  Pope  from  Aug.  | 
26  until  after,  269,  283  ;  McClellan's  \ 
indifference  to  Pope's  demands  for  | 
ammunition    and    rations  during, 
281,  283,  284 ;  estimates  o£  strength  \ 
of  Union  and  Confederate  armies  at,  j 
197  et  seq. ;  Union  and  Confederate  I 
armies  not  in  full  strength  at,  208  ;  j 
Ewell's  losses  in,  212  ;  kSumner  pre-  j 
vented  from  j)articipating  in,  276  ; 
but  for   error   of   orders  Sumner 
might  have  particix^ated  in,  333-334 ; 
the  survivors  of  Pope's  arrny,  Sept. 
2,  213  ;   position  of  Union  Army 
after,  139-140 ;  victory  claimed  by 
Pope,    142 ;   contrast  with  South 
Mountain  and  Antietam,  97  ;  McClel- 
lan's responsibility  for  the  loss  of, 
284  ;  scene  of,  revisited  by  Walcott 
and  Stevens,  173. 

Bull  Run  Mountains,  Va.,  Longstreet's 
position  beyond,  Aug.  28,  253. 

Burke's  Station,  Va..  on  Alexandria 
and  Orange  Railroad,  Taylor's  forces 
pursued  by  Confederate  cavalry 
to,  Aug.  27,  109 ;  captures  made  at, 
ih. 

Bumside,  A.  K,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(Aug.  6,  1861) ;  his  transfer  to  co- 
operate with  Pope,  known  at  Rich- 
mond, Aug.  3,  1862,  12,  46,  402  ; 
Lee's  purpose  to  strike  Pope  before 
he  cordd  be  joined  bv,  46  ;  in  com- 
mand at  Falmouth,  112,  265,  404; 
his  strength,  201,  404;  deficient  in 
cavalry,  270 ;  Reno's  division,  of  his 


corps,  127 ;  Reno  sent  to  Pope,  Aug. 
14,  52,  201,  202  ;  HaUeck  informed 
by,  Aug.  21,  of  Reynold's  movement 
to  join  Pope,  203  ;  the  danger  of  his 
command  made  known  to  McClel- 
lan,  24,  320  ;  Halleck's  i)roposition, 
Aug.  26,  that  he  should  superintend 
debarkation  of  troops  at  Acquia 
Creek,  111,  112-113;  Porter's  de- 
spatches to,  Aug.  27  and  28,  113, 
325,  336,  337,  357  ;  Porter's  insubor- 
dinate language  in  the  desxDatches  to, 
357  ;  cautioned  to  protect  his  right 
flank  by  McGlellan,  115  ;  McClellan's 
personal  escort  lent  to,  Aug.  27, 114 ; 
his  testimony  for  Porter  at  court- 
martial,  245,  298. 

"Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War,"  the 
Scribner  Series,  217. 

Campbell,  a  resident  of  Chantilly, 
carried  news  of  Jackson's  move- 
ment, Aug.  31,  to  Pope,  191. 

Campbell,  J.  A.,  Col.,  C.  S.  A.,  his  bri- 
gade under  command  of  Garnett, 
Aiig.  9,  418,  425 ;  its  position  at 
Cedar  Mt.,  418,  421  ;  repulsed  by 
Donnelly's  charge,  425  ;  its  aid  to 
Taliaferro  in  the  repulse  of  Geary, 
430. 

Carpenter,  J.  C.,  Lieut.,  C.  S.  A.,  posi- 
tion of  his  Virginia  battery,  Cedar 
Mt.  419. 

CarroU,  S.'S.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 
(March  13,  1865);  Col.,  U.  S.  A. 
(Oct.  9,  1861) ;  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(May  31,  1862)  ;  as  Colonel,  in  com- 
mand of  4th  brigade,  2d  division 
(Ricketts'),  3d  Corps,  A.  of  V., 
strength^  Aug.  16,  215. 

Carter,  in  the  bounds  of  Reid-farm 
survey,  187. 

Casey,  S.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 
(March  13,  1865)  ;  Col.,  U.  S.  A. 
(Oct.  9,  1861)  ;  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(May  31,  1862)  ;  a  part  of  his  troops 
assigned  to  MeClellan  at  Alexandria, 
113,  273 ;  McClellan's  proposition 
that  the  Alexandria  railway  should 
be  put  in  order  by,  117  ;  ordered  not 
to  move  his  force  to  Yorktown,  Aug. 
27,  122 ;  MeClellan  possessed  no 
authority  to  give  orders  to,  imtil 
Aug.  30,  290. 

Caskie,  W.  H,,  the  position  of  his 
battery.  Cedar  Mountain,  419. 

Castleman,  A.,  his  book  condemned  by 
Gen.  Gordon,  124. 

Catlett's  Station,  Va.,  on  Orange  and 
Alexandiia  Railroad,  Stuart's  raid 


450 


INDEX 


on,  Aug".  22,  321 ;  TJnion  forces  dis- 
posed on  road  to  Haymarket  from, 
Aug-.  27,  62,  126-127,  66;  Banks, 
Aug.  28,  moved  to  Manassas  Junc- 
tion from,  67 ;  public  property 
moved  to,  Aug.  27,  126,  129. 
Cavalry,  United  States  Army,  Regular. 
See  United  States  Army,  Regular, 
Cavalry. 

Cedar  Creek,  Shenandoah  Co.,  Va., 
Fremont's  forces  on,  July,  1862, 
893.- 

Cedar  Mountain,  Va.,  distance  from 
Culpeper,  46 ;  account  of  battle  of, 
Aug.  9,  1862,  15  et  seq.,  389-440 ; 
Crawford  concerned  in,  15,  16,  45, 
46,  47,  396,  401.  403-404,  406,  410, 
411,  414,  416,  420,  424,  432,  433  ; 
Gordon  concerned  in,  17-23,  389, 
411,  413-414,  416,  420,  422,  424, 
432-436,  439;  Ricketts'  movement 
to,  439 ;  on  guard  over  road  from 
Madison  Court  House  to,  404,  410  ; 
brought  to  battlefield  too  late,  50, 
407,  439 ;  Banks  ordered  to  move 
towards,  Aug.  9,  47,  404 ;  celerity  of 
Ms  movement  to,  47  ;  suffering  of 
the  troops  on  the  march  to,  ib.,  207  ; 
Banks'  strength  at,  38,  39,  48,  49, 
50,  201,  416-417 ;  about  equal  to  the 
Confederates,  47 ;  position  of  the 
Union  forces  at,  47,  48,  420-421; 
position  of  2d  Mass.  at,  17,  413,  414 ; 
Banks'  position  selected  by  Roberts, 
20-21,  406  et  seq. ;  his  removal  from 
that  position,  21,  22 ;  probable  re- 
sult, had  he  kept  it,  48 ;  Jackson,  his 
advance  towards,  46, 402, 403 ;  suffer- 
ings of  his  army  on  the  march,  403  ; 
his  delay,  417  ;  Confederate  forces  at, 
207, 418-420, 421-422;  their  strength, 
46,  48,  49,  50,  207  ;  about  equal  to 
Union  strength,  47,  Ewell's  move- 
ment towards,  46  ;  in  the  battle,  49 ; 
his  strength,  205  ;  A.  P.  Hill,  his 
advance,  46,  402,  421,  439;  his 
troops  employed  against  Pope  at,  319 ; 
position  of  Confederate  forces  at, 
411,  418-420,  421-422 ;  the  enemy's 
force  concealed  at,  409 ;  the  battle- 
field described,  411-413 ;  the  artillery 
duel,  48,  423-424,  425 ;  Banks  ex- 
pected by  Pope  to  hold  the  enemy 
in  check  at,  406, 407 ;  controversy  as 
to  the  instructions  given  by  Pope 
verbally  and  through  Marshall  and 
Roberts,  21-22,  47-48,  405-406  ; 
Pope's  denial  of  order  to  fight,  21, 
410 ;  the  order  cited  by  Banks,  21-22, 
47-48,  405-406  ;  Banks'  action  at. 


influenced  by  Pope,  898,  409 ;  the 
battle  caused  by  Banks'  attack,  22- 
23,  48,  423, 429  ;  Southern  claim  that 
the  battle  was  forced  in  obedience 
to  Jackson's  order,  22,  440  ;  Banks' 
action  criticized,  22 ;  his  desire  to 
fight,  ib.,  23,  48,  49,  398,  406,  409 ; 
Banks'  attack,  48  ;  its  impetuosity, 
49,  425,  427;  its  effect,  ib. ;  3d 
brigade  ordered  to  charge,  17  ;  the 
charge,  18,  19 ;  outnumbered  and 
forced  to  retire,  49  ;  a  gun  lost,  ib.  ; 
Union  loss,  50  ;  Confederate  loss,  51 ; 
McClellan  informed,  Aug.  10,  of  the 
battle  at,  320 ;  mentioned  by  Rebel 
War  Clerk,  12;  victory  claimed  by 
Pope,  52,  123,  126;  Gordon's  opinion 
as  to  the  conditions  for  victory,  23  ; 
the  effect  of  the  battle  to  show 
Halleck  the  aggressive  designs  of 
Lee,  24 ;  Pope's  losses  on  the  Rap- 
pahannock and  at,  202  ;  Mr.  Ropes' 
estimate  of  strength  of  Pope's  army 
after  the  battle  discussed,  197  et  seq. ; 
no  report  of  battle  made  by  Banks, 
22  ;  his  attempt  to  evade  responsi- 
bility for  defeat,  23 ;  documentary 
sources  of  data  for  history  of  the 
battle,  441-442  ;  mentioned,  30,  218, 
219,  265. 

Cedar  Run,  Fauquier  County,  Va., 
Banks'  position  on,  Aug.  27,  128. 

Cedar  Run,  Madison  County,  Va.,  in  the 
Cedar  Mountain  battlefield,  411; 
Bayard's  meeting  with  Crawford  on, 
Aug.  8,  410  ;  Crawford's  position  at, 
Aug.  9,  404;  Banks'  retreat  from 
Cedar  Mt.  across,  49 ;  a  Union  gun 
lost  in,  lb.  ;  Confederate  name  for 
battle  of  Cedar  Mountain,  197. 

Cedar  Run  Mountain,  another  name  for 
Cedar  Mountain,  412. 

Centreville,  Va.,  Franklin's  route  to 
the  Rappahannock,  not  to  be  by 
way  of,  Aug.  27,  113  ;  Ewell's  move- 
ment to,  329;  A.  P.  Hill's  movement 
through,  65,  75  ;  not  intended  to  de- 
ceive Pope,  329 ;  Jackson's  move- 
ment towards,  night  of  Aug.  27,  108, 
268  ;  known  to  Pope,  Aug.  28,  68, 
329  ;  mistaken  movement  of  Lawton 
and  Hayes  towards,  Aug.  28,  329 ; 
Pope  at,  Aug.  28,  329,  337 ;  Heint- 
zelman  and  Reno  at,  337 ;  Pope's  at- 
tempt to  catch  Jackson  at,  68 ;  his 
position  favorable  for  pursuit  of 
Jackson  to,  328 ;  the  theory  erroneous 
that  Jackson  might  have  been  inter- 
cepted at,  65-66  ;  his  plan  to  pui*- 
sue  Jackson  to,  should  have  been 


INDEX 


451 


understood  by  his  commanders,  336  ; 
McDowell  said  by  Pope  to  have 
been  ordered  to  advance  on,  Ang-, 

28,  330 ;  the  forces  ordered  to,  6S  ; 
Confederate  rearguard  driven  by 
Kearny  from,  2(38,  2  79 ;  delay  of 
Hooker  and  Reno  in  reaching-,  84- 
85  ;  times  of  their  arrival,  79  ;  delay 
of  Kearny's  movement  from,  84; 
Porter  ordered  to  move  upon,  at 
dawn,  Ang.  29,  225,  383  ;  his  move- 
ment towards,  85,  225  ;  time  lost  by 
moving  forces  by  way  of,  85  ;  the 
advance  from,  arrested,  86 ;  Pope's 
provision  in  joint  order  for  -with- 
drawal to,  night  of  Aug.  29,  81,  83, 
229,  310,  384 ;  his  purpose,  83,  87 ; 
supplies  expected  at,  S3 ;  Porter's 
misconstruction  of  the  order,  231, 
234  ;  Moreil  ordered  to  push  to,  fail- 
ing to  communicate  with  Sigel.  234, 
373 ;  Pope's  movement  to  battlefield 
from,  92  ;  noise  of  heavy  firing  at, 
reported  to  Halleck,  116-117 ;  the 
enemv  reported  as  evacuating,  Aug, 

29,  by  McCleHan,  279;  Pope  re- 
ported at,  by  Haupt,  Aug.  29,  278  ; 
his  trains  reported  by  Franklin  as 
parked  near,  280 ;  Franklin's  move- 
ment towards,  Aug.  30,  310 ;  Pope 
should  have  withdrawn  to,  morning 
of  Aug.  30,  93  ;  Porter's  theory  that 
Pope  intended  to  fight  the  battle, 
Aug.  30,  at,  87 ;  his  battle  should 
Lave  been  fought  there,  93,  95 ; 
permitting  two  brigades  to  march 
to,  Aug.  30,  a  charge  against  Porter, 
224 ;  Halleck's  effort  to  cause 
Sumner's  advance  to,  333  ;  Sumner 
ordered  to,  from  Georgetown,  too 
late  for  action,  276  ;  Franklin's  with- 
drawal to,  Aug.  30,  instead  of  ad- 
vanciag  to  battlefield,  276 ;  retreat 
of  Union  Army  to.  Aug.  30,  94,  261, 
309  ;  position  of  Union  Army  at.  Aug. 
31,  139,  140 ;  position  of  Confeder- 
ates aronnd,  Aug.  31-Sept.  1,  147 ; 
attack  by  Lee  expected,  Aug.  31,  at, 
84;  his  movement  by,  Aug.  31,  95; 
no  battle  at,  Aug.  31,  143 ;  the  be- 
lief at  Washington,  Aug.  31,  that 
Lee's  forces  were  between  "Washing- 
ton and,  301 ;  Sumner  at,  Aug.  31, 
146,  147  ;  his  retreat  from,  Sept.  1, 
160  ;  Union  forces  withdrawn  from, 
137,  141,  142,  153,  160, 166, 167, 169, 
180;  the  retreat  from,  known  to  Jack- 
son, 165  ;  Pope  did  not  intend  to  fight 
near,  149 ;  number  of  MeClellan's 
forces  who  joined  Pope  at,  213  note ; 


j     McClellan  directed  to  send  ammuni- 
tion to  Pope  at,  281 ;  his  evasion  of 
j      order,  ib. ;  Pope  informed  at,  that  he 
\      could  g'et  rations  by  sending  to  Alex- 
I      andxia,  ib. ;  distance  of  Sudley  Ford 
from,  145 ;    distance   of  Chantilly 
from,  136 ;  mentioned.  69,  70,  76,  78, 
:  132. 

Centreville   Turnpike,  the  battle  of 
Chantilly  not  fought   to  obstruct 
Jackson's  advance  to.  166-167,  188, 
!  191. 

I  Chancellorsville,  Ya.,  battle  of.  May 
j     2—4,  1863,  Lee's  sagacity  displayed 
at,  94. 

1  ChantiUy,Ya.,  battle  of,  Sept.  1, 1862, 
i      135-194 ;  the  Lnion  forces  engaged, 
i     135,  152-153 ;  its  situation,  136  ;  site 
I     of  battlefield,  137,  139  ;  not  fought 
j      according-  to  plan,  139 ;  the  opera- 
I     tions  preceding  the  battle,  139  et  seq. ; 
j     no  reconnaissance  made  by  Sumner 
towards,  147 ;  Union  cavalry  cap- 
tured near,  Aug.  31,  ib. ;  Stevens' 
movement  towards,  151 ;  his  position 
and  strength  at,  152  ;  his  disposition 
of  forces,  153-154 ;  his  charge,  154- 
155 ;  Stevens  killed,  155 ;  the  Con- 
i     federates  demoralized  by  the  charge, 
j      ih.  ;  Jackson's  movement  towards, 
145-147 ;  battlefield  reached  by  him 
I      at  noon,  145  ;  the  Confederate  forces 
of  Jackson's  corps  engaged,  155; 
thunder-storm,  155,  156 ;  its  effect 
!      on  Confederates,  156  ;  Union  forces 
j     reenforced,  155-156  ;  disposition  of 
new   troops,    155-156  ;  Kearny's 
I      death,  159-160 ;  the  indecisive  termi- 
I      nation  of  the  conflict,  160 ;  L^nion 
forces  withdrawn  from,   night  of 
j     Sept.  1,  160  ;  called  one  of  the  sever- 
'      est  eng-agements  by  Lane,  168 ;  the 
I     losses  on  both  sides,  161-164 ;  pau- 
city of  data  for  the  history  of  the 
battle,  138,  164  et  seq. ;  citations  con- 
cerning the  battle  from  Birney's 
,     report,  160-161 ;  citations  from  Con- 
federate reports  :  Jackson's,  165-166; 
I      D,    R.    Jones',    171-172 ;  Lane's, 
:      for  Branch's  brigade,  168 ;  Lee's, 
i     167  ;  Longstreet's,  171 ;  Mc-Gow- 
an's,  for  Gregg's  brigade,  169  ;  Pen- 
I      der's,   170  ;  Stuart's,  165  ;  Thom- 
as', 171 ;  erroneous  statements  con- 
cerning, 167  ;  the  real  object  of  the 
battle,  168  ;   caused  by  Lee's  effort 
to  turn  the  Union  right  wing,  95  ; 
contrast  with  Antietam,  97 ;  called 
j      by  Confederates  battle  of  Ox  Hill  ; 
revisited,  1883,  by  Waicott  and  Ste- 


452 


INDEX 


yens,  173  et  seq. ;  tlie  battlefield  ex- 
amined, 180  et  seq. ;  the  Reid  house, 
a  Union  hospital,  1862,  180  ;  the  ap- 
proach to,  identified,  182 ;  its  site, 
the  Reid  farm,  description  of  survey, 
187-188 ;  bullet  scars  in  the  trees 
on,  190. 

Charlottesville,  Va.,  Pope  expected  to 
operate  on  communications  of  Rich- 
mond with,  40,  392  ;  Hatch  ordered, 
July  14,  to  seize,  395  ;  his  failure, 
396. 

Chickahominy  River,  Va.,  24 ;  the 
transfer  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac to  the  James  from,  392. 

Choate,  J.  H.,  of  counsel  for  appellant, 
Porter  investigating  board,  363  ;  his 
treatment  of  Gen.  McDowell  dis- 
cussed, 363  et  seq. ;  his  attitude  to- 
wards McDowell  in  the  matter  of 
Porter's  despatches,  365-366 ;  also 
in  the  matter  of  the  misquotations 
from  Jackson's  report,  367-370. 

Christ,  B.  C,  Col.,  U.  S.  v.,  in  command 
of  1st  brigade,  1st  division,  9th 
Corps,  at  Chantilly,  152  ;  its  compo- 
sition, ih.  ;  his  losses,  162. 

Clark,  J.  S.,  Col.,  A.  D.  C,  U.  S.  V., 
reported  Jackson's  movement,  Aug. 
25,  1862,  59. 

Coggin's  Point,  Va.,  the  purpose  of 
D.  H.  Hill's  movement  to,  319. 

Colgrove,  S.,  Col.,  U.  S.  V.,  in  com- 
mand of  27th  Indiana,  at  Cedar  Mt., 
437;  unable  to  force  his  regiment 
against  terrific  fire  of  the  enemy, 
ib. ;  his  attempted  manoeuvre,  ib.  ; 
his  retreat,  ib. ;  his  loss,  ib. 

CoUis,  C.  H.  T.,  Capt.  of  Penna.  Com- 
pany Zouaves  d'Afrique,  under  Gor- 
don, in  position,  Aug.  9,  on  Brown 
House  hill,  413 ;  the  creditable  ser- 
vice of  his  Zouves,  439 ;  his  loss, 
ib. 

Compton,  A.  H.,  175  ;  visited  by  Wal- 
eott  and  Stevens,  1883,  179. 

Conduct  of  the  War,  Joint  Committee 
of  Congress  on.  See  United  States 
Congress. 

Confederate  States,  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  McClellan's  estimate  of 
the  strength  of,  Jime  25,  8,  10 ; 
efforts  to  re-enforce  it,  Aug.  3,  12  ; 
its  strength  at  Cedar  Mt.,  207 ;  its 
strength,  Aug.  20,  207-208,  218  ;  its 
losses  on  Rappahannock,  107,  208, 
209  ;  its  advance  against  Pope,  Aug. 
18,  266  ;  prevented  from  crossing  the 
Rappahannock,  Aug.  20-22,  ib. ;  Pope 
confronted   by,    at  Rappahannock 


Station,  ib. ;  cavalry  raid,  Aug.  22,  by 
way  of  Waterloo  Bridge,  267 ;  re- 
pulsed at  Sulphur  Springs  Aug.  23, 
ib. ;  position  of  the  main  part,  Aug. 
25,  1862,  59  ;  no  provision  made  by 
Pope  to  intercept  it,  at  Thoroughfare 
Gap,  65,^66,  67,  _70,  74,  77,  84; 
Pope's  miscalculation  of  time  of  ap- 
proach of,  83,  84;  its  advance  dis- 
covered by  Porter's  skirmishers, 
Aug.  29,  85  ;  its  position,  Aug.  29, 
248,  251,  252,  255  ;  its  left  wing 
under  Jackson  at  Chantilly,  Sept.  1, 
1862,  136 ;  data  for  that  battle  in  the 
reports  of,  138  ;  its  movement  at  that 
battle,  139  ;  its  condition  not  better 
than  Pope's  army,  209;  its  losses, 
212  ;  its  loyalty  to  its  commanders, 
143  ;  the  reports  of  commanders  of, 
as  evidence,  in  a  new  hearing  of  the 
Porter  case,  341  et  seq.,  354,  356, 
357-358;  the  evidence  ambiguous, 
341. 

Artillery:  strength  of,  July  20, 
estimated,  207,  208;  half  accompa- 
nied Lee  in  campaign  against  Pope, 
208 ;  none  used  at  battle  of  Chan- 
tilly, 136. 

Cavalry :  its  service  in  Jackson's 
Manassas  raid,  108,  109 ;  estimates 
of  its  strength,  Aug.,  1862,  205-208 ; 
commanded  by  Robertson,  Aug.  29, 
258-259. 

Confederate  States  Government,  in- 
formed of  project  at  Washington  to 
terminate  the  Peninsular  Campaign, 
12. 

Connecticut  Volunteers,  Artillery,  1st 
regt.,  at  Alexandria,  Aug.  27,  122: 
Infantry,  5th  regt.,  in  battle  of  Cedar 
Mountain,  414 ;  in  Crawford's  charge, 
424. 

Cook,  in  command  of  8th  Mass.  bat- 
tery, his  guns  at  Chantilly,  135 
note. 

Cooke,  J.  E.,  his  biography  of  Stone- 
wall Jackson  mentioned,  136,  389. 

Corinth,  Miss.,  Pope's  operations  at, 
1862,  34;  evacuated  by  Beauregard, 
May  30,  1862,  34. 

Cothran,  G.  W.,  Capt.,  U.  S.  V.,  in 
command  of  Battery  M,  1st  New 
York  Light  Artillery,  his  position, 
Aug.  9,  on  Brown  House  hill,  413, 
415,  422. 

Couch,  D.  N.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (July 
4,  1862),  called  from  the  Peninsula, 
Aug.  27,  114,  120;  his  division 
ordered  to  Fairfax  C.  H.,  from  Alex- 
andria, Sept.  1,  149,  213. 


IXDEX 


453 


Court  of  Inquirv  in  ease  of  Gen.  Me- 
Do^vell.  See  '  McDowell,  Conrt  of 
Inquirv. 

Cox..  J.  b..  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (Dec. 
7,  1864) ;  Brig. -Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (May 
IT,  1861)  ;  Ms  command  in.  tlie  Dis- 
trict of  the  Kanawha,  198,  393  ; 
strengtli  of  Ms  forces,  by  return  of 
July  31.  1862,  198 ;  ordered  from 
West  Virginia  to  re-enforce  Pope, 
201 ;  Pope  promised  the  supxDort  of. 
by  Halleck,  Aug.  21,  267;  had  not 
reported  for  duty,  Aug.  27,  60,  62, 
74;  withheld  from  Pope  by  Mc- 
Clellan,  273,  277;  sent  to  Upton's 
Hill  instead,  273  ;  the  cavalry  imder 
his  command,  ih. ;  his  force  not 
available  when  required  by  Pope, 
333 ;  the  responsibility  for  his  de- 
tention discussed,  ih. ;  slight  aid 
given  to  Pope  bv.  199. 

Crawford.  S.  W.V  B^.  Maj.-Gen., 
U.  S.  Y.  (Aug.  1.  1864) ;  Asst. 
Surgeon.  U.  S.  A.  (March  10,  1851)  ; 
Maj.,  U.  S.  A.  (Mav  14,  1861); 
Brig'.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (April  25. 1862  ; 
in  command  of  1st  brigade,  1st 
division,  2d  Corps.  A.  of  V.  ; 
ordered  to  Culpeper.  July  10,  42- ;  at 
Culpeper  July  24-Aug.  8,  39,  45, 
396,  401,  403  ;  Bayard  supported  by, 
Aug.  7,  401 ;  ordered  to  Cedar  Mt., 
Aug.  8,  to  support  Bayard,  45,  403- 
404  ;  Ms  movement.  Aug.  8,  15, 410 ; 
the  character  of  his  force,  410 ;  his 
strength,  216,  416  ;  Banks  ordered  to 
join,  Aug".  9,  16,  404 :  Banks'  junc- 
tion with,  47 ;  at  Cedar  Mt.,  46 ;  in 
position  on  Cedar  Run,  Aug.  9,  404  ; 
his  position  at  Cedar  Mountain  de- 
scribed. 410.  420 ;  the  enemy's  po- 
sition in  relation  to,  411  ;  Banks 
placed  in  position  by  Roberts  near, 
406,411;  Gordon  supposed  by  Banks 
to  be  in  position  on  the  right  of,  414 ; 
his  movement  to  new  position  after 
Augnr's  arrival,  ih. ;  Augur's  position 
in  relation  to.  420 ;  his  movement 
into  the  wood,  after  5  o'clock.  414, 
424  ;  promised  support  of  Gordon's 
brigade.  424;  his  disposition  of  forces 
in  his  advance,  ih. ;  did  not  accom- 
pany his  brigade  into  the  wood, 
ih. ;  Ruger  ordered  to  charge  by, 
ih.  ;  order  required  confirmation  by 
Banks,  ih.  ;  Gordon  censured  for  his 
failure  to  give  timely  support  to, 
432  ;  the  question  of  the  order  dis- 
cussed, 432-433  ;  mentioned.  39. 

Crittenden  House,   Cedar  Mountain 


j  battlefield,  Earlv's  position  near, 
i  418. 

I  Cross  Keys,  Va..  Frdmont  defeated  by 
I     Jackson  at,  June  8.  1862,  33. 
I  Cub  Run,  Va. ,  General  Stevens'  posi- 
I     tion  on,  Aug.  31,  139 ;  Reynolds  in 
I     position  on.  140. 
CuUum.  G.  W..  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
A.  (March  13,  1865) ;  Major,  Engi- 
neers, U.  S.  A.  (Aug.  6, 1861) ;  Brig.- 
j     Gen._,  U.  S.  V.  (Nov.  1,  1861)  ;  Col., 
Engineers   (March  7,   1867)  ;  de- 
clined to  make  an  effort  to  get  in- 
formation concerning  Pope,  302. 
I  Culpeper  Court  House,  Va.,  Crawford 
ordered  to.  July  10,  42  ;  in  position 
I     at  until  Aug.  8, 39,  45,  396, 401,  403 ; 
I     Hatch  ordered  to  position  at,  July 
'      12.  395  ;    Bayard  ordered  to  join 
i     Hatch  at.  July  15,  396  ;  Pope  ar- 
I     rived  at,  Aug.  8, 45  ;  his  headquarters 
I     at;  403  ;   Jackson's  movement  to- 
j     wards,  begun  Aug.  7,  15,  46,  402  ; 
I     expected  to  arrive  at,  morning  of 
Aug.  9. 403 ;  Pope  informed,  Aug.  7, 
of  enemy's  advance  towards,  403  ; 
orders  for  concentration  of  army  at, 
Aug.  S.  400,  403 ;  Ricketts  ordered 
to  position  near,  404 ;  his  arrival  at, 
45  ;  Crawford  ordered  to  Cedar  Mt. 
from,  Aug.  8,  46  ;  Pope's  disposi- 
tions of  Banks  and  Sigel  to  block 
Jackson  at,  15,  16  :  Banks  ordered 
to,  Aug.  8,  46  ;  arrived  that  night, 
;     15,  16.  404 ;  ordered  to  Cedar  Mt. 
I     from,  Aug.  9,  47 ;  Sigel  ordered  to, 
I     46, 404  ;  unable  to  find  the  only  road 
j     to,  ih.  ;  arrived  at.  afternoon  of  Aug. 
I     9,  50,  404  ;  Bayard's  retreat  to,  403  ; 
j     Pope's    interview   with  Banks  at, 
I     morning  of  Aug.  9,  48  ;  Pope's  or- 
!      der  sent  by  Marshall  to  Banks  from, 
I     Aug.  9.  405  ;   sound  of  battle  of 
I      Cedar  Mt.  heard  at.  by  Pope,  52  ; 
}     Pope  outnumbered  by  Jackson  at, 
28  ;  distance  from  Cedar  Mountain, 
I     46 ;  distance  of  Cedar  Run  from, 
411 ;  road  to  Madison  Court  House 
1      and  Cedar  Mountain   gxiarded  by 
I     Ricketts,  Aug.  8,  404;  roads  from, 
to  Orange  Court  House  and  Mad- 
ison Court  House,  413. 
Culpeper  Road,  Mrs.  Brown's  house 
on.  412  ;  description  of  the  battle- 
field on,  ih. ;  Augnr's  position  on, 
Aug.  9.  414,  420 ;  WiLliams'  position 
on,  420  ;   Geary's  engagement  on, 
428 ;  position  of  the  10th  Maine  on, 
428 ;  Confederate  position  on.  418. 
Gushing,  H.  C,  Bvt.  Major,  U.  S.  A, 


454 


INDEX 


(Aug.  28,  1864);  Capt.,  U.  S.  A. 
(Aug.  22,  1871) ;  1st  Lieut.,  U.  S.  A. 
(Sept.  17, 1862) ;  2d  Lieut.,  U.  S.  A., 
4th  ArtiUery  (Oct.  24, 1861) ;  his  po- 
sition at  Cedar  Mountain,  416. 
Cutter,  C,  Surgeon,  21st  Mass.,  taken 
prisoner,  Aug.  29,  1862, 177  ;  his  re- 
lation of  the  handiwork  of  Texan 
riflemen  at  hattle  of  Groveton,  178. 

D'Aquin,  L.  E.,  Capt.,  C.  S.  A.,  posi- 
tion of  his  battery  of  Louisiana 
Guard  Artillery,  Cedar  Mountain, 
419. 

Danville,  Va,,  the  enemy's  movement 
from  Richmond  towards,  July  30-31, 
319. 

Darling,  Fort,  on  James  River,  a  de- 
fence of  Richmond,  10. 

Davis,  Jeff.,  Lee's  report  of  hattle  of 
Chantilly  to,  167. 

Delaware  Volunteers,  3d  regt.,  stationed 
at  Front  Royal,  Aug.  9,  416. 

Dement,  W.  F.,  Capt.,  C.  S.  A.,  position 
of  his  1st  Maryland  battery,  Cedar 
Mountain,  419. 

Department  of  the  Potomac,  under 
command  of  McClellan,  391. 

Department  of  the  Rappahannock, 
under  command  of  McDowell,  390 ; 
constituted  the  3d  Corps,  Army  of 
Virginia,  ih. 

Department  of  the  Shenandoah,  under 
command  of  Banks,  390  ;  consti- 
tuted the  2d  Corps,  Army  of  Vir- 
ginia, ih. 

Diary  of  a  Rebel  War  Clerk  (J.  B. 
Jones),  cited,  12. 

Difficult  Run,  Va.,  Union  forces  in  po- 
sition on,  Sept.  1,  1862,  137,  164. 

District  of  Kanawha,  Cox  in  command 
in,  July,  1862,  393 ;  the  strength  of 
Union  force  in,  198,  394 ;  the  force 
ordered  to  Washington,  201. 

Dogan,  W.  H.,  visited  by  Walcott  and 
Stevens,  1883,  176  et  seq. ;  his  remi- 
niscences of  2d  Bull  Run,  177  et 
seq. ;  the  destruction  of  a  file  of  the 
5th  New  York,  177-178;  the  cap- 
ture of  General  Stoughton,  186. 

Donnelly,  D.,  Col.,  U.  S.  V.,  in  com- 
mand of  28th  New  York,  the  leader 
of  Crawford's  charge  at  Cedar  Moun- 
tain, 425  ;  his  loss  in  the  charge,  ib. ; 
mortally  wounded,  427. 

Doubleday,  A.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
A.  (March  13,  1865) ;  Maj.,  U.  S.  A. 
(May  14,  1861)  ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
V.  (iFeb.  3,  1862) ;  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
Y.  (Nov.  29,  1862  ;  Col.,  U.  S.  A. 


(Sept.  15,  1867)  ;  in  command  of  2d 
brigade,  1st  division  (King's  and 
Hatch's),  3d  Corps,  A.  of  V.,  his 
strength,  Aug.  16,  215. 

DranesviUe,  Va.,  McClellan's  propo- 
sition that  cavalry  be  sent  to,  Aug. 
27, 119 ;  scouting  force  sent  towards, 
Aug.  29,  279. 

Drayton,  T.  F.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
the  estimated  strength  of  his  brigade, 
July  20,  1862,  207. 

Duffee,  C,  Orderly,  1st  Ohio,  a  witness 
for  Government  at  Porter  Court  Mar- 
tial, 243. 

Duffi^,  A.  N.,  Col.,  U.  S.  v.,  in  com- 
mand of  1st  R.  I.  cavalry,  under 
Bayard,  3d  Corps,  A.  of  V.,  strength, 
Aug.  16,  216. 

Duryea,  A.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (Aug. 
31,  1861),  in  command  1st  brigade, 
2d  division  (Ricketts'),  3d  Corps,  A. 
of  v.,  strength,  Aug.  16,  215. 

Early,  J.  A.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  in 
command  of  a  brigade,  Ewell's  di- 
vision, Jackson's  corps,  his  position 
in  Cedar  Mountain  battlefield,  418, 
421 ;  supported  by  Thomas'  brigade, 
419 ;  part  of  his  brigade  forced  back 
by  Donnelly's  charge,  425 ;  his  guns 
engaged  in  attack  on  Muhlenberg, 
428  ;  his  artillery  endangered  by 
Union  skirmishers,  429  ;  saved  from 
capture,  ib. ;  his  aid  to  Taliaferro  in 
repulsing  Geary,  430,  431 ;  part  of 
his  brigade  attacked  by  Prince,  431 ; 
the  battle  attributed  to,  440 ;  his  re- 
port of  the  movement  from  Manas- 
sas, Aug.  27-28,  329 ;  cited  in  de- 
fence by  Porter,  248 ;  his  definition 
of  position  of  Ox  Hill,  136 ;  his  re- 
port for  Ewell's  division  cited  as  to 
the  panic  at  Chantilly,  156 ;  severe 
engagement  of  21st  Mass.  with,  157 ; 
site  of  encounter  identified  by  Wal- 
cott, 1883,  190;  his  statement  of 
strength  of  Ewell's  division,  Aug. 
9,  205. 

Ellgey,  in  the  bounds  of  Reid-farm 
survey,  187. 

Evans,  N.  G.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  in 
command  of  independent  brigade, 
his  strength,  July  20,  207;  in  co- 
operation with  Jackson  against  Pope, 
Aug.  29,  89,  91,  92  ;  his  position,  91 ; 
not  engaged,  92  ;  his  position  under 
Longstreet,  Aug.  29,  248  ;  not  in 
Porter's  front,  Aug.  29, 347  ;  formed 
to  support  Hood,  Axig.  29,  257,  344. 

Ewell,  R.  S.,  Lieut.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.; 


INDEX 


455 


Capt.,  1st  Dragoons,  U.  S.  A.  (Aug. 
4,  1849-May  7,  1861)  ;  Maj.-Gen., 
C.  S.  A.  (July-Sept.,  1862),  in  com- 
mand of  3d  division,  Jackson's  corps, 
the  strength  and  composition  of  his 
division  discussed,  205-206 ;  his 
losses,  212  ;  sent  with  Jackson,  July 
13,  to  protect  Gordonsville,  45,  206, 
318,  402 ;  at  Gordonsville,  July  16, 
396,  402 ;  in  movement  on  Pope, 
reached  the  Rapidan,  Aug.  7,  46, 
402  ;  crossed  the  river  Aug.  8,  46 ; 
advancing  against  Pope,  Aug.  9,  12  ; 
in  the  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain, 
Aug.  9,  49  ;  his  arrival  at  Cedar 
Mountain  battlefield,  417 ;  his  posi- 
tion, 418,  421  ;  his  strength,  205  ; 
the  composition  of  his  division,  Aug. 
9,  421 ;  the  number  of  his  guns, 
420 ;  his  inactivity  during  the  battle, 
432 ;  with  Jackson,  Aug.  21,  307  ;  in 
the  advance  on  Pope,  59,  266;  Lee 
extricated  from  perilous  position  by 
his  reerossing  of  Rappahannock, 
Aug.  25,  59 ;  repulsed  by  Hooker, 
Aug.  27,  at  Kettle  Run,  63, 103,  268, 
326 ;  the  movement  of  his  division 
from  Manassas  Aug.  27-28,  65,  329  ; 
repulsed  by  King  in  engagement  of 
Aug.  28,  76 ;  the  scene  of  the  action 
on  Stony  Ridge,  179  ;  his  division 
under  Lawton's  command  Aug.  29, 
257  ;  also,  Aug.  31,  145,  155;  in 
Jackson's  centre,  257;  his  position, 
Sept.  1,  at  Cha^ntilly,  166 ;  demoral- 
ized in  that  battle,  155 ;  his  losses, 
162 ;  report  of  his  division  at  Chan- 
tiUy  made  by  Early,  136,  156. 
Fairfax    County,   Va.,   situation  of 

Chantilly  in,  136. 
Fairfax  Court  House,  Va.,  Stuart's 
cavalry  seen  in  neighborhood  of, 
Aug.  27,  292 ;  an  alternative  in 
Franklin's  movement,  275 ;  the  enemy 
reported  advancing  against  Franklin 
from,  Aug.  29,  299  ;  Franklin's  ad- 
vance, Aug.  30,  to  position  near,  300 ; 
Confederate  movement  towards, 
Aug.  31,  95,  145,  148,  168,  169  ; 
Stuart's  movement  towards,  Sept.  1, 
137,  165  ;  Jackson's  report  of  his 
movement  towards,  165-166 ;  the 
roads  between  Centreville,  Washing- 
ton and,  filled  by  Pope's  trains,  Aug. 
81,  300 ;  Pope's  retreat  to,  Sept.  1, 
137,  148,  149  seq.,  164,  167;  with- 
drawal of  Union  forces  for  defence  of 
Washington  from,  Sept.  1,  160;  re- 
treat of  Sumner's  forces  to,  Sept.  1, 
146, 160 ;  Torbert  in  position  at,  Sept.  j 


I,  149  ;  Stevens'  movement  towards, 
151  ;  Pope's  expectation  of  a  battle 
at,  Sept.  1,  137;  Birney's  retreat 
to,  Sept.  2,  161 ;  Reynolds'  strength 
at,  Sept.  2,  217 ;  distance  of  Chan- 
tUly  from,  136 ;  General  Stoughton's 
capture  by  Mosby  at,  March  8,  1863, 
185-186;  visited  by  Walcott  and 
Stevens,  1883,  192 ;  mentioned,  140, 
141, 144, 146, 153, 168, 169, 184. 

Fairfax  Station,  Va.,  192. 

FaUs,  R.  I.,  Maj.,  U.  S.  V.,  in  com- 
mand of  1st  Pennsylvania  reserve 
cavalry,  429 ;  his  charge  across  the 
wheat-field  at  Cedar  Mountain  re- 
pulsed, ih. 

Falmouth,  Va.,  King's  division  sta- 
tioned at,  July,  1862,  41,  133,  152, 
393,  395  ;  his  movement  from,  Aug. 

II,  to  join  Pope,  52;  the  army  of 
the  Potomac  transferred  to,  on  its 
arrival  from  the  Peninsula,  111 ; 
Reynolds'  movement  from,  Aug.  21, 
203 ;  Porter's  movement  from,  to 
join  Pope,z&. ;  Burnside  at,  112,  265, 
404  ;  his  strength,  201,  204 ;  his  de- 
ficiency in  cavalry  at,  270 ;  Sum- 
ner to  be  hurried  to,  Aug.  27,  114  ; 
McClellan's  attempt  to  communi- 
cate with  Porter  and  Heintzelman 
through,  Aug.  27,  114,  115.  See 
Fredericksburg. 

Fayetteville,  Va.,  Banks  in  position 
at,  Aug.  26,  62,  113. 

Featherston,  W.  S.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
at  2d  battle  of  BuU  Run,  with  WH- 
eox,  Aug.  29  346. 

Ferrero,  E.,  Col.,U.  S.  V.,  in  command 
of  2d  brigade,  2d  division,  9th  corps, 
135  ;  at  Chantilly,  135, 155-156  ;  sent 
into  the  woods,  156  ;  mistake  in  de- 
livery of  order,  ih. ;  but  slightly  en- 
gaged, ih. 

Field,  C.  W.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  his 

brigade  in  A.  P.  Hill's  division  at 
Cedar  Mountain,  419 ;  his  brigade 
arrived  too  late  for  the  battle,  ih.  ; 
his  advance  towards  Brown's  house, 
439 ;  his  division  of  Jackson's  corps 
commanded  by  Brockenbrough,  Sept. 
1,  at  Chantilly,  166. 

Flat  Top  Moimtain,  West  Va.,  the 
main  body  of  Cox's  command  at, 
July,  1862,  393. 

Fleet,  W.  C,  Capt.,  C.  S.  A.,  posi- 
tion of  his  battery,  Cedar  Mountain, 
419. 

Flint  Hill,  Va.,  its  distance  from  Fair- 
fax C.  H.,  165  ;  Stuart's  movement, 
Sept.  1,  towards,  ih. 


456 


INDEX 


Florida,  Confederate  troops  called 
from,  to  re-enforce  Lee,  Aug-.  3, 1862, 
12. 

Forno,  H.,  Col.,  Sth  Louisiana  In- 
fantry, C.  S.  A.,  in  command  of 
Hays'  brigade,  Aug.  9,  418. 

Fort  Darling-  on  James  River,  its  cap- 
ture necessary  to  an  advance  on 
Richmond,  10. 

Fort  Monroe,  Va.,  MeClellan's  transfer 
of  army  from  Harrison's  Landing  to, 
begun  July  14,  24 ;  Franklin  em- 
barked for  Alexandria  at,  July  22, 
ih. ;  Burnside's  embarkation  at,  re- 
ported to  Lee,  Aug.  5,  1862,  46, 402 ; 
McCall's,  or  Reynolds',  division  em- 
barked at,  Aug.  19,  203 ;  further 
embarkation  of  troops  at,  Aug.  23, 
289,  298,  299;  left  by  MeClellan 
Aug.  23,  289;  within  MeClellan's 
military  command,  Aug.  30,  290 ; 
mentioned,  281,  298. 

Fort  Sumter,  S.  C.,  mentioned,  34. 

Fort  Ward,  inspected  by  MeClellan, 
Aug.  29,  280. 

Fort  Worth,  inspected  by  MeClellan, 
Aug.  29,  280.  ^ 

"Four  Years  vt^ith  General  Lee,"  by 
W.  H.  Taylor,  cited,  205. 

Franklin,  W.  B.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen., 
U.  S.  A.  (March  13,  1865);  Col., 
U.  S.  A.  (May  14, 1861) ;  Brig.-Gen., 
U.  S.  V.  (May  17,  1861)  ;  Maj.-Gen., 
U.  S.  V.  (July  4,  1862)  ;  returning 
from  the  Peninsula  embarked  at 
Fort  Monroe,  Aug.  22,  1862,  24, 
289 ;  disembarked  at  Alexandria, 
Aug.  26,  291 ;  the  delay  of  his  artil- 
lery horses,  299  ;  his  strength,  122, 
213,  213  note  ;  MeClellan's  proposi- 
tion to  unite  Sumner's  corps  with, 
116 ;  expected  by  Pope  to  be  at 
Gainesville,  Aug.  26,  323  ;  his  corps 
called  for  by  Pope,  Aug.  26,  to  protect 
his  right  flank,  ih. ;  ordered  to  join 
Pope,  Aug.  26,  272  ;  ordered  by  Mc- 
CleUan  to  march,  Aug.  27,  113, 114  ; 
ordered  again  to  make  ready  to 
march,  117 ;  his  corps  detained  at 
Alexandi^ia  for  transportation.  111, 
117-118,  275,  282,  290,  291-293  ; 
Halleck's  statement  of  abundance  of 
transportation,  284 ;  MeClellan's  de- 
nial, 295  ;  transportation  required  for 
garrison  purposes,  282,  284  ;  at  Wash- 
ington, Aug.  27,  292  ;  his  delay  in 
moving  to  join  Pope,  26,  60,  62,  74 ; 
the  question  of  his  delay  examined, 
272  et  seq.,  333 ;  the  questions  in- 
volved in  the  charge  against  Me- 


Clellan for  delaying  him,  291 ;  Me- 
Clellan's attempt  to  explain  the  de- 
lay, 282,  297 ;  his  detention  for  the 
defence  of  Washington  justified, 
301;  MeClellan  held  responsible,  312- 
313,  333 ;  the  responsibility  shared  by 
Halleck,  333  et  seq.;  Halleck's  im- 
patience because  of  delay  of,  273, 
274,  275,  291 ;  orders  disobeyed  by 
MeClellan,  312-313;  Halleck  cen- 
sured for  not  attending  personally  to 
the  details  of  forwarding  him,  293  ; 
correspondence  between  Halleck  and 
McCleUan  cited,  272-276  ;  his  road  to 
Pope  not  obstructed,  Aug.  29,  279, 
282  ;  his  despatch  to  Pope,  Aug.  29, 
concerning  rations,  cited,  281,  283 ; 
Pope's  conmient  thereon,  282  ;  com- 
pelled by  Halleck  to  set  out,  Aug. 
29,  illy  provided  with  transporta- 
tion for  his  artillery,  299  ;  his  march 
begun  Aug.  29,  273,  293  ;  his  move- 
ment to  Annaudale,  Aug.  29,  309- 
310;  halted  there  by  order  of  Me- 
Clellan, 273,  277,  293 ;  McCleUan's 
statement  of  reasons  for  his  deten- 
tion there,  294 ;  his  halt  caused  by 
report  of  the  advance  of  enemy,  299 ; 
the  incorrect  information  picked  up 
there  by,  280;  Pope  should  have 
waited  for,  after  battle  of  Aug.  29, 
93 ;  his  advance  to  position  near 
Fairfax  Court  House,  Aitg.  30,  300; 
again  ordered  at  1  P.  M.  to  join  Pope, 
ih. ;  his  ignorance  of  the  battle  of 
Aug.  30,  ih. ;  21st  Mass.  taunted  by 
his  division,  Aug.  30,  143-144;  liis 
failure  to  support  Pope,  Aug.  30, 
276;  re-enforced  Pope's  retreating 
army,  Aug.  30,  300,  310  ;  Torbert 
ordered  to  position  at  Germantown 
by,  300 ;  his  position,  Aug.  31,  140 ; 
in  Antietam  campaign,  97 ;  men- 
tioned, 253,  254,  298. 

Fredericksburg,  Va,,  McDowell's  re- 
turn to,  from  the  Shenandoah,  33; 
considered  as  a  j^laee  of  junction  for 
armies  under  MeClellan  and  Pope, 
9;  Pope  commanded  to  keep  com- 
munication with,  322-323  ;  King's 
division  stationed  at,  1862,  41,  46, 
152,  393;  moved  to  the  Rapidan 
from,  Aug.  11,  52 ;  Reynolds  and 
Porter  moved  by  way  of,  to  join 
Pope,  203  ;  Burnside's  strength  at, 
201 ;  cavalry  expeditions  to  damage 
the  Virginia  Central  R.  R.  sent  from, 
45.    See  Falmouth. 

Freedom  Hill,  Va.,  273. 

Fremont,  J.  C,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 


INDEX 


457 


(May  14,  1861),  Httle  damag-e  in-  \ 
flieted  to  Jackson  by,  May,  1S62,  , 
391 ;   defeated,  June  8,  1S62,  by  i 
Jackson  at   Cross   Keys,  33  ;  ids 
corps,  Jnne  27,  in  the  Slienandoali  I 
Valley,  393  ;    its  streng-tb,    394  ; 
bis   command    made    part   of  tbs 
Army  of  Virginia,  Jnne  26,  1862, 
4,  35,  390  ;  given  command  of  tbe 
1st  corps.  35,  390 ;  relieved  of  com- 
mand.  36,  390-391;  rei^laced  bv  I 
Sigel.'36.  391.  "  I 

Frobel,  B.  W..  Maj.,  C.  S.  A.,  Chief  of  j 
Artillery,  Army  of  Northern  Va.,  j 
his  demonstrarion  Aug.  29,  342.  343,  ' 
344.  '  I 

Front  Eoyal,  Va.,  Banks'  jjosition  at,  { 
Julv,  1862,  393  ;  strength  of  force 
at,  July  31, 1862, 199  ;  detachment  of  \ 
Geary's  forces  at.  Aug'.  9,  1862,  39 ;  | 
3d  Delavrare  stationed  at,  Aug.  9,  I 
416.  I 

Gaines" Mill,  Va..  Jaeksofi  participated 
ill  the  battle  of,  391. 

Gainesville,  Va.,  one  of  the  objects  of 
Jackson's    flank  movement,  Aug-. 
1862,  59;  Jackson  passed  through,  ; 
Aug.  25,  62 ;  believed  by  Pope  to  be 
protected  by  Army  of  Potomac,  73,  j 
74;  Frankliu  expected  by  PojDe  to 
have  reached,  Aug.  26,  323  ;  the  | 
concentration  of  Pope's   army  at,  j 
ordered,  Aug.  27,  62,  132,  325  ;  its  j 
object,  63-64,  83,  325-326 ;'  the  route 
to,  as  ordered,  127  ;  the  details  of 
the  movement,  129-132 ;  execution 
of  plan  delayed  by  Sigel,  63 ;  the 
reason  for  not  sending  Hooker  to, 
326 ;   iliiroy's  movement  to.  130- 
131 ;  taken' by  MiLroy,  131 ;  Pope's 
position  at,  Aug.  27.  308,  325,  326  ;  : 
the  army  at,  Aug.  27,  considered  by  ' 
Pope  as  his  right  "wing,  325  ;  Pope's 
call  for  re-enforcement  at,  Aug.  27, 
122  :  his  project  of  sending  force  to 
support  McDoTvell  at.  not  executed,  ' 
60,  330 ;  Pope's  order  withdrawing 
troops  from.  Aug.  28,  1.20  p.  m..  dis- 
cussed. 330-331 ;  no  provision  made 
for  holding,  65,  68j.  74,  75,  76,  95  ;  ' 
this  neglect  inexcusable,  66 ;   the  , 
cause   of  Pope's  failure  to  defeat  \ 
Jackson,  95 ;  McDowell  ordered  to  | 
Manassas  from.  Aug.  28,  65,  74;  a  j 
better  position  for  him,  66 ;  Sigel,  ■ 
Reynolds,  and  King  at.  noon.  Aug.  | 
2S,  67  ;  ordered  from,  to  Warrentou  ; 
tnmpike,  ih.  ;  engagement  between  ^ 
King  and  Jackson's  forces  near,  28, 


68.  76.  78 ;  the  retreat  of  Ricketts 
and  King  through,  night  of  Aug. 
28,  69 ;  without  protection.  Aug.  29, 
ih. ',  forces  sent  to,  76;  conjecture 
as  to  the  result  had  McDowell 
been  with  his  command  at.  night  of 
Aug.  28,  332  ;  Pope's  belief  that 
Jackson's  movement  was  directed  to 
Aldie  rather  than  to.  330  ;  also,  night 
of  Aug.  28.  that  McDowell  had  in- 
tercepted Jackson  at.  331  ;  at  9 
A.  jM.,  Aug.  29,  Pope  believed  Heint- 
zelman's  corps  to  be  not  far  from, 
81 ;  Porter  ordered  to  advance  with 
King  towards,  Aug\  29,  6-7  A. 
80,  226,  335,  383;  Porter's  move- 
ment, morning  of  Aug.  29,  on  road 
from  Manassas  to,  226,  338 ;  his 
movement  knovm  early  by  Lee,  248  ; 
the  joint  order  contemplated  an  ad- 
vance to  by  Porter  and  McDowell, 
Aug.  29,  310,  384;  Porter  not  ex- 
pected by  McDowell  to  reach,  226  ; 
a  Union  movement  towards,  would 
have  struck  Long-street's  centre.  252  ; 
Porter's  and  McDoweK's  problem  as 
to  diiving  enemy  back  to.  86 ;  Mc- 
Dowell's departure  from  Pope's  order 
to  march  to,  353  ;  Porter's  misap- 
prehension of  the  purj^ose  of  his 
march  to,  336 ;  occupied  by  strag- 
glers from  Jackson's  corps,  131 ; 
Buf ord's  report  of  the  enemy's  force 
at,  morning  of  Aug.  29,  85,  86,  90, 
231,  337 ;  enemy  discovered  by  Por- 
ter's skirmishers  advancing  from, 
noon,  Aug.  29,  85  ;  Longstreet  en- 
countered by  Stuart  between  Hay- 
market  and,  Aug.  29,  342  ;  his  men 
worn  out  in  their  march  to,  348 ;  the 
movement  of  Wilcox  past.  345  ;  con- 
jecture that  Stuart  dragged  bushes 
to  Biistoe  from,  250 ;  Union  forces 
reported  to  Porter  at  sunset  as  mov- 
ing towards,  239. 

ainesville  Turnpike,' Jackson's  right 
wing  on,  Aug'.  28,  308 ;  Longstreet's 
position  south  of,  Aug.  29,  255 ; 
Hood's  position  across,  255,  343 ; 
position  of  Confederate  artillery  on, 
343.  344;  Porter's  position  near, 
233;  370. 

ardner,  A.  B.,  Major  and  Judge  Ad- 
vocate. U.  S.  A.  (Aug.  18, 1873-Dec. 
8,  1888),  in  charge  of  the  Gov- 
ernment case  before  the  Fitz-John 
Porter  Investigation  Board,  351  ; 
Gen.  McDowell  called  as  a  witness 
for  Government  by,  363  ;  his  skir- 
mishes with  Choate,  369 ;  his  theory 


458 


INDEX 


tliat  Porter's  despatches  to  Morell 
indicated  a  conTiction  that  he  was  to 
attack  from  the  position  in  which  he 
was  left  by  McDowell,  373 ;  this 
theory  not  sustained,  374 ;  his 
management  of  the  ease  commended, 
381-382. 

Garnett,  T.  S.,  Lt.-Col.,  C.  S.  A.,  in 

command  of  Campbell's  brig-ade, 
Aug-.  9,  418  ;  Taliaferro's  brigade 
ordered  to  support,  ih,  ;  StoneAvall 
brigade  in  reserve,  in  rear  of,  419  ; 
his  forces  repulsed  by  Donnelly, 
425. 

Geary,  E.  K.,  Lieut.,  U.  S.  V.,  in  com- 
mand of  two  guns,  battle  of  Cedar 
Mountain,  416. 

Geary,  J.  W.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  in 

command  of  1st  brigade,  2d  division, 
2d  Corps,  A.  of  v.,  its  composition, 
415  ;  its  strength,  Aug.  9,  1862,  39, 
416 ;  his  brigade  under  Augur,  bat- 
tle of  Cedar  Mountain,  414;  his  po- 
sition, 414-415,  420  ;  Confederate 
force  opposed  to,  421  ;  his  advance 
after  5  o'clock  to  support  skirmish- 
ers, 423,  429 ;  the  Confederates  en- 
gaged by,  at  the  time  of  Crawford's 
charge,  425,  428  ;  repulsed,  430  ;  se- 
verely wounded  at  Cedar  Mountain, 
50,  431 ;  his  losses,  430 ;  in  return 
for  August,  216. 

Georgetown,  D.  C,  Sumner  ordered  to 
position  at,  276. 

Georgia  Volunteers,  C.  S.  A.,  14th  regt. 
in  Thomas'  brigade,  A.  P.  Hill's 
division,  Jackson  s  corps,  at  Chan- 
tilly,  155  ;  19th  regt.  in  Archer's 
brigade,  A.  P.  Hill's  division,  Jack- 
son's corps,  at  Chantilly,  ih. ;  35th 
and  45th  regt.  in  Thomas'  brigade, 
at  Chantilly,  ih.  ;  49th  regt.  in 
Thomas'  brigade,  at  Chantilly,  ih.  ; 
prisoners  taken  from,  by  Union  skir- 
mishers, 159. 

Germans  in  the  Civil  War,  appoint- 
ment of  Sigel  intended  to  conciliate, 
36. 

Germantown,  Ya.,  its  distance  from 
Fairfax  C.  H.,  136 ;  Torbert  stationed 
at,  Aug.  30-31,  300 ;  squadron  of  2d 
U.  S.  cavalry  captured  at,  Aug.  31, 
141 ;  Union  forces  in  retreat  to,  Sept. 
1,  1862, 137, 148  ;  MeDoweU's  move- 
ment to,  Sept.  1,  164  ;  command  of 
Union  troops  at,  given  to  Hooker, 
Sept.  1,  149  ;  Couch's  and  other 
forces  intended  for,  ordered  to  Fair- 
fax C.  H.,  149 ;  Stuart  repulsed  by 
Patrick's  brigade  o\\  Little  River 


Turnpike  before,  149-150  ;  Union 
losses,  164;  data  for  history  of  en- 
gagement, ih.  ;  in  Lee's  report,  167  ; 
in  Thomas'  report,  171. 
Getty,  G.  W.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 
(March  13,  1865) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S, 
V.  (Sept.  2, 1862) ;  Col.,  U.  S.  A.  (July 
28,  1866),  a  member  of  the  board  to 
investigate  the  Fitz-John  Porter  ease, 
351. 

Gettysburg,  Pa.,  Pickett's  charge  men- 
tioned, 180  ;  the  disastrous  charge 
made  by  Mudge  at,  435. 

Gibbon,  J.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 
(March  13,  1865)  ;  Capt.,  U.  S.  A. 
(Nov.  2,  1859) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(May  2,  1862) ;  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(June  7,  1864) ;  Col.,  U.  S.  A.  (July 
28,  1866) ;  in  command  of  4th  brig- 
ade, 1st  division  (King's  and  Hatch's), 
3d  Corps,  A.  of  v.,  his  strength,  Aug. 
16,  215 ;  bearer  of  Pope's  order  of 
6-7  A.  M.,  Aug.  29,  to  Porter,  226. 

Goodwin,  R.  C,  Capt.,  U.  S.  V.,  his  com- 
pany of  the  2d  Mass.  attacked  at 
close  of  Aug,  9,  Cedar  Mountain,  438. 

Gordon,  G.  H.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(April  9,  1865) ;  Col.,  2d  Mass.  (May 
24,  1861-June  9,  1862) ;  Brig.-Gen., 
U.  S.  y.  (June  9,  1862- Aug.  24, 
1865) ;  in  command  of  3d  brigade, 
1st  division,  2d  Corps ;  his  brigade, 
of  Williams'  division,  arrived  at 
Cedar  Mountain,  noon,  Aug.  9,  411  : 
his  position,  411,  420  ;  moved  to  po- 
sition by  Roberts'  order,  on  Brown's 
house  hill,  413,  420,  432  ;  his  position 
the  strongest,  413  ;  Banks'  ignorance 
of  Gordon's  position,  413-414 ;  his 
disposition  of  his  forces,  413 ;  his 
strength,  416  ;  Perkins'  order  for  a 
charge  across  the  wheat-field  to  An- 
drews countermanded  by,  435-436 ; 
his  action  without  authority,  436 ; 
Andrews  ordered  to  join  the  brigade 
by,  ih. ;  ordered  to  charge  across  a 
field  by  Banks,  436  ;  more  explicit 
instructions  called  for,  ih.  ;  period  of 
quiet  in  his  front,  422  ;  the  action 
begun  about  5  o'clock  not  visible 
from  his  position,  424  ;  his  whole 
command  ordered  by  Williams  to 
support  Crawford,  17-18,  434  ;  his 
prompt  movement,  432  ;  his  charge, 
18,  19  ;  its  effect,  19,  22,  23 ;  the 
order  discussed  and  criticised,  19-20 ; 
repulsed  by  Jackson's  reserves,  19, 
22-23 ;  his  statement  as  to  error  of 
tactics,  23  ;  Crawford  expected  the 
sjipport  of,  424  ;  censured  for  failure 


INDEX 


459 


to  support  CraTvford,  432  ;  expla- 
nation of  Ms  delay  in  obeying-  order, 
ih.  ;  his  brigade  could  not  ba,ve  ar- 
rived in  time,  433  ;  liis  position  not 
suited  for  prompt  support,  ih. ;  ques- 
tion as  to  his  influence  on  the  fate  of 
the  day,  433  ;  his  position  on  Brown's 
hill  not  approached  by  the  enemy, 
489  ;  relieved  by  Ricketts,  439  ; 
Pope's  statement  that  he  had  not 
ordered  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain  in 
the  presence  of,  21 ;  his  opinion  as  to 
conditio  us  for  success  in  the  battle. 
28  ;  an  authority  on  the  battle  of 
Cedar  Mountain,  18,  889  ;  his  state- 
ment of  Reynolds'  strength,  204  ; 
his  statements  concerning'  battle  of 
Chantilly  corrected,  189  ;  his  esti- 
mates of  strength  of  Union  and  Con- 
federate armies  in  Pope  campaign 
inaccurate,  204,  208  ;  in  return  for 
August,  216. 
Gordonsville,  Ya.,  Pope  expected  by 
Government  to  operate  on  enemy's 
commimieations  at,  40  ;  his  proposed 
operations  at,  317,  392  ;  Pope  be- 
lieved by  the  Confederates  to  be 
threatening-,  July,  45,  401  ;  Jackson 
and  Ewell  despatched  to,  July  13, 
45,  206,  318,  402 ;  Jackson  at.  July 
16.  44.  206 ;  EweU  at.  July  16,  396. 
402  ;  A.  P.  Hill  sent  to.  Jidy  27,  45, 
402  ;  railroad  damaged  by  Union 
cavalry  between  Richmond  and,  J uly, 
1862,  45  ;  Confederate  forces  called 
to,  from  Florida,  Aug.  3,  1862,  12  ; 
Jackson's  movement  from,  against 
Pope,  Aug-.  7,  402  ;  his  withdrav.'al 
to,  Aug-.  11,  440 ;  Hatch  ordered  to 
seize,  Aug-.  14,  395 ;  his  failure,  44, 
396  ;  Lee's  advance  to,  Aug-.,  52, 
266. 

Gould,  J.  M.,  Maj.,  U.  S.  v.,  his  history 
of  the  10th  Maine  as  to  the  battle  of 
Cedar  Momitain,  389 ;  further  infor- 
mation provided  by.  390. 

Graham,  W.  M.,  Pvt.  Biig.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
A.  (March  13.  1865) ;  Capt.,  U.  S.  A. 
(Oct.  26,  1861) ;  Col.,  U.  S.  V.  (April 
7,  1865);  CoL,  U.  S.^A.  (July  1, 
1891),  1st  artillery  ;  his  battery  on 
Henry  house  hill,  Aug.  80,  1862, 
14.3. 

Grant,  U.  S.,  General,  U.  S.  A.,  his 
operations  against  Petersburg  con- 
formed to  McClellau's  propositions, 
42. 

Greeley.  H.,  cited  as  to  Pope's  sugg-es- 
tion  that  a  General-in-Chief  be  ap- 
pointed, 4  ;  Pope  advised  by,  to  give 


I     up  the  command  of  the  Army  of 
Virginia.  July,  1862,  45  ;  cited  as  to 
Gen.  Le  Due,  26.  # 
Green  Springs,  erroneously  given  in 
I      one  version  of  Pope's  order  to  Mc- 
Dowell, Aug-.  28,  1.20  p.  ir.,  instead 
of  Gum  Spring-s,  380  note. 
Greene,  G.  S.,  Pvt.  Maj.-Gen.,U.  S.  A. 
j      (March  18,  1865) ;  Brig-.-Gen.,  U.  S. 

V.  (April  28,  1862) ;  in  command  of 
\      3d  brigade.  2d  division  (Augur),  2d 
;      Corps  (Banks),  A.  of  V.,  39,  414; 
I      at   Cedar  Mountain.  39,  414;  his 
[      strength,  39,  416  ;  his  position,  414, 
I     415,  420 ;  his  service  at  Cedar  Moun- 
j      tain,  431-482  ;  his  losses,  432  ;  in  re- 
i      turn  for  Aug-ust,  216. 
I  Greenwich,  Ya.,  Union  forces  ordered 
to  support  McDowell  at.  Aug-.  27, 
62,  63,  127,  128,  325  ;  Kearny  and 
Reno  ordered  to  Bristoe  and  Ma- 
j     nassas  from,  Aug-.  28,  65,  74,  827. 

Gregg.  M.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  in  com- 
I  mand  of  brigade,  A.  P.  Hill's  di-vi- 
!  sion,  Jackson's  corps,  not  at  Cedar 
I  Momitain,  207  ;  his  share  in  battle  of 
!  Aug-.  30,'  1862,  261 ;  in  battle  of 
;  Chantilly,  Sept.  1,  1862,  155,  157, 
166,  167  ;  the  report  of  his  brig-ade 
made  by  McGowan,  169  ;  his  losses, 

170  ;  Thomas  ordered  to  support  of, 

171  ;  killed  at  Fredericksburg.  169. 
Griffin,  C,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 

(March  13,  1865);  Capt.,  U.  S.  A. 
I  (April  25, 1861) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  Y. 
I  (June  9,  1862)  ;  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  Y. 
I  (April  2,  1865) ;  Col..  U.  S.  A.  (July 
I  28,  1866) ;  the  82d  Mass.  in  his  com- 
j  mand,  839 ;  848 ;  his  testimony  at 
j  Porter  court-martial  as  to  his  move- 
j     ment  Aug-.  29,  245,  338-339,  346; 

heard  no  soimd  of  battle  till  nigiit- 
I      fall ,  246 ;  by  h's  ov>'n  blunder  not 
eng-aged,  Aug.  80,  259. 
Grover,  C,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 
(March  13,  1865) ;  Capt.,  U.  S.  A. 
(Sept.  17, 1858) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  Y. 
(April  14, 1862) ;  Lieut.-Col.,  U.  S.  A. 
(July  28,  1866),  his  famous  charge, 
battie  of  Aug.  29,  1862,  89. 
Groveton,  Ya.,  forces  withdrawn  from, 
by  Pope,  Aug.  28,  76 ;   no  effort 
made  by  Pone  to  interpose  between 
Lee  and  Jackson  at,  Aug.  28,  68,  69, 
70,  76  ;  severe  engagement,  Aug. 
28,  between  King  and  Jackson  near, 
226,  268  ;  Jackson's  position,  Aug. 
28,  between   Sudley  Springs  and, 
107  ;  Sigel  ordered  to  attack  Jaek- 
j     son  near,  morning  of  Aug.  29,  835 ; 


460 


INDEX 


McDowell's  advance  towards,  Aug. 
29,  a  departure  from  Pope's  order, 
86,  353  ;  Taliaferro's  division  struck 
by  McDowell  at,  Aug.  28,  328  ;  en- 
emy's forces  discovered  by  Porter's 
skirmishers  advancing-  towards,  noon, 
Aug.  29,  85  ;  Buford's  confirmatory 
despatch,  85-86,  90 ;  cannonading 
at,  Aug.  29,  heard  by  Porter  and 
McDowell  at  Manassas,  227 ;  the 
effect  of  its  cessation  on  Porter's 
plans,  235 ;  a  route  from  Porter's 
position  to,  thought  to  be  impracti- 
cable, 230,  234  ;  Porter  considered 
to  be  under  no  obligation  to  force  a 
movement  to,  Aug.  29,  376  ;  position 
of  Confederate  artillery  on  turnpike 
between  Gainesville  and,  343  ;  King- 
attacked  by  Hood,  6  p.  M.,  Aug.  29, 
at,  92,  233  ;  Porter  called  to,  for 
battle  of  Aug.  30,  92 ;  disobedience 
of  order  of  Aug.  30,  to  march  to,  a 
charge  against  Porter,  224  ;  incident 
of  destruction  of  men  of  the  5th  New 
York  at  battle  of,  Sept.  30,  178; 
visited  by  Walcott  and  Stevens, 
1883,  176  ;  Confederate  cemetery  at, 
174 ;  mentioned,  173,  190. 
Gum  Springs,  Va.,  McDowell  ordered 
to  intercept  Jackson,  Aiig.  28,  at, 
329  ;  order  countermanded,  330  ; 
Pope's  reasons  for  abandoning  the 
movement  to,  ih.  ;  erroneously  given 
as  Green  Springs  in  one  version  of 
the  order,  330  note. 

Hall,  J.  A.,  Capt.,  U.  S.  V.,  in  com- 
mand of  2d  Maine  battery,  his  ap- 
proach with  Eicketts  to  Cedar 
Mountain  battlefield,  439  ;  Pegram's 
battery  silenced  by,  ih. 

Hall's  Hill,  near  Washington,  Rickett's 
retreat  to,  Sept.  2,  164. 

Halleck,  H.  W.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 
(Aug.  19,  1861),  appointed  General- 
in-Chief  July  11,  1862,  4,  7,  42,  393 ; 
the  caiise  of  his  appointment  as 
General-in-Chief,  3-4  ;  suggested  by 
Pope,  4,  393 ;  assumed  command, 
July  23,  4;  the  character  of  his  ad- 
ministration discussed,  3-30 ;  his  ap- 
pointment to  command  a  cause  of 
confusion  of  Virginia  campaign,  42  ; 
position  of  Union  armies  in  Vir- 
ginia on  his  assumption  of  command, 
5  ;  the  difficulties  involved  by  their 
separation,  ih. ;  the  reorganization  of 
forces  in  Virginia,  order  of  June  26, 
1862,  4 ;  his  visit  to  McClellan,  July 
25,  to  arrange  for  an  attack  on  Rich- 


mond, or  a  withdrawal  from  the  Pe- 
ninsula, 7,  318;  offered  McClellan 
20,000  men,  318  ;  unable  to  meet 
greater  demands,  ih. ;  the  withdrawal 
of  the  army  from  the  Peninsula  de- 
termined by,  ih.  ;  McClellan  ordered 
to  send  his  sick  away  by,  7  ;  with- 
drawal of  the  army  ordered,  Aug.  4, 
ih.  ;  charged  by  McClellan  with  an 
attempt  to  ruin  the  army  of  the 
Potomac,  25  ;  his  letter  of  Aug.  6, 
giving  reasons  for  withdraAval,  8-11 ; 
cogency  of  his  reasons,  26,  27  ;  cen- 
sured for  his  delay  to  inform  Mc- 
Clellan of  the  intended  withdrawal, 
318 ;  his  delay  justified,  ih.  ;  his 
efforts  for  an  expeditious  with- 
drawal, 24,  320;  Tucker's  de- 
spatches to,  announcing  the  move- 
ment of  the  forces,  Aug.  19,  203 ; 
declined  to  relieve  Pope  from  com- 
mand in  Virginia,  393 ;  the  Union 
line  ordered  to  be  held  on  the 
Rappahannock,  110,  266,  267,  321, 
324 ;  McClellan  informed  by,  of  the 
movement  of  the  enemy  from  Rich- 
mond, 319  ;  surprised  by  advance  of 
Jackson  at  Cedar  Mountain,  15  ;  an 
intimation  of  Lee's  aggressive  policy, 
ih.,  24;  McClellan  iiiformed  by,  of 
the  battle  at  Cedar  Mountain,  Aug. 
10,  320  ;  his  despatch  to  Pope,  Aug. 
18,  promising  re-enforcements,  266  ; 
his  like  despatch  of  Aug.  21,267; 
informed  of  Reynolds'  movement  to 
join  Pope,  Aug.  21,  203  ;  Pope's  un- 
wise dependence  on  the  promises  of 
re-enforcements  of,  60,  62,  74,  324; 
Pope's  plan  to  cross  Rappahannock 
approved  by,  Aug.  22,  58 ;  Pope's 
request  for  Franklin  to  protect  his 
right  flank,  Aug.  26,  323  ;  McClel- 
lan's  announcement  to,  of  his  arrival 
at  Aequia  Creek,  289  ;  McClellan 
ordered  to  Alexandria  by,  Aug.  26, 
111,  290  ;  incorrect  information 
given  by  Pope  to,  110;  McClellan 
informed  by,  Aug.  26,  that  the 
enemy  were  in  the  Shenandoah,  100, 
111,  129,  322  ;  ignorant  of  Jackson's 
proximity,  1]  1 ;  informed  of  burning 
by  Jackson  of  railway  bridge  over 
Bull  Run,  112;  expected  by  Jackson 
to  send  force,  Aug.  27,  to  Manassas, 
104  ;  Taylor  sent  to  oppose  Jackson 
by,  104;'  his  defeat,  104-105,  107, 
108,  119  ;  aroused  to  the  danger 
imminent,  113 ;  his  undue  alarm  for 
the  safety  of  Washington,  334  ;  Me- 
Clellan's  aid  invoked,  113,  290;  theu- 


INDEX 


461 


constant  correspondence,  115-116 ;  its 
character,  McClellan  courteous  but 
reproachful,  115-116  ;  expedients 
offered  by  McCleUan  to,  115-118, 
119,  120 ;  discussion  of  the  effects  of 
the  propositions  on,  121-122;  his 
failure  to  reply  to  McClellan's  de- 
spatches attributed  to  mortification, 
122  ;  at  a  dead-lock  with  McCleUan, 
120  ;  McClellan's  call  for  cavalry 
from,  120,  278  ;  informed  of  heavy 
firing'  at  Centreville,  116-117  ;  called 
on  by  Pope  to  hurry  Army  of  the 
Potomac  to  his  support,  Aug-.  27,  60 ; 
his  attempt  to  hasten  re-enforcements 
to  Pope,  25 ;  McClellan's  appeal  to 
Lincoln  ag-ainst  orders  of,  25-26  ;  his 
projects  for  hurrying-  the  re-enforce- 
ments, 113  ;  his  reiterated  orders  for 
moving-  Franklin,  272,  273,  274,  275, 
276.  278,  293 ;  his  orders  disobeyed 
by  McClellan,  283,  281,  312-313  ;  his 
correspondence  with  3icClellan  con- 
cerning' Franklin,  271-276,  291 ;  the 
difficulty  of  moving-  Franklin  made 
known  to,  117-118;  the  transporta- 
tion question  with  respect  to  Frank- 
lin, 291-293  ;  his  statement  concern- 
ing- the  abundance  of  transportation, 
284 ;  McClellan's  denial  of,  Aug-.  30, 
cited,  295  ;  McClellan's  despatch  of 
Aug.  29  to,  concerning-  the  deten- 
tion of  Franklin  at  Annandale,  294 ; 
his  displeasure,  296 ;  his  statement 
to  Conduct  of  War  Committee  as  to 
McClellan's  position  at  Alexandria 
and  liis  efforts  in  forwarding-  troops, 
270-272 ;  censured  for  leaving-  the 
duty  of  forwarding-  Franklin  to  Mc- 
Clellan, 293 ;  his  share  of  responsi- 
bility of  delay,  333-334 ;  his  orders 
concerning'  Sumner  executed  by  Mc- 
Clellan, 291 ;  his  correspondence 
concerning  Sumner,  333-334  ;  his 
share  of  the  responsibility  in  the 
detention  of  Cox  and  Sumner 
discussed,  333-334  ;  McCleUan's 
demand  for  a  definition  of  his  pow- 
ers, of,  121,  285,  302;  unable  to  de- 
fine his  position  prior  to  Aug.  30, 
289-290  ;  his  order  defining  his  po- 
sition Aug.  31,  290-291 ;  his  order 
of  Sept.  1,  increasing  McClellan's 
powers,  291 ;  his  instructions  to  Mc- 
Clellan as  to  provisions  and  ammuni- 
tion Aiig.  21,  280-281,  283,  284 ;  Mc- 
Clellan's report  of  his  ample  supply, 
281 ;  McClellan's  evasion  of  a  requi- 
sition for  ammunition  Aug.  30,  made 
by,  281,  283,  284 ;  Pope's  despatch 


to,  Aug.  30,  in  comment  on  Frank- 
lin's message  concerning  rations, 
282  ;  unable  to  get  satisfactory  in- 
formation, 113  ;  ignorant  of  Pope's 
whereabouts,  114  ;  his  refusal  to  get 
information,  302 ;  Kearny's  state- 
ment of  his  strength,  Aug.  21,  204 ; 
Porter's  telegram  to  Burnside  sent 
to  McClellan  by,  Aug.  27,  113; 
Pope's  report,  Aug.  20,  of  his 
strength  to,  201  ;  Pope's  report  of 
losses  to,  Aug.  29,  212 ;  Pope's  de- 
spatches to,  Aug.  31,  not  trust- 
worthy, 141 ;  Pope's  rejDort  of  Jack- 
son's flank  movement  to,  Sept.  1, 
148 ;  Pope's  report  of  Sept.  2  to, 
213,  214 ;  Pope's  diplomacy  in  put- 
ting the  responsibility  of  his  retreat 
on,  141,  142^  148,  149  ;  charged  with 
the  responsibility  of  failure  to  re- 
enforce  Pope,  301 ;  not  responsible 
for  misfortunes  of  Pope  campaign, 
27,  28-29  ;  his  extravagant  despatch 
concerning  Pope's  captures  at 
Corinth,  34 ;  refuted  by  Beauregard, 
ih. ;  his  abilities  and  defects  as  a 
military  commander.  305  ;  his  jeal- 
ousy of  McClellan,  121 ;  McClellan's 
intelligence  superior  to  that  of,  as 
to  state  of  affairs,  293  ;  McClellan's 
statement  of  his  ignorance,  297 ; 
Swinton's  prejudice  against,  5  ;  ex- 
tracts made  from  the  Confederate 
reports  in  the  possession  of,  366, 
368 ;  mentioned,  5, 6. 

Hammerstein,  PI.  von,  Maj..  U.  S.  V., 
sent  by  McClellan  to  get  information 
concerning  Pope,  302. 

Hampton,  W.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
strength  of  his  cavalry  brigade,  July 
20,  207 ;  stationed  at  Kichmond, 
Aug.  13,  and  did  not  accompanv  Lee, 
208. 

Hanover  Court  House,  Va.,  Army  of 
Potomac  not  demoralized  by  trans- 
fer from.  9. 

Harper's  Ferry,  Va.,  Banks  in  com- 
mand of  forces  at,  37. 

Harrison's  Landing,  or  Bar,  Va.,  Army 
of  the  Potomac  at,  5, 6, 42  ;  Lincoln's 
visit  at.  6  ;  Halleck's  visit,  7  ;  army 

•  ordered  to  withdraw  from,  ih. ;  with- 
drawal begun  Aug.  14,  24,  57,  297, 
899-400 ;  Porter's  transfer  from,  to 
Acquia  Creek,  223. 

Hartsuff,  G.  L.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
A.  (March  13,  1865) ;  Capt.,  U.  S.  A. 
(Aiig.  3,  1861) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(April  15,  1862)  ;  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
V.  (Nov.  29,  1862);  Lieut.-CoL,  U. 


462 


INDEX 


S,  A.  (June  1,  1864)  ;  in  command 
of  3d  brigade,  2d  division  (Ricketts), 
3d  Corps,  A.  of  v.,  strength,  Aug. 
16,  215. 

Hatch,  J.  P.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 

(March  13,  1865)  ;  Capt.,  U.  S.  K. 
(Oct.  13,  1860) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(Sept.  28, 1861) ;  Maj.,  U.  S.  A.  (Oct. 

27,  1863)  ;  in  command  of  cavalry 
2d  Corps,  A.  of  V.,  44,  395  ;  ordered 
to  position  at  Culpeper,  July  12,  395  ; 
ordered,  July  14,  to  seize  Gordons- 
viile  and  Charlottesville,  ih. ;  and  to 
destroy  railroad,  395-396  ;  and  to 
push  towards  the  James  River  and 
destroy  canal,  396 ;  promotion  to  he 
his  reward  for  success,  395  ;  his  fail- 
ure to  execute  the  orders,  44,  396  ; 
Bayard  ordered  to  join,  July  15,  ib.  ; 
superseded  by  Buford,  44,  396  ;  his 
strength,  July  31, 198  note  ;  on  Aug. 
16,  215 ;  in  command  of  brigade. 
King's  division,  ib. ;  in  command  of 
King's  division  engaged  in  the  battle 
of  Aug.  29, 77, 87, 238, 259 ;  reported 
by  Porter  as  moving  on  Gainesville 
at  sunset,  239 ;  his  report  of  his  re- 
pulse of  enemy,  238  ;  with  Porter 
until  the  meeting  with  McDowell, 
85  ;  rendered  little  service,  Aug.  29, 
87,  92. 

Haupt,  H.,  Col.,  A.  D.  C,  U.  S.  A. 

(April  27-Sept.  5,  1862),  283  ;  his 
despatches  to  Pope,  Aug.  24,  25,  as 
to  forwarding  re-enforceraents,  269 ; 
placed  under  McClellan's  direction, 
Aug.  27,  113;  his  encouraging  re- 
port of  Pope,  Aug.  29,  278  ;  his 
system  of  obtaining  intelligence  in- 
efficient, ib.  ;  ordered  by  McClellan 
to  provide  supply  trains  for  Frank- 
lin, Aug.  %),  294. 

Haven,  F.,  Lieut.-Col.,  A.  D.  C,  U.  S. 
v.,  his  argument  concerning  McClel- 
lan's conduct  at  Alexandria,  265- 
285  ;  reviewed  by  Col.  Lyman,  305- 
313 ;  his  indications  of  McClellan's 
distrust  of  Pope,  312. 

Haymarket,  Va.,  in  Pope's  plans,  Aug. 
27,  1862,  to  guard  Thoroughfare 
Gap,  63  ;  in  Milroy's  movement,  Aug.^ 
27,  130 ;  a  good  position  for  Porter, 
Aug.  28,  70 ;  Robertson's  movement 
to,  Aug.  28,  251;  Stuart's  movement 
towards,  342. 

Hays,  H. T., Brig.-Gen., C.  S.  A.,  in  com- 
mand of  brigade  in  Ewell's  division, 
Jackson's  corps,  at  Cedar  Moimtain, 
418  ;  his  brigade  under  Forno's  com- 
mand, Aug.  9,  ih. ;  his  position,  421 ; 


missed  his  way  in  his  retreat  from 
Manassas,  Aug.  28,  329  ;  withdrawn 
panic-stricken  from  battle  of  Chau- 
tilly,  156. 

Hazel  River,  Va.,  Banks'  movement  to, 
400 ;  Bank|  at,  Aug.  7,  45  ;  advanced 
to  Culpeper  from,  Aug.  8,  ib. ;  Sigel 
at,  Aug.  9,  46. 

Hazlett,  C.  E.,  1st  Lieut.,  U.  S.  A. 
(May  14, 1861),  Battery  B,  5th  U.  S. 
Artillery,  engaged  under  Morell, 
morning  of  Aug.  29,  338 ;  his  posi- 
tion, 236. 

Heath,  Isaac,  occupant  of  Reid's  house, 
Chantniy,  1862, 192. 

Hedgeman's  River,  Va.,  Rieketts' 
order  to  position  on,  July  21,  396. 

Heimack,  G.,  Lieut.,  Zouaves  d'Af- 
rique,  U.  S.  V..  taken  prisoner,  439. 

Heintzelman,  S.  P.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U. 
S.  A.  (March  13,  1865) ;  Col.,  U.  S. 
A.  (May  14,  1861) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U. 
S.  V.  (May  17,  1861) ;  Maj.-Gen.,  U. 
S.  V.  (May  5, 1862) ;  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen., 
U.  S.  A.  (May  31,  1862) ;  embarked 
at  Yorktown,  Aug.  21,  1862,  return- 
ing from  the  Peninsula,  24  ;  in  com- 
mand of  3d  Corps,  Army  of  Poto- 
mac, 146  ;  his  lack  of  transportation 
in  going  to  join  Pope,  127,  269,  292- 
293  ;  joined  Pope,  Aug.  24,  203,  205, 
269,  289,  308,  323;  in  position  at 
Warrenton  Junction,  Aug.  26,  62, 
323  ;  his  division  under  Kearny  re- 
ported as  at  Rappahannock  Station, 
Aug.  26,  114;  directed  to  protect 
railroad  at  Manassas,  Aug.  26,  322  ; 
his  supply  line  broken,  Aug.  27,  60 ; 
ordered  to  Greenwich,  Aug.  27,  62, 
127,  325  ;  Porter  ordered  to  his  sup- 
port, 63 ;  McClellan's  attempts  to 
communicate  with,  Aug.  27,  114, 
115 ;  not  mentioned  in  Porter's  tel- 
egram to  Burnside,  Aug.  27,  113 ; 
removed,  Aug.  28,  from  Manassas 
Junction  to  Centreville,  68  ;  Pope's 
project  to  send  him  to  Gainesville  to 
support  McDowell  evening  of  Aug. 
28,  330 ;  this  project  not  executed, 
ib. ;  his  reason  for  not  sending  him, 
331 ;  at  Centreville,  Aug.  28,  337 ; 
ordered  to  Warrenton  Turnpike,  78 ; 
informed  by  Pope  that  Jackson's  re- 
treat had  been  intercepted,  ib. ;  his 
movement  reported  by  Pope  to  Mc- 
Dowell and  Porter,  81,  384  ;  Pope's 
headquarters  with,  Aug.  29,  82,  384 ; 
ordered  to  join  in  Sigel's  attack, 
Aug.  29,  335,  336;  engaged  under 
Pope  in  battle  of  Aug.  29,  89  j  his 


INDEX 


463 


repulse  by  Jackson,  Aug-.  29,  1862, 
176  ;  his  position,  Aug.  31,  140  ; 
his  estimated  strength,  204,  210  ;  no 
report  of  his  losses,  213  ;  his  report 
concerning  the  order  to  move  to 
Chantilly,  Sept.  2,  which  was  counter- 
manded, 146-147 ;  his  corps  assigned 
to  garrison  duty  at  Washington  by 
McClellan,Sept.,  97  ;  mentioned,  177, 
298,  299. 

Henry,  H.  F.,  visited  by  Walcott  and 
Stevens,  1883,  174,  193 ;  his  mother 
killed  during  first  battle  of  Manas- 
sas, 175. 

Henry  house  hill,  action  on,  Aug.  30, 
1802,  143;  visited  by  Walcott  and 
Stevens,  1883,  173  et  seq. ;  the  sobri- 
quet "Stonewall"  earned  by  Jack- 
son in  first  Bull  Run,  at,  173  ;  bodies 
of  Union  dead  removed  to  Arlington 
from,  174;  the  poor  Union  monument 
on,  ib. 

Hill,  A.  P.,  Lieut.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A. ;  1st 
Lieut.,  U.  S.  A.  (Sept.  4, 185i-March 
1,  1861) ;  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.  (1862) ; 
detained  at  Richmond  in  fear  of  at- 
tack, July  13, 45  ;  composition  of  his 
division,  July  20,  206  ;  Aug.  9,  419  ; 
Thomas'  brigade  of  his  division,  421 ; 
his  strength,  July  20,  206,  207 ;  sent 
to  Gordonsville,  July  27,  to  re-en- 
force Jackson,  45, 206,  319, 400, 402 ; 
arrived,  Aug.  2,  45  ;  Ms  advance 
against  Pope,  46,  400 ;  by  mistake 
he  lost  his  proper  position,  402  ; 
reached  the  Rapidan,  Aug.  7,  46  ; 
crossed,  Aug.  8,  ib.  ;  his  advance  to 
Cedar  Mountain  battlefield,  Aug.  9, 
421 ;  his  position  at  Cedar  Mountain, 
49,  439 ;  with  Jackson  in  movement 
against  Pope,  begun  Aug.  25,  59, 
266,  307  ;  in  movement  to  Manassas, 
103  ;  artillery  duel  between  his  and 
Union  battery,  104,  105 ;  unable  to 
restrain  his  force  from  plundering  at 
Manassas  Junction,  105-106;  his  re- 
port of  Union  prisoners  taken,  105 
note  ;  position  of  his  forces  night  of 
Aug.  27,  108 ;  after  raid  at  Manas- 
sas, at  1  A.  M.,  Aug.  27,  he  marched 
to  Centreville,  ih.  ;  this  movement 
not  intended  as  a  ruse  to  deceive 
Pope,  329 ;  his  statement  concerning 
this  movement,  ib. ;  his  artillery  de- 
monstration, Aug.  29,  345  ;  his  posi- 
tion on  Jackson's  left,  257  ;  his  con- 
sideration for  Dr.  Cutter  of  21st 
Mass.,  177-178 ;  his  report  of  vio- 
lence of  battle  of  Aug.  30,  261 ;  his 
division  in  movement,  Aug.  31,  to 


Chantilly,  145 ;  his  position  on  the 
right  at  Chantilly,  166  ;  his  brigades 
bore  the  brunt  of  the  fight,  167  ; 
his  losses,  162 ;  his  losses  in  the  cam- 
paign, 212. 
Hill,  b.  H.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.  (1864) ; 
Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.  (1862) ;  the  pur- 
pose of  his  movement  to  Coggin's 
Point,  late  in  July,  319  ;  left  at  Rich- 
mond by  Lee,  in  advance  on  Pope, 
52. 

Holt,  J.,  Judge  Advocate  General,  U. 
S.  A.,  his  review  of  the  Porter  case 
cited,  as  to  the  findings  of  the  court- 
martial  in  2d  specification  of  1st 
charge,  243-244 ;  4th  specification  of 
2d  charge  withdravv'u  by,  259-260 ; 
his  admission  of  Porter's  good  ser- 
vice, 223  ;  his  construction  of  the  in- 
activity of  Porter  subsequent  to  his 
interview  with  McDowell,  231,  359. 

Hood,  J.  B.,  General,  C.  S.  A.  (1864) ; 
1st  Lieut.,  U.  S.  A.,  Aiig,  18,  1858 
(April  16, 1861) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A. 
(1862) ;  Ms  strength,  July  20,  207  ; 
in  command  of  a  division  under 
Longstreet  on  the  Rappahannock, 
Aug.  21,  307 ;  in  command  of  Long- 
street's  advance,  343  ;  his  position 
on  Jackson's  right,  Aug.  29,  91,  248- 
249,  257-258,  343-344 ;  in  co-opera- 
tion with  Jackson,  Aug.  29,  against 
Pope,  89,  91,  92 ;  Wilcox  detached 
from,  to  support  Jones,  249,  344, 
345;  Law's  brigade  of  Ms  division, 
254 ;  his  two  brigades  not  in  Porter's 
front,  Aug.  29,  347  ;  artillery  de- 
monstration made  morning  of  Aug. 

29,  by  order  of,  342,  344  ;  movement 
of  Union  troops  in  consequence,  344 ; 
his  the  only  force  of  Longstreet's 
command  engaged  in  the  battle,  92  ; 
the  good  fighting  of  his  veterans,  89- 
90 ;  King  attacked  by,  at  6  p.  m.,  233  ; 
gun  captured  by,  211,  218;  incident 
of  destruction  of  men  of  5tli  New 
York  by  his  Texas  riflemen,  Aug. 

30,  178;  engaged  at  Groveton,  92; 
evidence  from  his  report  and  letters 
cited,  in  defence  by  Porter,  248. 

Hooker,  J.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 
(March  13,  1865) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
V.  (May  17,  1861) ;  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
V.  (May  5,  1862) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
A.  (Sept.  20,  1862)  ;  joined  Pope, 
Aug.  24, 203  ;  his  estimated  strength, 
204  ;  at  Warrenton  Junction,  Aug. 
26,  1862,  62 ;  the  reason  for  sending 
him  to  the  railroad,  instead  of  to- 
wards Gainesville,  Aug.  27,  326  note ; 


464 


INDEX 


in  advance  on  Manassas  Junction, 
Aug".  27,  repulsed  by  Ewell  at  Kettle 
Run  or  Bristoe  Station,  63,  103,  268, 
326  ;  at  Manassas  Junction,  Aug.  28, 
67 ;  tlie  result  conjectured  had  lie 
joined  attack  on  Jackson,  Aug.  28, 
76  ;  believed  by  Pope,  night  of  Aug. 

28,  as  obstructing  Jackson's  retreat, 
331  ;  ordered  to  attack  Jackson, 
early  morning,  Aug.  29,  78,  82,  225, 
383;  did  not  cross  Bull  Run  till 
Aug.  29,  78 ;  his  movement  on  Cen- 
treville,  68,  76,  78 ;  reached  Centre- 
ville  at  11  A.  M.,  79,  84;  reported  by 
Haupt  as  driving  the  enemy,  Aug. 

29,  278  ;  his  repulse  by  Jackson, 
Aug.  29,  1862,  176 ;  a  gun  lost  by, 
211  ;  in  retreat  from  Centreville, 
Sept.  1,  137  ;  command  of  Union 
forces  at  Germantown  given  to,  Sept. 
1, 149 ;  his  position,  164  ;  given  com- 
mand of  McDowell's  corps  by  Mc- 
Clellan,  97  ;  mentioned,  126. 

Hopewell  Gap,  Va.,  345. 

Horton,  C.  P.,  Bvt.  Lieut.-Col.,  U.  S. 
V. ;  Capt.  and  A.  D.  C,  U.  S.  V.,  his 
estimates  of  Eanks'  strength,  38-39 ; 
cited,  200. 

Howard,  H.  B.,  Lieut.,  U.  S,  A. ;  4th 
Artillery,  his  position  battle  of  Cedar 
Mountain,  415. 

Hunter's  Lane,  Va.,  273. 

Hunton,  E.,  Col.,  C.  S.  A.,  his  move- 
ment, Aug.  29,  344. 

Hyland,  G.,  Jr.,  Maj.,  13th  New  York 
Volunteers,  his  testimony  before 
Porter  court-martial,  245,  339. 

Indiana  Volunteers,  Artillery,  16th 
Battery,  in  position  at  Cedar  Moun- 
tain, Aug.  9,  413, 415  ;  Infantry,  27tb 
regt.,  its  position  under  Gordon  on 
Brown's  House  hill,  413,  415;  in 
movement  to  support  Crawford,  434 ; 
its  unfortunate  position,  436-437 ;  its 
losses  in  that  position,  437. 

Ingham,  G.  T.,  Lieut.,  U.  S.  V.,  his  tes- 
timony for  Porter  at  court-martial, 
245,  246. 

Island  No.  10,  Mississippi  River,  cap- 
tured by  Pope,  April  8,  1862,  34. 

Jackson,  T.  J.,  "  Stonewall,"  Lieut.- 
Gen.,  C.  S.  A.  (1863) ;  Maj.-Gen.,  C. 
S.  A.  (1862);  the  strength  of  his 
forces,  July-Sept.,  1862,  considered, 
10,^46,  48,  49,  50,  206,  207,  208; 
variations  in  Ropes'  estimates,  208  ; 
his  strength  not  fully  stated  in  re- 
turn of  July  30,  205 ;  his  strength 


Aug.  9,  207,  210;  on  Aug.  21,  307; 
Aug.  26,  323 ;  his  losses,  211-212 ; 
his  successful  operations  in  the  Shen- 
andoah, 33  ;  Banks  driven  from  the 
Valley  by,  ih. ;  the  injury  inflicted 
upon  Banks,  May,  1862,  391 ; 
Banks'  first  military  experience,  the 
campaign  of  1862  against,  38 ;  the 
escape  from  serious  injury  in  the 
Valley  of,  391 ;  the  Union  command- 
ers in  the  Shenandoah  deceived  by, 
401  ;  Fremont  defeated  at  Cross 
Keys  by,  33 ;  the  success  at  Port 
Republic  of,  ih. ;  at  Weyer's  Cave 
June  12,  401 ;  his  advance  at  Ash- 
land, June  26,  33 ;  his  movement  to 
Richmond,  401 ;  engaged  in  Seven 
Days'  Battles,  ih.  ;  participated  in 
the  battle  of  Gaines'  Mill,  391 ;  sent 
to  guard  Gordonsville  July  13,  45, 

318,  402  ;  at  GordonsviUe,  July  16, 
44  ;  asked  for  re-enforcements,  45  ; 
A.  P.  Hill's  division  sent  to,  July  27, 

319,  400,  402 ;  Hill  joined  him  Aug. 
2,  45 ;  ordered  to  attack,  before  Pope 
should  be  re-enforced,  46,  402 ;  his 
movement  against  Pope  begun  Aug. 

7,  46,  402 ;  his  dispositions  of  forces 
for  the  march,  402  ;  ruse  to  conceal 
his  movements  to  the  Rapidan,  319 ; 
his  belief  that  he  had  deluded  Pope, 
12 ;  the  Rapidan  crossed  by,  Aug.  7, 
46,  403  ;  his  skirmishes  with  Bayard, 
47  ;  Union  cavalry  repulsed  by,  Aug. 

8,  402 ;  his  advance  retarded  by  Bay- 
ard, 403  ;  his  movement  towards  Cul- 
peper  known  to  Pope,  Aug.  9,  15 ; 
his  intention  to  reach  Culpeper  at 
noon,  Aug.  9,  417  ;  the  suffering  of 
his  army  on  the  march,  403;  his 
forces  seriously  affected  by  the  heat, 
207,  417;  fed  on  green  corn,  209; 
fatigued  by  the  march,  19 ;  probable 
effect  of  a  defeat  of,  conjectured, 
5L 

Cedar  Mountain :  his  arrival,  47 ; 
confronted  by  Banks,  47 ;  Banks  not 
expected  to  make  an  attack  on, 
until  re-enforced  by  Sigel,  407-408 ; 
Banks'  wish  to  attack,  about  3 
o'clock,  Aug.  9,  406 ;  Banks'  desire 
to  retaliate  for  reverses  in  the  Shen- 
andoah, 48 ;  the  failure  of,  to  attack, 
encouragement  for  attack  by  Banks, 
429 ;  Banks'  reckless  attack  on,  37, 
48 ;  his  resources  strained  to  repel 
attack,  23  ;  composition  of  his  forces, 
421-422  ;  his  strength,  207,  210 ;  his 
strength  miscalculated  by  Banks, 
48,  51,  407  ;  the  position  of  his 


INDEX 


465 


forces,  418-420,  421-422  ;  position  \ 
of  Hs  artillery,  419 ;  Ms  diyisiorL  \ 
Tinder  Winder's  command,  Aug.  9, 
206,  422 ;  position  of  his  division,  I 
421 ;  Hs  cavalry  not  engag-ed,  420 ;  : 
his  leading'  division  nnder  EvreU  ar-  \ 
rived  near  battlefield  at  1  P.  ii.,  417 ;  , 
engag-ed  in  artillery  dnel,  4S ;  ids  ! 
artillery  attack  about  5  o'clock,  423-  ] 
424  ;  liis  artillery  compelled  to  re-  ! 
tire   by   Donnelly's    cbarg-e,   425  ; 
cliarg'e  of  the  3d  brig'ade  repulsed 
by  Ms  reserves.  19,  23  ;  Ms  personal 
exertions  in  rallying  Ms  forces  after  \ 
Crawford's,  427 ;  Banks  forced  to  ; 
retire  by,  49 ;  Ms  loss.  51,  207 ;  tbe  i 
battie  noted  by  Rebel  War  Clerk,  I 
Jones,  11 ;  tbe  battle  said  to  bave 
been  precipitated  by,  440  ;  Pope's 
chance  to  capture  the  army  of,  2S  ; 
Gror don's  opimon  as  to  conditions  for  , 
defeating",  23  ;  Ms  defeat  probable  ■ 
had  Banks  held  position  and  vraited 
for  re-enforcements.  5 1 ;  Union  forces 
outnumbered  by,  28,  29,  48,  49,  50 ;  ' 
Pope  outgeneralled  by,  29;  Ms  at-  ' 
tack  not  renevred.  Aug.  10,  440  ;  his 
■withdrawal  to  Gordonsville.  Aug.  11, 
52,  440.  _  '  j 

Second  advance   against   Pope  :  i 
Lee's  order  further  to  re-enforce,  . 
Aug.  13,  320  ;  reason  for  not  largely  ■ 
re-enforcLog'.  prior  to  Aug.  13,  400; 
joined  by  Lee,  Aug.  16.  on  the  Eap-  , 
idan.  73  ;  crossed  the  Rappahannock, 
Aug.  22,  58 ;  conjecture  as  to  the 
result  had  Pope  attacked  Lee  ujider  , 
plan  of  Aug\  22,  ih. ;  Lee's  strategy  ; 
to  permit  Pope's  rear  to  be  gained 
by,  320  ;   Lee's  intention  to  flank  ; 
Pope,  321 ;  his  flank  movement  be-  \ 
gun  Aug.  25,  59,  73,  2ut3 ;  forces  ' 
employed.  59 ;  conjecture  as  to  its  ; 
object,  ih.  ;  61 ;  the  scheme  discov-  ; 
ered  by  Pope,  Aug.  15.  59,  321 ;  the  i 
destination  of.  believed  by  Pope  to  \ 
be  the  Shenandoah  Yalley,  Aug.  -26,  j 
110,111,322. 

Manassas  raid :  Pope's  failure  to  i 
foresee  the  raid  on  Manassas  of.  321-  j 
322  ;   the  serious  consequences  of  j 
Pope's  neglect  to  ascertain  the  des-  | 
tination  of.  323  ;  his  ignorance  of  the  ' 
movements  of.  inexcusable.  324 ;  be- 
lieved by  Pope.  Aug.  27.  Thorough- 
fare Gar)  had  not  been  passed  by,  : 
62  ;  Buford  employed.  Aug.  27,  in 
looking  for.  west  of  tiie  Gap,  109 ;  1 
his  progress  to  Bristoe  Station  un-  ' 
molested,  Aug.  25-26,  62,  73,  323 ; 


an  opportrmity  for  his  destruction, 
323  ;  engagement.  Aug.  27.  with 
Hooker,  103,  104-105,  268 ;  Pope's 
commmiications  interrupted  by,  62, 
277,  324;  no  evidence  that  he  cut 
Pope's  communications  at  Bristoe, 
111) ;  his  raid  at  Manassas  Junction, 
101  et  seq.  ;  292,  308 ;  Trimble  re- 
enforced  by,  102  ;  the  disposition  of 
his  forces,  Aug.  27, 103  ;  his  strength, 
119  ;  L^mon  forces  defeated  by,  104- 
105,  292  ;  his  praise  of  L'mon  Gen. 
Taylor,  105  ;  Stuart's  service  to,  Aug. 
27,  292 ;  supplies  captured  bv,  65, 
96,  101-102,  105-108  ;  prisoners  and 
slaves  recaptured,  101  ;  the  gains 
not  commensurate  with  risk,  96 ;  the 
condition  of  Ms  army,  107 ;  cut  o£P 
from  Longstteet.  Aug.  27,  308;  the 
peril  of  his  position  prior  to  Aug. 
29,  101,  102,  268,  280,  332-333  ; 
Lee's  confidence  in  his  safety,  256 ; 
the  unexpected  success  of  his  raid, 
107 ;  his  elation,  109 ;  Umon  dis- 
aster reported  to  Halleck,  119,  121, 
123.  126,  131  ;  his  advance  known  to 
McClellan,  Aug.  27,  277  ;  McClel- 
lau's  failure  to  repel  Mm  at  Ma- 
nassas Junction,  274  ;  tiiat  his  raid 
might  have  been  prevented  by  Mc- 
Clellan demed,  110  ;  his  position 
with  respect  to  Pope  night  of  Aug. 
27,  327 ;  Pope  informed  of  his  posi- 
tion mght  of  Aug.  27.  63.  74,  326 ; 
Pope's  conjectiu'e  of  the  plan  of,  to 
capture  the  trains  tmder  Banks,  64, 
327,  331 ;  Pope's  change  of  plans 
with  respect  to,  64,  65  ;  expected  by 
Pope  to  retreat  to  the  Gap,  80,  82 ; 
and  not  wait  to  be  attacked,  82,  83, 
84  ;  the  expectation  of  capture  of, 
327. 

Retreat  from  Manassas :  his  eva- 
sion of  Pope,  65,  268,  308 ;  skilful- 
ness  of  tMs  operation,  66,  96 ;  his 
disposition  of  forces  in  withdrawing 
from  Manassas.  329 ;  Ms  movement 
to  BuU  Run  battlefield,  Aug.  27, 
107  ;  the  cotrrse  of  his  army.  107- 
108 ;  his  position,  Aug.  2S.  65,  69, 
107  ;  no  evidence  that  A.  P.  Hill's 
movement  was  intended  as  a  rose, 
329  ;  Pope's  plans  frustrated  by 
Jackson's  night  movement.  328 ;  Mc- 
Dowell ordered,  noon.  Aug-.  28,  to 
intercept  him  at  Gum  Springs,  329  ; 
the  order  intercepted  by,  ih. ;  order 
countermanded.  330. 

Aug.  23 :.  Pope  ignorant  of  the 
position  of ,  68 ;  Pope's  dispositions 


466 


INDEX 


for  pursuit  in  a  movement  of,  to 
Centre ville,  Aug.  28,  62,  63,  80,  328 ; 
his  rear-g-uard  driven  from  Centre- 
viile  by  Kearny,  278,  279 ;  Pope's 
belief  that  his  destination  was  Aldie 
Gap,  330  ;  driven  towards  Gaines- 
ville, Aug".  28,  279  ;  only  confronted 
by  Sigel  and  Reynolds,  69  ;  his 
severe  fight  with  King-  near  Grove- 
ton,  Aug.  28,  68,  76,  78,  268 ;  be- 
lieved by  Pope  to  have  been  inter- 
cepted by  McDowell,  78,  225,  331  ; 
Pope's  orders  to  King  to  hold  front 
against,  not  received,  77  ;  withdrawal 
of  King  and  Rieketts  from  Gaines- 
ville, Aug.  28,  69,  77  ;  Pope's  chances 
to  give  battle  missed,  69,  70,  75,  76 ; 
probable  result  of  a  battle,  69,  70  ; 
outnumbered  by  Pope,  70  ;  the  prob- 
able result  of  a  movement  by,  round 
Pope's  right,  328 ;  Pope's  plan  for 
closing  on,  327  ;  Pope's  expectations 
from  forces  sent  in  pursuit  of,  83  ; 
that  his  plans  for  the  attack  and 
pursuit  of,  should  have  been  under- 
stood by  his  commanders,  reason- 
able, 336  ;  Porter's  incredulity  as  to 
his  capture  by  Pope,  337  ;  his  dis- 
positions with  a  view  to  junction  with 
Lee,  327. 

Aug.  29  :  his  junction  with  Lee 
effected,  33,  79,  86  ;  Pope's  mistaken 
calculation  as  to  time  of  coming  of 
Lee,  83,  84,  337  ;  Pope's  disposition 
apparently  not  intended  to  intercept 
Lee,  Aug.  27,  325 ;  the  junction  not 
prevented,  66,  67,  68,  69,  70,  77,  82, 
95  ;  McDowell  believed  Porter  could 
not  prevent  the  junction,  226  ;  his 
union  with  Longstreet  believed  to 
have  been  effected  by  Porter  and 
McDowell,  231,  233  ;  McClellan's  re- 
sponsibility, 284  ;  Longstreet  in  po- 
sition to  support,  by  10  A.  M.,  248, 
255 ;  Longstreet's  position  on  the 
right  of,  248-249 ;  the  character  of 
the  ground  held  by  his  artillery,  251 ; 
Ms  order  to  Early,  morning  of  Aug. 
29,  248  ;  the  disposition  of  his  forces 
according  to  Marshall,  257 ;  his  di- 
vision imder  command  of  Starke, 
257 ;  his  place  of  concealment  in 
railroad  cut  near  Groveton,  176 ;  re- 
enforced  by  Longstreet,  29,  344  ; 
Wilcox  sent  by,  to,  236  note  ;  in  bat- 
tle he  had  the  co-operation  of  Hood's 
and  Evans'  divisions,  89;  the  good 
fighting  of  his  command,  89-90 ; 
Stuart's  movement  in  relation  to, 
342 ;  attack  on,  by  Kearny  and 


Hooker,  ordered  at  dawn,  225  ;  con- 
jecture as  to  result  of  attack  on,  by 
King,  Rieketts,  Sigel,  and  Reynolds, 
79  ;  Confederate  testimony  as  to  the 
Union  movements  in  relation  to,  345- 
346  ;  Porter  ordered  to  attack  his 
right  flank,  241,  359;  Pope's  belief 
that  Porter  could  have  succeeded, 
89,  90 ;  Pope  ignorant  that  he  was 
engaged  with  a  force  other  than  that 
of,  90,  241,  309,  340 ;  court-martial 
found  only  a  few  skirmishers  of  army 
of,  before  Porter,  243,  359 ;  his  suc- 
cesses, 309 ;  his  statement  that  the 
Confederates  avoided  a  general  en- 
gagement, 345  ;  Porter  charged  with 
the  failure  to  flank,  310 ;  an  attack 
by  Porter  on  Longstreet  would  not 
have  weakened,  248 ;  such  an  attack 
would  have  been  to  the  advantage 
of,  256  ;  free  from  danger  of  attack, 
256  ;  Porter  not  confronted  by,  341 ; 
the  misquotation  of  his  report  in  a 
publication  against  Porter,  364,  366- 
370  ;  extract  sent  to  Pope  by  Mc- 
Dowell, 366  ;  the  purport  of  the  ex- 
tract as  used  by  Pope,  367  ;  the  cause 
of  misquotation  explained,  ib.,  368. 

Aug.  30 :  supposed  by  Po^je  to  be 
retreating,  259  ;  his  severe  battle 
with  Porter,  ib.  ;  his  report  cited  as 
to  violence  of  Porter's  attack,  260 ; 
B.  T.  Johnson's  report  of  the  en- 
gagement, 260-261  ;  his  rej)ort  ap- 
pealed to,  to  controvert  the  charge 
of  a  weak  attack,  311 ;  the  attack 
criticised  by  Wilcox,  253  ;  Porter 
defeated  by,  309  ;  saved  from  defeat, 
Aug.  29  and  30,  by  Longstreet's  aid, 
368. 

Aug.  31-Sept.  1 :  ordered  by  Lee 
to  turn  Union  right  flank,  144,  165, 
167  ;  the  discovery  of  his  movement, 
Aug.  31,  an  accident,  191 ;  informa- 
tion of,  carried  by  a  resident  at  Chan- 
tilly  to  Pope,  ib.  ;  his  route  to  Chan- 
tilly,  137,  145,  165  ;  followed  by 
Longstreet,  145  ;  his  forces  in  the 
movement,  145, 147, 148 ;  Longstreet 
not  engaged  with,  Sept.  1,  171. 

Chantilly  :  in  command  of  Con- 
federate left  wing  at  battle  of  Chan- 
tilly, Sept.  1,  136;  his  arrangements 
for  the  battle,  152,  166  ;  his  forces, 
153  et  seq. ;  his  division  commanded 
by  Starke,  145,  155,  166  ;  panic- 
stricken,  155,  156, 166;  the  cause  of 
panic,  156  ;  the  battle  forced  on, 
167  ;  his  own  report  of  battle,  165- 
166 ;   Pender  ordered  to  support 


INDEX 


467 


Broekenbrongli  by,  170;  his  move- 
ment to^vards  Fairfax  C.  H.,  in 
Stuart's  report,  165  ;  Pope's  failure 
to  do  liim  serious  injury,  94  ;  the 
operations  against,  in  which  the 
Pennsylvania  Reserves  shared,  133  ; 
his  sobriquet  "Stonewall,"  earned 
at  fii-st  battle  of  Bull  Run,  173  ;  his 
rashness,  96  ;  his  plans  inscrutable, 
64,  323  ;  Cooke's  biography  of,  3S9 ; 
mentioned,  198. 

James  River,  Ta.,  its  summer  climate 
dangerous,  10  ;  transfer  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  to,  392  ;  McClellan's 
position  at  Harrison's  Landing  on, 
42 ;  Hatch  ordered  to  push  a  force 
to,  July  14,  396;  his  faHure,  396; 
the  enemy's  movement  from  Rich- 
mond to  the  south  of,  319 ;  McClel- 
lan  a  menace  to  Lee,  400  ;  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  withdrawn  from, 
297,  399-400;  the  force  employed 
for  the  defence  of  Richmond  after 
the  withdrawal  of  McClellan,  401. 

Jenkins,  M.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  de- 
monstration by,  in  front  of  Bristoe, 
Aug.  29.  342-343. 

Johnson,  B.  T.,  Col.,  C.  S.  A.  (1862), 
in  command  of  2d  brigade,  Jack- 
son's division,  147  ;  in  command  of 
Second  Virginia  Brigade,  Talia- 
ferro's division,  Jackson's  corps,  at 
second  Bull  Run,  260  ;  his  encounter 
•with  McDowell's  column  at  Grove- 
ton,  Aug.  28,  328  ;  Pope's  orders  to 
Sigel  and  Reynolds  intercepted  by, 
ih.\  gun  ca2>tured  by,  211,  218;  his 
report  cited  as  to  the  violence  of 
Porter's  attack,  Aug.  30,  260-261 ; 
his  report  of  movement  towards 
ChantiUy,  Sept.  1,  147. 

Johnson.  J.  R.,  Capt_,  C.  S.  A.,  a  sec- 
tion of  his  Virginia  battery  at  Cedar 
Mountain,  419-420. 

Johnston.  J.  E.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 
(June  28,  1860-April  22,  1861); 

_  General,  C.  S.  A.,  192. 

Jones,  D.  R..  1st  Lieut.,  U.  S.  A. 
(May  7,  1849 -Feb.  15,  1861)  ; 
Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.  (1862-1863)  ;  his 
strength,  July  20,  207  ;  his  streng-th, 
Aug.  29,  258  ;  Pope  ignorant  of  his 
proximity,  92  ;  question  if  he  was  in 
position  before  Porter,  Aug.  29,  347  ; 
Porter  confronted  bv,  Aug.  29,  88  ; 
his  position,  91,  249^  255,  258,  344 ; 
"Wilcox  detached  to  his  support.  249, 
250,  255,  258,  344,  346  ;  demonstra- 
tion by,  in  front  of  Bristoe,  342-34:3  ; 
kept  inactive  by  Porter,  91,  92 ;  his 


report  as  to  Aug.  29,  cited,  346  ;  his 
forces  the  first  to  join  Jackson  at 
Chantilly,  171 ;  his  report  cited,  l7l- 
172. 

j  Jones,  J.  B.,  his  Diary  of  a  Rebel  War 
I     Clerk  cited,  12-15. 

! 

i  Kanawha,  District  of.  See  District  of 
Kanawha. 

Kane,  T.  L.,  Lieut.-CoL,  U.  S.  V.,  in 
command  of  rifle  battalion,  2d  divi- 
sion (Ricketts'),  od  corps,  A.  of  V., 
strength,  Aug.  16,  215. 

Kearny,  P.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (May 
17,  1861),  in  command  of  1st  divi- 
sion, 3d  corps,  composition  of  his 
division,  135,  163  ;  his  strength,  Aug. 
21,  204,  269  ;  joined  Pope,  Aug.  24, 
203,  269;  at  Warrentou  Junction, 
under  Heintzelman.  Ang.  26,  1862, 
62  ;  at  Rappahanuoek  Station,  Aug. 

26,  114 ;  without  artillery,  Aug.  27, 
129  ;  to  be  supplied  with  artillery  by 
Sigel,  127  ;  ordered,  by  way  of  Cat- 
lett's  Station,  to  Greenwich,  Aug. 

27,  127  ;  at  Greenwich,  Aug.  27,  63  ; 
the  hope  of  capturing  Jackson  ex- 
pressed to,  by  Pope,  Aug.  28,  327  ; 
ordered  from  Greenwich  to  Bristoe, 
Aug.  28,  ih.  ;  ordered  to  Manassas, 
Aug.  27,  65 ;  his  division  at  Manas- 
sas Junction,  noon  Aug.  28,  268 ;  in 
position  there,  Aug.  28,  67  ;  removed 
to  Centreville.  68,  76,  78 ;  at  Centre- 
ville,  night  of  Aug.  28,  78  ;  beheved 
by  Pope,  night  of  Aug.  28,  to  be  ob- 
structing Jackson's  retreat,  331;  or- 
dered to  Warrenton  turnpike,  78  ; 
might  have  been  profitably  em- 
ployed, Aug.  28,  in  an  attack  on 
Jackson,  70,  76  ;  reached  Centreville 
before  10  A.  M.,  Aug.  29,  79,  84 ; 
Confederate  rear-guard  driven  from 
Centreville  by,  268,  279  ;  pressed  for- 
ward in  pui'suit,  82  ;  his  arrival  at 
Sudley  Springs,  Aug.  29,  235  ; 
ordered  to  attack  early  morning 
Aug.  29,  225.  383  ;  his  repulse,  Aug. 
29,  1862,  by  Jackson,  176  ;  the  21st 
Mass.  taunted  and  threatened  by, 
158  ;  his  effort  to  protect  Bimey's 
right  flank  at  Chantilly,  158 ;  men- 
tioned in  Birney's  report,  161 ;  his 
indifference  to  danger,  159  ;  his  con- 
tempt of  Lieut.  Walcott's  warning, 
ih. :  killed  at  Chantilly,  95,  135,  138, 
160,  163,  166,  167  ;  killed  by  Georgia 
men,  of  Thomas'  brigade,  160,  166  ; 
the  scene  of  his  death,  159-160,  ISO, 
190,  191 J  indicated  on  maps,  187. 


468 


INDEX 


Kelly's  Ford,  Va.,  Heno's  position  at, 
Aug-.  20,  1862,  53  ;  Kearny  reported 
by  Porter  as  at,  Axig.  26,  184. 

Kelton,  J.  C,  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 
(March  13,  1865);  CoL,  U.  S.  V. 
(Sept.  19,  1861-May  12, 1862) ;  Maj., 
U.  S.  A.  (July  17,  1862) ;  Lieut.-CoL, 
A.  D.  C,  U.  S.  A.  (March  23,  1866) ; 
Capt.,  U.  S.  A.  (Aug-.  3,  1861-July 
17, 1862) ;  sent  by  McClellan  to  get 
information  concerning  Pope,  302. 

Kemper,  J.  L.,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A. 
(1865)  ;  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.  (1862)  ; 
in  command  of  division  Longstreet's 
corps,  2d  battle  of  Bull  Run,  Pope 
ignorant  of  his  proximity,  91 ;  his 
position,  91 ;  not  engaged,  ih. ,  92 ; 
kept  inactive  by  Porter,  91 ;  his  three 
brigades  not  in  front  of  Porter,  Aug. 
29,  347  ;  had  Porter  attacked,  he 
vv^ould  have  been  confronted  by,  88 ; 
his  movement  to  support  Confed- 
erate left,  258,  344 ;  D.  R.  Jones' 
position  with  regard  to,  Aug.  29, 
249 ;  demonstration  by,  in  front  of 
Bristoe,  342-343. 

Kershaw,  J.  B.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A. 
(1862)  ;  his  report,  as  Colonel  2d 
South  Carolina  regt.,  of  first  battle 
of  Bull  Run,  mentioned,  184  note. 

Kettle  Run,  Va.,  near  Bristoe  Station, 
Jackson  in  position  near,  Aug.  26, 
268  ;  Jackson  in  possession  of  the 
railroad  at,  323  ;  Ewell  repulsed  by 
Hooker,  Aug.  27,  in  engagement  at, 
63,  103,  268,  326. 

Keyes,  E.  D.,  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 
(May  31,  1862) ;  Col.,  U.  S.  A.  (May 
14,  1861) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (May 
17,  1861) ;  Maj. -Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (May 
5,  1862)  ;  covered  embarkation  of 
Union  forces  at  Yorktown,  returning 
from  Peninsula,  24 ;  left  in  command 
at  Yorktown,  Aug.  23,  289. 

King,  R.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (May  17, 
1861-Oct.  20,  1863)  ;  in  command 
of  1st  division,  3d  Corps,  Army  of 
Va.,  July  33,  1862,  40;  his  strength, 
Aug.,  213,  214,  215;  his  division 
at  Falmouth,  Aug.  7, 41, 46, 133,  393, 
395,  396,  400 ;  ordered  to  join  Pope, 
404 ;  moved,  Aug.  11,  to  the  Rapi- 
dan,  52  ;  arrived,  Aug.  11,  404;  his 
successful  cavalry  expedition  against 
the  Virginia  Central  Railroad,  396 ; 
position  night  of  Aug.  27, 132  ;  com- 
pelled by  illness  to  leave  his  com- 
mand, 77,  87,  244 ;  his  division  under 
command  of  Hatch,  77,  87,  238, 
259 ;   ordered  to  Centreville,  68 ; 


sent  to  Warrenton  turnpike,  iL  ;  to 
follow  Sigel  to  Gainesville,  129 ;  his 
engagement  vnth  Ewell,  on  Stony 
Ridge,  near  Groveton,  Aug.  28,  68, 
76,  78,  179,  226, 268 ;  sent  back  to 
Gainesville,  76  ;  his  division  reported 
at  sunset  as  moving  on  Gainesville, 
239 ;  at  Gainesville,  Aug.  28, 67  ;  his 
withdrawal  from  Gainesville  night  of 
Aug.  28,  69,  77,  79,  80,  84,  226,  246, 
332  ;  his  removal  left  Thoroughfare 
Gap  unprotected,  69,  70, 77 ;  McDow- 
ell's action  in  withdrawing,  criticized, 
246  ;  Pope's  orders  to  him  to  hold 
position  at  Gainesville  not  received 
by,  77  ;  not  blamed  by  McDowell  for 
withdrawing  from  Groveton,  226- 
227  ;  separated  from  McDowell,  69, 
77  ;  Pope  informed  early  morning 
Aug.  29  of  the  retreat  of,  332  ;  the 
effort  to  regain,  Aug.  29,  the  advan- 
tage lost  by  his  retreat,  227 ;  detached 
from  McDowell's  command  and  as- 
signed to  Porter  for  advance  on 
Gainesville,  80,  81,  85,  86,  226,  245, 
335,  383  ;  McDowell's  remonstrance, 
81,  335 ;  rejoined  McDowell,  86, 231 ; 
Porter's  projected  attack  frustrated 
by  the  detachment  from  his  com- 
mand, of,  232 ;  Porter's  request  that 
his  division  should  be  returned  to  his 
command,  245  ;  informed  by  Porter 
of  the  advance  of  enemy,  234-235, 
238  ;  Porter's  despatch  to,  a  proof  of 
disobedience  to  court-martial,  243 ; 
effort  of  Morell  to  join,  Aug.  29, 339, 
372,  373,  374  ;  the  movement  to, 
failed,  372 ;  conjecture  as  to  the  result 
of  an  attack  on  Jackson,  Aug.  29,  con- 
jointly with  Ricketts,  Sigel,  and  Rey- 
nolds, 79;  his  division  useless  and 
not  engaged  until  after  6  P.  M. ,  Aug. 
29,  77,  233  ;  attacked  by  Hood  at  6 
p.  M.,  ib. ;  rendered  no  important  ser- 
vice thereafter,  87 ;  member  of  the 
court  martial,  244 ;  his  appearance 
as  a  witness  criticized,  244. 

Knap,  J.  M.,  Capt.,  U.  S.  V.,  in  com- 
mand of  Battery  E.,  Pennsylvania 
Volunteers,  at  Cedar  Mountain,  410 ; 
engaged  in  artillery  duel,  411  ;  his 
position,  416. 

Kol!/-s,  J.  A.,  Col.,  U.  S.  v.,  in  com- 
mand  of  1st  brigade,  2d  division,  1st 
Corps,  A.  of  v.,  till  he  was  killed, 
Aug.  30,  his  services  in  battle  of 
Aug.  30,  94. 

Krepps,  J.  S.,  Maj.,  U.  S.  V.,  his  re- 
pulse of  Confederates  at  Buckland 
Mills,  Aug.  27, 130. 


INDEX 


469 


Lafayette,  anecdote  of,  ISS.  i 
Lane,  J.  H.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  his  : 
report  of  Braneli's  "brig-ade  in  battle 
of  Cliantilly  cited,  16S. 
Latimer.  J.  W..  C.  S.  A.,  posirion  of  his 
battery,  Cedar  Mountain,  419 ;  ids  ■ 
atta-ck    on   Muidenberg-'s  battery, 
428 ;  E^ell's  division  protected  bv. 
4:32. 

Lav,  E.  X..  Col.,  C.  S.  A. ,  4tb  Alabama, 
in  command  of  3d  brigade.  Hood's 
division,  254. 

Lavrton.  A.  R.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  his 
brigade  at  Gordonsville,  206 ;    not  ; 
eng'aged  at  Cedar  Motmtain,  207 ;  j 
employed  to  guard  trains,  403,  419  :  j 
his  strengtb,  Aug.  13,  205  ;  missed 
his  -^ay  in  retreat  from  Manassas. 
Ang.    28,   329  ;    in   command   of  i 
Evrell's  division,  Aug.  29,  145,  155. 
257  ;  his  position  at  Chantilly,  166. 

Leasnre,  D.,  Col.,  U.  S.  Y.,  in  command 
of  2d  brigade,  1st  division.  9th 
Corps,  at  Chantillv,  152  ;  his  losses. 
162.  \ 

Le  Duc;  v..  Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  cited  as  to 
unnecessary  delay  of  transfer  of 
Army  of  Potomac  from  the  Penin- 
snla.  26-27. 

Lee,  Fitzhngh,  1st  Lient..  U.  S.  A. 
(March  31-May  21.  1861)  ;  Brig.- 
Gen.,  C.  S.  A.  (1862)  ;  Maj.-Gen.,  . 
C.  S.  A.  (1865)  ;  his  estimated 
strength.  July  20,  207 ;  his  opera- 
tions in  Manassas  raid.  lOS-109,  oS4; 
in  command  of  Confederate  cavalry, 
in  movement  to  turn  Union  right. 
Aug.  31-Sept.  1.  145.  165. 

Lee.  R.  E.,  General.-  C.  S.  A..  CoL. 
U.  S.  A.  (March  16-April  25,  (1861) : 
his  strength,  307 ;  his  strengiih  Aug. 
20.  207.  208 ;  strength  of  his  forces.  ' 
August-September.  1862,  197  et  seq.. 
207,  20S,  210,  211 :  Ropes"  error  in 
estimate  of  strength  of.  209, 218 ;  the 
extravagant  reports  of  his  strength. 
277 ;  his  strength  unknown  at  Wash-  i 
ington.  Aug.  27-28,  292  :  his  army  no 
stronger  in  numbers  but  more  efficient  ' 
than  Pope's.  94 ;  condition  of  his  army 
not  better  than  Pope's,  209 ;  Col.  | 
Marshall  his  aide-de-camp,  241,  24S,  ! 
255  ;    his  advantage  from  interior 
lines,  400  ;  Jackson's  junction  vrith.  ' 
June  26,  1862,  33 ;  Jackson's  and  i 
Ewell's  divisions  sent   from  Rich-  j 
mond  to  Gordonsville.  oppose  Pope,  i 
July  13,  45,  318  ;  importuned  by 
Jackson  for  re-enforcements.  402  ;  in  ■ 
fear  of  attack.  Hill  and  Longstreet  ; 


kept  at  Richmond  by,  45  ;  A.  P. 
Hill  sent  to  Jackson  by,  July  27,  45, 
402 ;  the  purpose  of  his  ruse  in  de- 
taching forces  from  Richmond  late 
in  July,  319  ;  his  movement  against 
Pope  affected  by  McClellan's  pres- 
ence near  Richmond.  4U0 ;  informed 
of  Eumside's  embarkation  at  Fort 
Monroe,  46,  402  ;  informed  of  the 
intention  to  terminate  Peninsular 
campaign,  11-12  ;  his  delay  in  learn- 
ing of  McClellan's  -svithdravral  from 
the  James.  400  ;  having'  no  fears 
from  McClellan  he  removed  his 
army  to  re-enforce  Jackson,  Aug. 
13,  46,  320  J  his  orders  to  attack,  be- 
fore Pope  should  be  re-enforced,  402  ; 
the  energy  of  attack  to  be  expected 
from.  11  ;  his  project  of  an  advance 
on  TTashing-ton.  noted  by  Jones,  12  ; 
his  aggTessive  policy  made  known  to 
Halleck  by  battle  of  Cedar  Motm- 
taia,  15,  24  :  his  advance  to  Gordons- 
ville. Aug.  13.  52  ;  his  advance  made 
known  to  Pope  by  intercepted  letter, 
52,  266 ;  Jackson  re-enforced  on  the 
Rapidan  by,  73  ;  his  position  on  the 
Rappahannock.  Aug.  21,  307  ;  an  in- 
tention to  flank  Pope  on  the  Rappa- 
hannock indicated,  321 ;  his  plans  to 
cross  the  river.  57-58 ;  Pope's  efforts 
to  block  the  advance  of,  28  ;  his  un- 
successful effort  to  force  a  passage 
over  Rappahannock;  Aug.  20.  57, 
73  ;  his  correct  estimate  of  Pope's 
exigencies,  57  ;  conjecture  as  to  re- 
sult of  an  attack  by  Pope,  Aug.  22, 
58 :  his  perilous  position  caused  by 
freshet.  Aug.  22,  59  ;  extricated.  Aug. 
23.  ih. ;  his  movement  to  Sulphur 
Springs  expected  by  Pope,  58 ; 
Pope's  statement  of  his  intention  to 
take  position  between  Btdl  Run  and 
the  army  of,  Aug.  27,  questioned, 
325  ;  his  movement  against  Pope  be- 
gun. Aug.  25,  59,  73  ;  Jackson's  raid 
at  Manassas.  107  ;  believed  by  Pope 
and  Halleck  to  be  in  the  Shenandoah 
VaUey,  Aug.  26.  110,  111 :  his  posi- 
tion, Aug.  27,  268  ;  Pope's  movement 
of  Aug.  27,  not  intended  to  inter- 
pose between  Jackson  and.  63,  75  ; 
known  to  be  approaching  Thorough- 
fare Gap.  Aug.  28,  66,  68 ;  Pope's 
miscalculations  as  to  the  proximity 
of,  83,  84,  331 ;  his  appearance  ex- 
pected, Aug.  31.  84  ;  Pope  inexcus- 
able for  miscalculating  the  time  of 
his  approach.  332 ;  McClellan's  alarm, 
Aug.  27,  of  a  descent  on  Washington 


470 


INDEX 


by,  116 ;  Jackson's  commmiieation 
with,  cut  by  McDowell,  Aug-.  28, 
832  ;  his  force  about  equal  to  Pope's, 
808 ;  Jackson's  junction  with,  not 
preyented  by  Pope,  66,  67,  68, 69, 70, 
75,  332  ;  Ricketts  sent  to  protect  the 
Gap,  Aug-.  28,  67,  68  ;  his  advance  to 
Thoroughfare  Gap,  107,  124;  with 
Longstreet  encountered  Stuart,  morn- 
ing' of  Aug-.  29,  342  ;  his  forces  seen 
advancing  by  Buford,  9  A.  M.,  85,  90 ; 
his  advance  reported  by  Porter,  93 ; 
Jackson's  position  with  a  view  to 
junction  with,  327  ;  his  advance  con- 
jectured, 9  A.  M.,  Aug.  29,  by  Pope, 
82  ;  Pope's  error  of  delaying  battle 
of  Aug.  29,  79,  89  ;  the  junction  ef- 
fected, 86  ;  his  statement  as  to  the 
time  of  Long'street's  arrival,  255  ; 
with  Longstreet's  division,  ih. ;  Por- 
ter court-martial  ignorant  of  the 
presence  of  his  army,  359,  366-367  ; 
Porter's  evidence  of  the  presence  of, 
submitted  to  the  investigating  board, 
859-360  ;  his  knowledge  of  Porter's 
movement  early  Aug.  29,  248,  250, 
256,  257,  258 ;  his  wish  to  attack, 
249,  844  ;  dissuaded  by  his  officers, 
344-345  ;  Porter's  doubt  as  to  Pope's 
intention  to  engage  in  general  battle 
with,  87  ,*  Porter  received  no  orders 
in  alternative  in  ease  Jackson  should 
be  re-enforced  by,  80 ;  Porter's  de- 
monstration regarded  as  insignificant 
by,  316  ;  the  probable  effect  on,  of  a 
more  serious  demonstration,  377  ;  his 
opinion  that  an  attack  would  have 
been  repulsed,  249,  255,  256  ;  Rob- 
ertson ordered  to  support  Longstreet 
by,  251  ;  Longstreet  re-enforced  by 
Wilcox  by  order  of,  249,  250  ;  his 
opinion  that  Longstreet  was  held  in- 
active by  Porter,  91,  92,  249;  de- 
terred from  attempt  to  turn  Union 
left  by  Porter,  79-80,  87  ;  his  evi- 
dence as  to  the  withdrawal  of  Porter, 
846  ;  and  as  to  the  difficult  character 
of  the  coimtry,  249  ;  his  report  cited 
as  to  position  and  movement  of  Con- 
federates, 345-346  ;  his  statements  in 
accord  with  Stuart's,  346  ;  Pope's 
ignorance  of  his  presence,  92,  95  ; 
Pope  would  not  credit,  Aug.  30,  the 
report  of  the  presence  of,  93,  95  ; 
his  report  of  the  violence  of  battle 
of  Aug.  30,  261  ;  Pope's  left  wing 
overwhelmed  by,  93-94,  309  ;  the 
advantage  gained,  followed  up  by, 
94 ;  the  possibility  of  his  defeat  by 
a  different  disposition  of  the  Union 


forces,  92  ;  his  tactics,  Aug.  81,  in 
attempt  to  turn  the  Union  right, 
94-95,  144-145  ;  caused  no  battle, 
Aug.  31,  143 ;  his  report  of  battle 
of  Chantilly,  167 ;  his  estimate  of  his 
chances  at  2d  Bull  Run,  256 ;  the 
av/ful  consequences  conjectured  of 
the  destruction  of  Pope's  supply 
trains  by,  30 1 ;  the  destruction  pre- 
vented by  Torbert,  300-301  ;  his 
orders  disobeyed  by  Anderson  and 
Wilcox,  254 ;  Pope  out-generalled 
and  out-numbered  by,  29  ;  captures 
of  guns  by,  211 ;  prisoners  captured 
by,  213  ;  his  ability  like  Marlbor- 
ough's, his  sagacity  like  Napoleon's, 
118  ;  his  sagacity  at  Chancellors- 
ville,  94  ;  his  successful  strategy 
against  Mead  in  1863,  58,  321 ;  his 
letters  to  Porter,  255-256  ;  his  re- 
ports and  letters  cited  in  defence  by 
Porter,  248;  the  "Board  Maps" 
verified  by,  240-241 ;  his  verification 
of  Porter's  map,  255. 

Lee,  S.  D.,  1st  Lieut.,  U.  S.  A.  (Oct.  81, 
1856-Feb.  20,  1861)  ;  Col.,  C.  S.  A. 
(1862)  ;  in  command  of  Light  Ar- 
tillery battalion,  2d  Bull  Run,  his 
position  on  Jackson's  right,  251. 

Leesburg,  Va.,  Pope's  apprehensions 
for,  after  Manassas  raid,  76. 

Leipold,  R.  H.  G.,  U.  S.  V.,  Locke's 
statement  as  to  interview  with  Mc- 
Dowell sustained  by,  244  note. 

Lewinsville,  Va,,  McClellan's  propo- 
sition to  send  cavalry  to,  Aug.  27, 
119. 

Liberty  Mills,  Va.,  the  Rapidan  crossed 
Aug.  7,  by  Jackson  near,  403. 

Lincoln,  President,  his  alarm  in  June, 
1862,  34  ;  Army  of  Virginia  created 
by,  June  26,  4,  890 ;  Pope  given 
command  by,  4;  his  hopes  from 
Pope,  84 ;  Pope's  suggestion  to,  that 
a  General-in-Chief  be  appointed, 
4  ;  Halleck  appointed  by,  July  11, 
1862,  ih.^  7  ;  importuned  by  Mc- 
Clellan  for  re-enforcements,  6,  7 ; 
his  reply,  July  2,  6 ;  his  letter  to 
MeClellan,  July  4,  ih. ;  McClellan's 
letter  of  advice  to,  July  7,  6,  42  ; 
MeClellan  visited  by,  July  8,  6,  7  ; 
Pope's  suggestions  to,  as  to  the  move- 
ment on  the  Peninsula,  892  ;  the 
withdrawal  of  MeClellan  from  the 
Peninsula  favored  by,  7  ;  his  purpose 
to  vv^ithdraAv,  42  ;  McClellan's  appeal 
to,  for  orders  as  to  executing  Hal- 
leck's.  26  ;  McClellan's  incorrect  re- 
port of  affairs  at  Manassas  to,  279 ; 


INDEX 


471 


MeClellaii's  proposition  to  leave  Pope  j 
to  "  g-et  out  of  Ms  scrape  "  to,  26,  j 
280,  283,  301  ;  Porter's  case  revieTi-ed  ' 
by  Holt  for,  243  ;  his  reg'ard  for  Por-  ; 
ter  submitted  in  eyideuce  to  tlie  in-  j 
yestigating  board,  362  ;  Lis  opinion  i 
tbat  Porter  deserved  a  death  sen- 
tence, ih. ;  nnfitted  for  command  in 
military  affairs,  305  ;  his  creations 
of  independent  commands,  391  ;  the 
disadvantages  of  his  policy,  ih. 

Lincoln,  R.  T.,  his  evidence  that  the 
President  considered  Porter  to  de- 
serve a  sentence  of  death,  362. 

Little  River  Turnpike,  Va.,  position  of 
Chantilly  on,  136,  139  ;  in  Jackson's 
movement,  Aug\  31,  145,  147,  148; 
Stevens'  movement  on,  Sept.  1,  137, 
151 :  McDowell  ordered  to  protect, 
for  Union  retreat,  148  ;  comraand 
given  to  Hooker  of  Union  forces  on, 
149  ;  Reno  charged  "with  holding 
position  on,  150,  153 ;  Sumner's  po- 
sition on,  276  ;  Patrick  posted  on, 
149  ;  Stuart  repidsed  on,  149-150 ; 
Union  losses  in  the  action,  150,  164  ; 
Jackson's  report  of  movement  on,  ; 
165  ;  in  Lane's  report,  168  :  in  Lee's 
report,  167  ;  in  McDowell's  report, 
164 ;  in  McGowan's  report,  169  ;  in 
Riekett's  report,  164 ;  in  Stuart's  re- 
port, 165  ;  visited  by  TValcott  and 
Stevens,  1883, 180.  et  seq. :  also  called 
Alexandria  and  "Winchester  Turn- 
pike, 168  ;  mentioned,  141. 181, 191. 

Little  Washing-ion,  Va.,  Crawford's 
brigade  removed  from,  42  ;  Banks' 
movement  to,  July  17,  395  ;  in 
Banks'  movement  to  Culpeper,  400. 

Locke,  F.  T.,  Lieut.-CoL,  A.  D.  C.  U. 
S.  v.,  bearer  of  message  to  McDow- 
ell from  Porter,  232  ;  the  message 
and  answer,  ib. ;  his  testimony  as  to 
his  interview  with  McDowell,  244, 
245  ;  his  evidence  sustained  by  Lei- 
pold,  244  note  ;  Porter's  order  to 
Morell  to  attack.  Aug.  29,  carried  by, 
241, 

Longstreet,  J.,  Major,  A.  D.  C  U.  S. 
A':  ( Julv  19,  185vS-June  1,  1861)  ; 
Lieut.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.  (1862-1865)  ; 
his  streng-th,  232,  249,  250,  307 ;  on 
July  20,  207  ;  on  Aug.  29,  245,  247,  | 
347,  348 ;  detained  at  Richmond  in  I 
fear  of  an  attack,  45  ;  with  Lee  on  I 
the  Rappahannock,  Aug.  21,  307  ;  in  { 
the  advance  on  Pope,  266  ;  his  posi-  ! 
tion,  Aug.  27,  268  ;  at  White  Plains 
that  evening,  331 ;  cut  off  from  Jack-  : 
son  by  Pope,  308 ;  delayed  at  Thor- 


oughfare Gap  by  Ricketts  night  of 
Aug.  28,  69,  331.  332  ;  by  the  retreat 
of  King  and  Ricketts  his  junction 
with  Jackson  made  possible,  332  ; 
his  advance  reported  by  Porter  and 
McDowell,  231  ;  McDowell  ques- 
tioned that  Porter  could  prevent  the 
jimction  of  Jackson  and,  226,  233  ; 
his  forces  discovered  in  advance  on 
Groveton.  Aug.  29,  85,  86 ;  his  junc- 
tion with  Jackson,  231,  309  ;  his  flank 
seriously  menaced,  342,  345-346 ;  en- 
countered by  Stuart,  342  ;  warned 
by  Stuart  of  L^nion  advance,  ib.,  345- 
346  ;  the  jaded  condition  of  his  men, 
348  ;  demonstration  before  Bristoe, 
342-345 ;  his  position,  89,  248,  251, 
252,  255,  309,  343, 344  :  the  time  his 
forces  were  placed  in  position,  343, 
et  seq.  ;  only  part  of  his  forces  be- 
fore Pope,  347  ;  the  disposition  of 
his  forces,  248-249,  256  ;  Marshall's 
statement  of  the  disposition  of  his 
forces.  357  ;  on  Jackson's  right,  251, 
252,  255  ;  Jackson's  position  in  re- 
lation to  him,  257-258 ;  Jackson  re- 
enforced  by,  Aug.  29,  79,  171,  236  ; 
the  good  fighting  of  his  divisions 
under  Hood  and  Evans,  89-90  ;  Jack- 
son saved  from  defeat,  Aug-.  29-30, 
by  aid  from,  368  ;  Porter  confronted 
by.  88,  309 ;  Pope's  ignorance  of  his 
presence.  89,  90,  92,  241;  Pope's 
miscalculation  as  to  time  of  arrival 
of,  337 ;  his  presence  not  admitted 
at  Porter  court-martial,  368  ;  no 
comment  made  by  McDowell  on  his 
ignorance  of  the  presence  of,  369 ; 
Porter's  evidence  submitted  to  the 
board  that  he  was  confronted  by, 
359-360  ;  his  forces  held  inactive  by 
Porter,  232  ;  prevented  by  Porter 
from  further  advance,  249  ;  his  field 
minutes  cited  as  to  Lee's  wish  to 
attack,  344-345  ;  Porter's  attack  on, 
frustrated,  232  ;  probable  result  of 
attack,  88 ;  Porter  was  expected  to 
paralyze,  310  ;  Porter's  irresolute  at- 
titude, 366, 367  ;  Porter's  withdrawal, 
345  ;  Porter's  neglect  to  attack, 
questioned,  348  ;  Porter  not  con- 
victed for  failure  to  attack,  360 ;  his 
report  of  battle  of  Aug.  29,  cited, 
90-91 ;  hLs  aid  to  Jackson  in  repuls- 
ing Porter's  attack,  Aug.  30,  259, 
260  ;  the  Union  left  and  centre 
broken  by,  94  ;  his  losses  at  Ma- 
nassas, 212  ;  care  of  Confederate  dead 
and  wounded  on  battlefield  commit- 
ted to,  Aug.  31,  144 ;  his  movement 


472 


INDEX 


towards  Chantilly,  145,  165  ;  not  en- 
gaged at  Chantilly,  171 ;  Ms  report 
cited,  248-249 ;  extract  sent  to 
Pope  by  McDowell,  366;  not  cited 
fully  Tby  Pope  to  Comte  de  Paris, 
91 ;  the  Porter  "  Board  Maps  "  veri- 
fied by,  241 ;  mentioned,  126,  131, 
378. 

Louisa  Court  House,  Va.,  Ewell  ordered 
to,  July  13,  402;  removed  to  Gor- 
donsville  from,  ib. 

Louisiana  Volunteers,  15tli  regt.,  for- 
merly 3d  battalion,  in  Stafford's 
brigade,  Jackson's  division,  Jack- 
son's corps,  206. 

Lowell,  J.  R.,  Biglow  Papers  cited,  20. 

Luray  Gap,  Va.  (i.  e.  Milam's  Gap),  in 
the  Union  line,  July,  1862,  395. 

Luray  Valley,  movement  of  Sigel's 
corps  through,  July,  395. 

Lyman,  T.,  Col.,  A.  D.  C,  U.  S.  V„ 
his  review  of  arguments  concerning 
McClellan's  conduct  at  Alexandria, 
305-313  ;  his  explanation  of  Hook- 
er's movement,  Aug.  27,  326  note. 

Lynchburg,  A^a.,  the  enemy's  move- 
ment from  Richmond  towards,  July 
30-31,  319. 

McCall,  G.  A.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 

(May  17,  1861-March  31,  1863)  ; 
Reynolds  succeeded  to  the  command 
of  his  division,  203. 
McClellan,  G.  B.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 
(May  14,  1861-Nov.  8,  1864),  with- 
drawal of  Confederates  from  Ma- 
nassas, spring  of  1862,  on  his  advance 
towards  Richmond,  103 ;  McDowell's 
co-operation  with,  prevented,  391 ; 
Jackson's  forces  engaged  against,  in 
Seven  Days'  Battles,  401 ;  his  move- 
ment to  the  James  opposed  by  Pope, 
392  ;  Pope's  suggestion  as  to  the 
limit  of  the  southern  movement  of, 
ih. ;  his  position  on  Harrison's  Land- 
ing, 5,  42;  his  distance  from  Rich- 
mond, after  July  1,  8;  project  for 
the  co-operation  of  Pope  and,  4,  5 ; 
correspondence  respecting  co-opera- 
tion, 4,  392 ;  his  reluctance  to  co- 
operate, 15  ;  Pope's  open  censure 
of,  398 ;  his  letter  of  advice  to  Lin- 
coln, July  7,  6, 42 ;  visited  by  Lincoln, 
July  8,  7  ;  Halleck  appointed  his 
military  superior,  392-393  ;  his  de- 
mands for  re-enforcements,  6,  7, 
318  ;  compliance  dependent  on  his 
vigor  in  operations,  5  ;  his  demands 
not  complied  with,  318  ;  his  demands 
reviewed  by  Halleck,  9-10  ;  Hal- 


leck's  change  of  plan,  after  the  re- 
verses of,  4 ;  the  plan  of  govern- 
ment, Jidy  8,  to  facilitate  his  opera- 
tions by  a  demonstration  by  Pope, 
318  ;  informed  July  30-31,  of  move- 
ment of  the  enemy  from  Richmond, 
319;  directed  to  ascertain  the  facts 
of  the  enemy's  condition,  ih. ;  he 
took  no  advantage  of  the  opportu- 
nity, 318 ;  his  failure  to  get  infor- 
mation, Aug.  5,  319 ;  his  chance  to 
attack  a  weak  enemy  disregarded, 
ih. ;  visited  by  Halleck,  July  25,  7, 

318  ;  his  attack  on  Richmond  aban- 
doned, 42 ;  encouraged  with  a  hope 
to  attack  Petersburg,  ih. ;  his  failure 
in  Peninsular  Campaign  attributed 
by  him  to  the  denial  of  re-enforce- 
ments, 33  ;  ascribed  by  government 
to  his  conduct  of  it  on  military  prin- 
ciples, 34  ;  alarm  at  Washington  be- 
cause of  his  failure,  ih. ;  his  fears 
for  the  morale  of  his  army  in  case  of 
a  withdrawal,  318 ;  instructed  to 
send  away  his  sick,  July  30,  7,  319- 
320  ;  the  determination  to  withdraw 
his  army  from  the  Peninsula,  3,  4,  5, 
7,  399 ;  the  decision  concealed  from, 
42  ;  not  informed  of  intention  to 
terminate  the  campaign,  48,  318  ; 
the  order  issued,  Aug.  3,  7,  320 ; 
the  order  received  by,  Aug.  4,  7, 
265,  320,  399-400  ;  his  remonstrance, 
Aug.  1,  7  ;  HaUeck's  letter,  Aug.  6, 
to,  giving  reasons  for  terminating 
the  campaign,  8-11 ;  the  effect  of 
the  withdrawal  of,  on  Pope's  plans, 

319  ;  his  belief  that  the  interference 
with  his  plans  was  the  cause  of  dis- 
aster to  Pope,  120 ;  the  projected 
withdrawal  known  at  Richmond  be- 
fore it  was  known  by  the  officers  of, 
11-12  ;  Lee's  delay  in  learning  of 
the  withdrawal  of,  400 ;  his  presence 
on  the  James  the  cause  of  the  de- 
tention of  Lee's  forces  at  Richmond, 
ih. ;  the  Confederate  force  detained 
at  Richmond  after  the  withdrawal 
of,  401  ;  informed,  Aug.  10,  of  the 
battle  at  Cedar  Mountain,  320 ;  his 
assumption  that  his  army  could  not 
be  transferred  in  time  to  save  Wash- 
ington, ih. ;  and  to  re-enforce  Pope, 
ih. ;  believed  its  position  better  on 
the  James,  ih. ;  his  removal  to  Fort 
Monroe  begun,  Aug.  14,  24,  57 ;  his 
belief  that  the  route  to  the  Rappa- 
hannock was  shorter  from  Aequia 
Creek  than  Alexandria,  112  note; 
the  dates  at  which  his  command  was 


INDEX 


473 


forwarded  from  tlie  Peninsula,  2S9  ; 
details  of  the  transportation  of  his 
army  from  Fortress  Monroe,  298, 
299 ;  expectation  of  government  of 
a  quick  transfer,  57  ;  liis  expedi- 
tion in  sending  Porter  and  Heintzel- 
man  to  Pope,  289  ;  his  lack  of  en- 
ergy in  obeying  orders,  320 ;  Hal- 
leck's  eifort  to  hasten,  24,  320  ;  Le 
Due's  opinion  as  to  his  delay,  27  ; 
Lee's  apprehension  of  an  attack 
from,  relieved,  Aug-.  5,  46  ;  he  left 
Fort  Monroe,  Aug.  23,  289 ;  arrived 
at  Acquia  Creek,  Aug.  24,  272,  283, 
289  :  ordered  to  Alexandria  to  correct 
irregularities,  111,  272,  283  ;  arrived 
at  Alexandria,  Aug.  26,  25,  112,  265, 
268,  269,  271,  273,  290,  309;  con- 
tented with  condition  of  affairs  there, 
112  ;  in  command  at  Alexandria, 
Aug.  26  to  Sept.  1,  289,  290:  his 
lack  of  authority,  290  :  his  command 
restricted  to  the  Department  of  the 
Potomac,  391  ;  given  command  of 
troops  in  and  about  Washington 
after  Aug.  26,  25,  271,  283 ;  given 
charge  of  forwarding'  troops  to  Pope, 
25,  113  ;  in  command  of  the  de- 
fences of  Washiagton,  309  ;  his 
strength  at  Alexandria,  122,  284  ; 
informed  that  the  enemy  was  in  the 
Shenandoah,  Aug.  26,  110,  111,  129; 
Halleck's  call  for  aid  from,  113  ;  his 
activity  in  consequence,  114  ;  in- 
formed of  Lee's  advance  against 
Pope,  Aug.  27,  277 ;  reported  the 
destruction  of  Bull  Run  railway 
bridge,  112  ;  Union  disaster  at  Ma- 
nassas reported  to  Halleck,  119  ;  his 
incorrect  report  of  affairs  at  Manas- 
sas to  Lincoln,  279  ;  the  charge  that 
he  could  have  prevented  Jackson's 
raid,  denied,  110,  111 ;  his  telegrams 
to  Heiatzelman  and  Porter  asking 
information,  114  ;  Porter's  telegram, 
Aug.  27,  to  Burnside  announcitig 
battle  imminent,  sent  to,  113  ;  Burn- 
side  cautioned  by,  115  ;  his  personal 
escort  lent  to  Burnside,  114  ;  his  dis- 
tribution of  the  cavalry,  279 ;  his 
lack  of  cavalry,  Aug.  27,  292 ;  his 
demands  of  Pope  for  cavalry,  278  ; 
the  reports  received  from  cavalry  un- 
trustworthy, 279  ;  Halleck's  reiter- 
ated orders  to  send  Franklin  to  Pope, 
117,  293  ;  his  delay  in  forwarding 
Franklin,  272,  et  seq. ;  his  corre- 
spondence with  Halleck  concern- 
ing Franklin,  ib. ;  Franklin  detained 
at  Annandale  by  order  of,  Aug. 


29,  298  ;  his  reasons  for  detention, 
294  ;  responsible  for  the  detention, 
274,  et  seq. ;  277,  333,  334  ;  his  dis- 
obedience of  Halleck's  orders,  283, 
312-313  ;  the  detention  of  Franklin 
justified,  292  ;  his  statement  of  lack 
of  transportation,  117-118,  282  ;  his 
superior  knowledge  as  to  transporta- 
tion, 293 ;  the  abimdance  of  trans- 
portation denied  by,  295  ;  the  futil- 
ity of  his  plea  of  lack  of  transpor- 
tation, 282,  284 ;  Halleck  censured 
for  leaving  the  business  of  forward- 
ing Franklin  to,  293  ;  Cox  withheld 
from  Pope  by,  273,  277,  333 ;  Sum- 
ner prevented  from  joining  Pope  by, 
276,  334 ;  the  resiDonsibility  for  their 
detention  shared  by  Halleck,  333 ; 
the  defence  of  Washington  of  more 
concern  than  the  safety  of  Pope's 
army  to,  116,  277-278,  334 ;  as 
anxious  for  safety  of  Pope's  army  as 
for  Washington,  117  ;  his  provision 
for  defence,  279  ;  his  distrust  of 
Pope.  312  ;  his  appeal  to  Lincoln  for 
direction  as  to  executing  Halleck's 
orders,  26  ;  his  proposition  "  to  leave 
Pope  to  get  out  of  his  scrape,"  26, 
280,  283  ;  the  intention  of  this  prop- 
osition explained,  301 ;  his  solicitude 
for  Pope's  defeat,  115,  116,  118  ;  his 
confidence  that  Pope  would  be  equal 
to  the  emergency,  301  ;  his  exag- 
gerated estimate  of  Pope's  strength, 
ib. ;  ignorant  of  Pope's  position  and 
strength,  118 ;  his  fears  of  disaster, 
115  ;  his  dependence  upon  imtrust- 
worthy  reports,  278  ;  informed  of 
Pope's  call  for  re-enforcements  to 
Gainesville,  122  ;  reported  firing  at 
CentrevUle,  116,  117 ;  his  staff  em- 
ployed in  the  inspection  of  forts, 
Aug.  29,  280  ;  his  effort  to  ascer- 
tain Pope's  situation,  302  ;  Halleck's 
refusal  to  co-operate  with,  ib. ;  his 
indifference  as  to  the  condition  of 
Pope's  army,  278-279,  283  ;  his 
statement  concerning  ammunition, 
280-281  ;  his  evasion  of  providing 
supplies  for  Pope's  army,  281,  283, 
284  ;  Pope  informed,  Aug.  29,  that 
by  sending  to  Alexandria  rations 
would  be  furnished,  281  ;  Pope's 
comment  on  this  proposition,  282 ; 
his  conduct  at  Alexandria,  Aug-.  26- 

30,  examined,  265-285,  305-313  ; 
the  number  of  men  sent  to  Pope  by, 
Aug.  20-27,  203,  210,  213  note  ; 
Pope's  statement  as  to  re-enforce- 
ments inaccurate,  202 ;  the  number 


474 


INDEX 


of  his  men  available  for  Pope,  283  ; 
no  troops  forwarded  after  his  arrival 
at  Alexandria,  202,  269,  283  ;  the  re- 
sult of  his  efforts,  the  protection  of 
the  retreating"  supply  trains,  300- 
801  ;  his  testimony  concerning  re- 
enforcements,  273-274  ;  Halleek's 
statement  to  the  Conduct  of  War 
Committee  as  to  the  position  at  Al- 
exandria of,  270-272  ;  the  move- 
ments of  troops  chiefly  under  orders 
of,  272 ;  his  attempted  justification 
in  his  report  cited,  269-270  ;  his 
omission  of  orders  and  despatches 
from  report  which  would  not  sus- 
tain his  position,  270  ;  his  defence  in 
letter  of  June  20, 1876,  to  Gen.  Whit- 
tier  cited,  296-298  ;  censurable  for 
failure  to  re-enforce  Pope,  25,  26, 
80,  312-313  ;  defended  against  the 
charges,  298-302 ;  as  Halleek's  sub- 
ordinate not  responsible  for  the  fail- 
ure to  strengthen  Pope,  301 ;  the 
question  of  liis  responsibility  for 
Pope's  disaster  summed  up,  283-285  ; 
Porter's  admissions  of  disloyalty  to 
Pope,  and  loyalty  to,  362  ;  Pope  be- 
lieved to  be  more  enterprising  than, 
57 ;  the  army  rejoiced  by  restoration 
to  command  of,  97  ;  the  logic  of  his 
partisans,  ih. ;  reorganization  of  the 
army  by,  ih.  ;  his  disposition  of 
Sigel's  and  Heintzelman's  corps,  ih. ; 
forces  taken  for  his  Antietam  cam- 
paign, ih. ;  South  Mountain  and  An- 
tietam in  contrast  to  2d  Bull  Run 
and  Chantilly,  ih. ;  his  abilities  and 
defects  as  a  military  commander, 
305  ;  his  constitutional  peculiarities, 
284 ;  his  unfortunate  state  of  mind 
and  peculiarities  exhibited,  25-26  ; 
probable  effect  on,  had  he  been 
ordered  to  supersede  Pope,  26  ;  his 
relations  to  Halleck  discussed,  121- 
122  ;  Halleek's  ignorance  of  the 
character  of,  4 ;  his  accusation  of 
Halleck,  25  ;  their  dead-lock,  120  ; 
his  right  to  immunity  from  criticism, 
in  criticizing  Halleck  and  Pope,  118  ; 
his  correspondence  with  Halleck, 
Aug.  27,  115  ;  courteous  but  re- 
proachful, ih. ;  his  numberless  prop- 
ositions, 115-118,  122  ;  his  anxiety 
as  to  his  authority  and  position,  121 ; 
his  conduct  actuated  by  a  desire  for 
restoration  to  command,  285  ;  mis- 
represented in  newspapers,  122-123  ; 
generally  censured,  123  ;  mentioned, 
208,  253,  254. 
McClure,  C,  Maj.,  U.  S.  V.,  his  state- 


ments concerning  Patrick's  services, 
Sept.  1,  150. 
McDoweU,  I.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(March  14,  1862)  ;  his  operations 
against  Jackson,  132  ;  little  injury 
done  to  Jackson  by,  May,  1862,  391 ; 
his  co-operation  with  McClellan  be- 
fore Richmond,  prevented,  ih.  ;  his 
forces  unsuccessful  at  Port  Republic, 
June  9, 1862,  33  ;  his  command  made 
the  3d  Corps,  Army  of  Virginia,  4, 
35,  40,  390  ;  Pope's  statement  of  the 
strength  of,  July  8, 199  ;  his  strength, 
July  31,  40,  198  ;  his  own  report, 
Aug.  16,  201,  215  ;  as  reported  by 
Pope,  Aug.  20,  201 ;  in  Pope's  state- 
ment, Aug.  26,  203 ;  in  Pope's  final 
report,  209,  210,  214,  394  ;  his  losses 
along  the  Rappahannock,  Aug.  20- 
26, 203  ;  the  distribution  of  his  corps, 
July,  393  ;  the  cavalry  under  Bayard 
attached  to  his  command,  395  ;  his 
troops  in  good  condition,  394  ;  Rick- 
etts'  division  of  his  corps,  16  ;  Rick- 
etts  ordered,  July  22,  to  Waterloo 
Bridge,  41 ;  Ricketts  at  Culpeper, 
Aug.  8,  403  ;  his  position,  Aug.  9, 
46  ;  rations  supplied  to  Sigel  by,  50  ; 
his  position  at  Rappahannock  Station, 
Aug.  20,  53,  307  ;  informed  by  Pope 
that  Jackson's  destination  was  the 
Shenandoah  Valley,  Aug.  25,  110, 
322  ;  his  forces  near  Warrenton,  Aug. 
26,  61, 113  ;  Pope's  order  to,  Aug.  26, 
to  protect  the  railroad  to  Manassas, 
322  ;  Pope's  despatch  to,  evening  of 
Aug.  26,  323,  324;  his  advice  soli- 
cited by  Pope,  Aug.  27,  125  ;  advice 
given  by,  ih. ;  his  telegraphic  com- 
munications, Aug.  27,  with  Pope, 
125-127;  the  results,  127-128;  the 
great  importance  of  his  services,  126 ; 
in  accord  with  Pope  as  to  disposi- 
tions, 326 ;  in  agreement  with  Pope's 
conjecture  as  to  Jackson's  plans, 
64,  126  ;  Pope's  intention  to  occupy 
Gainesville  communicated  to,  60 ; 
ordered  to  Gainesville,  Aug.  27,  62, 
125,  127,  325  ;  his  movement  to 
Gainesville,  65,  66,  125,  129,  131; 
Banks  ordered  to  Catlett's  Station 
by,  126-127  ;  the  forces  at  Green- 
wich ordered  to  his  support,  128  ; 
his  expectations  from  Buford's  re- 
connaissance, 129 ;  reached  Buekland 
Mills,  evening  of  Aug.  27,  63;  in 
position  to  intercept  communication 
between  Jackson  and  Lee,  132,  327 ; 
Sigel's  corps  and  Reynolds'  division 
placed  under  command  of,  127 ;  his 


INDEX 


475 


order  to  Sigel  from  BncMand  Mills, 
S69  ;  Pope's  hope  to  capture  Jackson 
expressed  to,  327 ;  Pope  in  error  in 
belief  tiiat  Jackson  might  have  been 
intercepted  by,  65  ;  Jackson's  plans 
tnisapprehended  by,  66 ;  Jackson's 
communica,tions  with  Lee  cut  by, 
Ang\  28,  332  ;  ordered  to  Manassas 
Junction,  65,  327,  330 ;  the  position 
better  at  Gainesville,  66  ;  expected 
by  Pope,  to  encounter  Jackson  early, 
328 ;  ordered  in  the  afternoon  to 
intercept  Jackson  at  Gum  Springs, 
329  ;  the  order  countermanded,  330  ; 
Pope's  orders  to,  intercepted  by 
Jackson,  329  ;  Pope  ad^'ised  by,  to 
place  a  large  force  across  Warrenton 
Turnpike,  329-330 ;  the  reason  for 
failure  to  adopt  his  suggestion,  330  : 
Kicketts  sent  by,  to  check  Lee's 
advance,  67,  68,  75,  331  ;  censured 
by  Pope  for  this,  67,  331 ;  King  and 
Keynolds  sent  to  Warrenton  Turn- 
pike, 78  ;  the  engagement  \nt\\  Jack- 
son, Aug.  28,  226  ;  the  withdrawal 
of  his  forces  from  Gainesville,  226  ; 
King's  withdrawal  approved  by, 
226-227  ;  his  forces  reported  by 
Pope  to  have  intercepted  Jackson, 
78,  82,  225,  331,  383  ;  his  unsuccess- 
ful effort  to  find  Pope,  68,  69,  77  ; 
by  a<5cident  separated  from  his  com- 
mand, 77,  332  ;  conjecture  as  to  the  ! 
result  had  he  remained  with  his  I 
corps,  332 ;  his  corps  found  at  Ma- 
nassas, morning  of  Aug.  29,  81  ; 
Pope's  ignorance  of  his  position,  81, 
884;  in  command  of  Union  centre, 
309  ;  his  early  meeting  with  Porter,  ! 
225  ;  Pope's  plan  for  the  employment  I 
of,  in  the  capture  of  Jackson,  331 ;  | 
King's  division  nnder  Hatch,  de-  I 
tached  from,  85,  383  ;  his  remon- 
strance, 81,  335  ;  the  division  re- 
stored to  his  command,  85,  227,  232, 
245  ;  the  division  needed  by  Porter, 
242 ;  Pope's  joint  order  to  Porter 
and,  81,  231,  310,  335,  353,  384;  the 
order  received,  227,  228  ;  ordered  to 
communicate  with  Ricketts,  384  ; 
provision  made  for  his  withdrawal 
to  Centreville,  81,  82  ;  reasons  for 
the  same,  83-84  ;  authorized  to  de- 
part from  instructions  for  the  sake 
of  advantage,  81 ;  his  violation  of 
Pope's  joint  order,  243,  353  ;  with 
Porter  in  conference  over  the  order, 
85-86  ;  his  meeting  with  Porter,  226- 
227  ;  his  recollection  of  the  meeting, 
231,  244  ]  controversy  eonceruing  the 


interview,  230-231,  254;  the  data 
discussed,  337,  338  ;  the  probable  po- 
sition of  the  enemy  at  the  time  of 
meeting,  ih. ;  Biiford's  report  of  the 
enemy's  advance  communicated  to 
Porter  by,  85,  231,  337 ;  the  report 
sent  to  Pope  by,  85,  90,  124 ;  in- 
formed by  Porter  of  Confederate  ad- 
vance, 231,  234-235  ;  problem  caused 
by  Lee's  advance,  85-86  ;  his  igno- 
rance of  the  presence  of  Longstreet's 
forces,  359  ;  discouraged  Porter's 
hope  of  reaching  Gainesville,  226  ; 
a  route  to  Groveton  thought  to  be 
impracticable  for  Porter  by,  230 ; 
his  claim  that  he  ordered  an  attack, 
87,  229,  233,  244,  356;  his  claim 
questioned,  233,  311,  337 ;  his  dis- 
pute with  Porter,  310  ;  Wilcox's 
comment  on  the  orders  given  by, 
254 ;  Porter  believed  himself  ordered 
to  remain  in  position  by,  231,  245  ; 
Porter  attributed  his  inaction  to  the 
orders  of,  87  ;  Porter  s  statement  de- 
nied by,  ih.  ;  his  tenacity  to  state- 
ment that  he  expected  Porter  to  at- 
tack, 371  ;  the  vagueness  of  his 
order,  379,  380-381  ;  his  forgetful- 
ness  of  his  ordei-s,  233 ;  the  want  of 
clear  understanding  between  Porter 
and,  378-381 ;  the  effect  of  his  order 
to  Porter  as  to  the  place  at  wliich  to 
put  his  troops  in,  on  the  opinion  of  the 
court,  358-359  ;  not  considered  suf- 
ficiently explicit  by  the  Judge-Ad- 
vocate, 359  ;  Porter  exonerated  for 
his  failure  to  attack  without  the  sup- 
port of,  375-376  ;  suggestion  as  to  a 
proper  statement  by  Porter  to  the 
Board  of  the  consequences  of  follow- 
ing •  the  order  of,  360 ;  his  parting 
from  Porter,  86,  230;  his  route  by 
Sudley  Springs  Road  to  Warrenton 
Turnpike,  85,  88  ;  not  seen  by  King 
after  10  a.  m.  ,  244  ;  King  known  by 
him  to  be  incapacitated,  ib. ;  his  en- 
counter with  Bradley  T.  Johnson  at 
Groveton,  328 ;  Sigel's  position  on 
his  right.  383 ;  rendered  little  service, 
87,  92  ;  informed  by  Porter  of  affairs, 
238 ;  Porter  reassured  by,  ib.,  239 ; 
his  message  to  Porter  carried  by 
Locke,  232,  245  ;  the  result  of  Por- 
ter's message  to,  232  ;  Porter's  de- 
spatch to,  considered  as  evidence  of 
disobedience  of  joint  order,"  243  ; 
did  not  forward  Porter's  despatches 
to  Pope,  242  note ;  Porter's  dispo- 
sition of  forces  with  a  view  to  aid, 
234,  338 ;  expected  Porter  to  connect 


476 


INDEX 


with  Mm,  871,  372  ;  Porter  criticized 
for  liis  failure  to  establish  commu- 
nication with,  376,  377  ;  Porter's  in- 
ability to  join,  372 ;  believed  there 
would  be  no  general  battle,  226  ; 
Porter's  confidence  in  the  opinions 
of,  227 ;  Warren's  opinion  that  he 
was  responsible  for  Porter's  failure 
to  attack,  229-230 ;  conjecture  that 
the  Confederates  refrained  from  at- 
tacking Porter  because  of  the  prox- 
imity of,  91 ;  advantage  which  might 
have  followed  had  his  forces  and 
Banks'  been  united  with  Porter's, 
88,  92  ;  ordered  by  Pope  to  super- 
intend pursuit  of  an  enemy  not  re- 
treating, Aug.  30,  259  ;  his  position, 
Aug.  31, 140  ;  ordered  to  prepare  the 
way  for  retreat,  Sept.  1,  148  ;  his 
prompt  action,  149,  164 ;  Patrick 
posted  by,  to  repel  Stuart,  149  ; 
Stuart  repulsed,  149-150  ;  Union 
losses  in  that  action,  150,  164 ;  his 
report  of  engagement,  164  ;  in  re- 
treat to  Fairfax  C.  H.,  137 ;  his  corps 
put  under  Hooker's  command  by 
MeClellan,  97  ;  his  testimony  at  Por- 
ter court-martial,  243  ;  treated  with 
indignity  by  Porter's  counsel,  before 
the  investigating  board,  363,  et  seq.  ; 
the  object  of  his  employment  as  a 
witness  by  government  discussed, 
363-364  ;  his  discovery  of  Porter's 
note  of  Aug.  29,  364 ;  accused  of  a 
disposition  to  suppress  the  note,  365  ; 
the  note  employed  in  evidence,  364- 
365  ;  attempt  to  prove  him  guilty  of 
falsifying  Jackson's  report,  364,  368- 
370 ;  the  caution  of  his  statements, 
365-366  ;  his  silence  as  to  Long- 
street's  presence,  369,  370 ;  men- 
tioned, 93,  184,  213,  219. 

McDowell,  Court  of  Inquiry,  Roberts' 
testimony  at,  19,  23. 

McGilvery,  F.,  Capt.,  U.  S.  V.,  in  com- 
mand of  6th  Maine  Battery,  415, 
416  ;  Greene's  brigade  supported  by, 
Cedar  Mountain,  415,  420  ;  strength 
of,  416. 

McGowan,  S.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  his 
report  for  Gregg's  brigade  at  Chan- 
tilly,  169 ;  loss  of  the  brigade,  170. 

McLaws,  mider  Longstreet,  Aug.  21, 
307. 

McMahon,  mentioned  by  MeClellan, 
296. 

Madison  Court  House,  Va.,  Hatch  or- 
dered to  make  a  cavalry  demonstra- 
tion from,  396  ;  his  slow  movement 
to,  lb. ;  road  to  Sperryville  from, 


guarded  by  Sigel,  Aug.  7,  401 ;  Bu- 
ford's  report  from,  of  Confederate 
advance,  Aug.  8,  403  ;  road  to  Cedar 
Mountain  from,  guarded  by  Rick- 
etts,  16,  404,  410;  road  from  Cul- 
peper  to,  413. 

Maine  Volunteers,  Artillery,  3d  Bat- 
tery, strength,  Aug.  16,  215 ;  4th 
Battery  under  Robinson  at  Cedar 
Mountain,  416  ;  its  strength,  ib. ;  6th 
Battery  under  McGilvery  at  Cedar 
Mountain,  415,  416,  420. 

 ,  Cavalry,  1st  regt.  under  Allen, 

in  2d  division  (Ricketts'),  3d  Corps, 
A.  of  v.,  at  Cedar  Mountain,  421, 
432  ;  strength,  Aug.  16,  215  :  3d  regt. 
in  2d  brigade  (Birney's),  1st  division 
(Kearny's),  3d  Corps  (Heintzei- 
man's),  a.t  Chantilly,  160-161  ;  its 
losses,  163 :  4th  regt.  in  2d  brigade 
at  Chantilly,  160 ;  its  losses,  163 : 
10th  regt.  in  Crawford's  brigade, 
Cedar  Mountain,  414,  420  ;  Muhlen- 
berg's battery  supported  by,  428 ; 
its  advance  under  heavy  fire,  ib. ; 
removed  to  shelter,  ib.  ;  its  colonel 
censured  by  one  of  Banks'  aides,  ib. ; 
Gould's  history  of,  389. 

 ,  Infantry,  2d  regt.  under  Hall, 

439 ;  Pegram's  battery  silenced  by, 
Cedar  Mountain,  ib. ;  Whitman  and 
True's  "Maine  in  the  War,"  men- 
tioned, xxi.,  161. 

Malvern  Hill,  Va.,  McClellan's  call  for 
re-enforcements  before  the  battle  of, 
6. 

Manassas  Gap  Railway,  Rieketts  or- 
dered to  Waterloo  Bridge  from, 
July  22,  41 ;  railroad  from  Warren- 
ton  Junction  to,  seized  by  Lee,  1863, 
58  ;  his  arrival  at,  Aug.  26,  73 ;  not 
protected  by  Pope,  60,  62  ;  an  object 
in  Jackson's  flank  movement,  59  ; 
believed  by  Pope  to  be  i^roteeted  by 
Army  of  Potomac,  Aug.  26,  73  ; 
Pope's  movement  to,  Aug.  27,  63 ; 
Hooker  repulsed  Ewell  in  advancing 
towards,  ib. ;  in  possession  of  Jack- 
son, Aug.  27,  323,  324,  325  ;  Mc- 
Dowell's right  wing  ordered  to,  Aug. 
28,  65,  327 ;  Porter  and  McDowell's 
interview,  near  its  junction  with  Sud- 
ley  Springs  Road,  86  ;  the  Confed- 
erate position  on,  Aug.  29,  91,  93, 
249,  252,  255,  256,  258,  344 ;  Long- 
street's  position  on,  309  ;  A.  P.  Hill's 
position  on  the  unfinished  branch  of, 
257 ;  D.  R.  Jones'  position  on,  345, 
347 ;  Wilcox's  movement  to,  345  ; 
mentionedj  187,  323. 


INDEX 


477 


Manassas  Junction,  Va.,  Ricketts  in  po- 
sition near,  in  July,  393  ;  Jackson's 
raid  at,  Aug.  26-27,  268,^292,  308  ; 
Union  stores  captured,  65,  96,  101- 
102  ;  skUiuliiess  of  the  operation, 
66,  96  ;  measures  taken  by  Jackson 
for  defence  at,  103-104 ;  plunder  of 
stores  by  Confederate  soldiers  at, 
105-106  ;  supplies  burned  at,  108, 
109  ;  description  of  tbe  scene  of  op- 
erations at,  103  ;  perilous  position  of 
Confederates  at,  101-102  ;  Pope's 
orders  looking'  to  tbe  protection  of, 
Aug.  26,  322 ;  the  object  of  move- 
ment of,  Aug.  27,  to  attack  Jackson 
between  Thoroughfare  Gap  and,  63  ; 
in  his  disposition  of  forces,  327  ; 
Kearny  ordered  from  Greemvich  to, 
65  ;  Reno  ordered  to,  65,  327  ;  Mc- 
Dowell ordered  to,  64,  65, 327  ;  Union 
forces  sent  to  Warrenton  Turnpike 
from,  78  ;  McClellan's  failure  to  send 
forces  to,  to  repel  Jackson,  274 ;  en- 
gagement at,  Aug.  27,  104-105  ; 
Taylor's  attempt  to  drive  the  rebels 
from,  292  ;  almost  annihilated  by 
Jackson  at,  ib. ;  the  return  of  the 
remnants  of  Union  forces  to  Alex- 
andria from,  119  ;  Jackson's  with- 
drawal from,  Aug.  27-28,  65,  268, 
308,  328-329 ;  charge  that  McClellan 
could  have  prevented  the  disaster 
at,  denied,  110  ;  his  proposition  to 
employ  cavalry  in  watching.  115  ; 
Jackson's  raid  reported  by  Porter 
to  Bumside,  337 ;  disobedience  of 
Pope's  order  to  Porter  to  move  to 
Bristoe  from,  352  ;  Pope  informed  of 
Jackson's  position  at,  Aug.  27,  326 ; 
his  consequent  change  of  plan,  65, 
75  ;  public  x^roperty  transferred  from 
Warrenton  towards,  126  ;  Pope's  fear 
for  his  supplies  coming  from  "Warren- 
ton, 330-331  ;  Banks  assigned  to 
protection  of  trains  to,  129  ;  Banks 
ordered  to  push  trains  to  the  south 
of,  325  ;  Pope's  arrival  at,  about 
noon,  Aug.  28,  67,  268, 329 ;  Hooker, 
Reno,  and  Kearny  at,  67 ;  all  re- 
moved to  Centre ville,  68  ;  unfor- 
tunate removal  of  King  and  Rick- 
etts  to,  night  of  Aug.  28, 69, 70,  332  ; 
Pope's  plan  for  movement  to,  should 
have  been  understood  by  his  com- 
manders, 336  ;  exaggerated  reports 
of  Confederate  strength  at,  brought 
to  McClellan,  277 ;  Banks  removed, 
Aug.  28,  from  Catlett's  to,  67  ;  King 
and  Porter  directed  to  advance  to 
Gainesville  from,  morning  of  Aug. 


29,  335  ;  Porter's  movement  on  the 
road  to  Gainesville  from,  338  ;  the 
Union  movement  from,  early  known 
by  Jackson,  248  ;  Robertson's  move- 
ment towards,  342  ;  Stuart's  move- 
ment towards,  ih. ;  McDowell's  force 
seen  by  Stuart  retiring  to,  250  ;  Por- 
ter's meeting  with  Gibbon  at,  226  ; 
McDowell's  corps  foimd  by  him_  at, 
81 ;  meeting  of  Porter  and  McDowell 
near,  225  ;  Pope's  dispositions  to  se- 
cure a  means  of  retreat  to,  325-326  ; 
cannonading  at  Groveton  heard  at, 
227 ;  movement  to,  permitted  as  an 
alternative  for  King,  234,  373  ;  Por- 
ter's intention  to  withdraw  to,  234  ; 
Gri:^n's  movement  towards,  and  re- 
turn from,  338-339 ;  Union  troops 
seen  by  Confederates  retiring  to- 
wards, 343,  344  ;  Porter's  retreat  to, 
discussed,  338,  et  seq. ;  Porter  found 
guilty  of  shamefully  retreating  to- 
wards, 358  ;  in  Captain  Pope's  route 
with  4.30  p.  M.  order  to  Porter,  246 ; 
neither  Union  nor  Confederate  armies 
in  full  strength  at,  Aug.  1^9-30,  208  ; 
a  movement  at  Gainesville  from, 
would  have  struck  Longstreet's 
centre,  252  ;  McClellan's  meagre  re- 
ports of  affairs  at,  Aug.  29,  279 ; 
Franklin's  advance  towards,  Aug.  30, 
300  ;  the  reiterated  orders  to  Frank- 
lin to  move  towards,  272,  274,  278  ; 
Franklin  detained  by  McClellan  in 
march  to,  Aug.  29,  293  ;  Halleck's 
impatience  that  Franldin  was  not 
sent  to,  291 ;  Piatt's  arrival  at,  243  ; 
the  survivors  of  Pope's  army  at, 
Sept.  2,  213  ;  battlefield  revisited, 
18S3,  by  Walcott  and  Stevens,  173, 
et  seq.;  mentioned,  211,  212,  261, 
369,  370. 

Manassas.  Second  Battle  of.    See  Bull 

Run,  2d  battle. 
I  Manassas-Gainesville   Turnpike,  Por- 
i      ter's  position,  Aug.  29,  near,  233. 
I  Mansfield,  given  command  of  2d  Corps, 
I     A.  of  v.,  Sept.,  1S62,  97. 
1  Marlborough,  Lee  compared  with,  118. 
i  Marmont,  A.  F.  L.V.  de,  due  de  Raguse, 
I      his  rashness  at  Salamanca,  95-96. 

Maryland,  its  defence  considered.  9. 
I  MarshaU,  C,  Col.  and  A.  D.  C,  C  S. 

A.,  confidential  aid  to  Lee,  248;  his 
I  statement  as  to  the  Confederate 
i  movements,  Aug.  29,  cited  in  de- 
I     fence  by  Porter,  248,  249,  257  ;  not 

correctly  stated  to  the  Porter  court- 
!  martial,  249 ;  his  belief  that  Porter 
1     reached  the  field  after  Longstreet, 


478 


INDEX 


257 ;  Ms  statement  of  tlie  disposi- 
tion of  Longstreet's  forces,  257-258  ; 
tliat  D.  R.  Jones  was  not  in  line  on 
Porter's  approach,  347 ;  his  opinion 
that  an  attack  by  Porter  would  have 
been  repulsed,  249 ;  his  statements 
not  in  accord  with  reports  of  Con- 
federate g-enerals,  347  ;  the  Porter 
Board  Maps  verified  by,  240-241. 
Marshall,  E.  G.  (?),  Col.,  U.  S.  A.,  his 
report  of  movement  of  enemy,  Aug-. 

29,  236  ;  and  of  advance  of  enemy, 
237 ;  his  testimony  for  Porter  at 
court-martial,  245,  339,  348 ;  men- 
tioned, 235. 

Marshall,  J.,  Chief  Justice,  U.  S.  A,, 
Col.  C.  Marshall,  his  descendant, 
241.  ' 

Marshall,  L.  H.,  Col.,  U.  S.  V.,  Aide- 
de-Camp  to  Pope,  carried  order  to 
Banks  respecting  Cedar  Mountain, 
22,  47,  405. 

Martin,  A.  P.,  Capt.,  U.  S.  V.,  his  tes- 
timony for  Porter  at  court-martial, 
245  ;  readiness  of  Porter's  forces  for 
attack,  morning  of  Aug.  29,  338. 

Maryland  Volunteers,  2d  regt.,  Thomp- 
son's battery  silenced  Pegram,  Cedar 
Mountain,  439;  3d  regt.,  in  Prince's 
brigade,  Augur's  division,  its  po- 
sition at  Cedar  Mountain,  415,  430  ; 
its  advance  into  the  corn-field,  430 ; 
its  retreat  into  the  road,  431 ;  Pur- 
nell  Legion,  stationed  at  Warrenton, 
Aug.  9,  416. 

Massachusetts,  Banks.  Governor  of, 
1858-1861,  37. 

 ,  Volunteers,  2d  regt.,  in  1st 

division,  2d  Corps,  A.  of  V.,  50 ;  at 
Cedar  Mountain,  16,  et  seq. ;  its  po- 
sition on  Brown  House  hill,  413  ; 
ordered  to  the  svipport  of  Crawford, 
434  ;  its  attempted  charge  across  the 
wheat-field,  429,  438;  attacked  on 
the  right  flank,  438 ;  compelled  to 
retreat,  429  ;  its  loss,  50,  429,  439 ; 
the  enemy's  loss,  438 ;  a  futile  charge 
ordered  by  Banks,  435  ;  the  order 
cancelled  by  Gordon,  436  ;  the  order 
given  by  mistake,  ib.  ;  ordered  to  re- 
join the  brigade,  ib. ;  ordered  to  join 
Banks  at  6  o'clock,  433  ;  saved  by 
McDowell  from  participating  in 
second  Bull  Run,  126  ;  C.  J.  Mills  an 
officer  in,  266  ;  Quint's  record  of, 
389  :  8th  regt.,  its  guns  of  Cook's 
battery,  at  Chantilly,  135  note  ;  21st 
regt.,  in  Reno's  brigade,  143,  153, 
156  ;  its  position  and  service,  Aug. 

30,  on  Henry  House  hill,  143  ;  its 


want  of  confidence  in  Pope,  144 ; 
taunted  by  Franklin's  division,  ib. ; 
its  participation  in  the  battle  of  Chan- 
tilly, 138  ;  its  position  in  the  woods, 
156  ;  its  shattered  condition  on  with- 
drawal from  the  woods,  157  ;  its 
severe  engagement  with  Early's  bri- 
gade, ib. ;  its  delay  in  supporting 
Birney,  158 ;  its  guns  unserviceable, 
ib.  ;  taunted  by  Kearny,  ib. ;  its  losses, 
163  ;  Dr.  Cutter,  its  fighting  surgeon, 
178  ;  its  route  to  Chantilly  traced  by 
Walcott  and  Stevens,  1883,  180,  et 
seq.  ;  the  site  of  its  encounter  with 
Early's  forces  identified,  190 ;  its  po- 
sition when  Kearny  was  killed,  191 : 
28th  regt.,  at  Chantilly,  152, 154  ;  its 
losses,  162  :  32d  regt.,  its  movement, 
Aug.  29,  339. 
Meade,  G.,  Col.,U.  S.  V.,  data  supplied 
by,  217. 

Meade,  G.  G.,  his  services  in  battle  of 
Aug.  30,  94  ;  forced  by  Lee,  in  1863, 
to  retreat  behind  Bull  Run,  58,  321. 

Michigan,  Adjutant-General,  data  of 
losses  at  Chantilly  supplied  by,  161. 
— — ,  Volunteers,  2d  regt.,  in  3d  bri- 
gade (Poe's),  1st  division,  3d  Corps, 
its  losses  at  Chantilly,  163  ;  8th  regt., 
in  1st  brigade  (Christ's),  1st  division, 
9th  Corps,  at  Chantilly,  152;  its 
losses,  162  ;  Robertson's  "  Michigan 
in  the  War  "  mentioned,  161. 

Millan,  Walker,  an  authority  on  battle 
of  Chantilly,  189 ;  his  name  incor- 
rectly printed  MoUen  in  Stuart's  re- 
port, 191,  192  note. 

Millan's  House,  Chantilly,  in  the  battle 
of  Sept.  1,  165 ;  in  the  bounds  of 
Reid  farm  survey,  188. 

Miller,  E.  H.,  Lieut.-Col.,  C.  S.  A.,  of 
34th  North  Carolina  regt.,  mortally 
wounded  at  Chantilly,  170. 

Mills,  C.  J.,  citation  from  his  diary  as 
to  the  condition  of  the  army,  Aug. 
20-24,  266-267. 

Milroy,  R.  H.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  in 
command  of  brigade,  1st  Corps,  36 ; 
the  bridge  at  Buckland  Mills  saved 
and  secured  by,  Aug.  27,  130  ;  his 
movement  to  Gainesville,  130-131. 

Mitchell's  Station,  Va.,  road  to,  413 ; 
its  proximity  to  Cedar  Mountain,  411. 

MoUen  House.    See  Millan. 

Monroe,  Fort.    See  Fort  Monroe. 

Monteith,  his  testimony  for  Porter  at 
court-martial,  245. 

MoreU,  G.  W.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.,  in 
command  of  1st  division,  5th  Corps 
(Porter),  in  return  for  August,  217; 


INDEX 


479 


joined  Pope,  Aug'.  26,  &03  ;  Hs  readi- 
ness for  attack,  morning-  of  Aug.  29, 
SoS ;  liis  position,  233  ;  approach,  of 
the  enemy  discovered  by,  85 ;  Porter's 
order  to,  on  adyance  of  enemy,  23J: ; 
informed  of  movement  of  enemy  by 
Marshall,  237 ;  an  attack  on,  ex- 
pected, 238 ;  Porter's  order  to,  vnth. 
a  view  to  an  attack,  239,  241,  242, 
373-374  ;  the  time  of  issue  of  order 
discussed,  374 ;  order  carried  by 
Locke,  241 ;  ordered  by  Porter  to 
support  Sigel.  234,  235,  372,  373 ; 
o-\ving  to  the  difficulties  of  the  case 
no  effort  made  by,  374 ;  as  an  alter- 
native directed  to  push,  towards 
Centre-sTlle,  373  ;  his  demonstration, 
91,  376—377  ;  Porter  dissuaded  by, 
countermanded  the  order,  229,  246 ; 
the  time  of  his  movement,  339,  340 ; 
ordered  into  position  for  the  night, 
239,  242 ;  his  correspondence  Mith 
Porter,  235-238  ;  his  position  at  the 
front  until  Aug-.  30,  246  ;  his  testi- 
mony for  Porter  at  court-martial, 
245  ;  his  correspondence  vrith  Porter, 
evidence  that  Porter  retreated.  Aug. 
29,  340  ;  his  testimony  as  to  Pope's 
orders,  338. 

Morrison,  D.,  Col.,  79th  New  York,  at 
Chantillv,  152  ;  his  losses,  162. 

Morse,  C.  P.,  U.  S.  V.,  439. 

Mosby,  J.  S.,  Col.,  C.  S.  A.,  account  of 
the  organization  of  his  guerrilla 
force,  184  et  seq. ;  story  of  the  Union 
spy,  185  ;  Gen.  Stoug-hton  captured 
by,  185  et  seq. ;  the  deserter  from  a 
Kew  York  regiment  in  his  command, 
186 ;  the  demoralization  caused  by 
his  service,  186  ;  Lee  informed  by, 
of  withdrawal  of  Burnside  from  the 
Peninsula,  46,  402. 

Motmtain  Department,  West  Va., 
under  command  of  Fremont,  390  ; 
its  forces  constituted  the  1st  Corps, 
Army  of  Virginia,  ib. 

Mudge,  C.  P.,  Lieut.-CoL,  2d  Mass. 
(Jime  6.  1863) ;  Ist  Lieut.  (May  25, 
1861)  ;  Capt.  (July  8.  1861) ;  citation 
from  his  diary  as  to  the  condition  of 
the  army,  267  ;  bis  disastrous  charge 
at  Gettvsburg',  435. 

MuHenberg.  E.  D.,  Lieut.,  U.  S.  A.,  in 
command  of  battery  F,  4th  artillery, 
at  Cedar  Motmtain,  415  ;  his  posi- 
tion, 411,  415  ;  supported  by  10th 
Maine,  428  ;  attacked  by  Latimer's 
battery,  ib. 

Munroe,  Mrs.,  her  reminiscences  of 
battle  of  ChantiUy,  183. 


j  Napoleon  I.,  his  eensnre  of  Victor  and 
I  Mannont  for  rashness  at  Talavera 
I  and  Salamanca,  95-96 ;  Lee  com- 
I     pared  with,  118. 

j  New  Baltimore,  Va.,  McDowell  joined 

!     by  Reynolds,  Aug.  27,  at,  131. 

j  New  Jersey  Volunteers,  in  engagement, 
Aug".  27,  at  Manassas  Jimctiou,  104. 

j  New  Orleans,  La.,  mentioned,  14. 

;  Newport  News,  Va.,  Porter  embarked 
at,  Aug.  20,  24,  223  ;  estimate  of 
time  necessary  for  shipping  transpor- 
tation material  at,  27. 

j  New  York,  Adjutant-General,  infor- 
mation supplied   bv,  of    losses  at 

I      Chantilly,  161. 
New  York   Highlanders.    See  New 

I      York  Volunteers,  79th  regi;. 

:  New  York  Volunteers,  Artillery,  bat- 

1     tery   L,  under   Poemer   at  Cedar 

I     Mountain.  410 ;   position  of,   415  ; 

j     battery  M,  under  Cothran,  position, 

I     Aug.  9,  on  Brown  Hotise  hill,  413; 

I  415. 

i  Cavalry,  capture  of  a  company  of, 
j  by  Eobertson,  Aug.  31,  1802,  near 
Chantilly,  147 ;  2d  regt.  (Harris 
Light,  Kilpatiiek),  with  1st  division, 
3d  Corps,  A.  of  v.,  its  streng'th, 
Aug.  16,  215. 

Infantry,  1st  regt.  in  2d  brigade, 
(Birney),  1st  division  (Kearny),  3d 
Corps  (Heintzelman),  at  battle  of 
Chantilly,  160-161 ;  its  loss  not  re- 
ported, 163  :  5th.  regt.,  in  3d  brigade 
(Warren),  2d  division  (Sykes),  5th 
Corps  (Porter),  in  the  battle  of 
Groveton,  Aug.  30,  1862,  destruction 
of  men  of,  by  Texan  riflemen,  178, 
179  :  13th  regi;.,  its  officers,  Aug.  29, 
245  ;  employed  in  skirmishing-  by 
Morell,  338,  '339:  20th  regt.,  iu.  3d 
brigade  (Patrick),  1st  division,  3d 
Corps  of  Army  of  Virginia  (McDow- 
ell), 164;  losses  in  engagement  be- 
fore Germantown,  Sept.  1,  150.  164 : 
28th  regt.,  in  battle  of  Cedar  Moun- 
tain, 414  ;  in  Crawford's  charge,  424  ; 
the  charge  led  by  its  colonel,  425  ; 
its  colonel  killed,  427  :  40th  regt.,  in 
2d  brigade  (Birnev),  1st  division,  3d 
Corps,  at  Chantilly,  160-161  ;  its 
losses,  163  :  46th  regt.,  in  2d  brigade, 
1st  division,  9th  Corps,  at  Chantilly, 
I  152 ;  its  losses,  162  :  51st  regt.,  ia 
Reno's  brigade,  143,  153,  155  ;  its 
position  and  service,  Aug.  30,  on 
Henry  House  hill,  143 ;  its  move- 
ment on  Chantilly  battlefield,  155  ; 
under  mistake  in    order  sent  to 


480 


INDEX 


the  woods,  156 ;  its  losses,  163 : 
60t}i  rsg-t.,  stationed  at  Warrenton 
Spring's,  Aug-.  9,  411) :  79th  reg-t.,  in 
Greene's  brig'ade,  Augnr's  division, 
at  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain,  416 : 
79th  regt.,  Highlanders,  under  Col. 
Morrison,  at  Chantilly,  152;  Capt. 
Stevens  assigned  to,  in  the  charge, 
154 ;  its  colors  carried  hy  Gen.  Ste- 
vens, ih. ;  its  losses,  162  :  101st  regt., 
in  2d  brigade  (Birney),  1st  division 
(Kearny),  3d  Corps  (Heintzelman), 
at  Chantilly,  160,  161 ;  its  losses 
heavy,  but  not  reported,  163 :  102d 
regt.,  in  Prince's  brigade.  Augur's 
division,  its  position  at  battle  of 
Cedar  Mountain,  415,  430  ;  its  ad- 
vance into  the  corn-field,  430 ;  its 
retreat  to  the  road,  431. 
Ninth  Army  Corps.  See  U.  S.  Army 
Corps. 

North  Carolina,  Union  forces  from, 
which  joined  Pope,  poorly  fitted  for 
the  campaign,  127. 

 ,  Volunteers,  C.  S.  A.,  7th  regt., 

in  Branch's  brigade,  at  Chantilly, 
154  :  16th  regt.,  in  Pender's  brigade, 
A.  P.  Hill's  division,  Jackson's  corps, 
at  battle  of  Chantilly,  155,  170 ;  its 
commanding  officer,  Captain  Stowe, 
wounded,  170  :  18th  regt.  in  Branch's 
brigade,  at  Chantilly,  154,  168  :  22d 
regt.,  in  Pender's  brigade,  at  Chan- 
tilly, 155 :  28th  regt.,  in  Branch's 
brigade,  at  Chantilly,  154 ;  per- 
formed picket  duty  night  of  Sept.  1, 
168  :  33d  regt.,  in  Branch's  brigade, 
at  ChantUly,  154:  34th  regt.,  in 
Pender's  brigade,  at  Chantilly,  155, 
170  ;  its  colonel,  Riddick,  and  Lieut.- 
Col.  Miller,  mortally  wounded,  170  : 
37th  regt.,  in  Branch's  brigade,  at 
ChantiUy,  154:  38th  regt.,  in  Pen- 
der's brigade,  at  Chantilly,  165. 

O'Brien,  IJ.  S.  V.,  first  man  shot  at 
Bull  Run,  1861,  the  story  of  the  inci- 
dent, 183-184,  184  note. 

O'Conor,  C,  his  examination  of  Pope's 
order  to  Porter,  Aug.  28,  328. 

Ohio  Volunteers,  5th  regt.,  in  Geary's 
brigade,  Augur's  division,  its  po- 
sition battle  of  Cedar  Mountain,  415, 
430 ;  severely  engaged,  430 ;  its 
losses,  ih. :  7th  regt.,  in  Geary's  bri- 
gade, its  position  at  battle  Cedar 
Mountain,  415  ;  its  steady  advance 
under  destructive  fire,  429-430 ; 
compelled  to  retreat,  430  ;  its  losses, 
ib.\  29th  regt.,  in  Geary's  brigade. 


430 ;  its  severe  engagement  at  Cedar 
Mountain,  ih. :  66th  regt.,  of  Geary's 
brigade,  at  Cedar  Mountain,  415, 
429  ;  its  position,  415  ;  its  steady  ad- 
vance under  destructive  fire,  430 ; 
compelled  to  retreat,  ih. 
Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad,  Mit- 
chell's Station  on,  413 ;  five  com- 
panies of  Greene's  brigade  at,  Aug. 
9,  39 ;  Lee's  plans  against,  Aug.  20, 
58 ;  cut  at  Bristoe  Station  by  Jack- 
son, Aug.  25,  62,  74  ;  Union  forces 
at  Bealton  on,  Aug.  26,  73 ;  in  the 
possession  of  Jackson,  Aug.  27,  112; 
Pope's  erroneous  conjecture  that 
Jackson's  objective  was  his  supply 
trains  on,  64,  67,  74,  109 ;  Pope's  po- 
sition on,  Aug.  27,  308 ;  under  Jack- 
son's control,  Aug.  28, 107;  unfinished 
division,  demonstration  made  by 
Confederate  artillery,  Aug.  29,  from 
position  on,  342,  343 ;  seized  by  Lee, 
1863,  58. 

Orange  Court  House,  Va.,  Union  ad- 
vance expected  by  Confederates 
from,  July  13,  402  ;  road  to,  from 
Culpeper,  proximity  of  Cedar  Run 
to,  411,  413. 

Orleans,  L.  P.,  due  d',  Comte  de  Paris, 
misled  as  to  Banks'  streng  th,  38 ; 
Pope's  movement  of  Aug.  27,  ap- 
proved by,  63 ;  considered  Pope's 
estimate  of  Jackson's  plan  absurd, 
64 ;  cited  as  to  Stuart's  service  at 
Manassas,  Aug.  27,  292;  Pope's 
partial  extract  from  Longstreet's 
report  in  letter  to,  91 ;  his  treatment 
of  the  Porter  case,  356 ;  his  corre- 
spondence with  Pope,  its  publication, 
313  ;  his  controversy  with  Pope,  356. 

Orleans,  Va.,  in  Jackson's  flank  move- 
ment, Aug.,  1862,  59. 

Orr's  Rifles,  at  Chantilly,  169. 

Ox  Hill,  Va.,  battle  of,  Sept.  1,  1862, 
135-194  ;  its  position,  136  ;  its  dis- 
tance from  Pleasant  Valley,  161 
note  ;  in  Lee's  route,  Aug.  31,  95 ; 
in  Jackson's  report,  165-166  ;  in  D. 
R.  Jones'  report,  170 ;  in  Lane's  re- 
port, 168  ;  in  Lee's  report,  167  ;  in 
McGowan's  report,  169  ;  in  Pender's 
report,  170  ;  Stuart's  report  of  oper- 
ations at,  Sept.  1,  165  ;  visited  by 
Walcott  and  Stevens,  1883,  188  ei 
seq. ;  the  Confederate  name  for 
battle  of  Chantilly. 

Ox  Road,  191. 

Paris,  Comte  de.  See  Orleans,  L.  P., 
due  d'. 


INDEX 


481 


Patrick.  M.  E..  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen..  U.  S.  \ 

V.  (Marcli  13,  1S65) ;  Brig-.-Gen.  U.  | 
S.  V.  (March.  IT,  1862)  ;  in  command 
of  3d  brigade,  1st  division,  3d  Corps.  I 
A.  of  v.,  149, 16-1 ;  his  strength.  Aug.  ' 
16,  215  ;  his  position,  Sept.  1,  in  Union  ' 
retreat  from  CentreviUe,  137 ;  Me-  . 
Dowell's  meeting  with,  1-49  ;  Stuart 
repulsed  by,  on  Little  River  Turn- 
pike, 149-150  ;  his  losses,  164  ;  source 
of  information   as  to  his  services, 
Sept.  1,  150. 

Patterson,  R.,  Maj.-Gen..  U.  S.  V.,  suc- 
ceeded by  Banks  in  command  at 
Harper's  Ferry,  37, 

PegTam.  W.  J.,  Capt.,  C.  S.  A., position 
of  his  battery,  Cedar  Mountain,  419, 
439  ;  his  fire  upon  Ricketts,  419 ; 
silenced  with  heaw  loss.  ih. 

Pelouze.  L.  H..  Bvt.^  BrigvGen..  U.  S. 

A.  (March  13,  1865)  ;  Capt..U.  S.  A.  j 
■  (May  14.  1861) ;  Maj.,  A.  D.  C,  U. 
S.  A.  (July  8,  1862)  ;  on  Pope's  staff.  | 
July  3-Aug.  20,  1862 ;  Pope's  order  '; 
to  Banks  of  Aug-.  9  transcribed  by.  ! 
21,  47,  405 ;  copy  of  his  retained  ' 
copv,  405 ;  liis  altercation  with  j 
colonel  of  the  10th  Maine.  428-429.  I 

Pender,  W.  D.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A..  ! 
in  command  of  a  brigade,  A.  P.  ' 
Hill's  division,  Jackson's  corps,  at 
Cedar  Mountain,  419  ;  his  position 
on  ColgTove's  flank.  437 ;  his  share 
in  battle  of  Aug.  30,  261 ;  at  Chan- 
tilly,  Sept.  1.  155,  166 ;  his  position 
in  the  late  afternoon,  157,  159  :  with 
Branch  and  Gregg  bore  the  brunt 
of  fight,  167 ;  bis  position,  170  ;  his 
losses,  ih.  ;  his  report  of  the  battle,  ih. 

Peninsular  Campaign  in  V  irginia.  See 
Virginia.  i 

Peninsular  War.    See  Spain. 

Pennsylvania,  the  defence  of,  consid- 
ered. 9. 

 ,  Adjutant  -  General,  data  sup-  i 

plied  by.  161.  j 

 ,  Volunteers.  Bates'  History  of,  \ 

xi.  161.  '  ~  I 

 — ,  Artillery,  battery  E,  un-  1 

der  Knap,  at  Cedar  Mountain.  410,  | 
416. 

 ,  Cavalry,  1st  regi:.,  of  re- 
serves, repulsed  in  a  charge.  Cedar 
Moimtain,  429  :  12th  regt..  five  sur-  : 
vivors  of  engagement  at  Manassas.  ' 
Aug.  27. 119  ;  ordered  to  Barnard  for  , 
scouting  duty,  Aug.  29,  279.  I 

   ,  Infantry,  Pennsylvania 

Reserves,  under  Reynolds,  at  War- 
renton,  Aug.  26,  61 ;   ordered  to 


Gainesville,  Aug.  27,  62 ;  joined  Mc- 
Dowell at  Xew  Baltimore,  131 ;  theii- 
operations  against  Jackson,  132 ; 
their  strength,  Sei^t.  2.  217  ;  history 
of.  by  Sypher,  cited,  ih. :  11th  regt., 
in  Prince's  brigade.  Augur's  division, 
its  position,  battle  of  Cedar  Moun- 
tain, 415  :  2Sth  regt.,  detached  from 
Geary's  brigade,  Aug-.  9,  at  Thor- 
oughfare, 416 :  29th  regt.,  not  en- 
gaged at  Cedar  Mountain,  416-417 : 
46th  regt.,  in  Cra-v\'ford's  brigade  at 
Cedar  Mountain,  414 ;  in  Crawford's 
charge,  424  :  50th  regt.,  in  1st  bri- 
gade, 1st  division,  9th  Corps,  at 
Chantilly,  152  ;  its  losses,  162 :  51st 
regi;.,  in  Reno's  brigade,  143,  153 ; 
its  position  and  serrice  in  second 
battle  of  Bull  Run.  Aug.  30,  143  ; 
its  position  at  Chantilly.  not  engaged, 
156;  its  losses,  not  reported,  163: 
57th  regi:.,  in  2d  brigade  (Birney), 
1st  division  (Kearny),  3d  Corps,  at 
Chantilly,  its  losses  not  reported, 
163  :  62 d  regi:.,  employed  as  skir- 
mishers by  Morell,  morning  of  Aug. 
29,  338 :  99tli  regi:.,  iu  3d  brigade 
(Poe),  1st  division.  3d  Corps,  its 
losses  at  Chantilly.  163  :  100th  regi:., 
in  2d  brigade,  1st  division.  9th  Corps, 
at  Chantilly,  152 ;  its  losses,  162 : 
109th  regt.,  in  Prince's  brigade, 
Augnr's  division.  415,  430 ;  its  po- 
sition at  Cedar  Mountain,  415  ;  its 
advance  into  the  corn-field,  430  ;  its 
retreat  to  the  road,  431  :  111th  regt., 
in  Prince's  brigade,  at  Cedar  Moun- 
tain, 430  ;  its  advance  into  the  corn- 
field, ih. ;  its  retreat  to  the  road,  431. 
Perkins.  S.,  2d  Lieut.,  2d  Mass.  Tegi:., 
his  progTiostication,  Aug.  8.  of  a 
battle,  15-16  ;  chief  of  Banks'  staff, 
434;  2d  Massachusetts  ordered  into 
tke  wood  by,  ib. ;  his  order  for  a 
liopeless  charge,  435  ;  not  obeyed, 
436  ;  his  acknowledgment  of  a  mis- 
take, ih. ;  killed  at  Cedar  Mountain, 
16. 

Petersburg,  Va..  McClellan  encouraged 
in  his  plans  against,  42. 

Piatt,  A.  S.,  Brig.-Gen..  U.  S.  V.,  in 
command  of  brigade,  Reserve  Corps 
(Sturgis),  re-enforced  Pope.  AiTg. 
26,  198,  203;  assigned  to  Porters 
corps,  205  ;  at  Warrenton  J  unction, 
2-12-243  ;  at  Manassas.  Aug.  29,  243  ; 
bis  movement,  233 ;  joined  Pope, 
Aug.  30,  243  ;  his  strength,  ih. 

Pickett.  G.  E.,  Capt.,  U.  S.  A.  (March 
3,  1855-June  25,  1861) ;  Maj.-Gen., 


482 


INDEX 


C.  S.  A.,  his  charge  at  Getty shu|g 
mentioned,  180. 

Pitcher,  T.  G.,  Bvt.  Brig-.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
A.  (March  12,  1865) ;  Capt.,  U.  S.  A. 
(Oct.  19,  1858) ;  Brig-.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
V.  (Nov.  29,  1862) ;  Col.,  U.  S.  A. 
(July  28, 1866) ;  in  command  of  bat- 
talion, 8th  and  12th  U.  S.  Infantry, 
his  extraordinary  service  in  skirmish- 
ing- at  Cedar  Mountain,  415. 

Pleasant  Valley,  Va.,  distance  from  Ox 
Hill,  166;  in  Jackson's  movement, 
166  note. 

Poague,  W.  T.,  Capt.,  C.  S.  A.,  posi- 
tion of  his  battery,  Cedar  Mountain, 
419. 

Poe,  O.  M.,  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 
(March  13,  1865) ;  1st  Lieut.,  U.  S. 
A.  (July  1,  1860);  Col.,  2d  Mich. 
(Sept.  16,  1861) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
V.  (Nov.  29,  1862-March  4,  1863) ; 
Capt.,  U.  S.  A.  (March  3,  1863) ; 
Major,  U.  S.  A.  (March  7,  1867) ; 
Lieut.-Col.,  U.  S.  A. ;  Col.,  U.  S.  A. 
(April  7,  1888)  ;  in  command  of  3d 
brigade,  1st  division  (Kearny),  3d 
Corps,  at  Chantilly,  161 ;  his  losses, 
163-164. 

Pony  Mountain,  Va.,  detachment  of 
Geary's  forces  at,  Aug.  9,  1862,  39. 

Poolesville,  Va.,  scouting  force  sent  to, 
Aug.  29,  279. 

Pope,  D.,  Bvt.  Maj.,  U.  S.  A.  (March 
2,  1867)  ;  Capt.,  U.  S.  V.  (June  30, 
1862) ;  1st  Lieut.,  U.  S.  A.  (July  28, 
1866-Oct.  10, 1871) ;  bearer  of  Pope's 
4.30  p.  M.  order  to  Porter,  240;  car- 
ried back  Porter's  acknowledgment, 
241,  242  ;  his  testimony  for  govern- 
ment at  Porter  court-martial,  243, 
245,  246. 

Pope,  J.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 

(March  13,  1865) ;  Capt.,  U.  S.  A. 
(July  1,  1856) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(May  17,  1861) ;  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(March  21,  1862) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
A.  (July  14,  1862) ;  his  services  in 
capture  of  Island  No.  10  and  of 
Corinth,  34  ;  given  command  of  the 
Army  of  Virginia,  June  26,  1862, 
4,  34,  42,  390 ;  assumed  command, 
June  27,  391 ;  the  composition  of 
his  command,  4,  35-36,  390;  the 
junior  of  his  corps  commanders,  390 ; 
Fremont  refused  to  serve  under,  390, 
391 ;  project  of  government  for  his 
employment,  40,  318,  392  ;  position 
of  his  forces  before  Washington,  5, 
12-13  ;  his  headquarters  at  Wash- 
ington, 392 ;  his  expectation  of  the 


union  of  the  two  armies  in  Virginia 
under  his  command,  399 ;  the  cav- 
alry reported  as  in  a  bad  condition 
by,  40,  394 ;  the  position  of  his  army 
corps  in  July,  393  ;  his  orders  for 
the  concentration  of  his  army,  40-41, 
394-396  ;  his  testimony,  July  8,  be- 
fore the  Committee  on  the  Conduct 
of  the  War,  8,  35,  317 ;  his  descrip- 
tion of  the  Western  troops,  14,  28 ; 
his  project  for  defence  of  Washing- 
ton, 13,  317 ;  the  changes  in  affairs 
in  Virginia  after  his  arrival  at  Wash- 
ington, 42  ;  McClellan's  movement 
to  the  James  opposed  by,  392  ;  prob- 
lem of  government  as  to  his  coop- 
eration with  McClellan,  5  ;  his  claims 
as  to  the  possible  service  of  McClel- 
lan's forces  under  his  command,  14 ; 
withdrawal  of  McClellan  from  the 
Peninsula,  advised  by,  July  8,  7; 
his  plans  consequent  upon  the  Avith- 
drawal,  5,  319  ;  Crawford  ordered  to 
Culpeper,  July  10,  by,  42 ;  his  ad- 
dress, July  14,  1862,  to  the  Army  of 
Virginia,  13-14,  43  ;  cited,  397 ;  his 
general  orders  as  to  foraging  and 
rebellious  Virginians,  43,  398-399 ; 
exasperation  caused  by,  399 ;  con- 
trast between  the  spirit  of  his  ad- 
dress and  of  his  report,  29 ;  its  in- 
sinuations and  want  of  tact,  398 ; 
the  offence  given  by,  ih. ;  the  dislike 
in  the  army  for,  ih.  ;  his  reluctance 
to  continue  in  command  of  the  Army 
of  Virginia,  29,  45,  393  ;  advised  by 
Greeley  to  resign,  45  ;  his  request  to 
be  relieved  not  granted,  393 ;  an 
attack  on  Gordonsville  by,  appre- 
hended by  Lee,  12,  45, 401 ;  informed 
of  Hatch's  slow  movements,  July  17, 
396 ;  Hatch  replaced  by  Buford, 
44  ;  his  good  provisions  for  safety  of 
Shenandoah  Valley,  41 ;  his  opening 
operations  criticized  by  Comte  de 
Paris,  53  ;  left  Washington  to  join 
the  array,  July  29,  45,  392,  396 ;  un- 
favorable impression  made  by  him 
on  his  officers,  45 ;  not  enthusiasti- 
cally received  by  his  army,  396  ;  de- 
termination of  his  army  to  support 
him,  398 ;  the  movements  of  his 
army  after  July  29,  400-401; 
Banks'  intrepidity  in  sham-fight  be- 
fore, 37  ;  McClellan  informed,  Aug. 
6,  that  he  would  be  expected  to  aid, 
10. 

Cedar  Mountain :  the  Confederate 
forces  sent  from  Richmond  to  op- 
pose, 318 ;  Jackson  ordered  to  at- 


INDEX 


483 


tack,  46  ;  Jackson's  advance  towards 
400,  401,  402,  403;  at  Sperryville, 
Aug-.  7,  403  ;  position  of  Ms  army, 
Aug-.  7,  ih. ;  arrived,  Ang'.  8,  at  Cul- 
peper,  45,  403;  informed  of  Jack- 
son's advance,  15  ;  his  uncertainty 
of  Jackson's  destination,  403 ;  the 
effect  of  Buford's  despatch  on,  410  ; 
his  disj)ositions  to  block  Jackson, 
15,  16 ;  his  army  ordered  for  concen- 
tration at  Culpeper,  403-404 ;  Banks 
and  Sigel  ordered  to  Culpeper,  45, 
404 ;  joined  by  Banks,  140  ;  disap- 
pointed by  Sigel,  16 ;  Crawford's 
brigade  sent  towards  Cedar  Moun- 
tain, 403-404 ;  Banks  ordered,  Aug. 
9,  to  move  towards  Cedar  Mountain, 
404;  position  of  the  Union  forces, 
46  ;  his  intention  that  Banks  should 
hold  the  enemy  in  cheek,  406  ;  the 
controversy  as  to  the  order  given  to 
Banks,  48,  405  ;  his  statement  as  to 
the  orders,  in  his  report,  21 ;  his  in- 
terview with  Banks,  22,  48 ;  his 
order  to  fight  cited  by  Banks,  21, 
22 ;  the  oral  order  delivered  by 
Marshall,  47  ;  cited,  57,  405  ;  denied 
by,  405 ;  the  form  in  v\^hich  it  was 
recorded  by  Banks,  47  ;  his  error  in 
sending  a  verbal  order,  51 ;  his  dis- 
approval of  Banks'  attack,  440  ;  the 
wisdom  of  his  instructions,  28 ; 
Banks'  assault  in  consonance  with 
the  spirit  of  the  general  orders 
of,  ib. ;  Roberts  sent  by,  to  place 
Banlis  in  position,  406 ;  authority 
given  to  Roberts  to  issue  orders,  408  ; 
Roberts'  statement  as  to  this  author- 
ization qualified,  408  note  ;  not  pos- 
sessed of  authority  to  supersede 
Banks  in  command,  408 ;  Banks' 
impression  that  he  was  thought  to 
be  unwilling  to  fight  by,  23,  409 ; 
Banks  affected  by  the  terms  of  the 
July  14  letter  of,  409 ;  Banks'  des- 
patch to,  at  4.50  p.  M.,  423  ;  informed 
by  Roberts  of  the  probability  of  a 
general  battle,  407 ;  the  sound  of 
the  battle  heard  at  Culpeper  by,  52  ; 
arrived  at  Cedar  Mountain  about  7 
P.  M..  50,  440  ;  his  orders  to  2d  Mass., 
17  ;  Banks  praised  for  his  intrepidity 
by,  21,  440;  his  praise  of  the  2d 
Corps,  52,  440 ;  the  reverse  at  Cedar 
Mountain,  15 ;  victory  claimed  by,  52 ; 
Jackson's  attack  noted  by  Jones,  12  ; 
supposed  to  have  been  deluded  by 
Jackson,  ih. ;  his  position  the  supe- 
rior, 47 ;  his  lost  chance  to  capture 
Jackson's  army,  28 ;  his  statement  of 


Banks'  strength  at  Cedar  Mountain, 
38  ;  his  strength  and  Jackson's  about 
equal,  47  ;  his  error  in  estimating 
Jackson's  strength,  51;  his  demand 
for  a  report  of  battle  not  heeded  by 
Banks,  22  ;  his  statement  that  he 
did  not  order  the  battle,  21 ;  not 
denied  by  Banks  until  1864,  21 ;  his 
rejoinder  to  Banks'  testimony  before 
Conduct  of  Vfar  Committee,  23; 
Roberts  his  Chief  of  Cavalry,  20,  21. 

Augvist  18-25,  delayed  on  the 
Rapidan  until  Aug.  18,  321 ;  Lee's 
plan  of  campaign  against,  320 ;  Lee's 
intention  to  flank  him  on  the  Rap- 
pahannock, 321  ;  advised  of  Lee's 
advance,  Aug.  18,  by  intercepted  let- 
ter, 52,  265,  266;  Lee's  movement 
anticipated  by,  321 ;  his  successful 
withdrawal  to  the  Rappahannock, 
Aug.  18-19,  52,  266,  321,  440 ;  his 
movement  praised,  63,  321 ;  directed 
to  hold  his  line  on  the  Rappahan- 
nock, Aug.  18,  57,  266,267,322-323, 
324,  403 ;  his  operations  affected 
thereby,  403  ;  his  forces  divided,  41 ; 
his  apprehensions  on  account  of  the 
division,  395  ;  required  to  keep  com- 
munication with  Fredericksburg, 
323 ;  his  obedience  to  order,  27 ; 
crossed  the  Rappahannock,  Aug.  19, 
52,  73 ;  position  of  his  forces,  53, 
307 ;  believed  to  be  in  no  danger 
prior  to  Aug.  20,  298 ;  his  attempt 
to  block  Lee's  advance,  28 ;  jire- 
vented  the  crossing  of  the  river  by 
the  enemy,  Aug.  20-22,  57, 266,  321 ; 
Lee's  crossing  of  the  river  expected 
by,  58 ;  his  plans  to  attack  Lee,  ih. ; 
the  dangers  involved  in  the  attack 
as  planned,  ih. ;  conjecture  as  to  the 
result  of  an  attack,  ib. ;  crossing 
the  Rappahannock  prevented  by  a 
freshet,  Aug.  22,  59 ;  his  concentra- 
tion at  Warrenton.  61,  113  ;  his  con- 
flicting orders  to  Sigel,  61  ;  his  army 
exhausted  in  movements,  Aug.  21- 
25,  308 ;  scarcity  of  food  in  his 
army,  266-267  ;  Confederate  cavalry 
raid,  Aug.  22,  round  his  supply 
trains,  267  ;  confronted  by  the  en- 
emy at  Rappahannock  Station, 
Aug.  23-24,  266 ;  Confederates  re- 
pulsed, Aug.  23,  at  Sulphur  Springs, 
267: 

Aixgust  25-26 :  Jackson's  flank 
movement  begun  Aug.  25,  59 ;  in- 
formed of  Jackson's  advance,  z6., 
403 ;  ignorant  of  his  destination, 
324-325;  believed  Jackson's  move- 


484 


INDEX. 


ment  directed  towards  tlie  Shenan- 
doah Valley,  110,  322;  deceived  by 
Lee,  124 ;  his  indifference  to  the 
signs  of  Jackson's  advance,  321-322 ; 
the  serious  consequences,  75,  76, 
323  ;  the  position  of  his  army,  Aug". 
26,  62 ;  his  situation  night  of  Aug. 
26,  324  ;  the  importance  of  the  con- 
trol of  railway  to,  57  : 

August  27 :  his  reason  for  send- 
ing Hooker  to  the  railroad,  326,  326 
note ;  informed  of  Jackson's  move- 
ment through  Thoroughfare  Gap, 
324 ;  Buf  ord  sent  to  reconnoitre,  109, 
120 ;  cut  off  from  Washington  by 
Jackson,  308,  324 ;  his  supplies  de- 
stroyed at  Manassas  by  Jackson,  65, 
268,  308 ;  the  plunder  described, 
105-108 ;  informed  of  Jackson's  de- 
struction of  railroad  at  Bristoe  Sta- 
tion, 62,  73,  124 ;  his  vacillation  in 
the  adoption  of  a  plan,  124-125  ; 
conscious  of  his  inability  to  deter- 
mine the  projier  movement  to  be 
made,  124;  his  telegraphic  com- 
munications with  McDov/ell,  125- 
126  ;  Jackson's  intentions  misappre- 
hended by,  61,  65-66,  75,  126;  his 
reasonable  fear  of  an  attack  on  his 
trains,  327 ;  shared  by  McDowell, 
64,  326;  his  order  to  McDowell 
cited,  125  ;  precision  of  his  order  to 
Banks,  128 ;  McDowell's  important 
service  to,  125-126  ;  the  results,  127- 
128 ;  his  proposition  to  occupy 
Gainesville,  59-60  ;  concentration  of 
army  at  Gainesville  ordered,  62, 
325  ;  the  intention  of  his  orders  dis- 
cussed, 325  ;  not  designed  to  cut  ofi! 
Jackson,  ih.  ;  his  dispositions  criti- 
cized, 60,  73,  74,  75,  76 ;  his  orders 
not  strictly  obeyed,  66,  67  ;  his  divi- 
sion of  his  forces,  68  ;  his  interview 
with  Porter,  morning  of  Aug.  27, 
325,  336 ;  probably  stated  his  plans, 
325 ;  the  direction  of  his  line,  326 ; 
criticized  for  his  apprehensions  for 
his  right  at  Bristoe.  ih. ;  position  of 
his  army,  evening  of  Aug.  27,  63 ; 
favorable  in  a  movement  by  Jackson 
roimd  his  right,  328 ;  his  change  of 
dispositions,  night  of  Aug.  27,  63-64, 
65  ;  his  order  to  Porter,  6.30  P.  M,, 
352 ;  his  error  in  concentrating  at 
Manassas,  64-65,  75  ;  his  conjecture 
as  to  Jackson's  plans,  having  learned 
his  position,  64,  74  : 

August  28  his  blunder  in  move- 
ment, 308 ;  his  order  of  1  A.  m.  to 
Porter,  224 ;    ordered  to  Manassas 


early,  Aug.  28,  64-65,  74  ;  his  theory 
as  to  the  chance  of  intercepting  Jack- 
son by  McDowell  erroneous,  65-66 ; 
his  dispositions  to  capture  Jackson, 
327 ;  Kearny  and  Reno  ordered  to 
Manassas,  65  ;  Porter  to  Bristoe,  65, 
74;  at  Manassas  Junction,  67,  268, 
329 ;  ordered  forces  to  Centreville, 
and  thence  to  Warrenton  Turnpike, 

78  ;  McDowell's  movement  cut  Jack- 
son's communications  with  Lee,  332 ; 
at  Centreville,  68,  337 ;  his  order  to 
McDowell  to  intercept  Jackson  at 
Gum  Springs,  329  ;  the  orders  inter- 
cepted by  Jackson,  ib. ;  his  effort  to 
hasten  pursuit  of  Jackson,  82  ;  him- 
self engaged  in  following  Jackson  to 
Gainesville,  80 ;  the  position  of  his 
army,  67  ;  his  movement  of  Aug.  28, 
68  et  seq. ;  his  forces  scattered  and 
out  of  position,  308,  309 ;  his  object, 
not  to  interpose  between  Lee  and 
Jackson,  but  to  attack  the  latter, 
63 ;  no  provision  made  for  holding 
Gainesville  and  Thoroughfare  Gap, 

65,  67,  68,  95  ;  this  neglect  inex- 
cusable, 66,  95 ;  made  no  effort  to 
prevent  Jackson  from  rejoining  Lee, 

66,  67,  68,  69,  70 ;  McDowell  cen- 
sured by,  for  sending  Ricketts  to 
Thoroughfare  Gap,  67 ;  his  lost  op- 
portunity to  block  Thoroughfare 
Gap  and  defeat  Jackson,  69-70,  75- 
76  ;  his  combination  against  Jackson 
destroyed  by  the  retreat  of  King  and 
Ricketts,  332 ;  probable  effect  of 
their  retreat  on  action  of  Aug.  29, 

79  ;  his  opportunity  to  intercept  and 
destroy  Jackson,  323  ;  conjecture  as 
to  the  result  had  a  force  been  main- 
tained at  the  Gap,  332  ;  learned  of 
King's  engagement,  78 ;  predicated 
too  much  on  the  report,  ib.,  79 ;  his 
headquarters  at  night  near  Black- 
burn's Ford,  78 ;  his  force  about 
equal  to  Lee's,  308  ;  the  facilities 
of  communication  between  Alexan- 
dria and  his  position,  after  Aug.  28, 
277: 

August  29 :  Jackson  within  his 
power  prior  to  Aug.  29,  332-333  ; 
his  plans  made  in  ignorance  of  the 
retreat  of  Ricketts  and  King,  79 ; 
reported  that  Jackson's  retreat  had 
been  intercepted,  78,  225  ;  informed 
early  morning,  of  the  retreat  of  King 
and  Ricketts,  332  ;  his  indignation, 
82 ;  his  orders  in  consequence,  335  ; 
ignorant  of  Ricketts'  position,  80  ; 
his  plans   frustrated  by  Jackson's 


INDEX 


485 


Tonforeseen  nig-ht  movement,  65, 328- 
329  ;  no  evidence  that  A.  P,  HilFs 
movement  was  intended  to  deceive, 
329  ;  Sig-el  directed  to  attack  Jack- 
son at  Groveton,  335  ;  Heintzelman 
and  Reno  ordered  to  join  in  the  at- 
tack, ih. ;  unsuccessful  effort  of  Mc- 
Dowell to  fiud,  68 ;  his  order  to  Por- 
ter delayed  until  Aug-.  29,  78;  his 
orders  to  Porter,  3  A.  M.,  78,  79,  80, 
224-225,  383  ;  Porter  sent  to  Centre- 
ville,  225  ;  Porter's  misapprehension 
of  the  puriDose  of,  336 ;  believed 
Jackson  to  be  hurrying"  his  retreat 
by  way  of  Thoroughfare  Gap,  80,  82, 
83  ;  his  6-7  a.  m.  order  to  Porter  for 
movement  to  Gainesville,  80,  226, 
335,  383 ;  Porter  ordered  to  take 
Kiiag's  division,  335  ;  remonstrance 
of  McDowell,  because  of  the  assig'n- 
ment  of  King^'s  division  to  Porter, 
81 ;  his  joint  order  to  Porter  and  Mc- 
DoweU,  9  A.  M.,  81,  224,  229, 241,  242, 
243,  352,  353,  384;  McDoweU  and 
Porter  in  conference  over,  85-86 ; 
its  provisions  discussed,  83-84,  310; 
the  spirit  in  which  it  was  given,  82  ; 
its  provision  for  withdrawal  to  Cen- 
treville  at  nig'ht,  81,  82  ;  his  ]Durpose 
in  this  provision,  83,  325-326 ;  rea- 
sons why  it  could  not  be  obeyed, 
311 ;  the  joint  order  superseded  all 
others  of  prior  date,  82 ;  its  effect 
upon  Porter's  action,  378 ;  his  head- 
quarters with  Heintzelman,  82  ;  Lee's 
advance  conjectured  by,  9  A.  M.,  82, 
124 ;  the  position  of  enemy  not  im- 
derstood  by,  225  ;  time  lost  throug'h 
his  movement  by  way  of  Centrevllle, 
85  ;  did  not  reach  field  of  battle 
until  noon,  90,  92  ;  his  imsuccessful 
attack  -ndth  his  rig'ht  wing",  309  ;  his 
order  to  Porter  at  4.30  P.  M.,  89,  224, 
240,  241-242,  311,  354,  357 ;  the  or- 
der cited,  385  ;  Porter  ordered  there- 
in to  attack,  311 ;  the  order  given 
under  misapprehension  of  the  op- 
posing' force,  340-341 ;  the  order 
aeknowledg-ed  by  Porter,  241 ;  it 
reached  Porter  too  late  to  be  acted 
on,  89  ;  the  time  of  receipt,  365  ;  an 
attack  on  Long-street  by  Porter 
would  have  been  no  advantag-e  to, 
89,  249,  256  ;  would  have  resulted 
in  disaster,  249.  256,  259 ;  the  order 
criticized  by  Wilcox,  253 ;  its  effect 
on  Porter's  movement,  340  ;  Porter's 
disposition  of  Sykes  with  a  view  to 
aiding,  234 ;  the  country  impassable 
between  Porter  and,  87,  88,  245 ; 


Porter's  demonstrations  had  little 
effect  in  relieving  the  pressure  on, 
346 ;  his  message  to  Porter,  240 ; 
informed  of  all  events  by  Porter, 
238 ;  Porter's  despatches  not  for- 
warded by  McDowell  to,  242  note  ; 
his  miscalculation  as  to  the  time  of 
Lee  and  Longstreet's  arrival,  83, 
84,  337 ;  inexcusable,  254,  332 ;  his 
ignorance  of  the  enemy's  position, 
337 ;  the  Confederate  strength  in 
front  of,  250 ;  his  belief  that  Jack- 
son only  was  his  ojDponent,  83,  90, 
92,  309;  opposed  also  by  Hood's 
and  Evans'  divisions,  89,  90,  309, 
346,  347,  348 ;  his  ignorance  of 
Longstreet's  presence,  89,  90,  93,  95, 
241,253;  the  Confederate  strength 
held  inactive  by  Porter,  246,  249  ; 
Porter  informed  that  Jackson  had 
been  reenf  orced,  236 ;  Longstreet's 
presence  not  admitted  at  Porter 
court-martial  bv,  359,  368 ;  the  bat- 
tle of  Aug.  29,  fought  by  Pope,  89  ; 
not  skilfully  fought,  ib.  ;  the  pos- 
sibility of  defeating  Lee,  had  the 
forces  of  Banks,  Porter,  and  Mc- 
Dowell been  employed,  88,  92  ;  he 
neglected  to  call  for  Banks,  93  ;  his 
errors,  89 ;  little  help  given  him  by 
McDowell,  92 ;  Porter's  movement 
in  retreat  caused  by  report  of  the  re- 
pulse of,  243,  340 ;  his  misapprehen- 
sion that  the  enemy  were  retreating, 
259 ;  intended  no  pursuit  beyond 
Gainesville,  83 ;  the  orders  of,  dis- 
obeyed by  Porter,  stated,  352  et  seq. ; 
his  orders  to  Porter,  Aug\  29  :  3  a.  m., 
78,  79,  80,  224,  225,  226,  383 ;  6-7 
A.  M.,  80,  226,  335,"  383 ;  9  a.  m., 
joint  order  to  Porter  and  Mc- 
Dowell, 81,  82.  83.  84,  86.  224,  229, 
241,  242,  243,  310,  311,325,  326,  352, 
378,  384 ;  4.30  p.'  m.,  89,  224,  240, 
241,  242,  249,  253,  256,  259,  311, 
340,  341,  354,  357,  365,  385;  8.50 
p.  M.,  242  ;  complications  caused  by 
his  orders,  80-81 :  his  verbal  orders, 
225-226  ;  offence  taken  by  Porter's 
request  for  written  orders,  226  ;  de- 
lays in  execution  of  his  orders,  85  ; 
his  orders  criticized,  79 ;  his  orders 
antedated,  225  ;  his  belief  that  Jack- 
son's right  flank  could  have  been 
turned  by  Porter,  89,  90 ;  Porter's 
means  of  knowledge  of  the  battle  of 
Aug.  29,  considered,  348 ;  Porter's 
doubt  as  to  the  intention  of,  to  en- 
gage in  a  general  battle,  87 ;  the 
justice  of  the  assertion  questioned, 


486 


INDEX 


335  ;  a  construction  of  Porter's  tlieory 
as  to  the  plans  of,  337  : 

Aug-ust  30 :  Porter  summoned  to 
Groveton  by,  for  battle  of  Aug".  30, 
92,  224,  259 ;  his  order  of  8.50  p.  m. 
obeyed  by  Porter,  242 ;  repulsed  by 
Jackson,  309;  his  left  and  centre 
broken  by  Lee,  93-94,  309 ;  his  de- 
feat not  disastrous,  94  ;  his  army  not 
demoralized,  96-97  ;  the  confidence 
of  the  army  in  him  impaired,  94,  96- 
97  ;  his  great  error  in  not  falling 
back  to  Centre ville,  93,  95 ;  he 
would  not  have  fought,  Aug.  30,  had 
he  known  of  Lee's  presence,  92  ;  his 
claim  of  victory  at  second  Bull  Run, 
142 ;  his  retreat  to  Centrevilie  well 
conducted,  94,  309: 

August  31 :  his  position  and 
strength  at  Centrevilie,  139,  140 ; 
Lee's  effort  to  turn  the  right  of,  94- 
95 ;  his  correction  of  Union  lines, 
140 ;  informed  of  Jackson's  move- 
ment on  his  right  flank,  147,  191 ; 
his  ignorance  of  Jackson's  position, 
148 ;  and  of  Sumner's,  141 ;  his 
statements  open  to  correction,  as  to 
alleged  order  to  Sumner,  140-141 ; 
Sumner's  testimony  concerning  the 
orders  of,  146 ;  his  promise  to  at- 
tack, 148 : 

September  1  :  order  for  attack 
given,  148  ;  informed  of  Confederate 
advance  on  Little  River  Turnpike, 
150-151 ;  his  report  relative  to  Con- 
federate flank  movement  cited,  146  ; 
McDowell's  report  to,  concerning 
action  before  Germantown,  cited, 
164 ;  his  orders  to  Stevens,  151 ; 
called  on  for  reenfoi-cements  by 
Stevens,  154 ;  no  statement  made 
by,  of  his  orders  to  Reno,  150 ;  the 
battle  of  Chantilly,  95;  his  cam- 
paign terminated  at  Chantilly,  135  ; 
his  statement  that  he  intended  to 
fight  near  Chantilly,  questioned, 
149 ;  his  attempt  to  cause  Halleck 
to  order  a  retreat,  141, 142, 148  ;  his 
retreat  to  Fairfax  C.  H.,  137  et  seq. ; 
his  expectation  of  battle  there,  137  ; 
his  army  withdrawn  to  Washington, 
95  ;  his  trains  protected  by  Torbert, 
300  ;  his  fears  for  his  army,  Sept.  2, 
213,  214. 

His  strength :  his  testimony  to 
Conduct  of  War  Committee,  July  8, 
as  to  his  strength,  199 ;  his  total 
strength,  July  31,  1862,  40,  198; 
Allan's  estimate,  199;  as  reported 
by  iiim,  Aug.  7,  400 ;  prior  to  Aug. 


9,  210 ;  his  report  of,  Aug.  20,  201 ; 

during  operations  on  the  Rappahan- 
nock, 210,  307 ;  according  to  his 
estimate,  Aug.  26,  323  ;  his  estimate, 
Aug.  27,  205 ;  his  army  as  strong, 
Sept.  1,  as  Lee's,  94 ;  his  report  of, 
Sept.  2,  213,  214;  his  statement  in 
his  report,  209,  394;  McDowell's 
force  understated  by,  201 ;  the  num- 
ber provided  by  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac, 203,  205,  210,  269 ;  his  state- 
ment, Aug.  26,  of  forces  of  Sigel, 
McDowell  and  Reynolds,  203;  the 
number  of  men  brought  to  him  by 
Reno,  Aug.  14,  201,  202,  265;  his 
estimate  of  Reynolds'  strength,  203 ; 
the  estimate  questioned,  203,  204 ; 
his  statements  of  numbers  careless, 

202,  204,  209,  213,  213  note;  his 
underestimate  of  the  corps  dis- 
cussed, 39 ;  Allan's  discussion  of  his 
strength,  197  et  seq. ;  Ropes'  esti- 
mate, 209;  Ropes'  estimates  re- 
viewed, 197  et  seq.  ;  his  report  of 
deserters  from  Banks'  corps,  52  ;  his 
losses  prior  to  Aug.  29,  209,  212 ; 
his  Josses  in  the  campaign,  97  ;  his 
statement  of  losses  in  his  report, 
213  ;  the  number  of  prisoners  cap- 
tured by  Confederates,  ih. ;  Lee's 
capture  of  guns  discussed,  211. 

Re-enforcements :  promised  re- 
enforcements  by  Halleck,  266,  267 ; 
the  object  of  the  government  in  re- 
enforcing  him,  298 ;  his  confidence 
in  support  of  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
60,  61,  73,  74;  attempt  to  hasten 
McClellan's  junction  with,  24,  57, 
113 ;  McClellan's  statement  of  his 
effort  to  re-enforce,  25,  296-298; 
troops  from  Army  of  Potomac  illy 
supplied,  Aug.  27,  127  ;  re-enforce- 
ments ceased  on  McClellan's  arri- 
val at  Alexandria,  Aug.  26,  269 ; 
McClellan's  responsibility  in  with- 
holding re  -  enforcements,  277  ;  a 
cause  of  his  failure,  219 ;  Halleck's 
statement  concerning  McClellan's 
efforts  to  re-enforce,  270  et  seq. ;  Hal- 
leck charged  with  the  responsibility 
of  the  failure,  301  ;  Haupt's  de- 
spatches as  to  forwarding  troops, 
Aug.  24,  25,  269  ;  Cox  ordered  from 
West  Virginia  to,  201 ;  aid  given  by 
Cox  to,  199 ;  joined  by  King,  Aug. 
11,  52  ;  joined  by  Reno,  Aug.  14,  52, 
201,  202,  265,  323;  by  Reynolds, 

203,  308,  323  ;  by  Porter,  Aug.  26, 
203,  205,  223,  269,  289,  308,  323;  by 
Herntzelman,  Aug.  26,  269,  289,  308, 


INDEX 


487 


323;  by  Piatt,  Aug.  26,  198;  by 
Franklin,  Aug.  30,  300;  by  Sum- 
ner, Aug.  31,  140 ;  Porter's  effort 
to  come  to  aid  of,  24;  Frankliu 
expected  by,  to  be  at  Gainesville, 
Aug.  26,  323-324 ;  Halleck's  orders 
concerning  Franklin  disobeyed  by 
McClellan,  312-313  ;  Halleck's  dis- 
pleasure because  of  tbe  detention  of 
Franklin,  296 ;  Franklin's  junction 
■witb,  as  the  army  -was  retreating, 
Aug.  30,  300 ;  Sumner  delayed  in 
his  advance  towards,  until  Aug.  30, 
335  ;  re-enforcements  called  for,  60 ; 
his  call  for  re-enforcements  at 
Gainesville,  122 ;  his  mistaken  esti- 
mate of  the  force  of  the  enemy  di- 
rected towards  Manassas,  Aug.  26, 
322. 

His  relations  with  Halleck :  Hal- 
leck's extravagant  report  of  the 
captures  made  by,  at  Corinth,  34 ; 
his  suggestion  as  to  the  appointment 
of  a  military  superior,  4,  392-393 ; 
in  command  of  Army  of  Virginia 
for  a  month  prior  to  Halleck's 
assumption  of  command,  28-29 ; 
Halleck  ignorant  of  the  character 
of,  4  ;  Halleck  aroused  to  a  sense  of 
the  peril  of,  Aug.  27,  113  ;  respon- 
sible for  Halleck's  unconcern  as  to 
danger  at  Manassas,  110 ;  his  posi- 
tion unknown  to  Halleck,  Aug.  27, 
113,  114,  297;  his  despatch  to"  Hal- 
leck, Aug.  30,  concerning  the  ration 
question,  282  ;  conjecture  as  to  Hal- 
leck's apj)rehensions  in  the  event  of 
failure  of,  121,  122  ;  apparent  want 
of  confidence  of  Halleck  in,  334; 
Halleck  not  responsible  for  the  mis- 
fortunes of  the  campaign  of,  27. 

His  relations  with  McClellan  :  his 
overtures  to  McClellan  as  to  co-op- 
eration, 4,  392  ;  his  letter,  July  4, 
cited,  4;  McClellau's  reply,  July  7, 
ib. ;  the  reply  not  satisfactory  to, 
392 ;  his  free  censure  of  McClellan, 
398  ;  the  effect  of  McClellan"s  delay 
in  withdrawing  from  the  Peninsula 
on  the  campaign  of,  320  ;  McClel- 
lan's  aid  invoked  by  Halleck,  113  ; 
McClellan  charged  with  forwarding 
troops  to,  290  ;  McClellan  informed 
of  Lee's  advance  against,  277 ;  his 
report  of  the  enemy's  movement 
communicated  to  McClellan,  319  ; 
McClellan's  propositions  looking  to 
the  aid  of,  116-118;  apprehensions 
that  the  bridges  over  Bull  Rim 
would  not  afford  means  of  retreat 


to,  117;  McClellan's  inquiry  as  to 
the  position  of,  Aug.  24,  289 ; 
McClellan's  proposition  to  let  him 
"get  out  of  his  scrape,"  26,  280; 
McClellan's  exaggeration  of  the 
strength  of,  301  ;  McCleUan's  confi- 
dence in  the  ability  of,  ih.  ;  McClel- 
lan's distrust  of,  312;  McCleUan's 
neglect  to  learn  the  condition  of, 
278,  284;  McClellan's  efforts,  not 
seconded  by  Halleck,  to  get  accurate 
information  concerning,  302 ;  in- 
formed by  McClellan  that  he  could 
get  supplies  by  sending  to  Alexan- 
dria, Aug.  29,  281,  283-284;  Mc- 
Clellan's offer  to  supply  ammuni- 
tion to,  281  ;  on  demand  for  ammu- 
nition, Aug.  30,  McClellan's  evasion 
of  compliance,  ih. ;  the  defence  of 
Washingi:on  of  more  importance  to 
McClellan  than  the  safety  of  the 
army  of,  277-278 ;  McClellan's  soli- 
citude for  defeat  of,  115-116,  117- 
118 ;  McClellan  represented  as  hav- 
ing done  nothing  to  aid,  123 ; 
probable  effect  on  ]\IcClellan  had  he 
been  ordered  to  supersede,  26  ;  his 
defeat  attributed  to  McClellan  by, 
123 ;  energy  on  the  part  of  McClel- 
lan would  have  saved  the  enemy 
from  massing  against,  319  ;  the  aid 
rendered  bv  McClellan  to.  discussed, 
289,  302 ;  "  McClellan  believed  to 
have  done  all  he  could  to  aid.  296  ; 
his  disaster  attributed  by  McClellan 
to  interference  with  plans  against 
Kiclimond,  120. 

His  relations  with  the  Comte  de 
Paris :  the  controversy,  356 ;  his 
partial  extract  from  Longstreefs  re- 
port in  letter  to  Comte  de  Paris,  91 ; 
reference  to  the  publication  of  their 
correspondence,  313. 

His  relations  with  Porter :  his  tes- 
timony at  Porter  court-martial, 
243 ;  Porter's  intention  to  injure, 
244;  Porter's  insubordinate  lan- 
guage, criticizing  the  operations  of, 
357 ;  his  charge  that  Porter  retreated 
from  the  enemy  not  sustained  by 
court-martial,  ib. ;  failed  to  submit 
Porter's  announcement  of  expecta- 
tion of  attack,  238,  242;  Porter 
found  guilty  of  second  specification, 
first  charge,  357-358 ;  also  of  third 
specification,  358 ;  the  court  held 
that  Porter  had  no  discretion  in  fail- 
ing to  execute  the  order  of,  359 ;  his 
opposition  to  the  re-opening  of  the 
case,  356;  his  citation  of  Stuart's 


488 


INDEX 


report  in  opposing  a  rehearing-,  250, 
252  note  ;  extracts  from  Confederate 
reports  sent  by  McDowell  to,  366  ; 
cited  in  his  pamphlet,  ih. ;  the  pur- 
port of  the  extracts,  366,  367 ;  his 
extract  of  Jackson's  report  collated 
with  the  original,  367  ;  the  use  made 
by  Porter's  counsel  of  his  misquota- 
tions from  Jackson's  report,  367  et 
seq. ;  Porter's  admission  of  disloyalty 
to,  362 ;  the  versions  of  his  report, 
41  note  ;  map  in  his  report,  240. 

His  personal  characteristics,  35 : 
his  veracity  questioned,  254,  407; 
his  despatches  to  Halleck  not  trust- 
worthy, 141,  142 ;  his  braggadocio, 
141-142  ;  he  acted  more  wisely  than 
he  wrote  or  spoke,  28 ;  his  abilities 
and  defects  as  a  military  comman- 
der, 305 ;  his  campaign  discussed 
and  criticized,  95-96 ;  his  campaign 
conducted  admirably  prior  to  Aug. 
26,  321,  324 ;  criticized  because  his 
plans  of  July  8  were  not  carried  out, 
322-323  ;  the  criticism  unjust,  323 ; 
the  criticisms  of  Wilcox  of,  253- 
254 ;  his  ignorance  of  his  enemy's 
troops  and  his  own,  309  ;  his  cul- 
pable ignorance  of  the  enemy's 
movements,  335  ;  his  efforts  to  fit  his 
army  for  the  campaign  considered 
to  be  at  variance  with  his  opinions 
as  to  needs  of  forces  for  war,  28 ; 
want  of  confidence  of  Army  of  Vir- 
ginia in,  94,  96-97,  143-144;  his 
probable  expectation  from  his  arm^y, 
83 ;  his  army  not  homogeneous, 
219 ;  less  effective  than  Lee's,  94 ; 
the  precise  character  of  his  orders, 
335-336  ;  the  constant  movement  of 
the  army,  266 ;  the  army  fatigued 
by,  96,  324  ;  his  lack  of  qualities  of 
a  great  general,  27-28 ;  his  reputa- 
tion based  upon  his  capture  of  Island 
No.  10,  34  ;  not  a  timid  general,  58  ; 
not  disposed  to  intimidation  by  esti- 
mates of  his  opponent's  strength, 
82;  believed  to  have  more  enter- 
prise than  McClellan,  57  ;  his  belief 
in  an  aggressive  policy,  14  ;  his  con- 
tempt for  old  systems  of  warfare, 
35  ;  possessed  of  energy,  persistency 
and  courage,  but  not  great  judg- 
ment, 75,  96 ;  his  sudden  changes  of 
opinion,  61 ;  not  fitted  to  cope  with 
Jackson  and  Lee,  29  ;  his  ignorance 
and  incapacity  in  contrast  with  Ijee's 
ability  and  sagacity,  1 18 ;  his  self- 
confidence,  96 ;  the  dislike  of  Vir- 
ginians for,  177;  the  charge  of  his 


incapacity  not  proven,  30 ;  would 
probably  have  been  successful  at 
Antietam,  96 ;  a  want  of  charitable 
disposition  in  critics  towards,  27 ; 
the  judgment  of  censure  given  him 
to  be  modified  in  history,  29 ;  men- 
tioned, 3,  108. 

Port  Republic,  Va.,  Jackson  successful 
in  engagement  at,  June  9, 1862,  33. 

Porter,  F.  J.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (July 
4,  1862) ;  Col.,  U.  S.  A.  (May  14, 
1861) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (May  17, 
1861);  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(June  27,  1862)  ;  cashiered  (Jan.  21, 
1863) ;  in  command  of  5th  Corps, 
Aug.-Sept.,  1862 ;  his  prompt  trans- 
fer of  his  corps  from  the  Peninsula, 
223  ;  his  forces  sent  to  the  Rappa- 
hannock from  Acquia  Creek,  112 ; 
his  movement  to  join  PojDe,  24,  223 ; 
Aug.  26,  his  junction  with  Pope 
effected,  203,  269,  289,  308,  323; 
his  lack  of  transijortation  and  sup- 
plies, 127 ;  269  ;  at  Bealeton  Station, 
62,  323 ;  Aug.  27,  ordered  to  Green- 
wich, 63,  127-128,  325 ;  his  line  of 
supply  abandoned,  60  ;  ordered  to 
aid  Banks  at  Warrenton,  128;  at 
Warrenton  Station,  63 ;  his  meet- 
ing with  Pope,  325,  336 ;  probably 
informed  of  Pope's  plans,  325 ;  his 
position  on  Banks'  right,  ib. ;  Mc- 
Clellan's  attempts  to  communicate 
with,  114,  115 ;  McClellan's  propo- 
sition to  open  communications  be- 
tween Pope  and,  115 ;  his  telegram 
to  Burnside  reporting  battle  immi- 
nent, 113;  sent  to  McClellan,  274; 
his  despatch  to  Burnside  4  p.  M., 
336  ;  Pope's  order  to,  6.30  p.  m.,  241, 
352 ;  Aug.  28,  the  order  of  1  a.  m., 
to  move  to  Bristoe,  65,  224,  327 ;  the 
object  of  the  order,  327 ;  his  despatch 
to  Burnside,  2  p.  M.,  336-337;  his 
contemptuous  comment  on  Pope's 
plans  therein,  ib.  ;  at  Bristoe,  67  ; 
convicted  of  disobedience  of  this 
order,  327-328 ;  no  intimation  of  an 
attack  at  Bristoe  given  him,  328 ; 
the  better  positions  to  which  he 
should  have  been  assigTied,  69,  70, 
76 ;  but  for  Pope's  misapprehension 
of  Jackson's  movement  he  would 
have  been  ordered  to  Gainesville, 
330;  Aug.  29,  in  command  of  left 
wing,  309 ;  Pope's  order  of  3  A.  m., 
78,  79,  85,  224-225,  226,  229,  393 ; 
order  cited,  383 ;  its  object  to  meet 
enemy  on  Warrenton  Turnpike,  78, 
229 ;  the  order  criticized,  79 ;  not 


INDEX 


489 


sent  by  shortest  road,  ih. ;  his  move- 
ment toTvards  Centreville,  85 ;  re- 
moYing-  him  from  field  of  battle, 
225  ;  received  verbal  order  to  hasten, 
ih.  ;  asked  for  vrritten  orders,  22fi ; 
his  meeting"  vdth  McDowell,  225  ; 
the  order  of  6-7  a.  m.,  80,  226,  383 ; 
ordered  to  march   vrith   King  to 
Gainesville,  80,  335  ;  order  repeated 
verbally.  226 ;  no  alternative  given 
to,  SO ;  his  change  of  movement  in 
conseqtience,    85 ;   his   position   at  | 
noon,  ih. ;  338 ;  preparation  made  j 
for  action  by,  85  ;  "  joint  order,"  9 
A.  ii.,  to  McDowell  and,  81-82,  384 ;  | 
time  of  receipt  by,  85 ;   discussed  \ 
and  criticized,  So-S-i ;  its  provision 
for  rettrrn  at  night  to  Centreville, 
81-82  ;  his  constrtiction  of  this  pro- 
vision, 87 ;  his  movements  possibly 
affected  thereby,  377-378  ;  question 
as  to  the  effect  of  joint  order  in  > 
superseding  prior  orders,  335 ;  his  '. 
action  negatived  by  complication  of 
orders.  80,  81 ;  his  second  meeting  ' 
•with  McDowell,  226  ;  their  confer-  ; 
ence,  85-86,  337;  the  controversy  i 
as  to    their    interview,    230-231 ; 
McDowell's  recollections  of  it.  244 ;  i 
his  disposition  of  troops  to  attack  at  ! 
the  time  of  the  meeting,  338 ;  in-  j 
formed  by  McDowell  of  Bnford's  i 
report  of  the  enemy's  advance,  337  ;  ' 
their  problem  cattsed  by  evidence  of  . 
Lee's  advance,  85-86  ;  the  ronte  to  j 
Groveton  thought  to  be  impracti-  I 
cable  by  McDoweH  and,  230,  231 ;  j 
McDov.-ell's  parting  from.  86,  230 ;  ' 
not  aware  that  this  sejoaration  was 
for  the  day,  870-371 ;  McDowell's 
movement  on  Sudley  Spring  Road 
stiggested  by,  370  ;  his  failure  to  in-  : 
stire  the  co-operation  of  McDowell,  | 
376 ;  their  want  of  a  clear  under-  | 
standing',  378-381 ;  McDowell's  al- 
leged orders  to,  229,  231 ;  expected 
by  McDowell  to  attack,  244,  371 ; 
and  to  make  connection  with  him, 
371  ;  his  dispute  with  McDowell  as 
to  order  to  attack,  310;  his  claim  i 
that  he  was  ordered  not  to  attack, 
87 ;   that     he    was    directed  by 
McDowell   to  "'remain  where   he  ; 
was,"  231,  245,  246  ;  that  he  was  j 
told  by  McDowell  that  he  was  not 
in  a  suitable  position  for  a  battle,^  \ 
245,  246;  that  he  was  opposed  by  ' 
a  large  force,  245  ;  King's  division 
taken  by  McDowell  from,  85.  227, 
232,  245 ;  his  apparent  disobedience 


of  McDowell's  order,  355-356 ;  his 
doubts  as  to  Pope's  intention  to  en- 
gage in  a  general  battle,  87 ;  con- 
firmed by  McDowell,  Aug.  29,  226  ; 
informed  by  Morell  of  advance  of 
enemy,  237;  his  expectation  of 
attack  by  enemy,  238 ;  attack  by 
Morell  ordered  and  countermand- 
ed, 234,  239,  241,  242;  his  order 
countermanded  for  good  reasons, 
246  ;  his  project  of  attack  frustrated 
by  the  detaclunent  of  King,  232, 
242,  245,  246 ;  Warren's  opinion 
that  McDowell  was  responsible  for 
the  failure  of,  to  attack,  229-230; 
his  small  force  and  difficult  position, 
87  ;  the  impropriety  of  his  position, 
88 ;  the  Confederate  advance  re- 
ported to  McDowell  by,  231,  238; 
Pope  and  McDowell  informed  of  all 
events  by,  238  ;  Morell  ordered  to 
join  Sigel  by,  234,  372,  373 ;  the 
order  rescinded,  374;  his  personal 
reconnaissance,  235 ;  its  inefficient 
character,  376-377 ;  demonstradon 
by  MoreU  ordered,  236-239;  this 
demonstration  not  effective,  343, 
344 ;  its  inefficient  character,  377 ; 
regarded  by  Lee  as  insignificant, 
346  ;  his  correspondence,  as  to  op- 
erations, with  Morell,  236-238  ;  the 
construction  given  to  these  de- 
spatches, 372  ;  evidence  of  an  inten- 
tion to  attack  of,  373  ;  his  purpose 
in  Morell's  movement  discussed,  338- 
340  ;  Morell's  testimony  as  to  orders 
given  him  by,  338  ;  his  correspon- 
dence with  Morell  in  evidence,  340  ; 
his  dispositions  of  troops  in  the 
afternoon  criticized,  376,  3S2  ;  Morell 
ordered  by,  at  6  P.  M.,  on  a  recon- 
naissance, 374 ;  Pope's  4.30  p.  m. 
order  to,  22-*,  240,  241,  242,  243, 
385 ;  acknowledged,  241 ;  the  order 
was  received  too  late  to  be  acted 
upon,  89,  245,  246,  247,  311 ;  time 
of  receipt,  365  ;  the  order  was  given 
under  a  misapprehension  of  the  con- 
ditions of  the  case,  247 ;  and  of  the 
opposing  force,  340 ;  Pope's  message 
sent  by  TTeld  to,  240;  evidence  of 
his  efforts  to  be  of  service,  235  et 
seq.  ;  his  inaction,  Aug.  29,  77,  87, 
246,  355  ;  the  wisdom  of  his  neglect 
to  attack  questioned,  88,  348 ;  the 
probable  effect  of  an  attack  by,  88  ; 
an  attack  would  not  have  relieved 
Pope  or  weakened  Jackson,  89,  24*^  ; 
would  have  been  too  hazardous,  247  ; 
the  enemy  wished  him  to  attack, 


490 


INDEX 


248;  an  attack  by  Long-street  on 
Pope  prevented  by,  246 ;  an  attack 
on  Jackson  by,  would  have  caused 
disaster,  256  ;  bis  only  road  to  main 
army  occupied  by  McDowell,  88; 
that  the  country  between  Pope  and 
himself  was  impassable,  245 ;  in- 
formed that  the  enemy  before  Pope 
was  re-enforced,  286  ;  reassured  by 
McDowell,  238,  239;  informed  of 
repulse  of  enemy  by  Hatch,  238  ;  his 
despatch  announcing"  his  plans  to 
McDowell  at  6  p,  m.,  234-235,  354  ; 
deceived  by  Stuart's  ruse  of  brush 
dragging",  342 ;  his  want  of  confi- 
dence in  Stuart's  statement,  343 ; 
his  note  to  McDowell  the  cause  of 
his  condemnation  by  court-martial, 
235  ;  the  movement  made  under  the 
impression  that  Pope  was  withdraw- 
ing", 243  ;  his  claim  that  he  held  his 
position  all  day,  246  ;  the  question 
whether  he  retreated  discussed,  339- 

340  ;  the  Confederate  evidence  as  to 
his  retreat,  346 ;  his  disposition  of 
forces  for  the  night,  233 ;  his  head- 
quarters at  Bethlehem  Church,  ih. ; 
his  troops  believed  to  have  reached 
the  field  after  Longstreet's,  257 ; 
seen  by  Lee  in  his  advance  from 
Manassas,  248,  250,  256,  257,  258; 
watched  by  Robertson,  258,  259, 
343 ;  his  movements  as  observed  by 
enemy  through  the  day,  344 ;  con- 
fronted by  Longstreet  at  noon,  309  ; 
strength  of  opposing  force,  232,  247, 

341  et  seq. ;  the  claims  made  as  to 
Longstreet's  strength  exaggerated, 
347  ;  his  estimate  of  the  Confederate 
force  not  in  accord  with  Stuart's 
statement,  343 ;  his  neglect  to  as- 
certain the  composition  of  the  ene- 
my's force,  376  ;  Longstreet's  force 
divided,  347 ;  Pope's  ignorance  of 
forces  opposed  to,  89,  90,  341  et  seq. ; 
new  evidence  to  prove  the  presence 
of  Lee's  army,  359-360 ;  Long- 
street's  forces  held  inactive  by,  232  ; 
the  claim  that  he  relieved  the  press- 
ure on  Pope  not  well  founded,  346 ; 
Lee  deterred  from  turning  Union 
left  by,  Aug.  29,  80,  87;  Long- 
street's  right  extended  beyond  his 
left  fiank,  258  ;  his  risk  conjectured 
had  he  and  Longstreet  changed 
places,  177  ;  believed  by  Pope  that 
Jackson's  right  flank  might  have 
been  turned  by,  89,  90 ;  conjecture 
as  to  resnlt  of  an  attack  on,  by 
Jackson,  65 ;  incredulity  as  to  his 


apparent  misapprehension  of  Pope's 
intentions,  336 ;  a  construction  of  his 
theory  in  this  regard,  337 ;  the  pro- 
bable advantage  which  would  have 
been  gained  by  the  union  of  his 
force  with  McDowell  and  Banks, 
88 ;  no  general  battle  until  5  p.  m., 
245,  246,  247  ;  his  position  examined 
by  Walcott  and  Stevens  in  1883, 
179  ;  Pope's  order  to,  at  8.30  P.  M., 
to  move  to  Groveton,  92,  224,  242 ; 
obeyed  Aug.  30,  242  note. 

Aug.  30,  joined  Pope,  259 ;  his 
withdrawal  to  Groveton  permitted 
Lee  to  turn  Union  flank,  93  ;  ordered 
to  pursue  the  enemy  not  retreating, 
259  ;  in  an  attack  on  Jackson,  re- 
pulsed, ih.,  309 ;  his  losses  Aug,  30, 
259,  312 ;  the  charge  of  a  feeble 
attack  controverted  by  Confederate 
officers,  260-261,  311-312  ;  Aug.  31, 
his  position,  140. 

Estimates  of  his  strength,  204-205, 
210,  232,  242  ;  in  return  for  August, 
217 ;  his  strength,  Sept.  1,  213  ;  the 
estimate  of  Reynolds'  strength  in 
his  possession,  204 ;  accompanied 
McClellan  in  Antietam  campaign, 
97 ;  mentioned,  298. 
Porter  Court-Martial,  Nov.  27,  1862- 
Jan.  10,  1863,  the  charges  preferred, 
30,  223-224  ;  Pope's  charges  against, 
discussed,  310-312  ;  conclusions  that 
they  were  not  justified,  311-312  ;  his 
defence,  352,  353,  354  ;  his  defence 
in  second  specification,  first  charge, 
245-248  ;  convicted  on  all  charges  of 
this  specification,  247  ;  Holt's  opin- 
ion cited  as  to  findings  of,  under 
this  specification,  243-244;  the  pro- 
ceedings relative  to  Aug.  29  con- 
sidered, 243  et  seq.  ;  evidence  in  its 
records  of  Porter's  position  at  noon, 
Aug.  29,  338  ;  judge-advocate's  the- 
ory as  to  the  indications  that  he 
was  expected  to  attack  the  enemy 
from  the  position  in  wliich  he  had 
been  left  by  McDowell,  373;  the 
effect  on  the  opinion  of  the  court  of 
his  inactivity  after  McDowell's  direc- 
tion as  to  the  place  to  advance,  358- 
359 ;  considered  by  the  judge-advo- 
cate as  an  indication  of  the  line  of 
duty  of,  359  ;  the  charge  of  misbe- 
havior in  the  face  of  enemy,  355 ; 
convicted  of  disobedience  of  order, 
4.30  P.  M.,  340 :  his  despatch  to  Mc- 
Dowell announcing  advance  of  enemy 
not  submitted  to,  238  ;  his  note  ac- 
knowledging 4.30  p.  M.  order  with- 


INDEX 


491 


held  from,  242;  Ms  retirement  to 
Manassas  a  disobedience  o£  "joint 
order,"'  243  ;  the  correspondence  be- 
tween Porter  and  Morell  s:ibmitted 
in  evidence,  2o5  ;  Holt's  construction 
of  his  nmvilling-ness  to  fig'ht,  23  i  ; 
the  note  to  McDowell  cited  in  proof, 
235  ;  his  defence  against  the  charge, 
231 ;  held  by  the  court  as  having  no 
discretion  under  Pope's  orders,  359  ; 
the  coiirt's  ignorance  of  the  presence 
of  Lee's  army,  243,  359,  368 ;  his 
statements  concerning'  the  enemy's 
force  not  credited  by  Pojoe,  93 ; 
charged  at  court-martial  with  mak- 
ing a  feeble  attack,  Aug.  30,  259 ; 
the  charge  withdrawn,  259-260  ;  not 
permitted  to  offer  proof  in  defence 
of  this  charge,  260 ;  tlie  conclusions 
of  court-martial  summed  tip,  358  ; 
the  points  on  which  he  was  con- 
demned, 307 ;  the  damaging  char- 
acter of  the  e-s-idence  submitted,  355  ; 
his  condemnation  on  the  evidence 
not  siu-prising,  356  ;  prosecuted  with 
ill-temper  by  the  government,  355  ; 
not  convicted  of  failure  to  attack 
Longstreet,  but  of  failure  to  attack 
Jackson,  360;  the  coxxrt  held  that 
his  failure  was  intentional,  244  :  that 
his  action  was  due  to  dishonorable 
motives,  358 ;  that  he  was  respon- 
sible for  Pope's  defeat,  243-244 ; 
his  case  re-^-iewed,  305-313 ;  found 
g'uilty  on  insufficient  evidence,  243  : 
Confederate  reports  of  battle  not 
considered  by  the  court,  341 ;  the 
proposition  to  reopen  the  case  dis- 
cussed, 261-262,  337  ;  his  good  rec- 
ord prior  to  Aug.  28  unimpeached, 
223 ;  the  plea  that  his  conduct  was 
that  of  a  soldier  and  an  honorable 
man,  247  ;  that  his  past  record  should 
have  weight,  ih. ;  the  evidence  in  sup- 
port of  his  defence  discovered  after 
the  court-martial,  247-250  ;  the  sym- 
pathy of  W.  H.  Dogan  for,  177  ;  his 
appeals  for  a  nev/  trial,  356  ;  his  ap- 
peals granted  by  g'overnment,  ih. 

Board  of  Investigation  convened 
by  order  of  General  Sherman,  1878, 
351 ;  members  of,  ib.  ;  the  findings  of 
court-martial  re-examined,  ih. ;  the 
charges  considered,  352 ;  the  free 
construction  of  the  order  as  to  evi- 
dence, 351,  352  ;  the  question  of  the 
employment  as  evidence  of  Confed- 
erate reports,  discussed,  341  et  seq. ; 
the  source  of  the  new  evidence,  248, 
356 ;  Lee's  letter  to,  Sept.  9,  1870, 


255-256  ;  Robertson's  letter  to,  May 
27,  1870,  251-252;  Wilcox's  letter 
to,  Jan.  12,  1870,  253-255  ;  the  evi- 
dence that  Longstreet's  force  was 
not  wholly  in  Porter's  front,  347  ; 
criticized  for  insubordinate  language, 
557  ;  e\'idence  of  Porter's  confession 
of  disloyalty  to  Pope,  362 ;  the  tes- 
timony of  B.  F.  Smith,  E.  G.  Mar- 
shall, and  Hyland,  as  to  their  move- 
ments, 339 ;  testimony  of  Martin, 
Morell,  and  Griffin,  as  to  the  ar- 
rangements for  attack,  338-339 ; 
its  opinion  as  to  the  time  of  issue  of 
Porter's  order  to  Morell,  374 ;  con- 
tradictory evidence  as  to  Lincoln's 
oijinions,  362  ;  testimony  as  to  his 
good  faith  and  military  judgment, 
378 ;  its  conclusions  as  to  Porter's 
good  judgment  in  not  following 
Pope's  orders,  353-354 ;  relieved 
from  blame  for  not  attacking  with- 
out McDowell's  support,  375 ;  its 
approval  of  the  defendant,  357  ;  the 
vindication  of  his  character  con- 
curred in.  382  ;  his  innocence  of  an 
intentional  disregard  of  duty,  ih. ; 
its  publication  of  records,  356-357  ; 
the  maps  concerning  his  case  de- 
scribed, 240  ;  the  character  of  the 
presentation  of  the  case  criticized, 
361 :  suggestion  as  to  a  proper  state- 
ment to  the  board,  360-361  ;  gov- 
ernment witnesses  before,  treated 
%\ith  indignity  by  the  apx^ellant's 
counsel.  3o2  et  seq. ;  the  discovery  by 
McDowell  of  Porter's  6  p.  M.  note 
written  by,  364,  365,  366 ;  the  at- 
tempt of  his  counsel  to  asperse  the 
character  of  McDowell,  365-366 ; 
the  ability  with  which  his  case  was 
conducted,  381. 
Potomac,  Army  of.  See  Army  of  the 
Potomac. 

Potomac.  Department  of.  See  Depart- 
ment of  the  Potomac. 

Potomac  River.  211  ;  Burnside's  move- 
ment from  Fort.  Monroe  on,  46  ;  cau- 
tioned to  protect  his  right  flank 
between  Rappahannock  and,  Aug. 
27. 115  ;  MeCleUan's  proposition  that 
it  be  watched,  119,  120 ;  the  Con- 
federate plan  of  movement  to,  an- 
ticipated by  government,  320 ; 
scouting  party  in  reconnaissance  on, 
Aug.  29,  279';  mentioned,  23,  211. 

Prince.  H.,  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 
(March  13.  1865)  ;  Maj.,  A.  D.  C, 
U.  S.  A.  (May  23, 1855) ;  Brig-.-Gen., 
U.  S.  y.  (April  28,  1862) ;  his  bri- 


492 


INDEX 


gade  in  Augnr's  division  at  Cedar 
Mountain,  414 ;  its  composition,  415  ; 
his  position,  414,  415,  420 ;  his 
strength,  416  ;  Confederates  opposed 
to,  42 i ;  sent  into  action  about  5 
o'clock,  428 ;  his  advance  into  the 
corn-field,  430  ;  the  forces  employed, 
ih. ;  his  retreat,  431 ;  his  losses,  ih. ; 
captured  by  the  enemy,  50,  ib. 
Pry  or,  R.  A.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
with  Wilcox,  Aug.  29,  34(3. 
Purnell  Legion,  Maryland  Volunteers, 
stationed  at  Warrenton,  Aug.  9.  416. 

Quincy,  S.  M.,  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
v.,  as  Captain  2d  Massachusetts,  at 
Cedar  Mountain,  15,  30 ;  citations 
from  his  diary,  16-18  ;  wounded,  18 

Quint,  A.  H.,  Rev.;  chaplain  2d  Mass.; 
his  history  of  the  2d  Massachusetts, 
389. 

Randolph, G.  E.,  Capt.,  U.  S.  V.,  in  com- 
mand of  battery  E,  1st  Rhode  Island 
Artillery,  at  Chantiily,  136 ;  position 
of  his  battery,  157. 

Randolph,  L.,  Lieut.,  C.  S.  A.,  his  re- 
port of  fighting  with  stones,  battle  of 
Aug.  30,  261. 

Rapidan  River,  Va.,  movements  of 
Union  forces  north  of,  Aug.  7-9,  46  ; 
Confederate  ruse  to  conceal  Jack- 
son's movement  to,  319,  320  ;  crossed 
by  Jackson  in  advance  on  Culpeper, 
Aug.  8,  1862,  15,  46  ;  McClellan  in- 
formed of  the  crosring,  320  ;  bxit  for 
attack  at  Cedar  Mountain,  Jackson 
would  probably  have  withdrawn  to, 
51  ;  King's  movement  to,  Aug.  11, 
52 ;  Pope  detained  on,  waiting  re- 
enforcements  from  McClellan,  321 ; 
Pope  re-enforced  by  Reno  on,  Aug. 
14,  265 ;  Jackson  re-enforeed  by 
Lee,  Aug.  16,  on,  73 ;  Pope's  re- 
treat from,  Aug.  18,  52. 

Rapidan  Station,  Va.,  Bayard  stationed 
at,  Aug.  7,  401 ;  Buford's  pickets 
on,  lb. 

Raccoon  Ford,  Va.,  a  limit  of  Bayard's 
picket  line,  Aug.  7,  401 ;  crossed  by 
Jackson,  Aug.  7,  403  ;  Confederate 
position  on  road  to,  418. 

Rappahannock,  Department  of.  See 
Department  of  Rappahannock. 

Rappahannock  River,  Va.,  in  Pope's 
plan  of  campaign,  July  8,  317 ; 
Union  forces  on,  July  31,  198  ;  Burn- 
side's  removal  to,  known  at  Rich- 
mond, Aug.  3,  1862,  12,  402 ;  the 
crossing  at  Falmouth  guarded  by 


King,  395 ;  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac expected  seasonably  to  reach 
the  Union  lines  on,  57,  399 ;  effort 
by  Haileck  to  hurry  troops  from 
Alexandria  to,  113,  114;  McClellan 
believed  the  communication  froni 
Acquia  Creek  shorter  to,  than  from 
Alexandria,  112  note;  the  transfer 
of  troops  to,  superintended  by  Mc- 
Clellan, Aug.  26,  111 ;  transfer  sus- 
pended by  Haileck,  111 ;  Pope's 
forces  distributed  on,  112 ;  Pope's 
skilful  retreat  to,  Aug.  18,  52,  73, 
266,  321,  440;  crossed  by  Army  of 
Virginia,  Aug.  19,  52,  59 ;  Pope's 
position  on  the  north  side  of,  53,  307, 
325  ;  Pope  ordered  to  hold  his  lines 
on,  Aug.  18-20,  57,  266,  324 ;  Pope's 
operations  affected  thereby,  403 ; 
Lee's  position  on  south  side  of,  Aug. 

21,  307  ;  his  intention  to  flank  Pope 
on,  321 ;  the  Confederate  efforts  to 
cross,  unsuccessful,  Aug.  20-22,  57- 
73,  266  ;  the  hazard  of  crossing,  58 ; 
swollen  by  heavy  rains,  266 ;  Pope's 
strength  in  operations  on,  210 ;  Riek- 
etts  stationed  at  Waterloo  Bridge 
on,  41 ;  crossed  by  Jackson,  Aug.  22, 
58  ;  Lee's  perilous  position  on,  Aug. 
22-25,  59;  Pope  authorized,  Aug. 

22,  to  cross  to  attack  Lee,  57  ;  pre- 
vented by  freshet,  59 ;  the  fords 
abandoned  by  Pope,  60  :  estimate  of 
Union  losses  in  skirmishes  on,  197  et 
seq.,  202,  208,  211  ;  losses  by  Sigel 
and  McDowell  considerable,  203, 
204 ;  Union  and  Confederate  losses 
not  unequal,  209 ;  recrossed  by 
Ewell,  Aug  25,  59  ;  Ewell's  loss  on, 
212  ;  in  Pope's  disposition  of  forces, 
Aug.  27,  327  ;  Lee's  successful  strat- 
egy, on,  1863,  58,  321 ;  mentioned, 
9,  10,  115,  131,  205,  211,332. 

Rappahannock  Station,  Va.,  one  of 
Greene's  regiments  at,  Aug.  9,  39 ; 
McDowell  in  position  at,  Aug.  20, 
53  ;  Lee's  unsuccessful  effort  to  cross 
the  river  at,  Aug.  20-22,  57 ;  Pope 
authorized  to  cross  at,  Aug.  22,  58 ; 
strong  force  of  enemy  at,  Aug.  23- 
24,  266;  Kearnv  reported  at,  Aug. 
26.  by  Porter,  114. 

Rebel  War  Clerk.    See  Jones. 

Rebellion  Record,  138. 

Red  River  Campaign,  mentioned,  21. 

Reid  Farm,  scene  of  battle  of  Chan- 
tiily, 187  ;  the  survey  of,  1858,  de- 
scribed, 187-188 ;  reproduction  of 
the  map,  188  note. 

Reid    House,    Cliantilly  battlefield, 


INDEX 


493 


visited  "by  Walcott  and  Stevens,  1SS3, 
180  et  seq.,  191 ;  a  Union  hospital, 
1862,  18U ;  occupied  by  Isaac  Heatli, 
1862,  192. 

Eeid,  Joiin,  tlie  survey  of  Hs  farm, 
1858,  described.  187-188. 

Reno.  J.  L.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (Jiilv 
18,'  1862) ;  Capt.,  U.  S.  A.  (Julv  1, 

1860)  ;  Brig-.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (Xov."'l2! 

1861)  ;  joined  Pope.  Aug-.  14,  1862, 
52,  201,  265,  323,-  bis  strength,  201, 
202,  209,  210,  265;  composition  of 
his  brigade,  143,  153 ;  his  corps 
poorly  supplied  for  campaign,  127 ; 
recrossed  the  Rapidan  and  Rappa- 
hannock. 52  ;  in  position,  on  Pope's 
left,  at  Kelly's  Ford,  Aug.  20,  1862, 
58,  307;  informed  of  Reynolds' 
moyement  from  Falmouth.  Aug.  21, 
203 ;  on  the  Rappahannock,  Aug. 

26,  112 ;  his  position  on  the  right, 
113  ;  his  division  of  the  Ninth  Corps 
at  Warrenton,  Aug.  26,  61, 114,  323  ; 
ordered  to  Greenwich,  Aug.  27.  62, 
127 :  at  Greenwich,  evening  of  Aug. 

27,  63 ;  Porter  ordered  to  his  sup- 
port, ib. ;  ordered  to  Manassas.  Aug. 
28,65,  327;  at  Manassas  Junction, 
noon.  Aug.  28,  67,  268 ;  moved  to 
Centreville,  6S,  70,  76,  78,  337; 
Pope's  project  to  send  him  to  Gaines- 
ville to  support  McDovrell,  evening 
of  Aug.  28,  330 ;  this  project  not 
executed,  26. ;  the  reason  for  not 
sending  him,  331 ;  believed  by  Pope, 
night  of  Aug.  28,  as  obstructing 
Jackson's  retreat,  ib. ;  place  of  en- 
campment, night  of  Aug.  28,  78 ; 
ordered  to  Warrenton  Tunpike,  78 ; 
reached  Centreville  at  noon,  Aug. 
29.  79,  84-85  :  ordered  to  attack  and 
pursuit  of  Jackson,  335,  336  ;  in  pur- 
suit of  enemy,  82,  384 ;  mentioned  in 
joint  order  to  McDowell  and  Porter, 
81 ;  at  Sudley  Springs,  235  ;  engaged 
under  Pope  in  battle  of  Aug,  29,  89 ; 
Confederates  repulsed  by,  Aug.  30, 
on  Henry  House  hill,  143,  173  ;  his 
position.  Aug.  31, 140  :  charged  with 
folding  position,  Sept.  1,  on  Little 
River  Turnpike,  150 ;  his  attack  on 
Stuart,  before  Germantown,  164; 
Bimey  ordered  to  Chantilly  by,  160  ; 
his  force  at  battle  of  Chantilly,  135  ; 
Ms  division  under  Stevens'  com- 
mand. Sept.  1,  150. 158  ;  accompanied 
his  forces  to  battlefield,  but  took  no 
part  in  the  conflict,  153  ;  his  services 
at  Chantilly,  ib. ;  mistake  in  deliv- 
ery of  his  orders  to  Ferrero,  156  ;  no 


report  of  battle  made  by,  13S  ;  no 
statement  made  by  Pope  of  his 
orders,  to,  150  ;  route  of  his  forces 
under  Stevens  to  Cliantilly  battle- 
field traced,  18^3,  by  Walcott  and 
Stevens,  180  et  seq. ;  accompanied 
MeClellan  in  Antietam  campaign. 
97 ;  killed  at  South  Mountain,  Sept. 
14,  138  ;  mentioned,  126,  177. 
Revnolds,  J.  F.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(Nov.  29, 1862) ;  Lieut.-CuL,  U.S.  A. 
(Mav  14.  1861) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(Aug.  26, 1861) ;  CoL.  U.  S.  A.  ( Jtme 
1,  1863)  ;  in  command  of  division, 
3d  Corps,  A.  of  V.,  transferred  from 
Fort  Monroe,  Aug.  19,  203 ;  his 
forces  sent  to  the  Rappahannock 
from  Ac-quia  Creek,  112  ;  moved  from 
Fahnouth  to  join  Pope,  Aug.  21, 

203.  205  ;  joined  Pope.  Aug.  23,  203, 
268-269 ;  308. 323  :  his  strength,  203, 

204,  216.  269  ;  Sept.  2,  217  ;  at  War- 
renton  Junction,  Aug.  26,  61,  323  ; 
his  division  placed  under  McDow- 
ell's command.  Aug.  27.  127  ;  joined 
McDoweR  at  Xew  Baltimore,  131 ; 
ordered  to  Gainesville,  Aug.  27,  62, 
325  ;  to  follow  Sigel,  129 ;  reached 
Buckland  MUIs  evening  of  Aug.  27, 
63  ;  his  place  of  encampment,  133  ; 
in  position  to  intercept  communica- 
tion between  Jackson  and  Lee,  327  : 
Pope's  order  to.  Aug.  28,  intercepted, 
828  ;  reached  Gainesville,  noon.  Aug. 
28,  67  ;  sent  to  TTarrenton  Turnpike, 

68,  78  ;  sent  back  to  Gainesville,  76  ; 
with  Sigel,  Jackson's  only  opponent. 

69,  70,  77 ;  believed  by  Pope,  night 
of  Aug.  28,  as  obstructing  Jackson's 
retreat,  331 ;  enconntered  by  Stuart, 
morning'  Aug.  29,  343 ;  ordered  to 
attack  Jackson.  82.  84;  engaged 
under  Pope  in  battle  of  Aug.  29,  89  ; 
ignorant,  though  fighting  from  early 
morning",  of  other  than  Jackson's 
forces.  ii2 ;  the  scheme  for  junction 
of  McDowell  and.  suggested  by 
Porter,  370-371,  379;  Porter  ordered, 
at  4.30  P.  M.,  to  keep  in  communica- 
tion with,  240,  385 ;  his  good  fight- 
ing. Aug.  29.  85  ;  conjecture  as  to 
result  of  attack  on^  Jackson,  con- 
jointly with  Sigel.  King,  and  Rick- 
etts.  79  ;  aid  given  to  Porter  by,  in 
repulse  of  Jackson.  Aug.  30,  259  ; 
his  position.  Aug.  31,  140  ;  the  con- 
dition of  his  command.  132 ;  his 
former  operations  against  Jackson. 
lb. ;  his  testimony  for  Porter  at 
court-martial,  245  ;  that  the  coun. 


494 


INDEX 


try  between  Porter  and  Pope  was 
impassable,  ih. ;  testimony  as  to  bis 
movement  Aug.  29,  341-842 ;  that 
there  was  no  battle  until  5  p.  M., 
245;  mentioned,  126,  129,  179. 

Rhode  Island  Volunteers,  Artillery,  1st 
reg't.,  Battery  E,  under  Randolph  at 
ChantiUy,  Sept.  1,1862,  136;  Cav- 
alry, 1st  regt.  (Duffi^),  with  i]d  Corps, 
Army  of  Virginia,  Aug.  1,  1862,  202  ; 
strength,  Aug.  16,  216. 

Riddiek,  R.  H.,  Col.,  C.  S.  A.,  of  34th 
North  Carolina  regiment,  mortally 
v>^ounded  at  ChantiUy,  170. 

Richmond,  Va.,  withdrawal,  spring  of 
1862,  of  Confederate  force  from 
Manassas  Jimetion  to,  103 ;  Jack- 
son's return  to,  after  his  Shenandoah 
Valley  campaign,  June,  1862,  33, 
391 ;  the  project  for  the  army  under 
Pope  against,  prior  to  July  1,  1862, 

4  ;  in  the  plan  of  government,  318  ; 
McClellan  on  the  James  a  menace 
to,  July,  400 ;  the  effect  of  opposi- 
tion by  strong  force  from,  considered 
by  Pope,  July  8,  317 ;  scheme  to 
draw  Confederate  force  from,  392 ; 
attacks  from,  apprehended  at  Wash- 
ington, ih.  ;  Poise's  operations  in- 
tended to  interrupt  communications 
with,  40 ;  and  relieve  Army  of  Poto- 
mac, ih. ;  McClellan's  estimate  of 
Confederate  army  at,  July  25,  8  ; 
his  distance  from,  ib. ;  distance  of 
Pope  from,  ih. ;  the  two  Union  armies 
in  Virginia  separated  by,  July,  1862, 

5  ;  advance  of  both  against,  depend- 
ent on  McClellan,  ih. ;  the  successful 
operation  against,  expected  from  the 
Union  of  the  Armies  of  Virginia  and 
the  Potomac,  399 ;  scheme  of  ad- 
vance on,  by  McClellan  reviewed  by 
Halleck,  9-10;  Hatch  ordered  to 
make  a  cavalry  demonstration,  July 
12,  towards,  395  ;  railroad  damaged, 
July,  1862,  by  Union  cavalry  be- 
tween Gordonsville  and,  45 ;  Pope 
believed  at,  to  be  preparing  to  ad- 
vance on,  Aug.  3,  12  ;  the  enemy's 
movement  from,  to  the  south  of  the 
James,  319;  McClellan's  neglected 
opportunity  to  attack  a  reduced  force 
at,  319  ;  attack  on,  abandoned  by 
McClellan,  42  ;  the  intention  of  gov- 
ernment to  withdraw  Union  army 
from,  known  at,  8,  11-12  ;  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  withdrawn  from  be- 
fore, 399 ;  Hill  and  Longstreet,  for 
protection,  detained  at,  45,  400 ;  re- 
leased by  the  withdrawal  of  McClel- 


lan, 400 ;  the  force  remaining  for 
defence  thereafter,  401  ;  strength  of 
Lee's  army  in  advance  from,  207- 
208  ;  the  interference  with  his  plans 
before,  believed  by  McClellan  to  be 
the  cause  of  Pope's  disaster,  120 ; 
distance   from   Fredericksburg,  9 ; 
mentioned,  133. 
Ricketts,  J.  B.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
A.  (March  13,  1865)  ;  Capt.,  U.  S. 
V.  (Aug.  3,  1852) ;  Brig. -Gen.,  U. 
S.  V.  (July  21,  1861)  ;  Maj.,  U.  S. 
A.  (June  1,  1863) ;  Bvt.  Col.,  U.  S. 
A.  (June  3,  1864)  ;  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen., 
U.  S.  V.  (Aug.  1,  1864);  in  com- 
mand of  2d  division,  3d  Corps,  A. 
of  v.,  July,  1862,  16,  40,  149 ;  his 
division  ordered  to  Warrenton,  July, 
394 ;  ordered  to  Waterloo  Bridge, 
July  21,  41,  396;  his  movement  to 
Culpeper,  400 ;  at  Culpeper  C.  H., 
Aug.  7,  16,  17,  45,  46,  403 ;  ordered, 
Aug.  8,  to  position  on  road  near 
Cedar  Mountain,  404 ;   position  of 
his  division  at  noon,  ib. ;  his  reten- 
tion on  Madison  Court  House  Road, 
410;    Roberts'  advice  that  Banks 
should  send  for,  407  ;  his  inactivity, 
50 ;  Pope's  error  in  not  going  early 
in  the  day,  51 ;  reached  tbe  battle- 
field too  late,  50,  439 ;  time  of  his 
arrival,  439  ;  his  position,  ih.  ;  Pe- 
gram's  fire  on,  silenced,  ih.  ;  reported 
by  Porter  as  near  Warrenton,  Aug. 
27,  113,  126;  ordered  to  follow  Sig^el 
to  Gainesville,  129 ;   encamped  at 
Gainesville,  Aug.  27,  133  ;  sent  to 
Thoroughfare  Gap,  Aug.  28,  67,  75, 
331  ;  to  cheek  Lee's  advance,  68 ; 
the  value  of  his  position  at  the  Gap 
not  appreciated  by  Pope,  331 ;  his 
engagement  with  the  van  of  Long- 
street's  forces,  Aug.  28,  69 ;  seen  by 
Robertson,  251 ;    Longstreet's  ad- 
vance delayed  by,  331,  332 ;  his  re- 
treat from  the  Gap,  226,  332  ;  left 
the  Gap  unguarded,  69,  70,  77,  84 ; 
should  have  been  retained  and  re- 
enforced  ther-e,  75  ;  Pope's  combina- 
tion against  Jackson  destroyed  by, 
332 ;  effect  of  his  withdrawal  on 
battle  of  Aug.  29,  77,  79,  80  ;  Pope's 
ignorance  of  his  position,  morning  of 
Aug.  29,  81, 384 ;  McDoweU  directed 
to  comnmnieate  orders  to,  ih. ;  ac- 
companied McDowell  in  movement 
towards  Groveton,  231 ;  the  effect 
on  Porter's  plans,  246 ;  his  delay  in 
reac]iing  scene  of  action,  233 ;  re- 
ported to  Porter  as  moving  towards 


INDEX 


495 


Gainesville,  239 ;  Lis  division  use-  ) 
less.  Aug-.  29,  77 ;  conjeetiire  as  to  ' 
result  of  an  attack  on  Jackson  by. 
conjointly  -vrith  >ig'el.  Reynolds,  and 
King-,  79 ;  his  services  in  battle  of  : 
Aug-.  30,  94;  his  position  on  Difficult  j 
Kun,  Sept.  1,  137 ;  his  position  be-  I 
fore  Germanto-^.  164 ;  vi-ith  Buf  ord 
and  Patrick  engaged  in  repulse  of  ; 
Stuart  on  Little   River  Turupike.  | 
149-150  ;  his  report  of  action,  164—  | 
165 ;  his  former  operations  ag-ainst  j 
Jackson.  133;  mentioned.  131.  I 
Roberts.  B.  S.,  Bvt.  Brig-.-Gen..  U.  S.  i 
A.  and  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  \.  \ 
(March  13,  1865);  Maj..  U.  S.  A. 
(Mav  13,  1861);  Brig-.-Gen..  U.  S. 
V.  (July  16,  1862)  ;  A.  D.  C.  (Jnlv 
28-Sept.  3,  1862)  ;  Lient.-CoL.  U. 
S.  A.  (Jtily  28,  1866) ;  Pope's  chief 
of  cavalry,  406 ;  sent  to  place  Banks 
in  position,  ib. ;  Banks  only  expected  ' 
to  hold  the  enemy  in  check.  /6.  ;  ' 
authorized  by  Pope  to  give  orders 
in  his  name,  408  ;  the  propriety  of  . 
this   authorization  questioned,   ih. ;  : 
his  statement  qualified  by  him,  408  ; 
note ;  his  failure  to  use  his  author-  j 
ity  to   prevent    the    battle,  408 ;  i 
strong'  position  selected  by,  20-21 ;  I 
the  position  abandoned  by  Banks  . 
contrary  to  advice  of,  21,  48 ;  Gor- 
don ordered  to  position  by,  413  ;  his 
opinion  of  ability  of  2d  Corps  to  hold 
its  position,  Aug\  9.  19  ;  his  imputa- 
tions as  to  Banks"  tm-willingiiess  to 
fig-ht.  23.  48,  49,  409  ;  the  explana- 
tion of  the  charg-e,  23  ;  his  statement 
as  to  Banks'  action.  406 ;  opposed 
to  an  attack  by  Banks.  406  et  seq.  ;  , 
his  statement  that  Banks  foug:ht  on  '> 
his  ovrn  responsibility.  408  ;  not  un-  ' 
biased  in  his  statements  concerniug- 
Banks,  407 ;  his  memory  at  fault. 
49  ;  his  evidence  as  to  Banks"  eifort  ' 
to  evade  responsibility  for  defeat. 
23.  4S ;    his  testimony  concerning 
Cedar  Mountain  at  ^IcDowell  Court 
of  Inquiry.  19.  23  ;   a  ^vitness  for 
government  at  Porter  court-martial. 
243. 

Robertson,   B.   H.,  Capt.,  U.  S.  A.  , 
(March  3-Aug.   8,  1861)  :   Brig.-  ' 
Gen..  C.  S.  A.  (1862)  ;  his  cavalry 
brigade  at  Gordonsville.  its  strength. 
206 ;   -with  Jackson's  command  in 
advance  against  Pope,  reached  the 
Rapidan,  Aug.  7,  1862,  46;  repulsed 
Bayard,  Aug.  8,  402  ;  crossed  the  j 
river,  Aug.  8,  46 ;  his  movement,  i 


Aug.  28,  to  Hayroarket,  251;  in 
command  of  Confederate  cavalry 
at.  Aug\  29,  258-259  ;  assigned  to 
support  Longstreet,  in  advance  to 
Gainesville,  251 ;  Porter's  corps  dis- 
covered by,  343 ;  assigTied  to  -watch 
Porter,  258.  259  ;  position  of  his  own 
brigade,  258 ;  his  statement  as  to 
Jackson"s  posi-tion,  ib. ;  his  move- 
ment to-wards  Manassas,  342 ;  e\'i- 
dence  from  his  report  and  lettei's 
cited  in  defence  by  Porter,  248 ;  his 
letter  to  Porter  of  May  27,  1870. 
cited,  251-252 :  his  denial  that 
bushes  -were  dragged  by  Stuart,  250, 
252,  252  note ;  Union  cavalry  cap- 
tured by.  Aug.  31,  147  ;  his  position 
near  Chantilly,  Sept.  1.  ib. 

Robertson.  J.,  Michigan  in  the  -war,  by, 
mentioned,  161. 

Robertson"s  River.  Va.,  Sigel's  force 
at.  Aug.  7,  401.  ' 

Robinson.  J.  C,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
Y.  (June  27.  1864)  ;  Capt..  U.  S.  A. 
(Aug.  12,  1850) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
T.  (April  28.  1862)  ;  Maj..  U.  S.  A. 
(Feb.  20,  1862^ ;  in  command  of  1st 
brigade,  1st  division  (Kearny's),  3d 
Corps,  at  Chantilly,  161 ;  suffered 
no  loss,  163. 

Robinson.  0"X.  W..  Capt..  U.  S.  V., 
in  conmiand  of  battery.  4th  Maine, 
at  Cedar  Moimtain,  416. 

Rockville.  Md..  scouting  force  sent  to, 
Aug.  29.  279. 

RoebHng,  TT.  A..  Col.,  A.  D.  C.  U.  S. 
A.,  his  opinion  that  McDo-well  -was 
responsible  for  Porter's  failure  to 
attack.  Aug.  29,  230. 

Roemer.  J..  Capt.,  U.  S.  Y..  in  com- 
mand of  battery  L.  2d  Xe-w  York, 
his  position  at  Cedar  Mountain.  410, 
415. 

Ronald.  C.  A.,  Col.,  C.  S.  A.,  in  com- 
mand of  the  Stone-wall  brigade. 
Cedar  Moimtain,  419 ;  his  position 
in  reserve,  ib.,  421 ;  his  advance 
against  Donnelly,  425  ;  thrown  into 
disorder  by  Donnelly,  425-426 ;  re- 
ported by  Branch  as  routed.  426. 

Ropes.  J.  C..  his  Army  imder  Pope  " 
cited,  136,  197,  389;  his  estimates 
of  strength  of  Union  and  Confeder- 
ate Armies,  in  Yirginia.  Aug.  1862, 
reviewed.  197  et  seq. ;  his  explana- 
tion of  discrepancy  of  statements 
of  Banks"  force,  200  ;  his  estimate 
of  Heintzelman's  strength.  204;  of 
Pope's  strength.  209 ;  of  Pope's  losses 
prior  to  Aug.  29,  ib. ;  of  Confederate 


496 


INDEX 


strength,  208 ;  his  statement  of  Jack- 
son's loss  corrected,  211 ;  the  Con- 
federate claim  of  the  prisoners  cap- 
tured questioned  by,  213 ;  concern- 
ing- guns  captured  by  Confederates, 
211,  218 ;  his  note  in  reply  to  Allan, 
217-219  ;  his  statements  as  to  place 
of  battle  of  Chantilly  corrected,  136, 
139  ;  his  opinion  of  good  condition  of 
Pope's  army  after  defeat,  214. 

Rosser,  T.  L.,  CoL,  C.  S.  A.,  his  engage- 
ment morning  of  Aug.  29,  342. 

Ruger,  T.  H.,  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 
(March  2,  1867);  Col.,  U.  S.  V. 
(Aug.  20,  1861)  ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
V.  (Nov.  29,  1862)  ;  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen., 
U.  S.  V.  (Nov.  30, 1864)  ;  Col.,  U.  S. 
A.  (July  28,  1866)  ;  in  command  of 
3d  Wisconsin,  424 ;  ordered  to  ad- 
vance into  the  woods  by  Crawford, 
ih.  ;  would  not  go  without  an  order 
from  Banks,  ih. ;  his  charge,  426  ; 
its  disastrous  consequences,  426-427. 

Ruggles,  G.  D.,  Bvt.  Brig-Gen.,  U.  S. 
A.  (March  13,  1865) ;  Col.,  A.  D.  C, 
U.  S.  A.  (June  28,  1862-May  31, 
1866) ;  ordered  to  Porter,  Aug.  29, 
8  A.  M.,  issued  by,  225,  383 ;  his 
testimony  for  Porter  at  court-mar- 
tial, 245. 

Russell,  H.  S.,  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
v..  Col.,  5th  Mass.  Cavalry,  captured 
by  the  enemy  at  Cedar  Mountain, 
439. 

Salamanaca,  Spain,  battle  of  July  22, 
1812,  95. 

Salem,  Va.,  in  Jackson's  flank  move- 
ment, Aug.  1862,  59,  73,  308,  323 ; 
Jackson  conjectured  to  be  marching 
to  Warrenton  from,  61 ;  Confederate 
forces  near,  Aug.  27,  268 ;  Long- 
street  at,  Aug.  27,  308 ;  mentioned, 
131,  369. 

San  Francisco,  Cal.,  the  residence  of 
Gen.  Halleck  at,  306. 

Savage,  J.,  Jr,  Maj.,  2d  Mass.,  mortally 
wounded  Cedar  Mountain,  439. 

Sehenck,  R.  C,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(Aug.  30,  1862)  ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
V.  (May  17,  1861)  ;  in  command  of 
brigade,  1st  Corps,  36  ;  temporarily 
in  command  of  1st  Corps,  394 ;  or- 
dered to  Sperryville,  395. 

Schofield,  J.  M.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 
(March  4,  1869) ;  Capt.,  U.  S.  A. 
(May  14,  1861)  ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
V.  (Nov.  21,  1861)  ;  Maj.-Gen.,  U. 
S.  V.  (Nov.  29,  1862) ;  Brig.-Gon., 
U.  S.  A.  (Nov.  30,  1864)  ;  a  member 


of  the  board  to  investigate  the  Por- 
ter case,  351 ;  his  comment  on  the 
charge  of  disobedience  of  Pope's  or- 
der of  Aug.  27,  6.30  p.  M.,  353 ;  his 
leanings  towards  the  petitioner's 
point  of  view,  382  ;  his  report  for 
the  board  in  the  Porter  case  com- 
mended, ih. 

Scribner's  Sons,  publishers  of  "  Cam- 
paigns of  the  Civil  War,"  217. 

Second  Army  Corps.  See  U.  S.  Army 
Corps. 

Second  Corps,  Army  of  Virginia.  See 
U.  S.  Army  Corps,  Army  of  Vir- 
ginia. 

Second  Massachusetts  Regiment  Asso- 
ciation, account  of  Battle  of  Cedar 
Mountain  by  Gordon,  read  to,  18. 

Sedgwick,  J.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(July  4,  1862) ;  Col.,  U.  S.  A.  (April 
25,  1861);  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(Aug.  31,  1861) ;  mentioned  by  Mc- 
Clellan,  296. 

Seven  Days'  Battles,  the  beginning  of, 
coincident  with  Pope's  assignment  to 
command,  392. 

Shenandoah  Valley,  Va.,  the  May, 
1862,  operations  in,  favorable  only 
to  Jackson,  391 ;  attempt  to  deceive 
Union  commanders  in,  June,  401  ; 
Jackson's  successful  operations  in, 
33  ;  severe  service  of  his  division  in, 
206 ;  his  movement  to  Richmond 
from,  401 ;  Banks'  reckless  attack  on 
Jackson  in,  37  ;  Banks  driven  from, 
33 ;  the  scene  of  all  of  his  actions 
prior  to  1862,  38  ;  experience  of  his 
forces  in,  39  ;  the  position  of  Union 
forces  in,  July,  393;  Banks'  wish 
to  retaliate  at  Cedar  Mountain  for 
reverses  inflicted  by  Jackson  in,  48  ; 
the  projected  employment  of  Pope 
for  safety  of,  40  ;  his  good  disposi- 
tions to  that  end,  41;  his  plan  to 
guard  the  outlets  of,  317,  392  ;  Jack- 
son's August  movement  believed 
by  Pope  to  be  directed  to,  110,  111, 
129,  322  ;  mentioned,  133. 

Shenandoah,  Department  of.  See  De- 
partment of  the  Shenandoah. 

Shepard,  Col.,  32d  Massachusetts  Vol- 
unteers, his  statement  as  to  move- 
ment, Aug.  29,  339,  346. 

Sherman,  W.  T.,  Gen.,  U.  S.  A.  (March 
4,  1869);  CoL,  U.  S.  A.  (May  14, 
1861);  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (May 
17, 1861) ;  Maj-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (Mav 
1,  1862- Aug.  12,  1864) ;  Brig.-Gen., 
U.  S.  A.  (July  4,  1863)  ;  Maj.-Gen., 
U.  S.  A.  (Aug.  12,  1864)  ;  Lieut.- 


IXDEX 


497 


Gen,.  U.  S.  A.  (J^v_25,  1S66);  Ms 
order  of  March.  9. 1S7S,  eonvermig  a 
board  to  re-lieaT  tlie  Porter  case, 
351 :  the  constraetion  of  the  hoard 
of  his  proTision  a,s  to  eTidenee.  ii. 
Sigel.  F..  Ma j. -Gen,.  U.  S.  A'.  (March 
21,  1S62)  :  Brig.-Gen..  U.  S.  V.  ^May 
17.  1861)  ;  his  service  in  Germany. 
184S,  36 ;  his  command  in  Alissis- 
sij)pi.  ib. ;  his  forces  of  little  service. 
36-37;  his  inefficiency.  36  ;  rei^laced 
Fremont  in  command  of  1st  Corps. 
A.  of  v.,  36.  391 ;  his  opp ointment 
intended  to  conciliate  Germans.  36  ; 
composition  of  his  corps,  ib. :  his 
strengTh,  37.  19S.  19'9.  201.'  203,' 394; 
his  unfavorable  report  of  tie  condi- 
tion of  his  command.  394;  ordered. 
July  5.  to  position  at  Sperryville.  41 ; 
tem^Dorarily  replaced  by  Schenck. 
3'94;  his  corps  inspected  by  Pope. 
Aug.  7.  4tj3  ;  dii'ected  to  support 
Buford.  Aug-.  7,  4ul ;  ordered  to 
move  to  Culpeper.  Aug.  S.  15,  46. 
404 ;  tinable  to  find  the  only  direct 
road.  16,  46.  404;  at  Hazel  Pdver. 
Aug.  9,  46;  arrived  at  Culpeper 
afternoon  of  Aug.  9.  50.  404  ;  Pope's 
orders  as  to  rations  violated  by.  4iJ4  : 
his  forces  tired  and  huugry.  oO.  404; 
delayed  for  rest  and  food  rill  too 
late  for  action.  50  ;  Banks  expected 
not  to  precipitate  a  fight  before  the 
arrival  of.  4ij7  ;  Ms  arrival,  evening, 
at  Cedar  Mountain.  440  :  in  position 
at  Sulphur  Springs.  Aug.  20-26,  53. 
61,  307 :  his  losses  in  skirmishes 
on  the  Ptappaliannock,  203  ;  Pope's 
capricious  orders  to.  61  ;  ordered  to 
Warrenton.  61,  113  ;  his  tvro  divi- 
sions at  TTarrenton,  Aug.  26.  1^62. 
61.  129  ;  his  corps  placed  under  Mc- 
Dowell's command;  Aug.  27,  127 : 
artillery  supplied  to  Kearny  by,  ih.  : 
his  corps  vrithout  cavalry,  129  ;  Mc- 
Dovr ell's  order  to,  Aug.  27.  369 ;  or- 
dered to  Gainesville.  Aug.  27.  62. 
129,  325 ;  by  his  slo^ess  delayed 
th.e  movement  of  the  army  to 
GainesTille.  63,  130-131 :  reached 
BuckLand  Mills,  evening.  Aug-.  27. 
63  ;  in  position  night  of  Aug'.  27.  to 
intercept  communication  between 
Jackson  and  Lee.  327 ;  Pope's  order 
to.  intercepted;  32S  ;  sent  to  Gaines- 
ville. Aug.  2S.  76  ;  at  Gainesville  at 
noon.  67 ;  sent  to  "VTarrenton  Turn- 
pike, 6S,  7S  :  ordered  to  Centre ville. 
6S:  vtith.Peynolds  confronted  Jack- 
son. 69  ',  his  engagement  with  J ack- 


son,  337 ;  believed  by  Pope,  night  of 
Aug.  2S.  as  obstructing  Jackson's 
retreat.  331  ;  Pope's  project  to  em- 
ploy him  in  pursuit  of  Jackson.  336  ; 
his  position,  morning.  Aug.  29,  225, 
3S3 ;  ordered.  Aug-.  29,  to  attack 
Jackson  near  Grovetou.  7S,  Si,  S2, 
S4.  335  ;  encountered  by  Stuart,  343  ; 
his  movement  in  pursuit  of  enemy. 
3S4;  Porter  and  McDowell  ordered 
to  join.  310  ;  McDowell  held  to  have 
ordered  Porter  to  join.  231 ;  Mc- 
Dowell's movement  by  Sudley  road 
caused  a  separation  from.  231.  232  ; 
effort  made  by  Porter  to  send  Morell 
to  aid.  234.  235  ;  Porter's  unsuccess- 
ful effort  to  communicate  with.,  373, 
374  ;  King's  movement  to  aid.  339  ; 
engaged  under  Pope  in  battie  of 
Aug.  29.  89  ;  his  good  fighting.  85  ; 
repulsed  by  Jackson.  176  ;  his  igno- 
rance of  other  forces  engaged  than 
Jackson's.  92;  conjecture  as  to  re- 
sult of  attack,  conjointiy  with  Rey- 
nolds. King  and  Ricketts,  79  ;  his 
position.  Aug.  31.  140 ;  no  report  of 
his  losses.  213  :  his  corps  assigned  to 
garrison  duty  at  Washington,  by  Me- 
Clellan.  97  ;  mentioned,  70.  77,  126, 
219. 

Slaughter's  Moimtain.  another  name 
for  Cedar  Moimtain. 

Slaus'hter's  Run.    See  Cedar  Run. 

Slocum.  H.  W..  Maj.-Gen..  U.  S.  V- 
{ Julv  4.  lS62-Sept.  2S.  1865)  :  Col.. 
U.  S.  V.  (Mar  21.  1861)  ;  Brig.- 
Gen..  U.  S.  T.  (Aug.  9,  1861) ;  at 
Washington.  Aug.  27.  292. 

Smith.  B.  F,.  Bvt.  Brio-.-Gen..  U.  S.  V. 
(March  26.  1865) ;  Capt.  U.  S.  A. 
(^lav  14.  1861)  :  Col..  126tli  Ohio 
(Sept.  10,  1862);  Maj..  U.  S.  A. 
(July  25,  1866)  ;  a  witness  for  gov- 
ernment. Porter  court-martial,  '24^-j, 
339.  :346, 

Smith..  T.  C.  H.,  Lieut.-Col..  A.  D.  C, 
U.  S.  v..  announced  Reynold's  move- 
ment from  Falmouth  to  Reno.  Aug. 
21.  203;  a  witness  for  government, 
Porter  court-martial.  24^^. 

Smitb.  W.  F..  Bvt.  Mai-Gen..  U.  S.  A. 
(March  13.  1865) ;  Capt..  U.  S.  A. 
(Julv  1.  1859) :  Col.,  U.  S.  Y.  (Julv 
I'x  '1861);  Brig.-C^n..  U.  S.  V. 
(Aus-.  13.  1861)  ;  :SIai.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
T.  (July '4.  1862);  Maj.,  U.  S.  A. 
(May  3'.  1863-]VIarcli  7,  1867) ;  at 
TTashington.  Aug.  27,  292  ;  in  ad- 
vance under  Franklin.  Aug.  29.  299 : 
owing  to  his  report  of  the  advance 


498 


INDEX 


of  enemy,  Franklin's  division  was 
halted  at  Aunandale,  ih.  ;  his  want 
of  artillery  ammunition,  299-300. 

South  Carolina  Volunteers,  C.  S.  A., 
1st,  or  Orr's  Rifles,  in  Gregg-'s  bri- 
gade, A.  P.  Hill's  division,  Jackson's 
corps,  at  battle  of  Cliantilly,  Sept. 
1,  1802,  155,  169:  2d  regt.  at  first 
battle  of  Bull  Run,  183  :  12th  regt., 
in  Gregg-'s  brig-ade,  A.  P.  Plili's  divi- 
sion, Jackson's  corps,  at  battle  of 
Chantilly,  Sept.  1,  1862,  155,  169: 
13th  regt.  in  Gregg's  brigade,  A. 
P.  Hill's  division,  Jackson's  corps, 
at  Chantilly,  155  ;  its  position  and 
service,  169:  14th  regt.  in  Gregg-'s 
brig-ade,  A.  P.  Hill's  division,  Jack- 
son's corps,  at  Chantilly,  155 ;  its 
position  and  service,  169. 

South  Mountain,  battle  of,  Sept.  14, 
1862,  a  contrast  to  second  Bull  Run, 
97  ;  Reno  killed  at,  138. 

Southern  Historical  Society  Papers, 
138. 

Spain,  Peninsular  War,  95. 

Sperryville,  Va.,  Banks  ordered  to 
position  at,  July  5,  1862,  41  ;  Sigel 
also,  26.,  395 ;  Ricketts  ordered  to 
position  on  the  road  to,  July  21,  41, 
396 ;  road  from,  to  Madison  Court 
House,  guarded  by  Sigel,  401 ; 
Sigel's  corps  inspected  by  Pope  at, 
Aug.  7,  403 ;  Sigel  ordered  to  Cul- 
peper  from,  Aug.  8,  46 ;  Sigel's 
difficulty  in  selecting  a  road  for  his 
movement  from,  ib. ;  his  reluctant 
and  tardy  movement  from,  50 ; 
Buford's  retreat  towards,  morning 
of  Aug.  9,  410 ;  Banks'  position  in 
relation  to,  400. 

Stafford,  L.  A.,  Col.,  C.  S.  A.,  in  com- 
mand of  4th  brigade,  Jackson's  divi- 
sion, Jackson's  corps,  206 ;  its  com- 
position and  strength,  206-207  ;  his 
brigade  in  A.  P.  Hill's  division  at 
Cedar  Mountain,  419 ;  arrived  too 
late  for  the  battle,  ih.  ',  his  advance 
towards  Brown's  house,  439. 

Stanton,  E.  M.,  Secretary  of  War, 
his  hopes  from  Pope,  34 ;  unfitted 
for  command  in  military  affairs, 
305 ;  Halleek's  statement  of  July 
27,  concerning  his  visit  to  MeClel- 
lan,  318. 

Starf^e,  W.  E.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C  S.  A., 

with  Jackson,  Aug.  21,  307  ;  in  com- 
mand of  Jackson's  division,  145,  155, 
166,  257  ;  his  position,  257  ;  his  divi- 
sion fled  from  the  field  of  Cliantilly, 
155,  166  ;  Hays'  brigade  withdrawn 


panic  stricken  by,  156  ;  a  gun  cap- 
tured by,  211. 

Steinwehr,  A.  von,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
V.  (Oct.  12,  1861) ;  in  command  of 
2d  division,  1st  Corps,  A.  of  V., 
bridge  at  Buekland  Mills,  guarded 
by,  Aug.  27,  131. 

Stevens,  H.,  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(April  2,  1865)  ;  Capt.,  A.  D.  C,  U. 

5.  V.  (Oct.  21,  1861) ;  Col.,  U.  S.  V. 
(July,  1863) ;  ^Maj.,  U.  S.  V.  (Nov. 

6,  1864) ;  Adjutant- General  on  his 
father's  staff,  154 ;  his  participation 
as  Captain  and  Aide-de-Canip  in 
battle  of  Chantilly,  138  ;  assigned  to 
the  79th  New  York,  in  the  charge, 
154 ;  wounded,  ib.,  162 ;  information 
provided  by,  150 ;  revisited  Ma- 
nasses  and  Chantilly,  1883,  173,  178, 
182  ;  his  anecdote  of  Lafayette,  188. 

Stevens,  I.  I.,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(Jidy  4,  1862)  ;  Col.,  79th  New 
York  regt.,  (July  30,  1861)  ;  Brig.- 
Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (Sept.  28,  1868)  ;  his 
repulse,  Aug.  29,  by  Jackson,  at 
Groveton,  176 ;  his  position,  Aug. 
31,  at  Cub  Run,  139  ;  relieved  by 
Reynolds  in  that  position,  140 ; 
ordered  to  check  advance  of  enemy 
on  Little  River  Turnpike,  136,  150, 
151,  153 ;  in  command,  during 
Reno's  absence,  of  1st  division,  9th 
Corps,  139,  150;  accompanied  by 
Reno  to  the  battlefield  of  Chantilly, 
153 ;  the  composition  of  his  force, 
151-152 ;  his  strength,  148,  152 ;  his 
position,  152  ;  his  movement  against 
the  enemy,  151  ;  the  battle  caused 
by.  136 ;  the  responsibility  of  the 
action  taken  by,  153  ;  his  prepara- 
tions to  receive  attack,  ib.  ;  called 
for  re-enforcements,  154 ;  time  of 
his  advance,  153-154 ;  his  attack, 
148  ;  led  the  charging  column,  154  ; 
bore  the  flag  of  the  79th  New  York, 
ih  ;  the  effect  of  the  charge,  155 : 
killed,  95,  135,  138,  155,  162,  166; 
he  fell  in  front  of  Thomas'  Georgia 
brigade,  16<> ;  the  spot  where  he 
was  killed  indicated  on  map,  187, 
189  ;  his  division  being  Avithout  am- 
munition was  withdrawn  from  battle, 
157;  Birney's  account  of  the  with- 
drawal of  division  of,  160 ;  his  route 
of  approach  to  Chantilly  battlefield 
traced  by  Waleott  and  Stevens, 
1883,  180-181,  189-191. 

Stevenson,  J.,  Lieut.,  13th  New  York, 
his  testimony  for  Porter  at  court- 
martial,  245, 


INDEX 


499 


Stewart,  C,  visited  by  TValeott  and  I 
fetevens,  ISSo,  169  et  seq..  lUo ;  his  i 
reminiscences  of  battle  of  Chantilly, 
189  et  seq.  "  ' 

Stewart,  in  the  bounds  of  Reid  farm 
survey,  187. 

Stone  Bridge,  Bull  Run,  in  Ewell's 
movement,  Aug.  28,  65  ;  in  Early's 
movement.  329 ;  HilFs  movement 
towards,  ib. ;  threatened  by  Long- 
street,  Aug.  .30,  94;  visited,  1883, 
by  Walcott  and  Stevens,  180. 

"Stonewall"  sobriquet  given  to  Jack- 
son, after  first  Bull  Run,  ITo. 

Stonewall  Brigade.  C.  S.  A.,  its  com- 
j)osition,  419  ;  thrown  into  disorder 
by  forces  under  Donnelly.  420  ;  re- 
ported by  Branch  as  routed,  ib.  ;  its 
reception  of  Ruger's  attack,  ib. ;  Ru- 
ger  forced  back  by,  427.  ! 

Stony  Ridge,  or  Sudley  Mountain,  Va.,  ! 
in  the  second  battle  of  Manassas,  i 
173  ;  visited  by  Walcott  and  Stevens, 
179  ;  the  scene  of  engagement  be- 
tween King  and  Ewell.  Aug.  28, 179, 
226. 

Stoughton,  E.  H.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  Y. 
(Nov.  0,  1862) ;  2d  Lieut.,  U.  S.  A. 
(Sept.  5,  1859-March  4,  1861) ;  Col., 
4th  Vermont  (Sept.  21,  1861) ;  cap- 
tured by  Mosbv.  Mar.  8,  1863,  at 
Fairfax  C.  H.,  185-186. 

Stowe.  L.  W.,  Capt..  C.  S.  A.,  in  com- 
mand of  16th  Xorth  Carolina,  se- 
verely wounded  at  Chantilly,  170. 

Strasburg  Turnpike,  Ya..  Banks'  po- 
sition, on.  Julv.  1862.  393. 

Stribling,  R.  M.,  Capt.,  C.  S.  A.,  his 
artillerv  demonstration  under  Hood, 
Aug.  29.  344. 

Stuart.  J.  E.  B..  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
Capt.,  U.  S.  A.  (April  22-May  14,  \ 
1861)  ;   his  partiality  for  raiding,  ! 
109  ;  his  encounters  with  Buford,  j 
137  ;  his  loss,  estimated,  212  ;  his  j 
strength,  July  20,  207  ;  Lee's  letter  i 
to,  of  Aug.  15.  intercepted  by  Pope,  | 
265-266  ;  his  raid  to  Catlett  Station,  j 
Aug.  22,  not  heeded  by  Pope,  321  ;  j 
in  the   movement  from  Manassas 
Junction,  night  of  Aug.  27,  108; 
wdth  Jackson  in  the  raid  to  Manas- 
sas, 308 ;  his  service,  292  ;  not  in 
command  of  Confederate  cavalry, 
Aug.  29,  258-259  ;  the  cavalry  on 
the  Confederate  right  under  com- 
mand of,  345  ;  his  report  to  Lee  of 
Union  advance  from  Manassas,  250, 
255,  257,  344,  345-346  ;  his  move- 
ment, 342 ;  his  position,  255,  258 ;  \ 


his  attempt  by  dragging  brush  to 
■  deceive  Porter,  342  ;  his  statement 
questioned,  250  ;  denied  by  Robert- 
son, 250,  252,  252  note  ;  his  state- 
ments distrusted  by  Porter's  defend- 
ers, 343  ;  his  statement  of  Confed- 
erate force  before  Porter  morning-  of 
Aug'.  29,  not  in  accord  with  Porter's 
estimate,  ib. ;  his  statements  incor- 
rect as  to  the  brigade  sent  to  sup- 
port the  Confederate  right,  346  ;  his 
evidence  of  Porter's  withdrawal,  ib. ; 
his  capture  of  Union  cavalry,  Aug;. 
31.  147  ;  engaged  in  flank  movement 
during  Union  retreat.  Sept.  1,  137  ; 
his  report.  138 :  repulsed  on  Little 
River  Turnpike,  149-150,  164,  165 ; 
joined  Jackson  near  Chantilly,  147  ; 
his  report,  of  operations  at  Chantilly, 
cited,  165,  191 ;  extract  from  his  re- 
port sent  Pope  by  McDowell,  366, 
367  ;  his  report  employed  in  support 
of  his  attack  on  Porter  by  Pope.  250, 
252  note  ;  its  construction  by  Weld, 
250. 

Sturgis,  S.  D.,  Brig.-Gen..  U.  S.  Y. 
(Aug.  10, 1861)  ;  Maj.,  U.'S.  A.  (Mav 
3,  1861) ;  Lieut.-CoL,  U.  S.  A.  (Oct. 
27,  1863) ;  in  command  of  the  de- 
fences of  Washington  (May  25-Aug. 
24,  1862) ;  in  position  at  Washing- 
ton. Julv,  1862.  393  ;  his  strength, 
198'.  200-201,  394  ;  with  Pope  on  the 
Rappahannock,  Aug.  21,  307;  Pope 
re-enforced  bv  his  brigade  under 
Piatt,  Aug.  26^  40,  198,  203,  205. 

Sudley  Ford,  Bull  Run,  crossed  by 
Jackson,  Aug.  31,  1862,  145,  165 ; 
also  by  D,  R.  Jones,  171 ;  also  by 
Longstreet.  145,  171 ;  the  left  of  A. 
P.  Hill's  division  in  position  near, 
257  ;  mentioned,  175. 

Sudley  Mills,  Ya.,  Taliaferro's  move- 
ment, Aug.  28.  on  road  to.  1'  S. 

Sudley  Springs,  Ya..  position  of  Jack- 
son's left  wing  near,  Aug.  28.  107, 
308  ;  effect  of  the  attack  on  L^uiou 
right  at,  Aug.  29,  on  Porter's  plans, 
235  ;  the  Union  movement  from 
Bristoe  towards,  observed  by  Con- 
federates, 342  ;  mentioned,  177. 

Sudley  Springs  Road.  Taliaferro's  route 
of  march  from  Manassas.  Aug.  27,  65  ; 
Jackson's  movement  by,  Aug.  28, 
328,  329  ;  route  of  Union  forces  from 
Gainesville  to  Warrenton  turnpike, 
68  ;  movement  of  Ricketts  and  King 
on,  77  ;  Porter's  position  near,  noon, 
Aug,  29,  85.  233  ;  McDowell's  move- 
ment on,  Aug.  29,  86,  231,  337,  353, 


500 


INDEX 


359,  370,  379 ;  McDowell's  presence 
on,  probably  known  to  the  Confed- 
erates, 92 ;  Morell's  movement  to,  339, 
372, 373,  374,  375  ;  Pope's  %ht  near, 
reported  to  Porter,  240 ;  only  avail- 
able for  McDowell's  forces,  88  ; 
mentioned,  328. 
Sulphur  Springs,  Va.,  one  of  Greene's 
regiments  at,  Aug.  9,  39  ;  Sigel's  po- 
sition at,  Aug.  20,  53  ;  Lee's  plan  to 
cross  the  Rappahannock  at,  57-58  ; 
recrossed,  Aug.  22,  1862,  by  Ewell, 
69 ;  Confederates  repixlsed  at,  Aug. 
23,  267 ;  bridge  at,  destroyed  by 
Uxiion  force,  ib. ;  Lee's  army  in  po- 
sition opposite,  Aug.  25,  59  ;  Sigel 
at,  Aug.  25,  61 ;  McDowell's  move- 
ment to  Gainesville,  Aug.  27,  by 
way  of,  131  ;  Confederate  forces  at, 
Aug.  27,  268 ;  in  Lee's  movement, 
1863,  58. 

Sumner,  E.  V.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
A.  (March  31,  1862) ;  Col.,  U.  S.  A. 
(March  3,  1855) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
A.  (March  16,  1861) ;  his  corps  at 
Acquia  Creek,  Aug.  26,  112,  289, 
290,  299,  333  ;  had  not  reported  for 
duty,  Aug.  27,  60,  62  ;  intention  to 
forward  his  forces  to  Falmouth,  Aug. 
27,  114 ;  MeClellan's  proposition  to 
unite  Franklin's  corps  with,  116 ; 
his  movement  to  Alexandria  117, 120, 
309,  333 ;  his  attempt  to  find  trans- 
portation for  Franklin,  295 ;  corre- 
spondence between  McClellan  and 
Halleck  concerning,  333-334 ;  his 
detention  at  Alexandria,  333  ;  the 
responsibility  for  his  detention  dis- 
cussed, ib.  ;  his  detention  defended 
by  McClellan,  297 ;  his  detention  for 
the  defence  of  Washington  justified, 
117,  301 ;  not  required  for  the  de- 
fence of  Washington,  334  ;  orders  to 
join  Pope  given  by  McClellan,  273, 
274;  delayed  until  Aug.  30,  275, 
276,  335  ;  his  report  of  his  devious 
movement,  276  ;  might  have  reached 
battlefield  in  time,  but  for  his  move- 
ment to  Georgetown,  276,  277  ;  his 
force  not  available  when  required  by 
Pope,  333  ;  Pope  should  have  waited 
for,  after  battle  of  Aug.  29,  93; 
joined  Pope,  Aug.  31,  140;  discus- 
sion of  Pope's  alleged  order  as  to 
position  of,  Aug.  31,  140-141 ;  and 
as  to  a  reconnaissance  by,  146-147, 
149 ;  Confederate  flank  movement 
discovered  by,  Sept.  1,  146;  ordered 
to  retreat  from  Centre ville,  Sept.  1, 
147;  his  retreat  to  Fairfax  C.  H,, 


160 ;  no  report  made  by,  146  ;  his 
strength,  213,  213  note ;  with  Mc- 
Clellan in  Antietam  campaign,  97 ; 
his  testimony  to  the  Conduct  of  War 
Committee  concerning  his  detention, 
146,  333-334 ;  his  statements  em- 
ployed in  the  discussion  of  MeClel- 
lan's conduct  at  Alexandria,  283 ; 
mentioned,  298. 

Sumter,  Fort.    See  Fort  Sumter. 

Swinton,  W.,  his  prejudice  against 
Halleck,  5 ;  cited  as  to  military 
problem  in  Virginia,  July,  1862,  ib. ; 
his  commendation  of  Pope's  move- 
ment to  Manassas,  Aug.  27,  cited, 
63 ;  his  silence  as  to  Pope's  conjec- 
ture of  Jackson's  plans,  64  ;  his  state- 
ment as  to  demoralization  of  Army 
of  Virginia,  cited,  and  its  truth  de- 
nied, 97. 

Sykes,  G.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 
(March  13,  1865) ;  Maj.,  U.  S.  A. 
(May  14,  1861)  ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(Sept.  28, 1861) ;  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(Nov.  29, 1862) ;  Lieut.-Col.,  U.  S.  A. 
(Oct.  16,  1863) ;  in  command  of  2d 
division,  5th  Corps  (Porter),  in  re- 
turn for  August,  217  ;  joined  Pope, 
Aug.  26,  203 ;  his  position,  Aug.  29, 
233,  246  ;  its  object,  234 ;  his  position 
at  night,  242 ;  his  service,  Aug.  30, 
ib. ;  his  testimony  for  Porter  at  court- 
martial,  245. 

Sypher,  J.  R.,  his  History  of  the  Penn- 
sylvania Reserves  cited,  217. 

Talavera,  Spain,  battle  of  July  27, 
1809,  95. 

Taliaferro,  W.  B.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
47th  and  48th  Alabama  regts.  in  his 
brigade,  at  Cedar  Mountain,  206  ;  his 
position,  418-419,  421 ;  expected  to 
re-enforce  Garnett,  418 ;  took  com- 
mand of  Jackson's  division  on  the 
death  of  Winder,  422;  his  brigade 
forced  back  by  Crawford's  forces, 
425  ;  Geary's  brigade  repulsed  by, 
430;  with  Jackson  in  movement 
against  Pope,  begun  Aug.  25,  1862, 
59  ;  in  movement,  Aug.  27,  to  Ma- 
nassas, 103;  his  retreat  from  Ma- 
nassas, night  of  Aug.  27,  65,  108 ; 
the  spoils  of  the  raid  in  his  custody, 
108  ;  the  2d  Virginia  brigade  in  his 
division,  260,  328 ;  his  movement  by 
Sudley  Springs  Road,  Aug.  28,  329 ; 
his  encounter  with  McDowell  at 
Groveton,  328 ;  repulsed  by  King, 
76. 

Taylor,  G.  W.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 


INDEX 


501 


(May  9, 1862) ;  in  command  of  forces  ' 
sent,  Aug.  27,  ag-ainst  Jackson  at  | 
Manassas  Junction,  104 ;  his  eug-age- 
ment  and  repulse  on  Cub  Run,  104,  | 
105  ;  almost  annihilated,  292 ;  his 
g'aUant    conduct,    105 ;  mortally 
wounded,  ih. ;  pursuit  of  his  forces  i 
by  Fitzhug'h  Lee,  109;  his  disaster  | 
known  at  Alexandria,  119 ;  the  re-  j 
turn  of  the  remnants  of  his  brig-ade  | 
to  Alexandria,  ih.  ;  McClellan"s  re- 
port of  disaster  to  Halleek,  ih.  \ 

Taylor.  W.  H.,  Capt.,  A.  D.  C,  C.  S.  A.,  I 
his  "Four  Years  with  Lee"  cited  j 
as  to  strength  of  Confederate  armv,  ' 
205.  '  I 

Tennessee  Volunteers,  C.  S.  A.,  1st  j 
reg't.   (Provisional  Army),  in  Arch-  j 
er"s  brigade,  A.  P.  Hill's  division,  | 
Jackson's  corps,  at  Chantilly,  Sept. 
1,  18(32,  155  :  7th  regl.  also.  ih.  ;  14th 
regt.  also,  ih. 

Terrv,  A.  H.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 
(March  13,  1865) ;  Col.,  7th  Conn. 
(Sept.  17,  1861) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
V.  (Apiil  25,  1862) ;  Maj.-Gen.,  U. 
S.  V.  (April  20,  1865) ;  Brig.-Gen., 
U.  S.  A.  (Jan.  15,  1865)  ;  a  member 
of  the  board  to  investigate  the  Porter 
case,  351. 

Texas  Volunteers,  1st,  4th,  5th  regts., 
in  Hood's  brigade.  Hood's  division, 
Long-street's  corps,  their  disastrous 
attack  on  5th  JSTew  York  at  battle  of 
Groveton.  178,  179. 

Third  Army  Corps.  See  L^'nited  States 
Armv  Corps.  ] 

Thomas,  E.  L.,  Brig.-Gen..  C.  S.  A.,  in 
command  of  brigade,  A.  P.  Hill's 
division.  Jackson's  corps,  at  Cedar 
Mountain.  419 ;  his  position,  421 ; 
attacked  by  Prince,  43 1 ;  his  share 
in  battle  of  Aug.  30,  261 ;  at  Chan- 
tiUy,  Sept.  1,  1862,  155,  166;  his 
movement  against  Birney,  157,  159  ; 
prisoners  from  his  command  taken 
by  Laiion  skirmishers,  159  ;  Stevens 
and  Kearny  killed  by  his  men,  159- 
160,  166  ;  support  given  to.  by  Pen- 
der. 170;  his  report  of  the  battle, 
cited,  171. 

Thompson,  J.,  Capt.,  U.  S.  V.,  in  com- 

*  mand  of  2d  Jilaryland  battery  en- 
gaged in  silencing  Pegram,  7  P-  M., 
Cedar  Momitain,  439. 

ThorougMare    Gap,    Va.,   in  Jack- 
son's flank  movement,  Aug.,  1862.  59.  I 
62,  73 ;  Lee's  intention  to  advance 
to,  discussed,    321 ;    Poise's  effort 
to  block,  59-60;   want  of  report 


of  cavalry  reconnaissance  to,  com- 
plained of  by  Pope,  322 ;  Jackson's 
movement  towards,  not  anticipated 
by  Pope,  321,  322,  323 ;  passed  by 
Jackson's  force,  Aug.  26,  2o8,  3o8, 
324 ;  Jackson's  advance  known  to 
MeClellan,  Aug.  27,  277 ;  Buford 
employed,  Aug.  27,  in  looking  for 
Jackson  west  of,  109;  not  protected 
by  Pope,  62,  325  ;  Pope's  plans  for 
protecting,  63  ;  believed  by  Pope  to 
be  protected  by  Army  of  Potomac, 
73  ;  Pope's  intention  to  attack  Jack- 
son between  Manassas  and,  63 ; 
Jackson  expected  by  Pope  to  retreat 
to,  80, 82 ;  Jackson's  retreat  towards, 
Aug'.  28,  268 ;  Lee's  advance  to- 
wards, 66,  107,  124 ;  no  provision 
made  for  holding,  Aug.  28,  65,  66, 

67,  70,  74,  75,  95 ;  this  neglect  inex- 
cusable, 66  ;  Pope's  lost  opportunity 
for  driving  Lee  back  to,  92 ;  Ricketts 
sent.  Aug.  28,  by  McDowell  to,  67, 

68,  75  ;  Longstreet  arrived  at,  Aug. 
28,  3  p.  31.,  331 ;  engagement  be- 
tween Ricketts  and  Longstreet  at, 

69,  331;  the  retreat  of  Ricketts  and 
King  from,  332 ;  their  removal  left 
Lee's  passage  xmchecked,  69,  70,  77  , 
Long-street's  advance  from,  morniag 
of  Aug-.  29,  85  ;  the  enemy  reported 
by  MeClellan,  Aug.  29,  as  retiring 
towards,  279 ;  mentioned,  336,  345, 
369. 

Thoroughfare  Mountain,  Va.,  28th 
Peimsvlvauia  stationed  at,  Aug.  9, 
416. 

TilLson,  D.,  Maj.,  U.  S.  V.  Chief  of 
Artillery,  2d  division  (Ricketts).  3d 
Corps.  A.  of  v.,  liis  strength,  Aug. 
Id,  215. 

Toombs,  R..  Brig -Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  in 
command  of  brigade,  D.  R.  Jones' 
division,  Longstreet's  coi-ps,  at 
ChantlLLy,  171. 

Torbert.  A.  T.  A.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen..  U. 
S.  A.  (March  13,  1865)  ;  1st  Lieut., 
U.  S.  A.  (Feb.  25.  1861) ;  Col.,  U.  S. 
V.  (Sept.  16,  1861);  Brig.-Gen. .  U. 
S.  V.  (Xov.  29,  1862)  ;  saved  Gen. 
Pope's  traias  from  destruction,  300  ; 
Pope's  orders  to,  149 ;  in  position, 
Sept.  1,  at  Fairfax  C.  H.,  149. 

Tower.  Z.  B.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(June  12,  1865)  ;  Maj.,  U.  S.  A. 
(Auo-.  6,  1861);  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
V.  (Nov.  23,  1861)  ;  Lieut.-Col.,  U- 
S^  A.  (Xov.  11,  1865) ;  Col.,  U.  S  A. 
(Jan.  13,  1874) ;  in  command  of  2d 
brigade,  2d  division  (^Rieketts),  3d 


502 


INDEX 


Corps,  A.  o£  v.,  strength,  Aug-.  16, 
215 ;  ordered  to  post  at  German- 
town,  Aug-.  30,  by  Franklin,  300 ; 
his  services,  94 ;  his  snccessful  en- 
gagement, Aug.  31,  ib. 

Trimble,  I.  R.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  in 
command  of  brigade,  Ewell's  divi- 
sion, Jackson's  corps,  Aug.-Sept., 
1862,  his  position,  Cedar  Mountain 
battlefield,  418,  421 ;  his  captures  of 
Union  stores  at  Manassas  Junction, 
Aug.  26-27,  101-102;  his  perilous 
position,  ih. ;  re-enforced  by  Jack- 
son, 102  ;  unable  to  restrain  Confed- 
erates from  plundering  stores,  105- 
106  ;  his  movement  in  retreat  from 
Manassas,  Aug.  28,  329  ;  severe  en- 
gagement of  21st  Mass.  with  his 
force  at  Chantiliy,  Sept.  1,  157. 

Tripp,  information  concerning  Cedar 
Mountain  provided  by,  390. 

Tucker,  J.,  Assistant  Sec'y  of  War, 
his  statement  of  the  strength  of 
Reynold's  division,  Aug.  19,  203. 

Tyler,  E.  B.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(May  14,  1862)  ;  strength  of  his 
force  at  Alexandria,  Aug.  27,  122 ; 
concerned  in  the  defence  of  Wash- 
ington, 334 ;  assigned  by  McClellan 
as  escort  to  Franklin,  Aug.  29,  294. 

Tyler,  R.  O.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S.  A. 
^March  13,  1865)  ;  Capt.,  A.  D.  C, 
U.  S.  A.  (May  17,  1861)  ;  Col.,  U.  S. 
V.  (Aug.  29,  1861) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U. 
S.  V.  (Nov.  29,  1862)  ;  Lieut.-CoL, 
U.  S.  A.  (July  29,  1866) ;  at  Alexan- 
dria, Aug.  27,  122. 

Union  Mills,  Va.,  Morell  ordered  to 
Centreville  by  v/ay  of,  Aug.  29,  234, 
373. 

United  States  Army,  under  command 
of  Lincoln,  Stanton  and  lialleek, 
305. 

 Adjutant-General,  Pope's  ex- 
tract from  Jackson's  report  collated 
with  the  original  in  the^office  of,  367. 
 Regular.  Artiller}^,  2d  regt.  bat- 
tery E,  under  Benjamin  at  Chantiliy, 
Sept.  1, 1862,  135  :  4th  regt.,  battery 
F,  its  service  at  Cedar  Mountain, 
Aug,  9,  411,  415. 

 Cavalry,  2d  regt.,  a  squadron  of, 

captured,  Aug.  31,  at  Gerraantown, 
141 :  4th  regt.,  1st  squadron,  McClel- 
lan's  escort,  114. 

 lufantry,  8th  regt.,  battalion  of, 

under  Pitcher  in  Prince's  brigade, 
Augur's  division,  in  skirmish  line, 
Cedar  Mountain,  415  ;  its  extraor- 


dinary service,  ih. ;  12th  regt.  also, 
415. 

United  States  Army  Corps,  2d  Corps, 
under  Sumner,  joined  Pope,  Aug.  31, 
140 ;  its  position,  140-141  ;  with 
McClellan  in  Antietam  campaign, 
97 ;  3d  Corps,  under  Heintzelman, 
given  garrison  duty  at  Washington, 
Sept.  9,  by  McClellan,  97  ;  1st  divi- 
sion under  Kearny,  135  ;  1st  brigade, 
under  Robinson,  at  Chantiliy,  161 ; 
suffered  no  loss,  163  ;  2d  brigade, 
under  Birney,  at  Chantiliy,  157-158  ; 
its  opponents,  157,  159 ;  its  composi- 
tion, 160-161 ;  its  losses,  163  ;  its  re- 
treat, 161 ;  3d  brigade  under  Poe,  at 
Chantiliy,  161 ;  its  losses,  163-164  ; 
5th  Corps,  under  Porter,  with 
McClellan  in  Antietam  campaign, 
97 ;  in  return  for  August,  217  ;  1st 
division  (Morell),  in  return  for  Au- 
gust, 217 ;  2d  division  (Sykes),  in 
return  for  August,  217  ;  2d  division, 
its  withdrawal  from  line  of  battle, 
Aug.  29,  339;  Artillery  (Weed),  in 
return  for  August,  217  :  6th  Corps, 
under  Franklin,  re-enforeed  Pope 
after  Aug.  30,  94 ;  with  McClellan 
in  Antietam  campaign,  97 :  8th 
Corps,  strength  of  brigade  at  Win- 
chester under  J.  White's  command, 
July  31,  198;  9th  Corps,  under 
Burnside,  97  ;  its  position,  Atig.  31, 
on  Cub  Run,  139;  1st  division 
under  Stevens  at  battle  of  Chantiliy, 
135,  138 ;  its  movement  against  the 
enemy,  151  ;  its  losses  at  Chantiliy, 
162-164 ;  1st  brigade  under  Col, 
Christ,  at  Chantiliy,  152  ;  its  com- 
position, ih. ;  its  losses,  162 ;  2d 
brigade  under  Leasure  at  Chantiliy, 
152  ;  its  composition,  ih.  ;  its  losses, 
1()2  ;  3d  brigade,  under  Morrison,  at 
Chantiliy,  152  ;  its  losses,  162  ;  2d 
division,  under  Reno,  at  Warrenton, 
Axig.  26,  1862,  (U ;  ordered  to 
Greenwich,  Aug.  27,  62;  its  compo- 
sition, 135,  151-152 ;  under  com- 
mand of  Stevens,  139,  150 ;  position 
on  Cub  Run,  Aug.  31,  139;  relieved 
by  Reynolds,  140  ;  ordered  to  Little 
River  "Turnpike,  150,  151,  153;  at 
Chantiliy,  135, 136, 148 ;  its  strength, 
148,  152;  its  position,  152,  153;  its 
charge,  154,  155  ;  without  ammuni- 
tion, withdrawn,  157,  160 ;  1st  bri- 
gade, under  Col.  Nagle,  its  severe 
action,  Aug.  29,  151 ;  2d  brigade, 
under  Ferrero,  at  Chantiliy,  135, 
151,  155-156;  its  composition,  156, 


INDEX 


503 


163 ;  its  position,  153 ;  sent  into 
■woods,  156 ;  mistake  iu  delivery  of 
order,  ih. ;  slig'Iitly  engag-ed,  ih. ;  its 
losses,  163 ;  Kanawha  division,  un- 
der Cox,  its  streng'th,  July  31,  198 : 
Reserve  Corps,  under  Stiirg-is.  in  de- 
fence of  Wasliiug'ton  (May  25-Ang-. 
24,  1S62) ;  its  strengi^h,  July  31, 
198 ;  McDovrell  re-enforced  by,  40. 
198. 

United  States  Army  Corps,  Army  of 
Virginia.  1st  Corps,  formed  of  forces 
under  Fremont  in  Mountain  Depart- 
ment, June  26,  1862,  4,  35,  390; 
command  given  to  Fremont,  390  ; 
command  resigned  by  Fremont,  ih. ; 
command  given  to  Sigel,  36,  391 ; 
its  position,  July,  1882,  in  tbe  Sben- 
andoali  Valley,  393 ;  its  streng'tli, 
198,  394;  unfavorable  report  of  its 
condition  made  by  Sigel,  394  ;  placed 
on  garrison  duty  at  Washington,  bv 
McCleUan,  Sept.,  1862,  198;  reor- 
ganized, ih. ;  2d  Corps,  formed  from 
the  troops  of  the  Department  of  the 
Shenandoah,  June  26,  1862,  390; 
command  given  to  Banks,  37,  390 ; 
its  service  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley, 
May,  39,  391 ;  demoralized  in  June, 
394 ;  its  position  in  the  Shenandoah 
Valley,  Julv,  393  ;  its  strengi;h,  38, 
48,  49,  '50, 198,  216, 394 ;  discrepancy 
of  statements  as  to  its  strength.  38, 
394 ;  its  streng-th  miscalculated  by 
Confederates,  49  ;  Pope  re-enforced 
by.  after  Aug.  1,  94;  its  intrepidity 
at  Cedar  Mountain,  49  ;  Confederates 
panic-stricken  by  attack  of,  ih. ; 
praised  by  Pope,  52,  440 ;  desertion 
of  one  of  its  regiments,  52 ;  its 
movement  to  position  near  Warren- 
ton  affected,  Aug.  11,  395;  com- 
mand of.  given  to  Mansfield,  Sept. 
10,  by  McCleUan.  97. 

Cavalry  under  command  of  Hatch, 
895  ;  its  failures  imder  his  command, 
395-396  ;  command  given  to  Buford. 
396;  its  strength.  216  ;  Bayard  or- 
dered to  join.  July  11.  396  ;  Bayard"s 
streugi:li,216;  Ist  division  (Williams), 
loss  at  Cedar  Mountain,  50  ;  strength, 
Aug.,  216. 

1st  brigade  (Crawford),  loss  at 
Cedar  Mountain,  15,  16 ;  strength. 
Aug.  216  ;  3d  brigade  (Gordon),  in 
return  for  August,  216  :  loss  at  Ce- 
dar ZMountain.  16  et  seq.  ;  2d  division 
(Augiir),  loss  at  Cedar  ]S[ountain, 
50  :  in  return  for  August,  216  ;  Artil- 
lery under  Best,  in  return  for  Au- 


j      gust,  ih. ;  1st  brigade  (Geary),  in  re- 
i      turn  for  August,  216 ;  2d  brigade 
j      (Prince),  in  retm-n  for  August,  z6.  ; 
I      3d  brigade  (Greene),  in  return  for 
1      August,  ih. ;  3d  Corps,  formed  from 
1      the  Department  of  the  Rappahan- 
j      nock    and    the    troops  defending 
j      Washington,   June  26,  1862,   390 ; 
!      McDowell   given  command  of,  40, 
390  ;  inflicted  but  little  injury  on 
j      Jackson,   May,  391  ;   the  positions 
of  the   several   divisions  of,  393 ; 
strength  and  comj)osition  of,  40. 198, 
215,  394 ;   command  of,  given  by 
McCleUan  to  Hooker,  97 ;  1st  divi- 
sion (King's  and  Hatch's),  its  com- 
position and  strength,  Aug.  16,  215  ; 
1st  brigade  (Hatch  and  SuUivan), 
its   strength,  Aug.  16,  ih.  ;  2d  bri- 
I      gade    (Doubleday),    its  strength. 
I      Aug.  16,  ih.  ;  3d  brigade,  commanded 
j      by  Patrick,  149,  164 ;  its  strength, 
i     Aug.  16,  215 ;  its  position,  Sept.  1, 
on  Little  River  Turnpike,  137,  149  ; 
j      Stuart's  attack  repulsed  by,  149— 
150  ;  its  losses,  Sept.  1,  before  Ger- 
j      mantown,  150,  164 ;    4th  brigade 
j      (Gibbon),  its  strength,  Aug.  16.  215  ; 
!      ArtiUery,  strength  of,  Aug.  16,  ih. ; 
Cavalry,  2d  N.  Y.,  strength  of,  Aug. 
16,  ih. ;  2d  division  commanded  by 
Ricketts,  149  ;  its  strength,  Aug.  16, 
215  ;  his  report  of  engagement  be- 
fore Germantov-m,  Sept.  1,  164  ;  1st 
I      brigade  (Duryea),  its  strength,  Aug. 

16,  215 ;  2d  brigade  (Tower),  its 
i  strength,  Aug.  16,  ih. ;  3d  brigade 
I  (Hartsuff).  strength,  Aug.  16,  ih. ; 
I  4th  brigade  (CarroU),  strength,  Aug. 
I  16,  ib.  :  Rifle  battalion  (Kane),  its 
;  strength,  Aug.  16,  ib.  ;  ArtiUery 
'      (TiUson),   strength,  Aug.    16.   ib. ; 

Cavalry,  1st   Maine  regt.  (Allen), 
I      strength.  Aug.  16,  ih. 
\  United  States,  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
the  plan  of  government  for  the  em- 
ployment of,  in  July,  400 ;  Pope  to 
divert  force  from  Richmond  to  the 
advantage  of,  40,  392 ;  its  transfer 
to  the  James,  392 ;  the  movement 
,      opposed  by  Pope,  ih. ;  at  Harrison's 
Landing,  "  July   23,    1862,   5,   6  : 
'      strength  of,   July  25,  8 ;    on  the 
j      James  a  menace  to  Lee.  400  ;  ques- 
!      tions  as  to  its  disposition  at  close  of 
Peninsular  campaign.  42  ;  danger  to 
the  health  of.  in  summer  on  the 
James.  1"  ;  McClellan's  opinion  of 
i      demoralization  to   ensue  by  with- 
drawal from  the  Peninsula,  7  ;  Hal- 


504 


INDEX 


leek's  answer  to  that  proposition,  9- 
11 ;  order  for  its  withdrawal  from 
the  Peninsula  received  by  MeClellan, 
Aug".  4,  899-400;  Halleck  charged 
by  MeClellan  with  an  effort  to  ruin 
it,  25 ;  McClellaii's  resentment  of 
governmental  interference  with,  120  ; 
withdrawal  from  the  Peninsula  of, 
3,  7,  8,  73  ;  the  cause  of  the  with- 
drawal of,  from  the  Peninsula,  318  ; 
its  movement  to  Fortress  Monroe 
begun,  Aug.  14,  24,  57,  320  ;  the  pro- 
cess of  transfer  from  the  Peninsula, 
298-299  ;  widely  separated  from  the 
Army  of  Virginia,  400 ;  project  of 
union  with  Army  of  Virginia,  5,  9, 
399;  the  union  not  effected,  219; 
the  co-operation  of,  with  the  Army 
of  Virginia  expected  by  Pope,  392  ; 
Lee's  delay  in  learning  the  with- 
drawal of,  400 ;  his  effort  to  defeat 
Pope  before  he  could  be  re-enforced 
by,  59 ;  expectation  of  government 
of  quick  transfer  of,  to  the  Rappa- 
hannock, 57  ;  attempt  of  Halleck  to 
hasten  the  transfer  of,  24  ;  and  its 
junction  with  Pope,  25  ;  its  delay  in 
joining  Pope  discussed,  333  et  seq. ; 
Le  Due's  opinion  as  to  its  unneces- 
sary delay,  26-27  ;  Pope's  confidence 
in  its  coming  to  his  support,  13,  60, 
61 ;  Pope  delayed  on  the  Pappahan- 
nock  waiting  the  arrival  of,  321,  324 ; 
the  number  of  men  from,  who  joined 
Pope  prior  to  Aug.  25,  268-269 ; 
Halleck's  statement  concerning 
troops  sent  to  Pope  from,  270  et 
seq. ;  not  available  to  Pope  at  the 
crucial  moment,  333 ;  illy  supplied 
with  transportation,  provisions,  and 
ammunition,  127 ;  its  scattered 
forces  organized  under  Pope,  4,  33  ; 
MeClellan  censured  in,  123 ;  its 
hatred  of  Pope,.  143  ;  insinuations 
of  Pope  against,  398  ;  its  situation, 
Aug.  26,  305  ;  McDowell  believed, 
Aug.  29,  that  Pope  would  not  en- 
gage in  battle  till  re-enforced  by, 
226  ;  McClellan's  authority  over,  de- 
fined, Aug.  30,  290,  391 ;  two  corps 
retained  under  his  command  by  Me- 
Clellan, 299 ;  mentioned,  133,  364. 
United  States,  Army  of  Virginia,  con- 
solidated under  order  of  June  26, 
1862,  4,  33,  390  ;  its  composition,  4, 

35-  36 ;  its  organization  described, 
390  et  seq. ;  its  corps  commanders, 

36-  38 ;  made  of  independent  com- 
mands, not  homogeneous,  219  ;  Pope 
assigned  to  command  of,  June  26, 


1862,  4,  33,  34,  &90 ;  command  as- 
sumed by  Pope,  June  27,  391 ;  the 
return  of,  July  31,  1862,  40,  198; 
estimates  of  its  strength,  Aug.,  1862, 
197  et  seq.,  217-219 ;  its  strength, 
Aug.  31,  and  its  position,  139,  140 ; 
as  strong  as  Lee's,  Sept.  1,  but  not 
so  effective,  94 ;  its  losses  in  the 
campaign,  97. 

 Cavalry,  the  poor  condition  of, 

July,  1862,  40,  145,  199,  200,  394 ; 
ctrength  of,  394  ;  Pope's  efforts  to 
fit  it  for  the  campaign,  28 ;  its  bad 
condition  under  poor  sanitary  reg- 
ulations, 401 ;  questions  as  to  its 
employment,  42  ;  its  duty,  the  de- 
fence of  Washington,  4,  5  ;  widely 
separated  from  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  in  July,  5,  400 ;  union  of 
Army  of  Potomac  with,  projected 
by  government,  5,  399  ;  under  Pope 
for  a  month  prior  to  Halleck's  as- 
sumption of  command,  28-29 ;  Pope's 
address  to,  July  14,  13-14,  397 ;  the 
address  criticized,  29 ;  offended  by 
the  address,  398  ;  Pope  not  received 
enthusiastically  by,  396 :  his  orders 
as  to  foraging,  44 ;  Pope's  effort  to 
be  relieved  from  command  of,  393  ; 
Pope's  dispositions  of,  40-41 ;  move- 
ments of,  after  July  29,  400-401 ; 
the  concentration  of,  near  Culpeper, 
Aug.  7,  400;  the  dispositions  of, 
Aug.  8,  45  ;  Jackson's  movement 
against,  400, 401, 402,  403 ;  at  Cedar 
Mountain,  Aug.  9,  47-52;  its  posi- 
tion superior  to  Confederate's,  47  ; 
moved  to  the  Rappahannock,  Aug. 
18,  52  ;  crossed  the  river,  Aug.  19, 
ih.  ;  its  position,  Aug.  19,  53,  57 ; 
divided  by  order  of  government,  41 ; 
its  want  of  provisions,  266,  267 ;  its 
position,  Aug.  26,  61,  62,  73 ;  its 
situation,  305 ;  flanked  by  Jackson, 
62  ;  the  movement  of,  determined  on 
by  Pope  and  McDowell,  Aug.  27, 
127-128 ;  ordered  to  Gainesville, 
Aug.  27,  62,  127-130;  the  move- 
ment delayed  by  Sigel,  63  ;  its  posi- 
tion, evening  of  Aug.  27,  ib.  ;  at 
Warrenton,  Aug.  27,  268  ;  Pope's 
change  of  dispositions  of,  night  of 
Aug.  27,  64-65  ;  movements  of,  Aug. 
28,  67-68  ;  its  position,  Aug.  29,  on 
Porter  map  verified  by  Lee,  255  ; 
lines  corrected,  Aug.  31,  140 ;  Con- 
federate attempt  to  fiank,  in  the  re- 
treat to  Fairfax  C.  H.,  Sept.  1,  137; 
the  position  tliere,  139  ;  its  forces  in 
the  battle  of  Chantiiiy,  135-136  ;  not 


INDEX 


505 


disorgauized  after  Aug.  80,  94,  96, 
97 ;  its  well  conducted  retreat,  94 ; 
its  confidence  in  Pope  destroyed,  94, 
96-97 ;  its  constant  employment, 
267 ;  fatigued  by  Pope.  324 ;  de- 
moralization of.  under  Pope,  143- 
144  ;  McClellan's  evasion  of  order  to 
provide  ammunition  and  rations  for, 
281,  282,  2S3,  284 ;  MeClellan  cen- 
sured in,  123  ;  partisans  of  MeClellan 
in,  398  ;  merged  in  Army  of  Potomac, 
Sept.,  1862,4,  34;  rejoiced  in  Mc- 
Clellan's restoration  to  command, 
97 ;  McClellan's  changes  of  corps 
commanders,  ih. ;  its  distrust  of  its 
commanders,  143.  See  United 
States,  Army  Corps,  Army  of  Vir- 
ginia. 

United  States,  Congress,  Joint  Com- 
mittee on  tlie  Conduct  of  the  War, 
informed  by  Pope  that  he  had  ad- 
vised the  withdi-awal  of  MeClellan 
from  before  Eichmond,  July  8,  7  ; 
also  of  his  plans  for  defence  at 
Washington,  13  :  PojDe's  expressed 
contempt  of  old  systems  of  warfare 
to,  35  ;  Pope's  statement  of  strength 
to,  199  ;  his  statement  of  plan  of 
camx)aign  made  to,  317  ;  Pope's  plans 
stated  to,  not  carried  out,  322  ;  Pope's 
report  to,  240 ;  Banks'  testimony  to, 
concerning  Cedar  Mountain,  21-22, 
409  ;  McClellan's  testimony  concern- 
ing effort  to  re-enf  oree  Pope  to,  273- 
274;  Halleck's  statement  concerning 
MeClellan  to,  270,  et  seq. ;  Sumner's 
testimony  to,  concerning  his  move- 
ment of  Aug.  31,  146  ;  and  his  de- 
tention at  Alexandria,  333-334, 

U.  S.  Congress.  House  of  Representa- 
tives. Banks  speaker  of,  Feb.  2, 1856- 
March  3,  1857,  37. 

United  States,  Government,  pa^nie- 
strieken  by  condition  of  affairs  in 
Virginia,  June,  1862,  33-34  ;  the 
policy  of  indej)endent  commands,  34 ; 
its  plans  for  the  employment  of  the 
army  in  July,  400  ;  the  plan  of,  to 
aid  MeClellan  by  the  vrithdrawal  of 
Confederate  force  to  oppose  Pope, 
318 ;  the  termination  of  Peninsular 
campaign  by,  discussed,  3-12  ;  Mc- 
Clellan's failure  ascribed  to  his  em- 
ployment of  military  principles.  34  ; 
Pope  appointed  to  command  of  Army 
of  Virginia,  34 ;  his  forces  di^ided 
by  orders  of,  41 ;  Pope  directed  by, 
to  wait  on  Rappahannock  for  re- 
enforcements,  27  ;  ignorant  of  means 
of  water  transx^ortation  for  Army  of 


Potomac  in  withdrawal  from  Pen- 
insula, 297  ;  Porter's  appeal  to,  for 
a  rehearing  of  his  case,  356  ;  his  ap- 
peals granted,  ib. ;  board  of  of&cers 
to  investigate  the  case  appointed,  ib. ; 
its  Avitnesses  before  the  investigating 
board  treated  with  indignity  by  Por- 

I      ter's  counsel,  362. 

i   Department  of  War,  its  author- 
ity over  the  several  independent 
commands  in  Virginia,  391  ;  its  in- 
ability to  conduct  the  movements 
in  A^irginia,  ib.  ;  its  purpose  to 
strengthen  Pope,  298 ;  its  orders  re- 
quiring the  division  of  Pope's  army, 
395  ;  correspondence  with  MeClellan 
as  to  re-enforcing  Pope,  269-270 ; 
its  order  defining  McClellan's  com- 
mands issued  Aug.  30,  290  ;  records 
and  papers  from,  employed  in  the 
investigation  of  the  Porter  case,  351 ; 
maps  authenticated  by,  240. 

 Adjutant-General,  errors  as  to 

Banks'  strength,  July,  1862,  38. 
— ■■ —  Quartermaster  -  General,  could 
have  sujoplied  Franklin  with  means 
of  transportation,  275,  296. 

!  U.  S.  Military  Academy,  West  Point, 
N.  Y.,  Pope  a  cadet  at,  1838-1842, 
35. 

Upton's  Hill,  Va.,  Cox  sent  by  Me- 
Clellan, Aug.  27,  to,  273. 

Victor,  General,  censured  by  Napoleon 
for  rashness  at  Talavera,  95-96. 

Vienna,  Va.,  reconnaissance  ordered  to, 
Aug,  27,273  ;  scouting  force  sent  to- 
wards, Aug.  29,  279. 

Virginia,  the  position  of  the  two  Union 
armies  in,  5  ;  the  Union  operations 
in,  placed  under  Halleck's  commands, 
392-393  ;  exasperation  in,  caused  by 
Pope's  orders,  399. 

 Peninsular  Campaign,  1862,  the 

termination  of,  favored  by  Lincoln, 
7  ;  advised  by  Pope,  ib.  ;  ordered 
by  Halleck,  ib. ;  the  order  received 
by  MeClellan,  Aug.  4,  265,  399-400  ; 
Ms  remonstrance,  8  ;  the  reasons  for, 
given  by  HaHeck,  8-11 ;  the  subject 
discussed,  3,  et  seq..  42,  318  ;  Mc- 
Clellan's delay  in  withdrawing  the 
army,  26-27 ;  Halleck's  orders  as 
to  ammunition,  280  ;  debarkation  of 
troops,  112  ;  purpose  to  call  Couch 
from  the  Peninsula.  Aug,  27,  114. 

Virginia  Volunteers,  2d  brigade  under 
command  of  B,  T.  Johnson  at  2d 
Bull  Run,  260  ;  22d  battalion,  in 
Brockenbrough's  brigade,  at  Chan- 


506 


INDEX 


tilly,  154:  1st  regi;.  (Irisli),  its  po- 
sition, battle  of  Cedar  Mountain,  418 ; 
demoralized  by  Donnelly's  ebarg-e, 
425 ;  almost  captured  by  Donnelly, 
ih. :  2d  regt.,  in  Stonewall  brigade, 
419;  in  tbe  repulse  of  Ruger's  attack, 
427 :  4th.  regt.,  in  Stonewall  brigade, 
419  ;  in  the  repulse  of  Ruger's  at- 
tack, 427  :  5th  regt.,  in  Stonewall 
brigade,  419  ;  in  the  repulse  of  Ru- 
ger's  attack,  427  :  10th  regt.,  its  po- 
sition, Cedar  Mountain,  418  :  loth 
regt.,  in  Early's  brigade,  Ewell's  di- 
vision, Jackson's  corps,  at  Chantilly, 
Sept.  1,  1862,  157:  21st  regt.,  its 
position.  Cedar  Mountain,  418  ;  de- 
moralized by  Donnelly's  charge,  425 : 
25th  regt.,  in  Early's  brigade,  Ewell's 
division,  Jackson's  corps,  at  Chan- 
tilly, Sept.  1,  157:  27th  regt.,  in 
Stonewall  brigade,  419  :  31st  regt., 
in  Early's  brigade,  Ewell's  division, 
Jackson's  corps,  at  Chantilly,  Sept. 
1,  157 :  33d  regt.,  in  Stonewall  bri- 
gade, 419  :  40th  regt.,  in  Brocken- 
brough's  brigade,  at  Chantilly,  154  : 
47th  regt.,  also,  ih. :  48th  regt.,  its 
position,  Cedar  Mountain,  418  :  55th 
regt.,  in  Brockenbrough's  brigade  at 
Chantilly,  154  :  60th  regt.,  of  A.  P. 
Hill's  division,  sent  to  West  Virginia, 
206.  _ 

Virginia,  Army  of.  See  Army  of  Vir- 
ginia. 

Virginia  Central  Railway,  damaged 
between  Gordonsville  and  Richmond 
by  Union  cavalry,  July,  1862,  45  ; 
successful  cavalry  expedition  sent 
by  King  to,  396. 

Volunteers,  U.  S.  Armies,  the  Western, 
described  by  Pope,  14  ;  the  German, 
in  Army  of  Virginia,  36. 

Walcott,  C.  F.,  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
V.  (April  9, 1865) ;  Capt.,  21st  Mass. 
(Aug.  21,  1861)  ;  Lieut. -Col.,  61st 
Mass.  (Sept.  22,  1864)  ;  Col.  (Nov. 
9,  1864)  ;  his  participation  in  battle 
of  Chantilly,  138  ;  his  encounter  with 
Kearny,  158 ;  Kearny  warned  by, 
159  ;  his  visit  to  Manassas  and  Chan- 
tilly, 1883,  173  et  seq. 

Walker,  J.  G.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  in 
command  of  a  division,  under  Long- 
street,  Aug.  21, 307. 

Walker  ,  in   the  bounds  of  Reid 

farm  survey,  187. 

Walton,  J.  B.,  Col.,  Washington  (Lou- 
isiana) Artillery,  C.  S.  A.,  position 
of  his  artillery,  Aug.  29,  345. 


Ward,  Fort.    See  Fort  Ward. 

Warren,  G.  K.,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
A.  (March  13,  1865) ;  1st  Lieut.,  U. 
S.  A.  (July  1,  1856) ;  Lieut.-Col.,  5th 
N.  Y.  (May  14, 1861) ;  Brig.-Gen.,  U. 
S.  V.  (Sept.  26,  1862);  Maj.-Gen., 
U.  S.  V.  (May  3,  1863) ;  Maj.,  U.  S. 
A.  (June  25,  1864);  Lieut.-Col., 
U.  S.  .A.  (March  4,  1879) ;  position 
of  his  brigade,  Aug.  29,  233;  his 
opinion  that  McDowell  was  respon- 
sible for  Porter's  failure  to  attack, 
230;  and  that  McDowell  did  not 
favor  an  attack  by  Porter,  311 ;  his 
services  in  battle  of  Aug.  30,  in 
command  of  3d  brigade,  2d  division, 
5th  Corps,  94 ;  the  destruction  of  his 
men  of  the  5th  New  York,  178 ;  his 
survey  for  map  used  in  the  Porter 
case,  177  ;  his  letter  of  Nov.  7,  1876, 
to  Porter,  cited,  230. 

Warrenton,  Va.,  Ricketts'  division 
ordered  to,  July,  1862,  394 ;  in  po- 
sition at,  113  ;  and  from  thence  to 
Waterloo  Bridge,  July  21,  41,  396 ; 
Banks'  movement  to,  395 ;  his  po- 
sition near,  ih. ;  Purnell  Legion  sta- 
tioned at,  Aug.  9,  416 ;  Jackson 
conjectm'ed  to  be  marching  on,  Aug. 
25-26,  61 ;  Union  army  concentrated 
at,  ih.,  113  ;  Sigel  ordered  to,  Aug. 

25,  61 ;  Reno  in  position  at,  Aug. 

26,  ih.,  113  ;  Pope's  forces  at,  use- 
less, 74  ;  abandoned  by  Pope,  Aug. 

27,  125 ;  Sigel  ordered  to  Gaines- 
ville, from,  129  ;  McDowell's  move- 
ment from,  131 ;  public  property  re- 
moved from,  126,  128;  mentioned, 
132. 

Warrenton  Junction,  Va.,  Bayard 
ordered  to  Culpeper  from,  July  15, 
396 ;  Pm'nell  Legion  stationed  at, 
Aug.  9,  416;  Lee's  plans  against 
railroad  at,  Aug.  20,  58  ;  Jackson  in 
position  near,  Aug.  26,  268 ;  Pope's 
headquarters  at,  Aug.  26,  325 ;  be- 
lieved by  Halleck  to  be  at,  Aug.  27, 
113  ;  Heintzelman  at,  Aug.  26,  62, 
73 ;  Pope's  forces  at,  323  ;  the  forces 
useless  at,  Aug.  26,  74;  Pope's  com- 
munications with  McDowell  by  tele- 
graph from,  125-126 ;  proposition 
for  Banks'  movement  by  way  of, 
126 ;  public  property  transferred 
through,  126,  129  ;  supply  trains  at, 
put  under  Banks'  direction,  Aug.  27, 
63.  126,  128,  325;  Porter  at,  Aug. 
27,  63,  127,  327  ;  Porter  ordered  to 
remain  at,  until  relieved  by  Banks, 
127 ;  Ewell's  encounter  with  Hooker 


INDEX 


507 


coming'  from,  103  ;  McClellan's  tele- 
grams to,  114 ;  McClellan's  appre- 
hensions as  to  disaster  at,  116  ;  Porter 
ordered  to  Bristoe  from,  Aug-.  28, 
65,  66-67  ;  Sykes  g-uarding-  trains  at, 
prior  to  Aug.  39,  243  ;  Lee's  more- 
ment  on,  1S63,  against  Meade,  58. 

Warrenton  Springs,  Va.,  60th  New 
York  stationed  at,  Aug.  9,  416. 

Warrenton  Turnpike,  in  Lee's  plans, 
Aug.  20,  1862,  against  Pope,  58 ;  in 
the  route  for  the  concentration  of 
the  Union  army  at  Gainesville,  127, 
325  ;  details  of  the  Union  movement 
on,  129-132;  Ricketts'  delay  in 
reaching,  233  ;  in  Taliaferro's  route, 
night  of  Aug.  27,  108  ;  the  route  of 
Jackson's  retreat  from  Centreville, 
268 ;  in  Ewell's  movement,  Aug.  28, 
65 ;  Pope  convinced,  Aug.  27,  that 
Jackson's  force  was  south  of,  63-64 ; 
McDowell's  suggestion  to  Pope,  Aug. 
28,  to  intercept  Jackson  on,  329-330; 
not  heeded,  331;  Sigel,  Reynolds, 
and  King  sent  to,  Aug,  28,  68,  75, 
78  ;  encounter  on,  of  McDowell  with 
Taliaferro's  division,  Aug.  28,  328 ; 
movement  of  the  enemy  on,  dis- 
covered morning'  of  Aug.  29,  85,  86  ; 
Longstreet's  junction  -ndth  Jackson 
on,  309  ;  Longstreet's  position  across, 
248-249,  252,  258 ;  Pope  in  pursuit 
of  Jackson  on,  80, 384 ;  Pope's  move- 
ment announced  by  Porter,  383 ; 
and  in  joint  order  to  McDowell  and 
Porter,  81 ;  Sigel's  movement  on, 
310 ;  evidences  of  skirmishing  on, 
seen  by  Porter  and  McDowell,  morn- 
ing of,  230  ;  Jackson's  luie  of  battle 
north  of,  341 ;  Pope's  message  to 
Porter  concerning  the  fight  on,  240  ; 
the  rough  character  of  the  country 
between  Porter's  position  and,  359 ; 
Porter  prevented  the  turning  of 
Union  left  flank  by  Lee  on,  87 ; 
Stevens'  movement,  Sept.  1,  towards 
Chantilly,  on,  151 ;  re-enforcements 
called  for  by  Stevens  from,  154 ; 
the  direct  road  irom  Fairfax  Court 
House  to  Centreville.  136 ;  mentioned, 
153,  173,  176,  180,  329. 

Washington,  D.  C,  alarm  at,  June 
1862,  34;  the  forces  stationed  at, 
under  command  of  Sturgis,  36,  393 ; 
the  strength  of  troops  at,  36,  394 ; 
assigned  to  McDowell's  command, 
June  26,  40,  390  ;  Pope  in  charge  of 
the  defence  of,  392  ;  disposition  of 
his  army  to  that  end,  4,  5,  9,  12-13  ; 
Pope  expected  to  ensure  safety  of, 


40 ;  McClellan's  theories  as  to  the 
true  means  of  defence  of,  119-120 ; 
Pope's  plan  for  defence  of,  317 ; 
commimicated  to  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War,  13;  the  necessity 
of  protecting,  of  the  first  importance 
in  Pope's  movements,  392  ;  the  dan- 
ger to,  involved  in  a  transfer  of  Pope 
to  the  James,  9 ;  Cox  ordered  to, 
from  West  Virginia,  201 ;  Pope's 
headquarters  at,  untH  July  29,  391- 
392;  bis  departure  from,  to  join  the 
army,  45 ;  Lee's  project  of  an  ad- 
vance on,  noted  by  Jones,  12  ;  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  ordered  from 
the  Peninsula  to  the  neighborhood 
of,  399-400;  McClellan's  assump- 
tion, Aug.  12,  that  his  army  could 
not  be  transferred  in  time  to  save, 
320 ;  McClellan  in  command  of  the 
forces  in  and  about,  after  Aug.  26, 
271,  272  ;  persons  inimical  to  Mc- 
Clellan at,  398 ;  McClellan's  respon- 
sibility for  the  defence  of,  277,  278 ; 
Pope's  communication  with,  inter- 
cepted by  Jackson,  Aug.  26,  323, 
324;  Jackson's  measures  for  defence 
at  Manassas,  Aug.  27,  against  force 
expected  from,  103  ;  liis  engagement 
with  Union  forces  from,  104-105 ; 
McClellan's  provision  for  theldef enee 
of,  279  ;  his  exaggerated  estimate  of 
force  under  Lee  in  advance  on,  277 ; 
McClellan's  solicitude  for  safety  of, 
116, 117, 118, 122,  334 ;  Halleck's  im- 
due  apprehensions,  334  ;  Pope's  de- 
pendence on  supplies  from,  330,  331 ; 
three  commanders-in-chief  at,  305- 
S06  ;  Union  generals  found  at,  Aug. 
27,  292  ;  ignorance  concerning  Jack- 
son's force  at,  ib. ;  the  extravagant 
reports  concerning  Lee's  advance 
on.  Aug'.  28,  277 ;  forces  ordered  to 
Fairfax  C.  H.,  from,  149;  Lee's 
forces  believed,  Aug.  31,  to  be  be- 
tween Centreville  and,  301 ;  Pope's 
scheme  to  alarm  Halleck  as  to  safety 
of,  Aug.  31,  Sept.  1,  141,  142,  148  ; 
Pope's  retreat  to,  271  ;  Birney's  re- 
treat to  161 ;  Ricketts'  retreat  to, 
164 ;  McClellan  given  command  of 
the  defence  of,  Sept.  1,  291,  301 ; 
Union  forces  withdrawn,  Sept.  2,  to 
the  defence  of,  160  ;  the  two  Union 
armies  of  Virginia,  united  before, 
4,  34 ;  the  regiment  deserted  from 
Banks'  corps  in  service  at,  52  ;  Si- 
gel's  and  Heintzelma-n's  corps  given 
garrison  dutv  at.  by  McClellan,  97  ; 
mentioned,  107,  130,  192,  202,205, 


508 


INDEX 


219,  254,  367  ;  U.  S.  Government  at. 
See  U.  Government. 

Waterloo,  Va.,  Lee's  plan,  Aug-.  20, 
1862,  to  cross  Rappahannock  at,  58  \ 
his  army  in  position,  Aug-.  25,  oppo- 
site, 59 ;  his  intention  to  cross  the 
Rappahannock  at,  discussed,  321 ; 
Confederate  forces  at,  Aug-.  27,  268 ; 
mentioned,  131. 

Waterloo  Bridge,  Va.,  over  Rappahan- 
nock, Ricketts  ordered,  Jtily  21, 
to,  41,  396  ;  in  raid  of  Confederate 
cavalry,  Aug-.  22,  277  ;  destroyed  by 
Union  forces,  Aug-.  23,  ih.  ;  Sigel  at, 
Aug-.  25,  61  ;  ordered  to  Warrenton 
from  ih. ;  ordered  to  cross  at,  Aug-. 
26,  ib. 

Waterloo  Road,  McDowell's  move- 
ment, Aug.  27,  by,  131. 

Weir  House,  Manassas  Junction,  place 
of  meeting-  of  Porter  and  McDowell, 
Aug.  29,  225. 

Weld,  S.  M.,  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V., 
GoL,  56th  Mass.,  bearer  of  despatches 
from  Porter  to  Pope  and  McDowell, 
Aug.  29,  238 :  his  communications 
to  Porter,  238',  240 ;  his  defence  of 
MeClellan's  conduct  at  Alexandria, 
289-302  ;  reviewed  by  Coi.  Lyman, 
305-313  ;  letter  read  by,  concerning 
MeClellan's  efforts  to  get  informa- 
tion about  Pope,  302 ;  his  indi- 
cations of  MeClellan's  distrust  of 
Pope,  312  ;  his  testimony  for  Porter 
at  court-martial,  245 ;  that  Mc- 
Dowell did  not  favor  an  attack  by 
Porter,  311 ;  as  to  time  of  receipt  by 
Porter  of  Pope's  4.30  P.  M.  order,  ib. 

Wellington,  Field  Marshal,  the  Duke 
of,  mentioned,  20. 

West  Virginia,  Cox's  forces  stationed 
in,  July,  1862,  393 ;  ordered  to  join 
Pope  from,  201 ;  60th  Virginia  sent 
to,  206. 

West  Point,  N.  Y.,  U.  S.  Military 
Academy  at.  See  U.  S.  Military 
Academy. 

Western  Soldiers,  Pope's  account  of, 
14. 

Weyer's  Cave,  Va.,  Jackson  encamped 

at,  June  12,  401. 
White,  J.,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V.  (June 

9,  1862)  ;  in  command  of  a  brigade, 

8tli     Corps,    at     Winchester,  his 

strength,  July  31,  1862,  198,  199. 
White  House,  Va.,  Pope's  opinion  that 

MeClellan's     southern  movement 

should  stop  at,  392. 
White  Plains,  Va.,  in  Jackson's  flank 

movement,  Aug.,  1862,  59,  62,  73; 


supposed  to  be  marching  on  Warren- 
ton from,  61 ;  Lee's  movement  by, 
124  ;  Longstreet  at,  evening  of  Aug. 
27,  331 ;  Buford's  reconnaissance  to, 
Aug.  27,  109,  129  ;  in  Pope's  dispo- 
sition of  forces,  Aug.  27,  327 ;  men- 
tioned, 131. 

Whiting,  W,  H.  C,  Capt.,  U.  S.  A. 
(Dec.  13, 1858-Feb.  20, 1861) ;  Maj.- 
Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  his  division  imder 
Hood's  command,  207. 

Whitman,  W.  E.  S.,  and  C.  H.  True, 
"  Maine  in  the  War,"  by,  mentioned, 
xxi,  161. 

Whittier,  C.  A.,  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S. 
.  V. ;  2d  Lieut.,  20th  Mass.  (June, 
1861) ;  Lieut.-Col.,  A.  D.  C,  U.  S. 
v.,  Capt.,  U.  S.  A.  (July  28,  1866- 
Aug.  8,  1870);  MeClellan's  letter 
to,  June  20,  1876,  296-298. 

Wilcox,  C.  M.,  Capt.,  U.  S.  A.  (Dec. 
20,  1860-June  8,  1861) ;  Brig.-Gem, 
C.  S.  A.,  1862,  Maj.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
the  composition  of  his  force,  Aug. 
29,  346  ;  his  strength,  258 ;  his  posi- 
tion, 91,  249,  258 ;  Porter  confronted 
by,  88 ;  Pope  ignorant  of  his  prox- 
imity, 92 ;  not  engaged,  91,  92 ; 
kept  inactive  by  Porter,  91 ;  his 
movement  to  support  Jones,  236, 
249,  250,  255,  258,  344,  345,  346; 
restored  to  his  former  position,  250  ; 
no  other  forces  than  his  diverted 
from  Longstreet,  346 ;  his  report 
cited  as  to  his  movement,  345 ;  in 
accord  with  Stuart's  statement,  346  ; 
his  disobedience  of  Lee,  254 ;  his 
criticisms  of  Pope,  253-254  ;  his  let- 
ter to  Porter,  Jan.  12,  1870,  cited, 
253-255 ;  his  opinion  as  to  Porter's 
immunity  because  of  disobedience  of 
orders,  253 ;  the  Porter  "  Board 
Maps  "  verified  by,  241. 

Williams,  A.  S ,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.  S.  V. 
(May  17,  1861)  ;  in  command  of  di- 
vision under  Banks,  38  ;  the  strength 
of  his  division,  Aug.  9,  416;  the 
form  of  his  line,  Cedar  Mountain, 
414-416 ;  his  position,  420  ;  one  of 
his  regiments  ordered  to  advance, 
5.40  p.  M.,  423 ;  his  report  as  to  the 
position  of  Gordon's  brigade,  433 ; 
his  order  to  Gordon  to  support  Craw- 
ford, 434  ;  his  statement  as  to  the 
promptness  of  Gordon's  movement, 
432-433  ;  at  close  of  day  his  divi- 
sion still  held  its  ground,  438. 

Williamsburg,  Va.,  Porter's  advance  to 
join  Pope  from,  24. 

Winchester,  Va.,  engagement  between 


Banks  and  Jackson  at,  June,  1862, 
33  ;  the  foolhardy  tactics  of  Banks 
at,  49  ;  strength  of  White's  brigade 
at,  by  return  of  July  31,  198,  199. 

Winchester  and  Alexandria  Turnpike. 
See  Little  River  Turnpike. 

Winder,  C.  S.,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.  S.  A.,  his 
division  sent  under  Jackson  to  pro- 
tect Gordonsville,  July  13,  1862,  45, 
206 ;  crossed  the  Rajjidan,  Aug.  8, 
in  advance  against  Pope,  46 ;  in 
command  of  Jackson's  division,  bat- 
tle of  Cedar  Mountain,  206,  418,' 422  ; 
the  composition  of  his  division,  206  ; 
mortally  wounded,  48,  422 ;  suc- 
ceeded by  Taliaferro,  422. 

Wisconsin  Volunteers,  3d  regt.,  six 
comi^anies  of,  employed  in  skirmish- 
ing in  front  of  Brown  House  hill, 
Aug.  9,  413,  420,  424 ;  in  movement 


to  support  Crawford,  434  ;  its  losses, 
437-4o8  ;  3d  regt.,  Bryant's  history 
of,  389 ;  5th  regt.,  at  Alexandria, 
Aug.  27,  1862,  119. 
Worth,  Fort.    See  Fort  Worth. 

York  River,  Pope's  opinion  that  Me. 
Clellan's  southern  movement  should 
stop  at,  392. 

Yorktown,  Va.,  the  reduction  of  de- 
fences before  Richmond  conjectured 
as  difficult  as  those  of,  10  ;  Frank- 
lin embarked  at.  Aug.  21,  1862,  re- 
turning from  the  Peninsula,  24  ;  es- 
timate of  time  for  shipping  troops 
at,  27 ;  Keyes  given  command  at, 
289 ;  Couch  called  to  Alexandria 
from,  Aug.  27,  1862, 114, 120 ;  Casey 
ordered,  Aug.  27,  not  to  move  to, 
122. 


THE  MILITARY  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY 
OF  MASSACHUSETTS. 


OFFICERS,  MEMBERS,  AND  PAPERS  READ  AT  ITS 
MEETINGS. 


THE  ROOMS  OF  THE  SOCIETY, 

In  the  Armory  of  the  First  Corps  of  Cadets,  Massachusetts  Volunteer  Militia, 
corner  of  Columbus  Avenue  and  Ferdinand  Street, 
Boston,  Massachusetts. 


\ 


OFFICERS 

OF  THE  MILITARY  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY  OF  3USSACHTJSETT8. 


1876. 

PEESIDEXT. 

Brevet  Major-Gexekal  GEORGE  H.  GORDON. 

SECRETARY  AXD  TREASURER. 
Brevet  Captain  EDWARD  B.  ROBIXS. 

EXECUTIVE  CO^nilTTEE. 

JOHX  C.  ROPES,  Esq. 
Brevet  Major-Gexeeal  CHARLES  DEYEXS. 
CoLOXEL  THO:iIAS  L.  LIVERMORE. 


1895. 

PRESIDENT. 

Brevet  Brigadiee-Gexeral  FRAXCIS  A.  WALKER. 

SECRETARY. 
Lieutexant  CHARLES  H.  PORTEE. 

TREASURER. 
Brevet  Captain  EDTTARD  B.  ROBINS. 

EXECUTIVE  COMMITTEE. 

JOHX  C.  ROPES,  Esq. 
CoLO-VEL  THOMAS  L.  LIYERMORE. 
Brevet  Captaix  HOWARD  STOCKTON. 

TRUSTEES. 

Brevet  Brigadier-General  FRAXCIS  A.  WALKER. 
Lieutenant  CHARLES  H.  PORTER. 
Brevet  Captain  EDWARD  B.  ROBIXS. 
JOHX  C.  ROPES,  Esq. 
Colonel  THOMAS  L.  LIYERMORE. 
Brevet  Captain  HOWARD  STOCKTON. 
Brevet  Colonel  THOMAS  F.  EDMANDS. 


RESIDENT  MEMBERS. 


The  names  of  Members  who  have  died  are  indicated  by  an  asterisk. 


CHAKLES  FRANCIS  ADAMS, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Colonel,  Fifth  Massachusetts  Cavalry. 

ADELBERT  AMES, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  A. 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Twenty-fourth  Infantry,  U.  S.  A.,  1866-1870. 
Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V.   Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

CHARLES  BEAN  AMORY, 
Brevet  Major,  U.  S.  V. 

Captain  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  V. 

CHARLES  WALTER  AMORY, 

First  Lieutenant,  Second  Massachusetts  Cavalry,  U.  S.  V.  Resigned  member- 
ship. 

GEORGE  LEONARD  ANDREWS, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V.    Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Professor,  U.  S.  Millitary  Academy,  1871-1892. 

Second  Lieutenant  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A,  1854-1855. 

NATHAN  APPLETON, 

Brevet  Captain,  U.  S.  V. 

Second  Lieutenant,  Fifth  Massachusetts  Battery. 

*  JOHN  BADGER  BACHELDER, 

Government  Historian  of  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg.  Died  December  22, 1894. 

*  GEORGE  PEMBERTON  BANGS, 

Captain,  Second  Massachusetts  Infantry,  U.  S.  V.   Died  June  28,  1893. 

GEORGE  MIDDLETON  BARNARD, 
Brevet  Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 
Captain,  Eighteenth  Massachusetts  Infantry. 


MEMBEES. 


515 


*  WILLIAM  FRANCIS  BARTLETT, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Brigadier-General,  U.  S.       Died  December  17, 1876. 

EDWARD  TRACY  BOUV^:, 

Major,  Twenty-sixth  New  York  Cavalry,  U.  S.  V. 

HENRY  PICKERING  BOWDITCH,  M.  D., 

Major,  Fifth  Massachusetts  Cavalry,  U.  S.  V. 

Professor  of  Physiolog}^  Harvard  University.   Resigned  membership, 

EDWARD  HICKLING  BRADFORD,  M.  D. 

EDWIN  HOWARD  BRIGHAM,  M.  D. 

EVERETT  CEPHAS  BUMPUS, 

First  Lieutenant,  Third  Massachusetts  Heavy  Artillery,  U.  S.  V. 

ARTHUR  TRACY  CABOT,  M.D. 

EDWARD  CLARKE  CABOT, 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Forty-fourth  Massachusetts  Infantr}",  U.  S.  V. 

BENJAMIN  SHREVE  CALEF, 

Captain  and  Aide-de-Camp,  U.  S.  V. 

*  WILLIAM  LATHAM  CANDLER, 

Brevet  Colonel,  Captain,  Aide-de-Camp,  U.  S.  V.   Died  December  20,  1892- 

EDWARD  CHANNING,  Ph.  D., 

Assistant  Professor  of  History,  Harvard  College^ 

ROBERT  FARLEY  CLARK, 

Captain  and  Aide-de-Camp,  U.  S.  V. 

*  JOHN  MURRAY  CORSE, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  Y. 
Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V.    Died  April  27, 1893, 

*  BENJAMIN  WILLIAM  CROWNINSHIELD, 

Brevet  Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 

Major,  First  Massachusetts  Cavalry.   Died  January  17,  1892. 

CASPAR  CROWNINSHIELD, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Colonel,  Second  Massachusetts  Cavalry. 


516 


MEMBERS. 


GREELY  STEVENSON  CURTIS, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  IT.  S.  V. 
Lieutenant-Colonel,  First  Massachusetts  Cavalry. 

HENRY  ROGERS  DALTON, 

Major  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  V. 

LORIN  FULLER  DELAND,  Esq. 

*  CHARLES  DEVENS,  LL.  D. 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  Y. 
Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Attorney-General  of  the  United  States  ;  Justice,  Supreme  Court  of  Massa- 
chusetts.  Died  January  7,  1891. 

THEODORE  AYRAULT  DODGE, 

Brevet  Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  A. 

Captain,  U.  S.  A.  Retired. 

HENRY  GUSTAYUS  DORR, 

First  Lieutenant,  Fourth  Massachusetts  Cavalry,  U.  S.  V. 

WILLIAM  FRANKLIN  DRAPER, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Thirty-sixth  Massachusetts  Infantry. 

WILLIAM  RAYMOND  DRIVER, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 

Major  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  Y. 

THEODORE  FRELINGHUYSEN  DWIGHT,  Esq. 

THOMAS  FRANKLIN  EDMANDS, 
Brevet  Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Twenty-fourth  Massachusetts  Infantry; 

EDWARD  WALDO  EMERSON,  M.  D. 

CHARLES  FAIRCHILD, 

Assistant  Paymaster,  U.  S.  N.,  1864. 

EDWARD  NICOLL  FENNO,  Esq. 

JOHN  FISKE,  LiTT.  D.,  LL.  D. 

WILLIAM  HATHAWAY  FORBES, 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Second  Massachusetts  Cavalry,  U.  S.  V. 


MEMBERS. 


517 


EEGIXALD  FOSTES,  Esq. 

JAMES  FRAXCIS, 

Brevet  Lieutenaut-Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 
Major,  Second  Massachusetts  Infantry. 

*  GEORGE  HEXRY  GORDOX, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  Y. 

Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  Y,    Died  August  30,  188S. 

JOHX  CHIPMAX  GRAY,  LL.  D. 

Major  and  Judge  Advocate,  U.  S.  V. 

Royall  Professor  of  La'v\',  Harvard  University. 

XORY^OOD  PEXROSE  HALLOWELL, 

Colonel,  Fifty-fifth  Massachusetts  Infantry,  U.  S.  Y. 

ALPHEUS  HOLMES  HARDY, 

First  Lieutenant  Forty-fifth  Massachusetts  Infantry,  U.  S.  Y. 

ALBERT  BUSHXELL  HART,  Ph.  D. 

Assistant  Professor  of  History,  Harvard  College. 

FRAXKLES"  HAYEX, 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Second  California  Cavalry,  and  Aide-de-Camp,  U.  S.  V- 

JOHX  THEODORE  HEARD,  M.  D. 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  M.  S.  Y. 
Jiledical  Director,  Fourth  Army  Corps. 

FRAXCIS  LEE  HIGGIXSOX, 

Captain  Fifth  Massachusetts  Cavalry,  U.  S.  Y. 

EEXRY  LEE  HIGGIXSOX, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  Y. 
Major,  First  Massachusetts  Cavalry. 

THOMAS  WEXTTTORTH  HIGGIXSOX, 

Colonel,  Thirty-third  U.  S.  Colored  Troops. 

JOHX  HOMAXS,  M.  D., 

First  Lieutenant,  and  Assistant  Surgeon,  U.  S.  A. 


JOHX  HOMAXS,  2d.  M.  D. 


518 


MEMBERS, 


CHARLES  PAINE  HORTOiT, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 
Captain  and  Aide-de-Camp,  U.  S.  V. 

CHARLES  HUNT, 

Captain  Forty-fourth  Massachusetts  Infantry,  U.  S.  V, 

JAMES  FREEMAN  HUNTINGTON, 
Brevet  Major,  U.  S.  V. 
Captain,  First  Ohio  Light  Artillery. 

WILLIAM  JONES  LADD, 

Brevet  Captain,  U.  S.  V. 

First  Lieutenant,  Thirteenth  New  Hampshire  Infantry. 

JOHN  LATHROP, 

Captain,  Thirty-fifth  Massachusetts  Infantry,  U.  S.  Y. 
Justice  Supreme  Court  of  Massachusetts. 

THOMAS  LEONARD  LIVERMORE, 

Major  and  Brevet  Colonel,  Fifth  New  Hampshire  Infantry,  U.  S.  Y„ 
Colonel,  Eighteenth  New  Hampshire  Volunteers. 

ABBOTT  LAWRENCE  LOWELL,  Esq. 

*  EDWARD  JACKSON  LOWELL,  Esq. 

Died  May  11,  1894. 

*  GEORGE  HINCKLEY  LYMAN,  M.  D., 

Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Medical  Inspector,  U.  S.  A.    Died  August  19,  1891. 

THEODORE  LYMAN,  S.  B., 

Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  Massachusetts  Volunteer  Militia, 
Volunteer  Aide-de-Camp  to  Major-General  George  G.  Meade. 

SILAS  MARCUS  MACVANE, 

McLean  Professor  of  History,  Harvard  College. 

AUGUSTUS  PEARL  MARTIN. 
Brevet  Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 
Captain,  Third  Massachusetts  Battery, 

«  HERBERT  COWPLAND  MASON, 
Brevet  Major,  U.  S.  V. 

Captain,  Twentieth  Blassachusetts  Infantry.   Died  September  24,  1884 


MEMBERS. 


WILUXM  POWELL  MASOX, 

Captain  and  Additional  Aide-de-Camp,  U.  S.  Y. 

EICHARD  STTEET  MILTON", 

Captain,  Xinth  Massachusetts  Battery,  U.  S.  Y. 

HENRY  STEDMAX  XOURSE, 

Captain,  Fifty-fifth  Ilhnois  Infantry,  U.  S.  Y. 

WILLIAM  MILO  OLIX, 

Private,  Thirty-sixth  Massachusetts  Infantry,  U.  S.  Y. 
Secretary  of  State  of  Massachusetts. 

FRAXCIS  AUGUSTUS  OSBORX, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  Y. 

Colonel,  Twenty-fourth  Massachusetts  Infantry. 

WILLIAM  HEXRY  OSBORXE, 

Private,  T^venty-ninth  Massachusetts  Infantry,  U.  S.  Y. 

*  FRAXCIS  WDsTHEOP  PALFREY, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  Y. 

Colonel,  Twentieth  Massachusetts  Infantry.    Died  December  6,  1889c 

JOHX  CARYER  PALFREY, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  A. 

Captain  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A.,  1863-1866. 

Chief  Engineer,  Thirteenth  Army  Corps. 

FRAXCIS  EYERETT  PEABODl^  Esq. 

FRAXCIS  HOWARD  PEABODY,  Esq. 

CHARLES  LAAYREXCE  PEIRSOX, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General  L'.  S.  Y. 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Thirty-ninth  Massachusetts  Infantry. 

*  WILLIAM  EDWARD  PERKIXS, 

Captain,  Second  Massachusetts  Infantr.-,  U.  S.  Y.    Died  January  28,  18 

HEXRY  GODDARD  PICKERING,  Esq. 

CHARLES  HUXT  PORTER, 

First  Lieutenant.  Thirty-ninth  Massachusetts  Infantry,  U.  S.  Y. 

*  SAMUEL  ALFRED  PORTER, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,      S.  Y. 

Brevet  Major  and  Captaui,  U.  S.  A.   Retired.    Died  April  21,  1880. 


520 


MEMBERS. 


*  WILLIAM  PRATT, 

Captain  and  Assistant  Adjutant-Gentralj  U.  S.  V.   Died  March  2-9,  1893. 

GEORGE  PUTNAM,  Esq. 

*  SAMUEL  BIILLER  QUINCY, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Colonel  Eighty-first  U.  S.  Colored  Troops.   Died  March  24,  1887e 

ARNOLD  AUGUSTUS  RAND, 

Colonel,  Fourth  Massachusetts  Cavalry,  U.  S.  V. 

JAMES  FORD  RHODES,  Esq. 

MAURICE  HOWE  RICHARDSON,  M.  D. 

ANDREW  ROBESON, 

Brevet  Major,  U.  S.  V. 

Captain,  First  New  York  Engineers. 

EDWARD  BLAKE  ROBINS, 

Brevet  Captain,  U.  S.  V.  ■ 

First  Lieutenant,  Twentieth  Massachusetts  Infantry. 

ALFRED  PERKINS  ROCKWELL, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S  V. 
Colonel,  Sixth  Connecticut  Infantry. 

HENRY  MUNROE  ROGERS, 

Acting  Assistant  Paymaster,  U.  S.  N.,  1862-1865. 

JOHN  CODMAN  ROPES,  Esq. 

HENRY  STURGIS  RUSSELL, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Colonel,  Fifth  Massachusetts  Cavalry. 

*  WILLIAM  GURDON  SALTONSTALL, 

Acting  Volunteer  Lieutenant-Commander,  U.  S.  N.    Died  July  21,  1889. 

CHARLES  SPRAGUE  SARGENT, 

Brevet  Major,  U.  S.  V. 

Captain  and  Aide-de-Camp,  U.  S.  V. 

Arnold  Professor  of  Arboriculture,  and  Director  of  the  Arnold  Arboretum, 

Harvard  University. 


MEMBERS. 


521 


TVIORRIS  SCHAFF, 

Captain  of  Ordnance,  U.  S.  A. 

NATHANIEL  SOUTHGATE  SEALER, 

Captain,  Independent  Kentucky  Battery,  Field  Artillery,  U.  S.  V. 
Professor  of  Geology  and  Dean  of  tlie  Lawrence  Scientific  School,  Harvard 
University. 

THOMAS  SHERWIN, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Twenty-second  Massachusetts  Infantry. 

WILLIAM  PRICE  SHREVE, 
Brevet  Major,  U.  S.  V. 
First  Lieutenant,  Second  U.  S.  Sharpshooters. 

*  HIRAM  SMITH  SHURTLEFF, 

Captain,  Fifty-sixth  Massachusetts  Infantr}",  U.  S.  V.  Died  December  11, 1893. 

«  JACOB  HENRY  SLEEPER, 
Brevet  Major,  U.  S.  V. 

Captain,  Tenth  Massachusetts  Battery.    Died  August  19,  1891. 

JOHN  CODMAN  SOLEY, 

Lieutenant,  U.  S.  N.   Retired.    Resigned  membership. 

JOSEPH  LEWIS  STACKPOLE, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 
Major  and  Judge  Advocate. 

HAZARD  STEVENS, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Major  and  Assistant  Adjutant-GeneraL 

ROBERT  HOOPER  STEVENSON, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Twenty-fourth  Massachusetts  Infantry. 

HOWARD  STOCKTON, 

Brevet  Captain,  U.  S.  A. 

First  Lieutenant,  Ordnance  Corps,  U.  S.  A. 

Captain  and  Additional  Aide-de-Camp,  U.  S.  V. 


522 


MEMBERS, 


HENRY  STOXE, 

Brevet  Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  One  Hundredth  U.  S.  Colored  Troops. 

WILLIAM  WILLARD  SWAN, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  A. 
Captain,  Seventeeth  Infantry,  U.  S.  A. 

FRANK  WILLIAM  TAUSSIG,  LL.  B.,  Ph.  D., 

Professor  of  Political  Economy,  Harvard  College.  Resigned  membership. 

SAMUEL  LOTHROP  THORNDIKE,  Esq. 

WILLIAM  HENRY  TURNER, 

Major,  First  Rhode  Island  Cavalry,  U.  S.  V. 

*  ADIN  BALLOU  UNDERWOOD, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V.   Died  January  14,  1888. 

*  CHARLES  FOLSOM  WALCOTT, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Colonel,  Sixty-first  Massachusetts  Infantry.    Died  June  11,  1887. 

FRANCIS  AMASA  WALKER,  Ph.  D.,  LL.  D., 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  V. 
President  of  the  Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology. 

STEPHEN  MINOT  WELD, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Colonel,  Fifty-sixth  Massachusetts  Infantry. 

CHARLES  ALBERT  WHITTIER, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Captain,  Seventeenth  and  Nineteenth  Infantry,  U.  S.  A.,  1866-1870. 

EDWARD  NEWTON  WHITTIER,  M.  D., 
Brevet  Captain,  U.  S.  V. 

First  Lieutenant,  Fifth  Maine  Battery.   Acting  Inspector-General  of  Artillery. 

*  HENRY  WINSOR,  Jr., 

Captain  Sixth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  Acting  Assistant  Inspector-General 
Died  August  28,  1894. 


CORRESPONDING  MEMBERS, 


»  WILLIAM  ALLAN, 

Lieutenant-Colonel  of  Artillery,  C.  S.  A. 

Chief  of  Ordnance,  Second  Corps,  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

Died  September  17,  1889. 

ARCHER  ANDERSON, 

Colonel  and  Adjutant-General,  C.  S.  A. 

ELISHA  BENJAMIN  ANDREWS,  D.  D.,  LL.  D. 

Second  Lieutenant,  First  Connecticut  Artillery,  U.  S-  V. 
President  of  Brown  University. 

FRANCIS  CHANNING  BARLOW, 
Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 

JOHN  BIGELOW,  Jr., 

Captain  of  Cavalry,  U.  S.  A. 

TASKER  HOWARD  BLISS, 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Subsistence  Department,  U.  S.  A. 
Aide-de-Camp  to  the  Major-General  commanding  the  Army. 

HENRY  VAN  NESS  BOYNTON, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Lieutenant-Colonel,  Thirtj'-fifth  Ohio  Infantry. 

JOHN  RUTTER  BROOKE, 

Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  A. 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V.    Brigadier-General,  U  S.  V. 

*  HENRY  ARMITT  BROWN, 
Died  August  21,  1878. 

CORNELIUS  CADLE, 

Brevet  Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  Seventeenth  Army 
Corps. 


524 


MEMBERS. 


JOSHUA  LAWRENCE  CHAMBERLAIIT,  LL.  D., 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V.    Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V,l 
Governor  of  the  State  of  Maine. 
Formerly  President  of  Bowdoin  College. 

WINFIELD  SCOTT  CHAPLm, 

Second  Lieutenant,  Fifth  Artillery,  U.  S.  A.,  1870-1882. 

SELDEN  CONN^OR, 

Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Colonel,  Nineteenth  Maine  Infantry. 

JACOB  DOLSON  COX, 

Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Commandant,  Twenty-third  Army  Corps. 

HARRY  COOKE  GUSHING, 
Brevet  Major,  U.  S.  A. 
Captain,  Fomth  Artillery,  U.  S.  A. 

GEORGE  BRECKENRIDGE  DAVIS, 

Major  and  Judge  Advocate,  U.  S.  A. 

In  charge  of  publication  of  the  War  Records. 

*EPHRAIM  CUTLER  DAWES, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 

Major,  Fifty-third  Ohio  Infantry.    Died  April  23,  1895. 

GEORGE  DEWEY, 

Captain,  U.  S.  N. 

HENRY  KYD  DOUGLAS, 

Colonel,  Thirteenth  and  Forty -ninth  Virginia  Infantry,  C.  S.  A* 

GEORGE  BERNARD  DRAKE, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant  General,  U.  S.  V. 
First  Lieutenant,  Sixth  Infantry,  U.  S.  A.,  1864-1865. 

HENRY  ALGERNON  Du  PONT, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  A. 
Captain,  Fifth  Artillery,  U.  S.  A.,  1864-1875. 

JOSEPH  GILES  EATON, 

Lieutenant-Commander,  U.  S.  N. 


MEMBERS. 


525 


OSWALD  HERBERT  ERXST, 

Colonel,  Corps  of  Engineer?,  U.  S.  A. 

Superintendent  of  the  U.  S.  Militan,-  AcadernVj  "West  Point,  X.  Y. 
LUCIUS  FAIRCHILD, 

Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Captain,  Sixteenth  Infantry,  U.  S.  A.,  1861-1863. 

Governor  of  the  State  of  Wisconsin,  E.  E.  and  M.      of  the  United  States  to 
Spain,  1880-1882. 

DAXIEL  WEBSTER  FLAGLER, 
Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  A^ 
Chief  of  Ordnance  Department,  U.  S.  A. 

CHARLES  WILLIAM  FOLSOII, 
Brevet  Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 

Captain  and  Assistant  Quartermaster,  U.  S.  Y, 
MAXXIXG  FERGUSOX  FORCE, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  Y. 

*  GUSTAYUS  YASA  FOX, 

Captain.  U.  S.  X. 

Assistant  Secretary,  Xavv  Department,  1861-1886.   Died  October  29,  1SS3. 

WILLIAM  BULL  FRAXKLIX, 
Major-General,  U.  S.  Y. 

*  JAMES  BARXET  FRY, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  A. 

Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  A.   Died  Julv  11,  1894. 

JOSEPH  SCOTT  FULLERTOX, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  LT.  S.  Y. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  Y. 

GEORGE  RIGGS  GAITHER, 

Captain,  First  Yirginia  Cavairv,  C.  S.  A. 

GEORGE  LEWIS  GILLESPIE, 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A. 

ROBERT  HALE  lYES  GODDARD, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  Y. 
Caprain  and  Aide-de-Camp. 

JOHX  :*IEAD  GOULD, 

Major,  Twentj-uinth  Maine  Infantry,  U.  S.  Y, 


526 


MEMBERS. 


FRANCIS  MATHEWS  GREEN, 
Commander,  U.  S.  N. 

GEORGE  SEARS  GREENE, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V, 

EUGENE  GRIFFIN, 

Captain,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A.,  1886-1889. 

SIMON  GOODELL  GRIFFIN, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

*  WINFIELD  SCOTT  HANCOCK, 

Major-General,  U.  S.  A.   Died  February  9,  1886. 

ALFRED  STEDMAN  HARTWELL, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Colonel  Fifty-fifth  Massachusetts  Infantry, 

HARRY  LEROY  HAWTHORNE, 

First  Lieutenant,  First  Artillery,  U.  S. 

HENRY  HETH, 

Major-General,  C  S.  A. 

JAMES  JACKSON  HIGGINSON, 

Brevet  Major,  U.  S.  V. 

Captain,  First  Massachusetts  Cavalry. 

HENRY  CLAY  HODGES,  Jr., 

First  Lieutenant,  Twenty-second  Infantry,  U.  S.  A. 

JEDEDIAH  HOTCHKISS, 

Captain,  Engineer  Corps,  C  S.  A. 

McHENRY  HOWARD, 

First  Lieutenant,  Aide-de-Camp  and  Assistant  Inspector-General,  C  S.  A. 

HENRY  WILSON  HUBBELL, 

Captain,  First  Artillery,  U.  S.  A. 

Second  Lieutenant  Fortieth  New  York  Infantry,  U.  S.  ¥» 


MEMBERS. 


527 


*  AXDREW  ATKINSON  HUMPHREYS, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  A. 

Chief  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A.    Died  December  27,  1883. 

*  HENRY  JACKSON  HUNT, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  A. 

Chief  of  Artillery,  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  Y.    Died  February  11,  1889. 

*  ROBERT  HUNTER, 

Captain,  Seventy-fomlh  Ohio  Yolunteers.    Died  December  2,  1894. 

TPIOMAS  Y'ORCESTER  HYDE, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Colonel,  First  Maine  Yeteran  Yolunteers. 

JOHN  WILLIAM  JONES,  D.  D. 

Chaplain,  Army  of  Northern  Yirginia,  C.  S.  A. 
Chaplain  of  the  University  of  Yirginia. 

JOSEPH  TTILLIAM  KIRKLEY, 

War  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 

GILBERT  CRAWFORD  KNIFFIN", 
Brevet  Major,  U.  S.  Y. 
Captain  and  Commissary  of  Subsistence. 

ROBERT  EDWARD  LEE, 

Captain  of  Cavalry  and  Aide-de-Camp,  Army  of  Northern  Yirginia,  C.  S.  A, 

WILLIAM  ROSCOE  LFTERMORE, 

Major,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A. 

JAMES  LONGSTREET, 

Lieutenant-General,  C.  S.  A. 

STEPHEN  BLEECKER  LUCE, 

Rear-Admiral,  U.  S.  N.  Retired. 

WILLIAM  GORDON  McCABE, 

Captain  of  Artillery,  3d  Corps,  Army  of  Northern  Yirginia,  C  S.  A. 

ALEXANDER  CALDWELL  McCLURG, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  Y.    Assistant  Adjutant-General,  and  Chief 
of  Staff,  Fourteenth  Army  Corps. 


528  MEMBERS. 

« iRviN  Mcdowell, 

Major-General,  U.  S.  A.    Died  May  4,  1885. 

ALFRED  THAYER  MAHAN, 
Captain,  U.  S.  N. 

WILLIAM  MAHONE, 

Major-General,  C.  S.  A. 

CHARLES  MARSHALL, 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  C.  S.  A.,  Aide-de-Camp  to  General  Robert  E.  Lee. 

GEORGE  MEADE, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  V.,  Captain,  U.  S.  V.   Captain,  U.  S.  A,, 
1866-3874. 

Aide-de-Camp  to  Major-General  George  G.  Meade. 

*  MONTGOMERY  CUNNINGHAM  MEIGS, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  A. 

Quartermaster-General,  U.  S.  A.    Died  January  2,  1892, 

I^ELSON  APPLETON  MILES, 
,        Major-General,  U.  S.  A,  , 

FREDERIC  CUSHMAN  NEWHALL, 

Brevet  Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 

Major  and  Aide-de-Camp,  U.  S.  A. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  Y. 

JOHN  PAGE  NICHOLSON, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 

First  Lieutenant,  Twenty-eighth  Pennsylvania  Infantry. 

*  EMERSON  OPDYCKE, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V.    Died  April  25,  1884. 

EPHRAIM  ALLEN  OTIS, 

Captain  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Chief  of  Staff  of  Major-General  Rousseau. 

CARL  POLLEN  PALFREY, 

Captain,  Cgrps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A. 

*  LE  COMTE  DE  PARIS, 

Died  September  8,  1894. 


MEMBERS, 


529 


JOHN  GRUBB  PARKE, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  A. 
Colonel,  Co7-ps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A. 

*  FOXHALL  ALEXANDER  PARKER, 

Commodore,  U.  S.  N.   Died  June  10,  1879. 

*  LOUIS  HENRY  PELOUZE, 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  A. 

Major  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  A.   Died  June  2,  1878. 

WILLIAM  BROOKE  RAVVLE, 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  V. 
Captain,  Third  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

RICHARD  ROBINS, 

Captain,  Thirty-ninth  Infantry,  U.  S.  A. 

ANDREW  HOWL  AND  RUSSELL, 

Captain,  Ordnance  Corps,  U.  S.  A. 

DAVID  WARD  SANDERS, 

Blajor  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  French's  Division,  Stewart's  Corps, 
Army  of  the  Tennessee,  C.  S.  A, 

*  ROBERT  NICHOLSON  SCOTT,  -  -  . 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  U.  S.  A. 

Major,  Third  Artillery,  U.  S.  A.    In  charge  of  publication  of  the  War  Rec- 
ords.   Died  March  5,  1887. 

WILLIAM  FORSE  SCOTT, 

Lieutenant,  Fourth  Iowa  Cavalry,  U.  S.  V. 

THOMAS  OLIVER  SELFRIDGE, 
Captain,  U.  S.  N. 

JAMES  SHAW,  Jr., 

Brevet  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 
Colonel,  Seventh  U.  S.  Colored  Troops. 

*  WILLIAM  TECUMSEH  SHERMAN, 

General,  U.  S.  A.   Died  February  14,  1891. 


530 


MEMBERS, 


WILLIAM  FARRAR  SMITH, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  A. 
Major-General  U.  S.  V. 

Major,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A.  Retired. 

JAMES  RUSSELL  SOLEY, 

Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  1890-1893. 

GEORGE  AUGUSTIN  THAYER, 

Captain,  Second  Massachusetts  Infantry,  U.  S.  V. 

*  EDWARD  DAVIS  TOWNSEND, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  A. 
Adjutant-General,  U.S.A.    Died  May  10,  1893. 

CHARLES  SCOTT  VENABLE, 

Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  C.  S.  A. 

JOHN  GRIMES  WALKER, 
Rear-Admiral,  U.  S.  N. 

*  GOUVERNEUR  KEMBLE  WARREN, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  A.    Died  August  8,  1882. 

ALEXANDER  STEWART  WEBB,  LL.  D. 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  A.  and  U.  S.  V. 

Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  V. 

President  of  the  College  of  the  City  of  New  York. 

SKIPWITH  WILMER, 

Lieutenant  and  Aide-de-Camp,  C.  S.  A. 

CHARLES  URQUHART  WILLIAMS, 

Captain  and  Assistant  Adjutant  and  Inspector-General,  C.  S.  A. 
Aide-de-Camp  to  General  D.  R.  Jones  and  General  M.  D.  Corse. 

JAMES  HARRISON  WILSON, 

Brevet  Major-General,  U.  S.  A. 
Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Thirty-fifth  Infantry,  U.  S.  A. 

EDMUND  LOUIS  ZALINSKI, 

Captain,  Fifth  Artillery,  U.  S.  A.  Retired. 

Second  Lieutenant,  Second  New  York  Heavy  Artillery,  U.  S.  V. 


EEPORTS  AND  PAPEES. 


Since  its  organization,  reports  and  papers  have  been  read  before  th.e  Society  on 
the  follo^ring  subjects :  — 

OPERATIOXS  IX  TEE  SHEXAXDOAH  VALLEY,  1861  AXD  1862. 

1.  PaitePlSON^'s  Cajipaigx,  1S61. 

CoLO>-EL  THOilAS  L.  LIVEPvMOEE. 

2.  Ca?ipaigx  a&aixst  Jacksox.  tt.osi  Winchester  to  Poet  Republic, 

1832. 

By  Majoe  JAilES  F.  HTXTIXGTOX. 

THE  PEXIXSULAR  CAMPAIGX  OF  McCLELLAX  IX  1862. 

1.  General  AIcClellan's  Plans  for  the  Campaign  of  1562,  and  the 

Alleged  Interference  of  the  Government  vv-ith  them. 
J0H3  C.  ROPES,  Esq. 

2.  The  Siege  of  Yoektovtn. 

Ge>-esal  JOHX  C.  PALTRET. 

3.  The  Period  tthich  elapsed  betv^'een  the  Fall  of  Yorkiown  and 

the  Seven-Days'  Battles. 

Ge>-i:h^  FRAXCIS  PALTREY. 

■i.   The  Seven-Days'  Battles:  — 
Mechanicsville, 
Gaines's  Mill, 
"Wliite  Oak  SAvamp, 
Glendale. 

GE>-z?.Ai  FRANCIS  TT.  PALFREY. 

5.  The  Seven-Days'  Battles:  — 

Malvern  Hill. 

Ge>-eeal  FRAXCI5  TT.  PALFREY. 

6.  Comments  on  the  Peninsular  Ca:\tpaign. 

Grxkrat.  CHARLES  A.  TTEITTTEIR. 


The  foregoing  form  Yolume  1  of  tie  Society's  Publications. 


532 


REPORTS  AND  PAPERS. 


GENERAL  POPE'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1862. 

1.  The  Character  of  General  Halleck's  Military  Administration  in 

THE  Summer  of  1862;  with  Special  Eeference  to  the  Removal, 
SY  his  Order,  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  the  Peninsula, 
and  to  the  Share  which  belongs  to  him  in  the  Campaign  of 
General  Pope. 

General  SAMUEL  M.  QUINCY. 

THE  OBJECTS  AND  GENERAL  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN. 

2.  First  Part,  to  the  Nineteenth  of  August. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  CHARLES  P.  HORTON. 

3.  Second  Part,  to  the  Twenty-eighth  of  August. 

JOHN  C.  ROPES,  Esq. 

4.  Third  Part,  to  the  End  of  the  Campaign. 

JOHN  C.  ROPES,  Esq. 

5.  The  Twenty-seventh  Day  of  August. 

General  GEORGE  H.  GORDON. 

6.  The  Battle  of  Ciiantilly,  First  of  September. 

General  CHARLES  F.  WALCOTT. 

7.  The  Numbers  of  the  Two  Armies. 

Colonel  WILLIAM  ALLAN. 

8.  The  Case  of  Fitz-John  Porter. 

General  STEPHEN  M.  WELD. 

9.  The  Conduct  of  General  McClellan  at  Alexandria  in  August,  1862; 

the  Nature  and  Extent  of  his  Command;  and  his  Alleged  Neg- 
lect TO  Support  the  Army  of  General  Pope. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  FRANKLIN  HAVEN,  Jun. 

10.  The  Same  Subject. 

General  STEPHEN  M.  WELD. 

11.  Review  of  the  Reports  of  Colonel  Haven  and  General  Weld. 

Colonel  THEODORE  LYMAN. 


BEPOETS  AND  PAPERS. 


533 


12.  The  Conduct  of  Generates  McClellan  and  Halleck  r.i  August,  1862, 

AND  the  Case  of  Fitz-John  Porter. 

Colonel  TH02IAS  L.  LIVERMORE. 

13.  The  Hearing  in  the  Case  of  Fitz-John  Porter. 

cO'SN  C.  ROPES,  Esq. 

1-i.    The  Battle  of  Cedar  Mountain,  August  Ninth,  1862. 

General  GEORGE  L.  ANDREWS. 
,    The  foregoing  form  Volume  2  of  the  Society's  publications. 


THE  ARMY  OF  TEE  PQT03fAC  UNDER  McCLELLAN  AND 
BURNS  IDE,  SEPTEMBER  TO  DECEMBER,  1862. 

1.  The  Battle  of  Antietam. 

General  FRANCIS  W.  PALFREY. 

2.  The  Alleged  Delay  in  the  Concentration  of  the  Army  of  the 

Potomac,  and  the  Reasons  why  the  Second  Corps  did  not  enter 
INTO  THE  Action  earlier  on  the  Day  of  the  Battle. 
Major  JOHN  C.  GRAY. 

3.  Strategy  of  the  Campaign  of  Sharpsburg,  or  Antietam. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  WILLIAM  ALLAN. 

4.  The  Military  Situation  in  ISTorthern  Virginia,  from  the  First  to 

Fourteenth  Days  of  November. 

General  WILLIAM  F.  SMITH. 

5.  Fredericksburg,  December  Eleventh  to  Fifteenth. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  WILLIAM  ALLAN. 

6.  The  Left  Grand  Division  at  Fredericksburg,  December  Thirteenth, 

1862. 

General  WILLIAM  F.  SMITH. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE  UNDER  HOOKER,  1863. 

1.  The  Disaster  to  the  Eleventh  Corps  at  Chancellorsville. 

Colonel  THEODORE  A.  DODGE. 

2.  The  Fight  of  Sunday,  May  Third,  at  Chancellorsville. 

Colonel  THEODORE  A.  DODGE. 


534 


BEPOBTS  AND  PAPEBS. 


3.  Sedgwick  at  Chanoellorsville. 

Colonel  THEODORE  A.  DODGE. 

4.  The  Battle  of  Chancellorsville. 

Colonel  THEODORE  A.  DODGE. 

These  papers,  by  Colonel  Dodge,  have  been  embodied  in  his  book  "  The  Campaign  of  Chancel 

lorsville." 

5.  Meade  at  Chancellorsville. 

General  ALEXANDER  S,  WEBB. 

6.  The  Battle  of  Chancellors ville.    (Contributed,  but  not  read  by) 

Majoe  JAMES  F.  HUNTINGTON. 

THE  OPERATIONS  UNDER  MEADE  IN  1863. 

1.  The  Numbers  of  the  Two  Armies  at  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg. 

General  GREELY  S.  CURTIS. 

2.  The  Causes  of  the  Confederate  Failure  at  Gettysburg. 

General  GREELY  S.  CURTIS. 

3.  The  Strategy  of  the  Gettysburg  Campaign. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  WILLIAM  ALLAN. 

4.  The  Left  Attack  (Swell's)  at  Gettysburg. 

Captain  EDWARD  N.  WHITTIER. 

5.  Pickett's  Charge. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  WILLIAM  R.  DRIVER. 

6.  The  Regulars  at  Gettysburg. 

Captain  RICHARD  ROBINS. 

7.  The  Battle  of  Bristoe  Station. 

General  FRANCIS  A.  WALKER. 
This  paper  has  been  printed  in  General  Walker's  "  History  of  the  Second  Army  Corps." 

THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  UNDER  GRANT  IN  1864, 

1.   Grant's  Campaign  in  Virginia,  1864. 

JOHN  C.  ROPES,  Esq. 


BEPOBTS  AXD  PAPERS. 


535 


2.  The  TJselessxess  of  the  Maps  fur>'ished  to  the  Staff  of  the  Army 

OF  the  Potomac  previous  to  the  Campaign  of  Mat,  1864. 
CoLO>-EL  THEODORE  LYilAX. 

3.  XoTES  A>'D  Recollections  of  the  opexixg  of  the  Campaign'  of  1864^ 

Liet:texa>-t  ilcHEXRT  HOTTARD. 

4.  The  Battle  of  the  Wilderness. 

LlEUTENAOT-COLOlvEL  "^LLIAil  "W.  SVTAN. 

5.  The  Same  Subject. 

CoLO>-EL  THEODORE  LYilAIf. 

6.  The  Sixth  Corps  in  the  "Wilderness. 

Gexeeal  hazard  STETEXS. 

7.  The  Operations  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  the  Seventh 

TO  THE  Eleventh  Days  of  May. 

Gesteeal  CHARLES  L.  PEIR50X. 

8.  The  Capture  of  the  Salient  at  Spottsylvania,  May  Twelfth. 

Genebal  FRAXCIS  C.  BARLOW. 

9.  Review  of  General  Barlow's  Paper. 

Geneeal  lewis  a.  GR-AN'T. 

10.    The  Capture  of  the  Salient. 

lie^te^-a^-t-colo^-el  william  r.  driver. 

11    The  Operations  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  SIay  Thir- 
teenth to  June  Second,  inclusive. 

Majob  WILLIAM  P.  SHRETE. 

12.   The  Battle  of  Cold  Harbor,  June  First  to  Third. 

Captain  CHARLES  H.  PORTER. 

1.3.   Same  Subject. 

JOKN'  C.  ROPES,  Esq. 

14.  The  Operations  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  from  the  Fifth  to 

Fifteenth  of  June. 

CoLO^-EX  THEODORE  LT:VIAy. 

15.  The  Failure  to  take  Petersburg  on  the  Fifteenth  Day  of  June. 

CoLO^-EL  THEODORE  LYMAN. 


536 


heports  and  papers. 


16.  The  Same  Subject. 

Colonel  THOMAS  L.  LIVERMORE, 

17.  The  Failure  to  take  Petersburg  on  the  Sixteenth,  Seventeenth, 

AND  Eighteenth  Days  of  June. 

JOHN  C.  ROPES,  Esq. 

18.  The  Operations  at  Bermuda  Hundred  on  the  Sixteenth,  Seven- 

teenth, AND  Eighteenth  Days  of  June. 

General  FRANCIS  A.  OSBORN. 

19.  The  Petersburg  Mine,  July  Twenty-Ninth. 

General  STEPHEN  M.  WEED. 

20.  The  Same  Subject. 

Captain  CHARLES  H.  PORTER. 

21.  The  Movement  against  Petersburg. 

General  WILLIAM  F.  SMITH. 

22.  The  Operations  against  the  Weldon  Railroad  in  August. 

Captain  CHARLES  H.  PORTER. 

23.  The  Siege  of  Petersburg  after  the  Capture  of  the  "Weldon  RAiii- 

road. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  WILLIAM  R.  DRIVER. 

24.  The  Battle  of  Ream's  Station,  August  Twenty-First-Twenty-Sixth. 

General  FRANCIS  A.  WALKER. 

25.  The  Expedition  to  the  Boydton  Plank  Road  in  October. 

General  FRANCIS  A.  WALKER. 

26.  The  Operations  of  the  Cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in 

1864. 

General  JAMES  H.  WILSON. 

27.  The  Valley  (Sheridan's)  Campaign  of  1864. 

Lieutenant  L.  W,  V.  KENNON. 

28.  The  BattLe  of  Cedar  Creek,  October  Nineteenth. 

General  HAZARD  STEVENS. 

29.  The  Same  Subject. 

Colonel  BENJAMIN  W.  CROWNINSHIELD. 


REPORTS  AND  PAPERS. 


537 


TEE  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  UNDER  GRANT  IN  1865. 

1.  The  Xu.'mbers  of  General  Lee's  Ar:.iy  at  the  Openia'g  of  the  Cam- 

paign, March  Twenty-Fifth. 

Colonel  THEODORE  LYMAN. 

2.  Operations  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  March  Twenty-Seventh  to  Thirty- 

First  :  Gravelly  Run. 

Captain  CHARLES  H.  PORTER. 

3.  The  Battle  of  Five  Forks,  April  First. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  WILLIAM  W.  SWAN. 

4.  The  Same  Subject. 

Captain  CHARLES  H.  PORTER. 

-5.   The  Storming  of  the  Lines  of  Petersburg,  by  the  Sixth  Corps, 
April  Second. 

Geneeal  HAZARD  STEVENS. 

6.  The  Battle  of  Sailor's  Creek,  April  Sixth. 

General  HAZARD  STEVENS. 

7.  A  Narrative  of  the  Appomattox  Cajipaign. 

Colonel  THOMAS  L.  LIVERMORK 

8.  Grant's  Campaigns  against  Lee. 

Colonel  THOMAS  L.  LIVERMORE. 


CRITICAL  SKETCHES  OF  SOME  OF  THE  FEDERA.L  AND 
CONFEDERATE  COMMANDERS. 

General  Grant  as  a  Soldier, 

Colonel  THEODORE  A.  DODGE. 

The  Military  Character  and  Services  of  Major-General  "Winfield 
Scott  Hancock. 

Geneeal  FRANCIS  A.  WALKER. 

Major-General  Andrew  Atkinson  Humphreys. 

Gentiral  JAMES  H.  WILSON. 

General  Rawlins. 

Vi. 

I  General  JAMES  H.  WILSON. 


638 


BE  PORTS  AND  PAPERS. 


General  George  H.  Thomas. 

Colonel  HENRY  STONE. 

General  Thomas  in  the  Record. 

Colonel  THOMAS  L.  LIVERMORE. 

W  jth  tho  exception  of  General  Wilson's  paper  on  General  Rawlins,  these  Sketches  of  Com. 
manders  have  been  printed  in  Volume  10  of  the  Society's  publications. 

THE  CAMPAIGNS  IN  KENTUCKY  AND  TENNESSEE,  1862-1863. 

The  Battle  of  Shiloh,  April  Sixth-Seventh,  1862. 

Colonel  HENRY  STONE. 

The  Same  Subject. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  EPHRAIM  C.  DAWES. 

The  Kentucky  Campaign  of  1862. 

Captain  N.  S.  SHALER. 

The  Operations  of  General  Buell  in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  in 
1862. 

Colonel  HENRY  STONE. 

The  Chickamauga  Campaign,  September  Nineteenth-Twentieth, 
1863. 

Genekal  henry  V.  BOYNTON. 

The  Last  Battles  before  Chattanooga,  October-November,  1863. 
Genekal  HENRY  V.  BOYNTON. 

An  Historical  Sketch  of  the  Military  Operations  round  Chat- 
tanooga, Tennessee,  September  Twenty-Second  to  November 
Twenty-Seventh,  1863. 

General  WILLIAM  F.  SMITH. 


THE  CAMPAIGNS  UNDER  SHERMAN  AND  THOMAS  IN  1864. 

The  Opening  of  the  Atlanta  Campaign,  May  Sixth,  1864. 
Colonel  HENRY  STONE. 

From  the  Oostenaula  to  the  Chattahoochee. 

Colonel  HENRY  STONE. 


REPORTS  AND  PAPERS, 


539 


The  Siege  and  Capture  of  Atlanta,  July  Xixth,  September  Eighth, 
1864. 

Colored  HEXRY  STONE. 

A  Review  op  the  Atlanta  Campaign,  Mat  Fourth  to  Septembee 
Eighth,  1864. 

Battle  of  Feanklin,  ISTovember  Thirtieth,  1864. 

CoLOUEL  HEXRT  STONE. 

Battle  of  Kashville,  December  Fifteenth-Sixteenth,  1864. 
Colonel  HENRY  STONE. 

General  Sherman's  plans  after  the  Fall  of  Savannah. 
Geneeal  JOHN  C.  PALFREY. 

OPERATIONS  IN  THE  CAROLINAS. 

Major  Anderson  at  Fort  Sumter,  1861. 

General  GEORGE  H.  GORDON. 

Military  Operations  against  Charleston,  1862- 

GEifERAL  HAZARD  STEVENS- 
OPERATIONS  against  Charleston,  1863. 

General  ALFRED  P.  ROCKWELL. 

Operations  in  Xorth  Carolina,  1861-1862. 

Colonel  THOilAS  F.  EDMANDS- 

The  Department  of  Xorth  Carolina  under  General  Foster,  1862-63, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  LEWIS  STACKPOLE. 

PAPERS  ON  VARIOUS  SUBJECTS. 

The  Home  Squadron  in  the  Winter  of  1860-1861. 

Rear  Admiral  GEORGE  K  BELKNAP,  U.  S.  N. 

The  Cumberland. 

Captain  THOMAS  0.  SELFRIDGE,  U.  S.  N. 

The  Assault  on  Port  Hudson,  May,  1863, 

General  JOHN  C.  PALFREY. 

The  Red  River  Expedition,  M\rch-May,  1864. 

JOHN  -HOMANS,  M.  D. 


540 


EEPORTS  AND  PAPERS. 


The  Battle  of  Mobile  Bay,  August  Fourth,  1864, 

Commodore  FOXHALL  A.  PARKER,  U.  S.  N. 

The  Capture  of  Mobile,  March  Twenty-Seventh  to  April  Nikth, 
1865. 

General  JOHN  C.  PALFREY. 

Modern  Battles. 

Major  WILLIAM  R.  LIVERMORE. 

Artillery. 

General  HENRY  J.  HUNT. 

Cayalky  in  Virginia  during  the  War  of  the  Rebellion. 

Colonel  BENJAMIN  W.  CROWNINSHIELD. 

Aspects  of  the   Medical   Service   in   the  Armies  of  the  U»  8= 
DURING  the  Rebellion. 

GEORGE  H.  LYMAN,  M.  D. 

The  Northern  Volunteer. 

CoLOKEi.' THOMAS  L.  LIVERMORE. 

The  Negro  as  a  Soldier  in  the  War  of  the  EEBELLiom 
Colonel  NORWOOD  P.  HALLO  WELL. 

The  Naval  Brigade.  t 

Lieutenant  JOHN  C.  SOLEY,  U.  S.  K 

PERSONAL  NARRATIVES. 

BIy  Captivity. 

General  SAMUEL  M.  QUINCY. 

Personal  Reminiscences  of  the  War,  1861-1865. 

Commander  W.  G.  SALTONSTALL,  U.  S.  N. 

Recollections  of  Staff  and  Regimental  Life. 

General  STEPHEN  M.  WELD. 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  GREAT 
BRITAIN,  1812-1814. 

The  Fight  between  the  Java  and  the  Constitutiok. 

Lieutenant  JOHN  C.  SOLEY,  U.  S.  K. 


BEFOBTS  AXD  FAPEBS.  0 
The  Chesapkake  a>'d  the  5HA^-^-c^^ 

IjECTES-AiTC-COiESIAJfDEE  J.  G.  EAT  OX,  U.  S. 

TEE  TTAE  BET  WE  EX  THE  UXITED  STATES  AND  MEXICO. 

The  Battle  of  Buexa  Tista. 

Gi-^EEAi,  WTLLIAil  B.  FEAXEXIX. 

The  Battles  of  Co^^treras  a^cd  Cheruecsco. 

GzyFF.AT,  GEORGE  H.  GOEDOX. 

The  Battles  of  3Iolixo  del  Ret  axd  Chapultepec. 

GE^-EEAL  GEORGE  H.  GORDON. 


CAMPAIGXS  OF  XAPOLEOX. 

The  First  Campaign  of  Bo^-APARTE  ix  Italy,  1796. 

llAJOB  -VrrLLIAAl  E.  UTERMOEE. 


The  CA3IPAIGX  OF  Waterloo:  The  Grouchy  Co>-teoveesy. 
iiOWS  C.  ROPES.  Esq. 


BATTLEFIELD  OF  MANASSAS,VA. 
CLOSE  OF  THE  ACTION  AUGUST  29™  1802. 


Bcport  of  My. Gon.  John  Pope  to  tho  ConiTnittecon.  tJie  Conduct  of  the  War. 


(  Not  a  fac-simile.  copy 
Papers  of  the  Militarj/  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts,  Vol.  2 


Lon^street  <S  William's  Hap 


p7ii^'wiiam  Co..  Va 


LONGSTREET  AND 
WILLIAMS. 


Date  Due 


97^.43<i    /Wfi*^**    ^.2.  238636 

Cop.) 


374.         /Vl£H      V.^    C.I  338636 


